diff --git a/src/policy/policy.cpp b/src/policy/policy.cpp
--- a/src/policy/policy.cpp
+++ b/src/policy/policy.cpp
@@ -38,20 +38,6 @@
     return (txout.nValue < GetDustThreshold(txout, dustRelayFeeIn));
 }
 
-/**
- * Check transaction inputs to mitigate two potential denial-of-service attacks:
- *
- * 1. scriptSigs with extra data stuffed into them, not consumed by scriptPubKey
- * (or P2SH script)
- * 2. P2SH scripts with a crazy number of expensive CHECKSIG/CHECKMULTISIG
- * operations
- *
- * Why bother? To avoid denial-of-service attacks; an attacker can submit a
- * standard HASH... OP_EQUAL transaction, which will get accepted into blocks.
- * The redemption script can be anything; an attacker could use a very
- * expensive-to-check-upon-redemption script like:
- *   DUP CHECKSIG DROP ... repeated 100 times... OP_1
- */
 bool IsStandard(const CScript &scriptPubKey, txnouttype &whichType) {
     std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>> vSolutions;
     if (!Solver(scriptPubKey, whichType, vSolutions)) {
@@ -134,6 +120,22 @@
     return true;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Check transaction inputs to mitigate two
+ * potential denial-of-service attacks:
+ *
+ * 1. scriptSigs with extra data stuffed into them,
+ *    not consumed by scriptPubKey (or P2SH script)
+ * 2. P2SH scripts with a crazy number of expensive
+ *    CHECKSIG/CHECKMULTISIG operations
+ *
+ * Why bother? To avoid denial-of-service attacks; an attacker
+ * can submit a standard HASH... OP_EQUAL transaction,
+ * which will get accepted into blocks. The redemption
+ * script can be anything; an attacker could use a very
+ * expensive-to-check-upon-redemption script like:
+ *   DUP CHECKSIG DROP ... repeated 100 times... OP_1
+ */
 bool AreInputsStandard(const CTransaction &tx,
                        const CCoinsViewCache &mapInputs) {
     if (tx.IsCoinBase()) {