diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -1187,29 +1187,75 @@
     Misbehaving(node->GetId(), howmuch, reason);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Returns true if the given validation state result may result in a peer
+ * banning/disconnecting us. We use this to determine which unaccepted
+ * transactions from a whitelisted peer that we can safely relay.
+ */
 static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState &state) {
-    return state.GetDoS() > 0;
+    return state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS;
 }
 
 /**
  * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object
- * TODO: net_processing should make the punish decision based on the reason
- * a tx/block was invalid, rather than just the nDoS score handed back by
- * validation.
  *
- * @parameter via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing
+ * @param[in] via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing
  * should punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in
  * a compact block message or not. If the compact block had a valid header, but
  * contained invalid txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152.
+ *
+ * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected)
+ *
+ * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect().
  */
 static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState &state,
                             bool via_compact_block,
                             const std::string &message = "") {
-    int nDoS = state.GetDoS();
-    if (nDoS > 0 && !via_compact_block) {
-        LOCK(cs_main);
-        Misbehaving(nodeid, nDoS, message);
-        return true;
+    switch (state.GetReason()) {
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE:
+            break;
+        // The node is providing invalid data:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED:
+            if (!via_compact_block) {
+                LOCK(cs_main);
+                Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
+                return true;
+            }
+            break;
+        // Handled elsewhere for now
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID:
+            break;
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: {
+            LOCK(cs_main);
+            Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
+        }
+            return true;
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_FINALIZATION: {
+            // TODO: Use the state object to report this is probably not the
+            // best idea. This is effectively unreachable, unless there is a bug
+            // somewhere.
+            LOCK(cs_main);
+            Misbehaving(nodeid, 20, message);
+        }
+            return true;
+        // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: {
+            // TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super
+            // arbitrary)
+            LOCK(cs_main);
+            Misbehaving(nodeid, 10, message);
+        }
+            return true;
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT:
+        case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY:
+            break;
     }
     if (message != "") {
         LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message);
@@ -3032,19 +3078,17 @@
                 // due to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for
                 // nodes hidden behind it.
                 //
-                // Never relay transactions that we would assign a non-zero DoS
-                // score for, as we expect peers to do the same with us in that
-                // case.
-                if (!state.IsInvalid() ||
-                    !TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) {
-                    LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n",
-                              tx.GetId().ToString(), pfrom->GetId());
-                    RelayTransaction(tx.GetId(), *connman);
-                } else {
+                // Never relay transactions that might result in being
+                // disconnected (or banned).
+                if (state.IsInvalid() && TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) {
                     LogPrintf("Not relaying invalid transaction %s from "
                               "whitelisted peer=%d (%s)\n",
                               tx.GetId().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(),
                               FormatStateMessage(state));
+                } else {
+                    LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n",
+                              tx.GetId().ToString(), pfrom->GetId());
+                    RelayTransaction(tx.GetId(), *connman);
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -3125,22 +3169,9 @@
         CValidationState state;
         if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(config, {cmpctblock.header}, state,
                                     &pindex)) {
-            if (state.IsInvalid() && received_new_header) {
-                // In this situation, the block header is known to be invalid.
-                // If we never created a CBlockIndex entry for it, then the
-                // header must be bad just by inspection (and is not one that
-                // looked okay but the block later turned out to be invalid for
-                // some other reason).
-                // We should punish compact block peers that give us an invalid
-                // header (other than a "duplicate-invalid" one, see
-                // ProcessHeadersMessage), so set via_compact_block to false
-                // here.
-                // TODO: when we switch from DoS scores to reasons that
-                // tx/blocks are invalid, this call should set
-                // via_compact_block to true, since MaybePunishNode will have
-                // sufficient information to act correctly.
+            if (state.IsInvalid()) {
                 MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state,
-                                /*via_compact_block*/ false,
+                                /*via_compact_block*/ true,
                                 "invalid header via cmpctblock");
                 return true;
             }