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diff --git a/src/consensus/validation.h b/src/consensus/validation.h
index fba9c7f7f..edaf610b9 100644
--- a/src/consensus/validation.h
+++ b/src/consensus/validation.h
@@ -1,139 +1,141 @@
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2016 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#ifndef BITCOIN_CONSENSUS_VALIDATION_H
#define BITCOIN_CONSENSUS_VALIDATION_H
#include <cassert>
#include <string>
/**
* A "reason" why a transaction was invalid, suitable for determining whether
* the provider of the transaction should be banned/ignored/disconnected/etc.
*/
enum class TxValidationResult {
//! initial value. Tx has not yet been rejected
TX_RESULT_UNSET = 0,
//! invalid by consensus rules
TX_CONSENSUS,
//! inputs failed policy rules
TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
//! otherwise didn't meet our local policy rules
TX_NOT_STANDARD,
//! transaction was missing some of its inputs
TX_MISSING_INPUTS,
//! transaction spends a coinbase too early, or violates locktime/sequence
//! locks
TX_PREMATURE_SPEND,
/** Tx already in mempool or in the chain. */
TX_DUPLICATE,
/**
- * Tx conflicts with another mempool tx, i.e. spends the same coin.
+ * Tx conflicts with a finalized tx, i.e. spends the same coin.
*/
TX_CONFLICT,
/**
* This tx outputs are already spent in the mempool. This should never
* happen and is a symptom of a mempool bug/corruption.
*/
TX_CHILD_BEFORE_PARENT,
//! violated mempool's fee/size/descendant/etc limits
TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY,
//! this node does not have a mempool so can't validate the transaction
TX_NO_MEMPOOL,
//! fails some policy, but might be acceptable if submitted in a (different)
//! package
TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE,
+ //! fails some policy, but might be reconsidered by avalanche voting
+ TX_AVALANCHE_RECONSIDERABLE,
//! transaction was not validated because package failed
TX_UNKNOWN,
};
/**
* A "reason" why a block was invalid, suitable for determining whether the
* provider of the block should be banned/ignored/disconnected/etc.
* These are much more granular than the rejection codes, which may be more
* useful for some other use-cases.
*/
enum class BlockValidationResult {
//! initial value. Block has not yet been rejected
BLOCK_RESULT_UNSET = 0,
//! invalid by consensus rules (excluding any below reasons)
BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
//! this block was cached as being invalid and we didn't store the reason
//! why
BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID,
//! invalid proof of work or time too old
BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER,
//! the block's data didn't match the data committed to by the PoW
BLOCK_MUTATED,
//! We don't have the previous block the checked one is built on
BLOCK_MISSING_PREV,
//! A block this one builds on is invalid
BLOCK_INVALID_PREV,
//! block timestamp was > 2 hours in the future (or our clock is bad)
BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE,
//! the block failed to meet one of our checkpoints
BLOCK_CHECKPOINT,
//! the block header may be on a too-little-work chain
BLOCK_HEADER_LOW_WORK
};
/**
* Template for capturing information about block/transaction validation.
* This is instantiated by TxValidationState and BlockValidationState for
* validation information on transactions and blocks respectively.
*/
template <typename Result> class ValidationState {
private:
enum class ModeState {
M_VALID, //!< everything ok
M_INVALID, //!< network rule violation (DoS value may be set)
M_ERROR, //!< run-time error
} m_mode{ModeState::M_VALID};
Result m_result{};
std::string m_reject_reason;
std::string m_debug_message;
public:
bool Invalid(Result result, const std::string &reject_reason = "",
const std::string &debug_message = "") {
m_result = result;
m_reject_reason = reject_reason;
m_debug_message = debug_message;
if (m_mode != ModeState::M_ERROR) {
m_mode = ModeState::M_INVALID;
}
return false;
}
bool Error(const std::string &reject_reason) {
if (m_mode == ModeState::M_VALID) {
m_reject_reason = reject_reason;
}
m_mode = ModeState::M_ERROR;
return false;
}
bool IsValid() const { return m_mode == ModeState::M_VALID; }
bool IsInvalid() const { return m_mode == ModeState::M_INVALID; }
bool IsError() const { return m_mode == ModeState::M_ERROR; }
Result GetResult() const { return m_result; }
std::string GetRejectReason() const { return m_reject_reason; }
std::string GetDebugMessage() const { return m_debug_message; }
std::string ToString() const {
if (IsValid()) {
return "Valid";
}
if (!m_debug_message.empty()) {
return m_reject_reason + ", " + m_debug_message;
}
return m_reject_reason;
}
};
class TxValidationState : public ValidationState<TxValidationResult> {};
class BlockValidationState : public ValidationState<BlockValidationResult> {};
#endif // BITCOIN_CONSENSUS_VALIDATION_H
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index 1997d0280..41b98217d 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -1,8815 +1,8817 @@
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2016 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include <net_processing.h>
#include <addrman.h>
#include <avalanche/compactproofs.h>
#include <avalanche/peermanager.h>
#include <avalanche/processor.h>
#include <avalanche/proof.h>
#include <avalanche/statistics.h>
#include <avalanche/validation.h>
#include <banman.h>
#include <blockencodings.h>
#include <blockfilter.h>
#include <blockvalidity.h>
#include <chain.h>
#include <chainparams.h>
#include <config.h>
#include <consensus/amount.h>
#include <consensus/validation.h>
#include <hash.h>
#include <headerssync.h>
#include <index/blockfilterindex.h>
#include <invrequest.h>
#include <kernel/mempool_entry.h>
#include <merkleblock.h>
#include <netbase.h>
#include <netmessagemaker.h>
#include <node/blockstorage.h>
#include <policy/fees.h>
#include <policy/policy.h>
#include <policy/settings.h>
#include <primitives/block.h>
#include <primitives/transaction.h>
#include <random.h>
#include <reverse_iterator.h>
#include <scheduler.h>
#include <streams.h>
#include <tinyformat.h>
#include <txmempool.h>
#include <txorphanage.h>
#include <util/check.h> // For NDEBUG compile time check
#include <util/strencodings.h>
#include <util/trace.h>
#include <validation.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <atomic>
#include <chrono>
#include <functional>
#include <future>
#include <memory>
#include <numeric>
#include <typeinfo>
/** How long to cache transactions in mapRelay for normal relay */
static constexpr auto RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME = 15min;
/**
* How long a transaction has to be in the mempool before it can
* unconditionally be relayed (even when not in mapRelay).
*/
static constexpr auto UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY = 2min;
/**
* Headers download timeout.
* Timeout = base + per_header * (expected number of headers)
*/
static constexpr auto HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15min;
static constexpr auto HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER = 1ms;
/** How long to wait for a peer to respond to a getheaders request */
static constexpr auto HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME{2min};
/**
* Protect at least this many outbound peers from disconnection due to
* slow/behind headers chain.
*/
static constexpr int32_t MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT = 4;
/** Timeout for (unprotected) outbound peers to sync to our chainwork */
static constexpr auto CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT{20min};
/** How frequently to check for stale tips */
static constexpr auto STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL{10min};
/** How frequently to check for extra outbound peers and disconnect. */
static constexpr auto EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL{45s};
/**
* Minimum time an outbound-peer-eviction candidate must be connected for, in
* order to evict
*/
static constexpr auto MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME{30s};
/** SHA256("main address relay")[0:8] */
static constexpr uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY = 0x3cac0035b5866b90ULL;
/// Age after which a stale block will no longer be served if requested as
/// protection against fingerprinting. Set to one month, denominated in seconds.
static constexpr int STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60;
/// Age after which a block is considered historical for purposes of rate
/// limiting block relay. Set to one week, denominated in seconds.
static constexpr int HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60;
/**
* Time between pings automatically sent out for latency probing and keepalive.
*/
static constexpr auto PING_INTERVAL{2min};
/** The maximum number of entries in a locator */
static const unsigned int MAX_LOCATOR_SZ = 101;
/** The maximum number of entries in an 'inv' protocol message */
static const unsigned int MAX_INV_SZ = 50000;
static_assert(MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH > MAX_INV_SZ * sizeof(CInv),
"Max protocol message length must be greater than largest "
"possible INV message");
/** Minimum time between 2 successives getavaaddr messages from the same peer */
static constexpr auto GETAVAADDR_INTERVAL{2min};
/**
* If no proof was requested from a compact proof message after this timeout
* expired, the proof radix tree can be cleaned up.
*/
static constexpr auto AVALANCHE_AVAPROOFS_TIMEOUT{2min};
struct DataRequestParameters {
/**
* Maximum number of in-flight data requests from a peer. It is not a hard
* limit, but the threshold at which point the overloaded_peer_delay kicks
* in.
*/
const size_t max_peer_request_in_flight;
/**
* Maximum number of inventories to consider for requesting, per peer. It
* provides a reasonable DoS limit to per-peer memory usage spent on
* announcements, while covering peers continuously sending INVs at the
* maximum rate (by our own policy, see INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND) for
* several minutes, while not receiving the actual data (from any peer) in
* response to requests for them.
*/
const size_t max_peer_announcements;
/** How long to delay requesting data from non-preferred peers */
const std::chrono::seconds nonpref_peer_delay;
/**
* How long to delay requesting data from overloaded peers (see
* max_peer_request_in_flight).
*/
const std::chrono::seconds overloaded_peer_delay;
/**
* How long to wait (in microseconds) before a data request from an
* additional peer.
*/
const std::chrono::microseconds getdata_interval;
/**
* Permission flags a peer requires to bypass the request limits tracking
* limits and delay penalty.
*/
const NetPermissionFlags bypass_request_limits_permissions;
};
static constexpr DataRequestParameters TX_REQUEST_PARAMS{
100, // max_peer_request_in_flight
5000, // max_peer_announcements
std::chrono::seconds(2), // nonpref_peer_delay
std::chrono::seconds(2), // overloaded_peer_delay
std::chrono::seconds(60), // getdata_interval
NetPermissionFlags::Relay, // bypass_request_limits_permissions
};
static constexpr DataRequestParameters PROOF_REQUEST_PARAMS{
100, // max_peer_request_in_flight
5000, // max_peer_announcements
std::chrono::seconds(2), // nonpref_peer_delay
std::chrono::seconds(2), // overloaded_peer_delay
std::chrono::seconds(60), // getdata_interval
NetPermissionFlags::
BypassProofRequestLimits, // bypass_request_limits_permissions
};
/**
* Limit to avoid sending big packets. Not used in processing incoming GETDATA
* for compatibility.
*/
static const unsigned int MAX_GETDATA_SZ = 1000;
/**
* Number of blocks that can be requested at any given time from a single peer.
*/
static const int MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = 16;
/**
* Default time during which a peer must stall block download progress before
* being disconnected. The actual timeout is increased temporarily if peers are
* disconnected for hitting the timeout
*/
static constexpr auto BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT{2s};
/** Maximum timeout for stalling block download. */
static constexpr auto BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT_MAX{64s};
/**
* Maximum depth of blocks we're willing to serve as compact blocks to peers
* when requested. For older blocks, a regular BLOCK response will be sent.
*/
static const int MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH = 5;
/**
* Maximum depth of blocks we're willing to respond to GETBLOCKTXN requests
* for.
*/
static const int MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH = 10;
/**
* Size of the "block download window": how far ahead of our current height do
* we fetch? Larger windows tolerate larger download speed differences between
* peer, but increase the potential degree of disordering of blocks on disk
* (which make reindexing and pruning harder). We'll probably
* want to make this a per-peer adaptive value at some point.
*/
static const unsigned int BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW = 1024;
/**
* Block download timeout base, expressed in multiples of the block interval
* (i.e. 10 min)
*/
static constexpr double BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 1;
/**
* Additional block download timeout per parallel downloading peer (i.e. 5 min)
*/
static constexpr double BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER = 0.5;
/**
* Maximum number of headers to announce when relaying blocks with headers
* message.
*/
static const unsigned int MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE = 8;
/** Maximum number of unconnecting headers announcements before DoS score */
static const int MAX_NUM_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS_MSGS = 10;
/** Minimum blocks required to signal NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED */
static const unsigned int NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS = 288;
/**
* Average delay between local address broadcasts.
*/
static constexpr auto AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL{24h};
/**
* Average delay between peer address broadcasts.
*/
static constexpr auto AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL{30s};
/** Delay between rotating the peers we relay a particular address to */
static constexpr auto ROTATE_ADDR_RELAY_DEST_INTERVAL{24h};
/**
* Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions for inbound peers.
* Blocks and peers with NetPermissionFlags::NoBan permission bypass this.
*/
static constexpr auto INBOUND_INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL{5s};
/**
* Maximum rate of inventory items to send per second.
* Limits the impact of low-fee transaction floods.
*/
static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND = 7;
/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission. */
static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX_PER_MB =
INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND *
count_seconds(INBOUND_INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
/** The number of most recently announced transactions a peer can request. */
static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY = 3500;
/**
* Verify that INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY is enough to cache everything
* typically relayed before unconditional relay from the mempool kicks in. This
* is only a lower bound, and it should be larger to account for higher inv rate
* to outbound peers, and random variations in the broadcast mechanism.
*/
static_assert(INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY >= INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND *
UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY /
std::chrono::seconds{1},
"INVENTORY_RELAY_MAX too low");
/**
* Average delay between feefilter broadcasts
*/
static constexpr auto AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL{10min};
/**
* Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change.
*/
static constexpr auto MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY{5min};
/**
* Maximum number of compact filters that may be requested with one
* getcfilters. See BIP 157.
*/
static constexpr uint32_t MAX_GETCFILTERS_SIZE = 1000;
/**
* Maximum number of cf hashes that may be requested with one getcfheaders. See
* BIP 157.
*/
static constexpr uint32_t MAX_GETCFHEADERS_SIZE = 2000;
/**
* the maximum percentage of addresses from our addrman to return in response
* to a getaddr message.
*/
static constexpr size_t MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND = 23;
/**
* The maximum rate of address records we're willing to process on average. Can
* be bypassed using the NetPermissionFlags::Addr permission.
*/
static constexpr double MAX_ADDR_RATE_PER_SECOND{0.1};
/**
* The soft limit of the address processing token bucket (the regular
* MAX_ADDR_RATE_PER_SECOND based increments won't go above this, but the
* MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND increment following GETADDR is exempt from this limit).
*/
static constexpr size_t MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET{MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND};
/** The compactblocks version we support. See BIP 152. */
static constexpr uint64_t CMPCTBLOCKS_VERSION{1};
// Internal stuff
namespace {
/**
* Blocks that are in flight, and that are in the queue to be downloaded.
*/
struct QueuedBlock {
/**
* BlockIndex. We must have this since we only request blocks when we've
* already validated the header.
*/
const CBlockIndex *pindex;
/** Optional, used for CMPCTBLOCK downloads */
std::unique_ptr<PartiallyDownloadedBlock> partialBlock;
};
/**
* Data structure for an individual peer. This struct is not protected by
* cs_main since it does not contain validation-critical data.
*
* Memory is owned by shared pointers and this object is destructed when
* the refcount drops to zero.
*
* Mutexes inside this struct must not be held when locking m_peer_mutex.
*
* TODO: move most members from CNodeState to this structure.
* TODO: move remaining application-layer data members from CNode to this
* structure.
*/
struct Peer {
/** Same id as the CNode object for this peer */
const NodeId m_id{0};
/**
* Services we offered to this peer.
*
* This is supplied by CConnman during peer initialization. It's const
* because there is no protocol defined for renegotiating services
* initially offered to a peer. The set of local services we offer should
* not change after initialization.
*
* An interesting example of this is NODE_NETWORK and initial block
* download: a node which starts up from scratch doesn't have any blocks
* to serve, but still advertises NODE_NETWORK because it will eventually
* fulfill this role after IBD completes. P2P code is written in such a
* way that it can gracefully handle peers who don't make good on their
* service advertisements.
*/
const ServiceFlags m_our_services;
/** Services this peer offered to us. */
std::atomic<ServiceFlags> m_their_services{NODE_NONE};
/** Protects misbehavior data members */
Mutex m_misbehavior_mutex;
/** Accumulated misbehavior score for this peer */
int m_misbehavior_score GUARDED_BY(m_misbehavior_mutex){0};
/** Whether this peer should be disconnected and marked as discouraged
* (unless it has NetPermissionFlags::NoBan permission). */
bool m_should_discourage GUARDED_BY(m_misbehavior_mutex){false};
/** Protects block inventory data members */
Mutex m_block_inv_mutex;
/**
* List of blocks that we'll anounce via an `inv` message.
* There is no final sorting before sending, as they are always sent
* immediately and in the order requested.
*/
std::vector<BlockHash> m_blocks_for_inv_relay GUARDED_BY(m_block_inv_mutex);
/**
* Unfiltered list of blocks that we'd like to announce via a `headers`
* message. If we can't announce via a `headers` message, we'll fall back to
* announcing via `inv`.
*/
std::vector<BlockHash>
m_blocks_for_headers_relay GUARDED_BY(m_block_inv_mutex);
/**
* The final block hash that we sent in an `inv` message to this peer.
* When the peer requests this block, we send an `inv` message to trigger
* the peer to request the next sequence of block hashes.
* Most peers use headers-first syncing, which doesn't use this mechanism
*/
BlockHash m_continuation_block GUARDED_BY(m_block_inv_mutex){};
/** This peer's reported block height when we connected */
std::atomic<int> m_starting_height{-1};
/** The pong reply we're expecting, or 0 if no pong expected. */
std::atomic<uint64_t> m_ping_nonce_sent{0};
/** When the last ping was sent, or 0 if no ping was ever sent */
std::atomic<std::chrono::microseconds> m_ping_start{0us};
/** Whether a ping has been requested by the user */
std::atomic<bool> m_ping_queued{false};
/**
* The feerate in the most recent BIP133 `feefilter` message sent to the
* peer.
* It is *not* a p2p protocol violation for the peer to send us
* transactions with a lower fee rate than this. See BIP133.
*/
Amount m_fee_filter_sent GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){
Amount::zero()};
std::chrono::microseconds m_next_send_feefilter
GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){0};
struct TxRelay {
mutable RecursiveMutex m_bloom_filter_mutex;
/**
* Whether the peer wishes to receive transaction announcements.
*
* This is initially set based on the fRelay flag in the received
* `version` message. If initially set to false, it can only be flipped
* to true if we have offered the peer NODE_BLOOM services and it sends
* us a `filterload` or `filterclear` message. See BIP37.
*/
bool m_relay_txs GUARDED_BY(m_bloom_filter_mutex){false};
/**
* A bloom filter for which transactions to announce to the peer.
* See BIP37.
*/
std::unique_ptr<CBloomFilter>
m_bloom_filter PT_GUARDED_BY(m_bloom_filter_mutex)
GUARDED_BY(m_bloom_filter_mutex){nullptr};
/** A rolling bloom filter of all announced tx CInvs to this peer. */
CRollingBloomFilter m_recently_announced_invs GUARDED_BY(
NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY,
0.000001};
mutable RecursiveMutex m_tx_inventory_mutex;
/**
* A filter of all the txids that the peer has announced to us or we
* have announced to the peer. We use this to avoid announcing
* the same txid to a peer that already has the transaction.
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_tx_inventory_known_filter
GUARDED_BY(m_tx_inventory_mutex){50000, 0.000001};
/**
* Set of transaction ids we still have to announce. We use the
* mempool to sort transactions in dependency order before relay, so
* this does not have to be sorted.
*/
std::set<TxId> m_tx_inventory_to_send GUARDED_BY(m_tx_inventory_mutex);
/**
* Whether the peer has requested us to send our complete mempool. Only
* permitted if the peer has NetPermissionFlags::Mempool.
* See BIP35.
*/
bool m_send_mempool GUARDED_BY(m_tx_inventory_mutex){false};
/** The last time a BIP35 `mempool` request was serviced. */
std::atomic<std::chrono::seconds> m_last_mempool_req{0s};
/**
* The next time after which we will send an `inv` message containing
* transaction announcements to this peer.
*/
std::chrono::microseconds m_next_inv_send_time
GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){0};
/**
* Minimum fee rate with which to filter transaction announcements to
* this node. See BIP133.
*/
std::atomic<Amount> m_fee_filter_received{Amount::zero()};
};
/*
* Initializes a TxRelay struct for this peer. Can be called at most once
* for a peer.
*/
TxRelay *SetTxRelay() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_tx_relay_mutex) {
LOCK(m_tx_relay_mutex);
Assume(!m_tx_relay);
m_tx_relay = std::make_unique<Peer::TxRelay>();
return m_tx_relay.get();
};
TxRelay *GetTxRelay() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_tx_relay_mutex) {
return WITH_LOCK(m_tx_relay_mutex, return m_tx_relay.get());
};
const TxRelay *GetTxRelay() const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_tx_relay_mutex) {
return WITH_LOCK(m_tx_relay_mutex, return m_tx_relay.get());
};
struct ProofRelay {
mutable RecursiveMutex m_proof_inventory_mutex;
std::set<avalanche::ProofId>
m_proof_inventory_to_send GUARDED_BY(m_proof_inventory_mutex);
// Prevent sending proof invs if the peer already knows about them
CRollingBloomFilter m_proof_inventory_known_filter
GUARDED_BY(m_proof_inventory_mutex){10000, 0.000001};
/**
* A rolling bloom filter of all announced Proofs CInvs to this peer.
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_recently_announced_proofs GUARDED_BY(
NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY,
0.000001};
std::chrono::microseconds m_next_inv_send_time{0};
RadixTree<const avalanche::Proof, avalanche::ProofRadixTreeAdapter>
sharedProofs;
std::atomic<std::chrono::seconds> lastSharedProofsUpdate{0s};
std::atomic<bool> compactproofs_requested{false};
};
/**
* Proof relay data. Will be a nullptr if we're not relaying
* proofs with this peer
*/
const std::unique_ptr<ProofRelay> m_proof_relay;
/**
* A vector of addresses to send to the peer, limited to MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND.
*/
std::vector<CAddress>
m_addrs_to_send GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Probabilistic filter to track recent addr messages relayed with this
* peer. Used to avoid relaying redundant addresses to this peer.
*
* We initialize this filter for outbound peers (other than
* block-relay-only connections) or when an inbound peer sends us an
* address related message (ADDR, ADDRV2, GETADDR).
*
* Presence of this filter must correlate with m_addr_relay_enabled.
**/
std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter>
m_addr_known GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Whether we are participating in address relay with this connection.
*
* We set this bool to true for outbound peers (other than
* block-relay-only connections), or when an inbound peer sends us an
* address related message (ADDR, ADDRV2, GETADDR).
*
* We use this bool to decide whether a peer is eligible for gossiping
* addr messages. This avoids relaying to peers that are unlikely to
* forward them, effectively blackholing self announcements. Reasons
* peers might support addr relay on the link include that they connected
* to us as a block-relay-only peer or they are a light client.
*
* This field must correlate with whether m_addr_known has been
* initialized.
*/
std::atomic_bool m_addr_relay_enabled{false};
/** Whether a getaddr request to this peer is outstanding. */
bool m_getaddr_sent GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){false};
/** Guards address sending timers. */
mutable Mutex m_addr_send_times_mutex;
/** Time point to send the next ADDR message to this peer. */
std::chrono::microseconds
m_next_addr_send GUARDED_BY(m_addr_send_times_mutex){0};
/** Time point to possibly re-announce our local address to this peer. */
std::chrono::microseconds
m_next_local_addr_send GUARDED_BY(m_addr_send_times_mutex){0};
/**
* Whether the peer has signaled support for receiving ADDRv2 (BIP155)
* messages, indicating a preference to receive ADDRv2 instead of ADDR ones.
*/
std::atomic_bool m_wants_addrv2{false};
/** Whether this peer has already sent us a getaddr message. */
bool m_getaddr_recvd GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){false};
/** Guards m_addr_token_bucket */
mutable Mutex m_addr_token_bucket_mutex;
/**
* Number of addresses that can be processed from this peer. Start at 1
* to permit self-announcement.
*/
double m_addr_token_bucket GUARDED_BY(m_addr_token_bucket_mutex){1.0};
/** When m_addr_token_bucket was last updated */
std::chrono::microseconds
m_addr_token_timestamp GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){
GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>()};
/** Total number of addresses that were dropped due to rate limiting. */
std::atomic<uint64_t> m_addr_rate_limited{0};
/**
* Total number of addresses that were processed (excludes rate-limited
* ones).
*/
std::atomic<uint64_t> m_addr_processed{0};
/**
* Whether we've sent this peer a getheaders in response to an inv prior to
* initial-headers-sync completing
*/
bool m_inv_triggered_getheaders_before_sync
GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){false};
/** Protects m_getdata_requests **/
Mutex m_getdata_requests_mutex;
/** Work queue of items requested by this peer **/
std::deque<CInv> m_getdata_requests GUARDED_BY(m_getdata_requests_mutex);
/** Time of the last getheaders message to this peer */
NodeClock::time_point m_last_getheaders_timestamp
GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){};
/** Protects m_headers_sync **/
Mutex m_headers_sync_mutex;
/**
* Headers-sync state for this peer (eg for initial sync, or syncing large
* reorgs)
**/
std::unique_ptr<HeadersSyncState>
m_headers_sync PT_GUARDED_BY(m_headers_sync_mutex)
GUARDED_BY(m_headers_sync_mutex){};
/** Whether we've sent our peer a sendheaders message. **/
std::atomic<bool> m_sent_sendheaders{false};
/** Length of current-streak of unconnecting headers announcements */
int m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs
GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){0};
/** When to potentially disconnect peer for stalling headers download */
std::chrono::microseconds m_headers_sync_timeout
GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){0us};
/**
* Whether this peer wants invs or headers (when possible) for block
* announcements
*/
bool m_prefers_headers GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex){
false};
explicit Peer(NodeId id, ServiceFlags our_services, bool fRelayProofs)
: m_id(id), m_our_services{our_services},
m_proof_relay(fRelayProofs ? std::make_unique<ProofRelay>()
: nullptr) {}
private:
mutable Mutex m_tx_relay_mutex;
/**
* Transaction relay data. Will be a nullptr if we're not relaying
* transactions with this peer (e.g. if it's a block-relay-only peer or
* the peer has sent us fRelay=false with bloom filters disabled).
*/
std::unique_ptr<TxRelay> m_tx_relay GUARDED_BY(m_tx_relay_mutex);
};
using PeerRef = std::shared_ptr<Peer>;
/**
* Maintain validation-specific state about nodes, protected by cs_main, instead
* by CNode's own locks. This simplifies asynchronous operation, where
* processing of incoming data is done after the ProcessMessage call returns,
* and we're no longer holding the node's locks.
*/
struct CNodeState {
//! The best known block we know this peer has announced.
const CBlockIndex *pindexBestKnownBlock{nullptr};
//! The hash of the last unknown block this peer has announced.
BlockHash hashLastUnknownBlock{};
//! The last full block we both have.
const CBlockIndex *pindexLastCommonBlock{nullptr};
//! The best header we have sent our peer.
const CBlockIndex *pindexBestHeaderSent{nullptr};
//! Whether we've started headers synchronization with this peer.
bool fSyncStarted{false};
//! Since when we're stalling block download progress (in microseconds), or
//! 0.
std::chrono::microseconds m_stalling_since{0us};
std::list<QueuedBlock> vBlocksInFlight;
//! When the first entry in vBlocksInFlight started downloading. Don't care
//! when vBlocksInFlight is empty.
std::chrono::microseconds m_downloading_since{0us};
int nBlocksInFlight{0};
//! Whether we consider this a preferred download peer.
bool fPreferredDownload{false};
/**
* Whether this peer wants invs or cmpctblocks (when possible) for block
* announcements.
*/
bool m_requested_hb_cmpctblocks{false};
/** Whether this peer will send us cmpctblocks if we request them. */
bool m_provides_cmpctblocks{false};
/**
* State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT and EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL
* logic.
*
* Both are only in effect for outbound, non-manual, non-protected
* connections. Any peer protected (m_protect = true) is not chosen for
* eviction. A peer is marked as protected if all of these are true:
* - its connection type is IsBlockOnlyConn() == false
* - it gave us a valid connecting header
* - we haven't reached MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT yet
* - it has a better chain than we have
*
* CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT: if a peer's best known block has less work than our
* tip, set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT in the future:
* - If at timeout their best known block now has more work than our tip
* when the timeout was set, then either reset the timeout or clear it
* (after comparing against our current tip's work)
* - If at timeout their best known block still has less work than our tip
* did when the timeout was set, then send a getheaders message, and set a
* shorter timeout, HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds in future. If their best
* known block is still behind when that new timeout is reached, disconnect.
*
* EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL: after each interval, if we have too many
* outbound peers, drop the outbound one that least recently announced us a
* new block.
*/
struct ChainSyncTimeoutState {
//! A timeout used for checking whether our peer has sufficiently
//! synced.
std::chrono::seconds m_timeout{0s};
//! A header with the work we require on our peer's chain.
const CBlockIndex *m_work_header{nullptr};
//! After timeout is reached, set to true after sending getheaders.
bool m_sent_getheaders{false};
//! Whether this peer is protected from disconnection due to a bad/slow
//! chain.
bool m_protect{false};
};
ChainSyncTimeoutState m_chain_sync;
//! Time of last new block announcement
int64_t m_last_block_announcement{0};
//! Whether this peer is an inbound connection
const bool m_is_inbound;
CNodeState(bool is_inbound) : m_is_inbound(is_inbound) {}
};
class PeerManagerImpl final : public PeerManager {
public:
PeerManagerImpl(CConnman &connman, AddrMan &addrman, BanMan *banman,
ChainstateManager &chainman, CTxMemPool &pool,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche, Options opts);
/** Overridden from CValidationInterface. */
void BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock,
const CBlockIndex *pindexConnected) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex);
void BlockDisconnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &block,
const CBlockIndex *pindex) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex);
void UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew,
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork,
bool fInitialDownload) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
void BlockChecked(const CBlock &block,
const BlockValidationState &state) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
void NewPoWValidBlock(const CBlockIndex *pindex,
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_most_recent_block_mutex);
/** Implement NetEventsInterface */
void InitializeNode(const Config &config, CNode &node,
ServiceFlags our_services) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
void FinalizeNode(const Config &config, const CNode &node) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, !cs_proofrequest,
!m_headers_presync_mutex);
bool ProcessMessages(const Config &config, CNode *pfrom,
std::atomic<bool> &interrupt) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex,
!m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex,
!m_most_recent_block_mutex, !cs_proofrequest,
!m_headers_presync_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex);
bool SendMessages(const Config &config, CNode *pto) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex,
!m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex,
!m_most_recent_block_mutex, !cs_proofrequest,
g_msgproc_mutex);
/** Implement PeerManager */
void StartScheduledTasks(CScheduler &scheduler) override;
void CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers() override;
std::optional<std::string>
FetchBlock(const Config &config, NodeId peer_id,
const CBlockIndex &block_index) override;
bool GetNodeStateStats(NodeId nodeid, CNodeStateStats &stats) const override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
bool IgnoresIncomingTxs() override { return m_opts.ignore_incoming_txs; }
void SendPings() override EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
void RelayTransaction(const TxId &txid) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
void RelayProof(const avalanche::ProofId &proofid) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
void SetBestHeight(int height) override { m_best_height = height; };
void UnitTestMisbehaving(NodeId peer_id, const int howmuch) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex) {
Misbehaving(*Assert(GetPeerRef(peer_id)), howmuch, "");
}
void ProcessMessage(const Config &config, CNode &pfrom,
const std::string &msg_type, CDataStream &vRecv,
const std::chrono::microseconds time_received,
const std::atomic<bool> &interruptMsgProc) override
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex,
!m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex,
!m_most_recent_block_mutex, !cs_proofrequest,
!m_headers_presync_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex);
void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(NodeId node,
int64_t time_in_seconds) override;
private:
/**
* Consider evicting an outbound peer based on the amount of time they've
* been behind our tip.
*/
void ConsiderEviction(CNode &pto, Peer &peer,
std::chrono::seconds time_in_seconds)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* If we have extra outbound peers, try to disconnect the one with the
* oldest block announcement.
*/
void EvictExtraOutboundPeers(std::chrono::seconds now)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Retrieve unbroadcast transactions from the mempool and reattempt
* sending to peers
*/
void ReattemptInitialBroadcast(CScheduler &scheduler)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
/**
* Update the avalanche statistics for all the nodes
*/
void UpdateAvalancheStatistics() const;
/**
* Process periodic avalanche network messaging and cleanups.
*/
void AvalanchePeriodicNetworking(CScheduler &scheduler) const;
/**
* Get a shared pointer to the Peer object.
* May return an empty shared_ptr if the Peer object can't be found.
*/
PeerRef GetPeerRef(NodeId id) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
/**
* Get a shared pointer to the Peer object and remove it from m_peer_map.
* May return an empty shared_ptr if the Peer object can't be found.
*/
PeerRef RemovePeer(NodeId id) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
/**
* Increment peer's misbehavior score. If the new value >=
* DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD, mark the node to be discouraged, meaning the
* peer might be disconnected and added to the discouragement filter.
*/
void Misbehaving(Peer &peer, int howmuch, const std::string &message);
/**
* Potentially mark a node discouraged based on the contents of a
* BlockValidationState object
*
* @param[in] via_compact_block this bool is passed in because
* net_processing should punish peers differently depending on whether the
* data was provided in a compact block message or not. If the compact block
* had a valid header, but contained invalid txs, the peer should not be
* punished. See BIP 152.
*
* @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected)
*/
bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid,
const BlockValidationState &state,
bool via_compact_block,
const std::string &message = "")
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
/**
* Potentially disconnect and discourage a node based on the contents of a
* TxValidationState object
*
* @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected)
*/
bool MaybePunishNodeForTx(NodeId nodeid, const TxValidationState &state,
const std::string &message = "")
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex);
/**
* Maybe disconnect a peer and discourage future connections from its
* address.
*
* @param[in] pnode The node to check.
* @param[in] peer The peer object to check.
* @return True if the peer was marked for disconnection in
* this function
*/
bool MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(CNode &pnode, Peer &peer);
/**
* Handle a transaction whose result was not
* MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID.
*
* @param[in] maybe_add_extra_compact_tx Whether this tx should be added to
* vExtraTxnForCompact. Set to false
* if the tx has already been rejected
* before, e.g. is an orphan, to avoid
* adding duplicate entries.
*
* Updates m_txrequest, m_recent_rejects,
* m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable, m_orphanage and
* vExtraTxnForCompact.
*/
void ProcessInvalidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef &tx,
const TxValidationState &result,
bool maybe_add_extra_compact_tx)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex, cs_main);
struct PackageToValidate {
const Package m_txns;
const std::vector<NodeId> m_senders;
/** Construct a 1-parent-1-child package. */
explicit PackageToValidate(const CTransactionRef &parent,
const CTransactionRef &child,
NodeId parent_sender, NodeId child_sender)
: m_txns{parent, child}, m_senders{parent_sender, child_sender} {}
std::string ToString() const {
Assume(m_txns.size() == 2);
return strprintf(
"parent %s (sender=%d) + child %s (sender=%d)",
m_txns.front()->GetId().ToString(), m_senders.front(),
m_txns.back()->GetId().ToString(), m_senders.back());
}
};
/**
* Handle the results of package validation: calls ProcessValidTx and
* ProcessInvalidTx for individual transactions, and caches rejection for
* the package as a group.
*/
void ProcessPackageResult(const PackageToValidate &package_to_validate,
const PackageMempoolAcceptResult &package_result)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex, cs_main);
/**
* Look for a child of this transaction in the orphanage to form a
* 1-parent-1-child package, skipping any combinations that have already
* been tried. Return the resulting package along with the senders of its
* respective transactions, or std::nullopt if no package is found.
*/
std::optional<PackageToValidate> Find1P1CPackage(const CTransactionRef &ptx,
NodeId nodeid)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex, cs_main);
/**
* Handle a transaction whose result was
* MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID. Updates m_txrequest and
* m_orphanage. Also queues the tx for relay.
*/
void ProcessValidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef &tx)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex, cs_main);
/**
* Reconsider orphan transactions after a parent has been accepted to the
* mempool.
*
* @peer[in] peer The peer whose orphan transactions we will
* reconsider. Generally only one orphan will be
* reconsidered on each call of this function. If an
* accepted orphan has orphaned children, those will
* need to be reconsidered, creating more work, possibly
* for other peers.
* @return True if meaningful work was done (an orphan was
* accepted/rejected).
* If no meaningful work was done, then the work set for
* this peer will be empty.
*/
bool ProcessOrphanTx(const Config &config, Peer &peer)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Process a single headers message from a peer.
*
* @param[in] pfrom CNode of the peer
* @param[in] peer The peer sending us the headers
* @param[in] headers The headers received. Note that this may be
* modified within ProcessHeadersMessage.
* @param[in] via_compact_block Whether this header came in via compact
* block handling.
*/
void ProcessHeadersMessage(const Config &config, CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer,
std::vector<CBlockHeader> &&headers,
bool via_compact_block)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, !m_headers_presync_mutex,
g_msgproc_mutex);
// Various helpers for headers processing, invoked by
// ProcessHeadersMessage()
/**
* Return true if headers are continuous and have valid proof-of-work
* (DoS points assigned on failure)
*/
bool CheckHeadersPoW(const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers,
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams, Peer &peer);
/** Calculate an anti-DoS work threshold for headers chains */
arith_uint256 GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold();
/**
* Deal with state tracking and headers sync for peers that send the
* occasional non-connecting header (this can happen due to BIP 130 headers
* announcements for blocks interacting with the 2hr
* (MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME) rule).
*/
void HandleFewUnconnectingHeaders(CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer,
const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
/** Return true if the headers connect to each other, false otherwise */
bool
CheckHeadersAreContinuous(const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers) const;
/**
* Try to continue a low-work headers sync that has already begun.
* Assumes the caller has already verified the headers connect, and has
* checked that each header satisfies the proof-of-work target included in
* the header.
* @param[in] peer The peer we're syncing with.
* @param[in] pfrom CNode of the peer
* @param[in,out] headers The headers to be processed.
* @return True if the passed in headers were successfully processed
* as the continuation of a low-work headers sync in progress;
* false otherwise.
* If false, the passed in headers will be returned back to
* the caller.
* If true, the returned headers may be empty, indicating
* there is no more work for the caller to do; or the headers
* may be populated with entries that have passed anti-DoS
* checks (and therefore may be validated for block index
* acceptance by the caller).
*/
bool IsContinuationOfLowWorkHeadersSync(Peer &peer, CNode &pfrom,
std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(peer.m_headers_sync_mutex,
!m_headers_presync_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Check work on a headers chain to be processed, and if insufficient,
* initiate our anti-DoS headers sync mechanism.
*
* @param[in] peer The peer whose headers we're processing.
* @param[in] pfrom CNode of the peer
* @param[in] chain_start_header Where these headers connect in our
* index.
* @param[in,out] headers The headers to be processed.
*
* @return True if chain was low work and a headers sync was
* initiated (and headers will be empty after calling); false
* otherwise.
*/
bool TryLowWorkHeadersSync(Peer &peer, CNode &pfrom,
const CBlockIndex *chain_start_header,
std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!peer.m_headers_sync_mutex, !m_peer_mutex,
!m_headers_presync_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Return true if the given header is an ancestor of
* m_chainman.m_best_header or our current tip
*/
bool IsAncestorOfBestHeaderOrTip(const CBlockIndex *header)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Request further headers from this peer with a given locator.
* We don't issue a getheaders message if we have a recent one outstanding.
* This returns true if a getheaders is actually sent, and false otherwise.
*/
bool MaybeSendGetHeaders(CNode &pfrom, const CBlockLocator &locator,
Peer &peer)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Potentially fetch blocks from this peer upon receipt of new headers tip
*/
void HeadersDirectFetchBlocks(const Config &config, CNode &pfrom,
const CBlockIndex *pindexLast);
/** Update peer state based on received headers message */
void UpdatePeerStateForReceivedHeaders(CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer,
const CBlockIndex *pindexLast,
bool received_new_header,
bool may_have_more_headers)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
void SendBlockTransactions(CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer, const CBlock &block,
const BlockTransactionsRequest &req);
/**
* Register with InvRequestTracker that a TX INV has been received from a
* peer. The announcement parameters are decided in PeerManager and then
* passed to InvRequestTracker.
*/
void AddTxAnnouncement(const CNode &node, const TxId &txid,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
/**
* Register with InvRequestTracker that a PROOF INV has been received from a
* peer. The announcement parameters are decided in PeerManager and then
* passed to InvRequestTracker.
*/
void
AddProofAnnouncement(const CNode &node, const avalanche::ProofId &proofid,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time, bool preferred)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_proofrequest);
/** Send a version message to a peer */
void PushNodeVersion(const Config &config, CNode &pnode, const Peer &peer);
/**
* Send a ping message every PING_INTERVAL or if requested via RPC. May mark
* the peer to be disconnected if a ping has timed out.
* We use mockable time for ping timeouts, so setmocktime may cause pings
* to time out.
*/
void MaybeSendPing(CNode &node_to, Peer &peer,
std::chrono::microseconds now);
/** Send `addr` messages on a regular schedule. */
void MaybeSendAddr(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Send a single `sendheaders` message, after we have completed headers
* sync with a peer.
*/
void MaybeSendSendHeaders(CNode &node, Peer &peer)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
/** Send `feefilter` message. */
void MaybeSendFeefilter(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Relay (gossip) an address to a few randomly chosen nodes.
*
* @param[in] originator The id of the peer that sent us the address. We
* don't want to relay it back.
* @param[in] addr Address to relay.
* @param[in] fReachable Whether the address' network is reachable. We
* relay unreachable addresses less.
*/
void RelayAddress(NodeId originator, const CAddress &addr, bool fReachable)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex);
FastRandomContext m_rng GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
FeeFilterRounder
m_fee_filter_rounder GUARDED_BY(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
const CChainParams &m_chainparams;
CConnman &m_connman;
AddrMan &m_addrman;
/**
* Pointer to this node's banman. May be nullptr - check existence before
* dereferencing.
*/
BanMan *const m_banman;
ChainstateManager &m_chainman;
CTxMemPool &m_mempool;
avalanche::Processor *const m_avalanche;
InvRequestTracker<TxId> m_txrequest GUARDED_BY(::cs_main);
Mutex cs_proofrequest;
InvRequestTracker<avalanche::ProofId>
m_proofrequest GUARDED_BY(cs_proofrequest);
/** The height of the best chain */
std::atomic<int> m_best_height{-1};
/** Next time to check for stale tip */
std::chrono::seconds m_stale_tip_check_time{0s};
const Options m_opts;
/**
* Whether we've completed initial sync yet, for determining when to turn
* on extra block-relay-only peers.
*/
bool m_initial_sync_finished{false};
/**
* Protects m_peer_map. This mutex must not be locked while holding a lock
* on any of the mutexes inside a Peer object.
*/
mutable Mutex m_peer_mutex;
/**
* Map of all Peer objects, keyed by peer id. This map is protected
* by the m_peer_mutex. Once a shared pointer reference is
* taken, the lock may be released. Individual fields are protected by
* their own locks.
*/
std::map<NodeId, PeerRef> m_peer_map GUARDED_BY(m_peer_mutex);
/** Map maintaining per-node state. */
std::map<NodeId, CNodeState> m_node_states GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
/**
* Get a pointer to a const CNodeState, used when not mutating the
* CNodeState object.
*/
const CNodeState *State(NodeId pnode) const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/** Get a pointer to a mutable CNodeState. */
CNodeState *State(NodeId pnode) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
std::atomic<std::chrono::microseconds> m_next_inv_to_inbounds{0us};
/** Number of nodes with fSyncStarted. */
int nSyncStarted GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0;
/** Hash of the last block we received via INV */
BlockHash
m_last_block_inv_triggering_headers_sync GUARDED_BY(g_msgproc_mutex){};
/**
* Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to punish them when
* processing happens afterwards.
* Set mapBlockSource[hash].second to false if the node should not be
* punished if the block is invalid.
*/
std::map<BlockHash, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>
mapBlockSource GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
/** Number of outbound peers with m_chain_sync.m_protect. */
int m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0;
/** Number of preferable block download peers. */
int m_num_preferred_download_peers GUARDED_BY(cs_main){0};
/** Stalling timeout for blocks in IBD */
std::atomic<std::chrono::seconds> m_block_stalling_timeout{
BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT};
/**
* Check whether we already have this txid in:
* - mempool
* - orphanage
* - m_recent_rejects
* - m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable (if
* include_reconsiderable = true)
* - m_recent_confirmed_transactions
* Also responsible for resetting m_recent_rejects and
* m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable if the chain tip has changed.
* */
bool AlreadyHaveTx(const TxId &txid, bool include_reconsiderable)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main,
!m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex);
/**
* Filter for transactions that were recently rejected by the mempool.
* These are not rerequested until the chain tip changes, at which point
* the entire filter is reset.
*
* Without this filter we'd be re-requesting txs from each of our peers,
* increasing bandwidth consumption considerably. For instance, with 100
* peers, half of which relay a tx we don't accept, that might be a 50x
* bandwidth increase. A flooding attacker attempting to roll-over the
* filter using minimum-sized, 60byte, transactions might manage to send
* 1000/sec if we have fast peers, so we pick 120,000 to give our peers a
* two minute window to send invs to us.
*
* Decreasing the false positive rate is fairly cheap, so we pick one in a
* million to make it highly unlikely for users to have issues with this
* filter.
*
* Memory used: 1.3 MB
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_rejects GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){120'000,
0.000'001};
/**
* Block hash of chain tip the last time we reset m_recent_rejects and
* m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.
* FIXME: should be of BlockHash type
*/
uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
/**
* Filter for:
* (1) txids of transactions that were recently rejected by the mempool but
* are eligible for reconsideration if submitted with other transactions.
* (2) packages (see GetPackageHash) we have already rejected before and
* should not retry.
*
* Similar to m_recent_rejects, this filter is used to save bandwidth when
* e.g. all of our peers have larger mempools and thus lower minimum
* feerates than us.
*
* When a transaction's error is
* TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE (in a package or by
* itself), add its txid to this filter. When a package fails for any
* reason, add the combined hash to this filter.
*
* Upon receiving an announcement for a transaction, if it exists in this
* filter, do not download the txdata. When considering packages, if it
* exists in this filter, drop it.
*
* Reset this filter when the chain tip changes.
*
* Parameters are picked to be the same as m_recent_rejects, with the same
* rationale.
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable
GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){120'000, 0.000'001};
/**
* Filter for transactions that have been recently confirmed.
* We use this to avoid requesting transactions that have already been
* confirmed.
*/
mutable Mutex m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex;
CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_confirmed_transactions
GUARDED_BY(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex){24'000, 0.000'001};
/**
* For sending `inv`s to inbound peers, we use a single (exponentially
* distributed) timer for all peers. If we used a separate timer for each
* peer, a spy node could make multiple inbound connections to us to
* accurately determine when we received the transaction (and potentially
* determine the transaction's origin).
*/
std::chrono::microseconds
NextInvToInbounds(std::chrono::microseconds now,
std::chrono::seconds average_interval);
// All of the following cache a recent block, and are protected by
// m_most_recent_block_mutex
mutable Mutex m_most_recent_block_mutex;
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>
m_most_recent_block GUARDED_BY(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs>
m_most_recent_compact_block GUARDED_BY(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
BlockHash m_most_recent_block_hash GUARDED_BY(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
// Data about the low-work headers synchronization, aggregated from all
// peers' HeadersSyncStates.
/** Mutex guarding the other m_headers_presync_* variables. */
Mutex m_headers_presync_mutex;
/**
* A type to represent statistics about a peer's low-work headers sync.
*
* - The first field is the total verified amount of work in that
* synchronization.
* - The second is:
* - nullopt: the sync is in REDOWNLOAD phase (phase 2).
* - {height, timestamp}: the sync has the specified tip height and block
* timestamp (phase 1).
*/
using HeadersPresyncStats =
std::pair<arith_uint256, std::optional<std::pair<int64_t, uint32_t>>>;
/** Statistics for all peers in low-work headers sync. */
std::map<NodeId, HeadersPresyncStats>
m_headers_presync_stats GUARDED_BY(m_headers_presync_mutex){};
/** The peer with the most-work entry in m_headers_presync_stats. */
NodeId m_headers_presync_bestpeer GUARDED_BY(m_headers_presync_mutex){-1};
/** The m_headers_presync_stats improved, and needs signalling. */
std::atomic_bool m_headers_presync_should_signal{false};
/**
* Height of the highest block announced using BIP 152 high-bandwidth mode.
*/
int m_highest_fast_announce GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){0};
/** Have we requested this block from a peer */
bool IsBlockRequested(const BlockHash &hash)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Remove this block from our tracked requested blocks. Called if:
* - the block has been received from a peer
* - the request for the block has timed out
*/
void RemoveBlockRequest(const BlockHash &hash)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Mark a block as in flight
* Returns false, still setting pit, if the block was already in flight from
* the same peer pit will only be valid as long as the same cs_main lock is
* being held
*/
bool BlockRequested(const Config &config, NodeId nodeid,
const CBlockIndex &block,
std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator **pit = nullptr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
bool TipMayBeStale() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Update pindexLastCommonBlock and add not-in-flight missing successors to
* vBlocks, until it has at most count entries.
*/
void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count,
std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> &vBlocks,
NodeId &nodeStaller)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
std::map<BlockHash, std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator>>
mapBlocksInFlight GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
/** When our tip was last updated. */
std::atomic<std::chrono::seconds> m_last_tip_update{0s};
/**
* Determine whether or not a peer can request a transaction, and return it
* (or nullptr if not found or not allowed).
*/
CTransactionRef FindTxForGetData(const Peer &peer, const TxId &txid,
const std::chrono::seconds mempool_req,
const std::chrono::seconds now)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
void ProcessGetData(const Config &config, CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer,
const std::atomic<bool> &interruptMsgProc)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_most_recent_block_mutex,
peer.m_getdata_requests_mutex,
NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main);
/** Process a new block. Perform any post-processing housekeeping */
void ProcessBlock(const Config &config, CNode &node,
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &block,
bool force_processing, bool min_pow_checked);
/** Relay map. */
typedef std::map<TxId, CTransactionRef> MapRelay;
MapRelay mapRelay GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
/**
* Expiration-time ordered list of (expire time, relay map entry) pairs,
* protected by cs_main).
*/
std::deque<std::pair<std::chrono::microseconds, MapRelay::iterator>>
g_relay_expiration GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
/**
* When a peer sends us a valid block, instruct it to announce blocks to us
* using CMPCTBLOCK if possible by adding its nodeid to the end of
* lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs, and keeping that list under a certain size
* by removing the first element if necessary.
*/
void MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs(NodeId nodeid)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/** Stack of nodes which we have set to announce using compact blocks */
std::list<NodeId> lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
/** Number of peers from which we're downloading blocks. */
int m_peers_downloading_from GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0;
void AddToCompactExtraTransactions(const CTransactionRef &tx)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Orphan/conflicted/etc transactions that are kept for compact block
* reconstruction.
* The last
* -blockreconstructionextratxn/DEFAULT_BLOCK_RECONSTRUCTION_EXTRA_TXN of
* these are kept in a ring buffer
*/
std::vector<std::pair<TxHash, CTransactionRef>>
vExtraTxnForCompact GUARDED_BY(g_msgproc_mutex);
/** Offset into vExtraTxnForCompact to insert the next tx */
size_t vExtraTxnForCompactIt GUARDED_BY(g_msgproc_mutex) = 0;
/**
* Check whether the last unknown block a peer advertised is not yet known.
*/
void ProcessBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Update tracking information about which blocks a peer is assumed to have.
*/
void UpdateBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid, const BlockHash &hash)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
bool CanDirectFetch() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* To prevent fingerprinting attacks, only send blocks/headers outside of
* the active chain if they are no more than a month older (both in time,
* and in best equivalent proof of work) than the best header chain we know
* about and we fully-validated them at some point.
*/
bool BlockRequestAllowed(const CBlockIndex *pindex)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
bool AlreadyHaveBlock(const BlockHash &block_hash)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
bool AlreadyHaveProof(const avalanche::ProofId &proofid);
void ProcessGetBlockData(const Config &config, CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer,
const CInv &inv)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_most_recent_block_mutex);
/**
* Validation logic for compact filters request handling.
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request.
*
* @param[in] node The node that we received the request from
* @param[in] peer The peer that we received the request from
* @param[in] filter_type The filter type the request is for. Must be
* basic filters.
* @param[in] start_height The start height for the request
* @param[in] stop_hash The stop_hash for the request
* @param[in] max_height_diff The maximum number of items permitted to
* request, as specified in BIP 157
* @param[out] stop_index The CBlockIndex for the stop_hash block, if
* the request can be serviced.
* @param[out] filter_index The filter index, if the request can be
* serviced.
* @return True if the request can be serviced.
*/
bool PrepareBlockFilterRequest(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
BlockFilterType filter_type,
uint32_t start_height,
const BlockHash &stop_hash,
uint32_t max_height_diff,
const CBlockIndex *&stop_index,
BlockFilterIndex *&filter_index);
/**
* Handle a cfilters request.
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request.
*
* @param[in] node The node that we received the request from
* @param[in] peer The peer that we received the request from
* @param[in] vRecv The raw message received
*/
void ProcessGetCFilters(CNode &node, Peer &peer, CDataStream &vRecv);
/**
* Handle a cfheaders request.
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request.
*
* @param[in] node The node that we received the request from
* @param[in] peer The peer that we received the request from
* @param[in] vRecv The raw message received
*/
void ProcessGetCFHeaders(CNode &node, Peer &peer, CDataStream &vRecv);
/**
* Handle a getcfcheckpt request.
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request.
*
* @param[in] node The node that we received the request from
* @param[in] peer The peer that we received the request from
* @param[in] vRecv The raw message received
*/
void ProcessGetCFCheckPt(CNode &node, Peer &peer, CDataStream &vRecv);
/**
* Decide a response for an Avalanche poll about the given block.
*
* @param[in] hash The hash of the block being polled for
* @return Our current vote for the block
*/
uint32_t GetAvalancheVoteForBlock(const BlockHash &hash) const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Decide a response for an Avalanche poll about the given transaction.
*
* @param[in] id The id of the transaction being polled for
* @return Our current vote for the transaction
*/
uint32_t GetAvalancheVoteForTx(const TxId &id) const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main,
!m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex);
/**
* Checks if address relay is permitted with peer. If needed, initializes
* the m_addr_known bloom filter and sets m_addr_relay_enabled to true.
*
* @return True if address relay is enabled with peer
* False if address relay is disallowed
*/
bool SetupAddressRelay(const CNode &node, Peer &peer)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
void AddAddressKnown(Peer &peer, const CAddress &addr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
void PushAddress(Peer &peer, const CAddress &addr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex);
/**
* Manage reception of an avalanche proof.
*
* @return False if the peer is misbehaving, true otherwise
*/
bool ReceivedAvalancheProof(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
const avalanche::ProofRef &proof)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, !cs_proofrequest);
avalanche::ProofRef FindProofForGetData(const Peer &peer,
const avalanche::ProofId &proofid,
const std::chrono::seconds now)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
bool isPreferredDownloadPeer(const CNode &pfrom);
};
const CNodeState *PeerManagerImpl::State(NodeId pnode) const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) {
std::map<NodeId, CNodeState>::const_iterator it = m_node_states.find(pnode);
if (it == m_node_states.end()) {
return nullptr;
}
return &it->second;
}
CNodeState *PeerManagerImpl::State(NodeId pnode)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) {
return const_cast<CNodeState *>(std::as_const(*this).State(pnode));
}
/**
* Whether the peer supports the address. For example, a peer that does not
* implement BIP155 cannot receive Tor v3 addresses because it requires
* ADDRv2 (BIP155) encoding.
*/
static bool IsAddrCompatible(const Peer &peer, const CAddress &addr) {
return peer.m_wants_addrv2 || addr.IsAddrV1Compatible();
}
void PeerManagerImpl::AddAddressKnown(Peer &peer, const CAddress &addr) {
assert(peer.m_addr_known);
peer.m_addr_known->insert(addr.GetKey());
}
void PeerManagerImpl::PushAddress(Peer &peer, const CAddress &addr) {
// Known checking here is only to save space from duplicates.
// Before sending, we'll filter it again for known addresses that were
// added after addresses were pushed.
assert(peer.m_addr_known);
if (addr.IsValid() && !peer.m_addr_known->contains(addr.GetKey()) &&
IsAddrCompatible(peer, addr)) {
if (peer.m_addrs_to_send.size() >= m_opts.max_addr_to_send) {
peer.m_addrs_to_send[m_rng.randrange(peer.m_addrs_to_send.size())] =
addr;
} else {
peer.m_addrs_to_send.push_back(addr);
}
}
}
static void AddKnownTx(Peer &peer, const TxId &txid) {
auto tx_relay = peer.GetTxRelay();
if (!tx_relay) {
return;
}
LOCK(tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_mutex);
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_known_filter.insert(txid);
}
static void AddKnownProof(Peer &peer, const avalanche::ProofId &proofid) {
if (peer.m_proof_relay != nullptr) {
LOCK(peer.m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_mutex);
peer.m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_known_filter.insert(proofid);
}
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::isPreferredDownloadPeer(const CNode &pfrom) {
LOCK(cs_main);
const CNodeState *state = State(pfrom.GetId());
return state && state->fPreferredDownload;
}
/** Whether this peer can serve us blocks. */
static bool CanServeBlocks(const Peer &peer) {
return peer.m_their_services & (NODE_NETWORK | NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED);
}
/**
* Whether this peer can only serve limited recent blocks (e.g. because
* it prunes old blocks)
*/
static bool IsLimitedPeer(const Peer &peer) {
return (!(peer.m_their_services & NODE_NETWORK) &&
(peer.m_their_services & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED));
}
std::chrono::microseconds
PeerManagerImpl::NextInvToInbounds(std::chrono::microseconds now,
std::chrono::seconds average_interval) {
if (m_next_inv_to_inbounds.load() < now) {
// If this function were called from multiple threads simultaneously
// it would possible that both update the next send variable, and return
// a different result to their caller. This is not possible in practice
// as only the net processing thread invokes this function.
m_next_inv_to_inbounds = GetExponentialRand(now, average_interval);
}
return m_next_inv_to_inbounds;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::IsBlockRequested(const BlockHash &hash) {
return mapBlocksInFlight.find(hash) != mapBlocksInFlight.end();
}
void PeerManagerImpl::RemoveBlockRequest(const BlockHash &hash) {
auto it = mapBlocksInFlight.find(hash);
if (it == mapBlocksInFlight.end()) {
// Block was not requested
return;
}
auto [node_id, list_it] = it->second;
CNodeState *state = State(node_id);
assert(state != nullptr);
if (state->vBlocksInFlight.begin() == list_it) {
// First block on the queue was received, update the start download time
// for the next one
state->m_downloading_since = std::max(
state->m_downloading_since, GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>());
}
state->vBlocksInFlight.erase(list_it);
state->nBlocksInFlight--;
if (state->nBlocksInFlight == 0) {
// Last validated block on the queue was received.
m_peers_downloading_from--;
}
state->m_stalling_since = 0us;
mapBlocksInFlight.erase(it);
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::BlockRequested(const Config &config, NodeId nodeid,
const CBlockIndex &block,
std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator **pit) {
const BlockHash &hash{block.GetBlockHash()};
CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
assert(state != nullptr);
// Short-circuit most stuff in case it is from the same node.
std::map<BlockHash,
std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator>>::iterator
itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight.find(hash);
if (itInFlight != mapBlocksInFlight.end() &&
itInFlight->second.first == nodeid) {
if (pit) {
*pit = &itInFlight->second.second;
}
return false;
}
// Make sure it's not listed somewhere already.
RemoveBlockRequest(hash);
std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator it = state->vBlocksInFlight.insert(
state->vBlocksInFlight.end(),
{&block, std::unique_ptr<PartiallyDownloadedBlock>(
pit ? new PartiallyDownloadedBlock(config, &m_mempool)
: nullptr)});
state->nBlocksInFlight++;
if (state->nBlocksInFlight == 1) {
// We're starting a block download (batch) from this peer.
state->m_downloading_since = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>();
m_peers_downloading_from++;
}
itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight
.insert(std::make_pair(hash, std::make_pair(nodeid, it)))
.first;
if (pit) {
*pit = &itInFlight->second.second;
}
return true;
}
void PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs(NodeId nodeid) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Never request high-bandwidth mode from peers if we're blocks-only. Our
// mempool will not contain the transactions necessary to reconstruct the
// compact block.
if (m_opts.ignore_incoming_txs) {
return;
}
CNodeState *nodestate = State(nodeid);
if (!nodestate) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "node state unavailable: peer=%d\n", nodeid);
return;
}
if (!nodestate->m_provides_cmpctblocks) {
return;
}
int num_outbound_hb_peers = 0;
for (std::list<NodeId>::iterator it = lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.begin();
it != lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.end(); it++) {
if (*it == nodeid) {
lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.erase(it);
lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.push_back(nodeid);
return;
}
CNodeState *state = State(*it);
if (state != nullptr && !state->m_is_inbound) {
++num_outbound_hb_peers;
}
}
if (nodestate->m_is_inbound) {
// If we're adding an inbound HB peer, make sure we're not removing
// our last outbound HB peer in the process.
if (lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.size() >= 3 &&
num_outbound_hb_peers == 1) {
CNodeState *remove_node =
State(lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.front());
if (remove_node != nullptr && !remove_node->m_is_inbound) {
// Put the HB outbound peer in the second slot, so that it
// doesn't get removed.
std::swap(lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.front(),
*std::next(lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.begin()));
}
}
}
m_connman.ForNode(nodeid, [this](CNode *pfrom) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(
::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
if (lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.size() >= 3) {
// As per BIP152, we only get 3 of our peers to announce
// blocks using compact encodings.
m_connman.ForNode(
lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.front(), [this](CNode *pnodeStop) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
pnodeStop, CNetMsgMaker(pnodeStop->GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT,
/*high_bandwidth=*/false,
/*version=*/CMPCTBLOCKS_VERSION));
// save BIP152 bandwidth state: we select peer to be
// low-bandwidth
pnodeStop->m_bip152_highbandwidth_to = false;
return true;
});
lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.pop_front();
}
m_connman.PushMessage(pfrom,
CNetMsgMaker(pfrom->GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT,
/*high_bandwidth=*/true,
/*version=*/CMPCTBLOCKS_VERSION));
// save BIP152 bandwidth state: we select peer to be high-bandwidth
pfrom->m_bip152_highbandwidth_to = true;
lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs.push_back(pfrom->GetId());
return true;
});
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::TipMayBeStale() {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams = m_chainparams.GetConsensus();
if (m_last_tip_update.load() == 0s) {
m_last_tip_update = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
}
return m_last_tip_update.load() <
GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() -
std::chrono::seconds{consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing *
3} &&
mapBlocksInFlight.empty();
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::CanDirectFetch() {
return m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->Time() >
GetAdjustedTime() -
m_chainparams.GetConsensus().PowTargetSpacing() * 20;
}
static bool PeerHasHeader(CNodeState *state, const CBlockIndex *pindex)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) {
if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock &&
pindex == state->pindexBestKnownBlock->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight)) {
return true;
}
if (state->pindexBestHeaderSent &&
pindex == state->pindexBestHeaderSent->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid) {
CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
assert(state != nullptr);
if (!state->hashLastUnknownBlock.IsNull()) {
const CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(state->hashLastUnknownBlock);
if (pindex && pindex->nChainWork > 0) {
if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr ||
pindex->nChainWork >= state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork) {
state->pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex;
}
state->hashLastUnknownBlock.SetNull();
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::UpdateBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid,
const BlockHash &hash) {
CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
assert(state != nullptr);
ProcessBlockAvailability(nodeid);
const CBlockIndex *pindex = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash);
if (pindex && pindex->nChainWork > 0) {
// An actually better block was announced.
if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr ||
pindex->nChainWork >= state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork) {
state->pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex;
}
} else {
// An unknown block was announced; just assume that the latest one is
// the best one.
state->hashLastUnknownBlock = hash;
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::FindNextBlocksToDownload(
NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count,
std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> &vBlocks, NodeId &nodeStaller) {
if (count == 0) {
return;
}
vBlocks.reserve(vBlocks.size() + count);
CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
assert(state != nullptr);
// Make sure pindexBestKnownBlock is up to date, we'll need it.
ProcessBlockAvailability(nodeid);
if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr ||
state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork <
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork ||
state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork <
m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
// This peer has nothing interesting.
return;
}
if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == nullptr) {
// Bootstrap quickly by guessing a parent of our best tip is the forking
// point. Guessing wrong in either direction is not a problem.
state->pindexLastCommonBlock =
m_chainman
.ActiveChain()[std::min(state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight,
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Height())];
}
// If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an
// ancestor of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(
state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock);
if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock) {
return;
}
std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> vToFetch;
const CBlockIndex *pindexWalk = state->pindexLastCommonBlock;
// Never fetch further than the best block we know the peer has, or more
// than BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW + 1 beyond the last linked block we have in
// common with this peer. The +1 is so we can detect stalling, namely if we
// would be able to download that next block if the window were 1 larger.
int nWindowEnd =
state->pindexLastCommonBlock->nHeight + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW;
int nMaxHeight =
std::min<int>(state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight, nWindowEnd + 1);
NodeId waitingfor = -1;
while (pindexWalk->nHeight < nMaxHeight) {
// Read up to 128 (or more, if more blocks than that are needed)
// successors of pindexWalk (towards pindexBestKnownBlock) into
// vToFetch. We fetch 128, because CBlockIndex::GetAncestor may be as
// expensive as iterating over ~100 CBlockIndex* entries anyway.
int nToFetch = std::min(nMaxHeight - pindexWalk->nHeight,
std::max<int>(count - vBlocks.size(), 128));
vToFetch.resize(nToFetch);
pindexWalk = state->pindexBestKnownBlock->GetAncestor(
pindexWalk->nHeight + nToFetch);
vToFetch[nToFetch - 1] = pindexWalk;
for (unsigned int i = nToFetch - 1; i > 0; i--) {
vToFetch[i - 1] = vToFetch[i]->pprev;
}
// Iterate over those blocks in vToFetch (in forward direction), adding
// the ones that are not yet downloaded and not in flight to vBlocks. In
// the meantime, update pindexLastCommonBlock as long as all ancestors
// are already downloaded, or if it's already part of our chain (and
// therefore don't need it even if pruned).
for (const CBlockIndex *pindex : vToFetch) {
if (!pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::TREE)) {
// We consider the chain that this peer is on invalid.
return;
}
if (pindex->nStatus.hasData() ||
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Contains(pindex)) {
if (pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded()) {
state->pindexLastCommonBlock = pindex;
}
} else if (!IsBlockRequested(pindex->GetBlockHash())) {
// The block is not already downloaded, and not yet in flight.
if (pindex->nHeight > nWindowEnd) {
// We reached the end of the window.
if (vBlocks.size() == 0 && waitingfor != nodeid) {
// We aren't able to fetch anything, but we would be if
// the download window was one larger.
nodeStaller = waitingfor;
}
return;
}
vBlocks.push_back(pindex);
if (vBlocks.size() == count) {
return;
}
} else if (waitingfor == -1) {
// This is the first already-in-flight block.
waitingfor = mapBlocksInFlight[pindex->GetBlockHash()].first;
}
}
}
}
} // namespace
template <class InvId>
static bool TooManyAnnouncements(const CNode &node,
const InvRequestTracker<InvId> &requestTracker,
const DataRequestParameters &requestParams) {
return !node.HasPermission(
requestParams.bypass_request_limits_permissions) &&
requestTracker.Count(node.GetId()) >=
requestParams.max_peer_announcements;
}
/**
* Compute the request time for this announcement, current time plus delays for:
* - nonpref_peer_delay for announcements from non-preferred connections
* - overloaded_peer_delay for announcements from peers which have at least
* max_peer_request_in_flight requests in flight (and don't have
* NetPermissionFlags::Relay).
*/
template <class InvId>
static std::chrono::microseconds
ComputeRequestTime(const CNode &node,
const InvRequestTracker<InvId> &requestTracker,
const DataRequestParameters &requestParams,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time, bool preferred) {
auto delay = std::chrono::microseconds{0};
if (!preferred) {
delay += requestParams.nonpref_peer_delay;
}
if (!node.HasPermission(requestParams.bypass_request_limits_permissions) &&
requestTracker.CountInFlight(node.GetId()) >=
requestParams.max_peer_request_in_flight) {
delay += requestParams.overloaded_peer_delay;
}
return current_time + delay;
}
void PeerManagerImpl::PushNodeVersion(const Config &config, CNode &pnode,
const Peer &peer) {
uint64_t my_services{peer.m_our_services};
const int64_t nTime{count_seconds(GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>())};
uint64_t nonce = pnode.GetLocalNonce();
const int nNodeStartingHeight{m_best_height};
NodeId nodeid = pnode.GetId();
CAddress addr = pnode.addr;
uint64_t extraEntropy = pnode.GetLocalExtraEntropy();
CService addr_you =
addr.IsRoutable() && !IsProxy(addr) && addr.IsAddrV1Compatible()
? addr
: CService();
uint64_t your_services{addr.nServices};
const bool tx_relay = !m_opts.ignore_incoming_txs &&
!pnode.IsBlockOnlyConn() && !pnode.IsFeelerConn();
m_connman.PushMessage(
// your_services, addr_you: Together the pre-version-31402 serialization
// of CAddress "addrYou" (without nTime)
// my_services, CService(): Together the pre-version-31402 serialization
// of CAddress "addrMe" (without nTime)
&pnode, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION)
.Make(NetMsgType::VERSION, PROTOCOL_VERSION, my_services,
nTime, your_services, addr_you, my_services,
CService(), nonce, userAgent(config),
nNodeStartingHeight, tx_relay, extraEntropy));
if (fLogIPs) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, them=%s, "
"txrelay=%d, peer=%d\n",
PROTOCOL_VERSION, nNodeStartingHeight, addr_you.ToString(),
tx_relay, nodeid);
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, "
"txrelay=%d, peer=%d\n",
PROTOCOL_VERSION, nNodeStartingHeight, tx_relay, nodeid);
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::AddTxAnnouncement(
const CNode &node, const TxId &txid,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time) {
// For m_txrequest and state
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
if (TooManyAnnouncements(node, m_txrequest, TX_REQUEST_PARAMS)) {
return;
}
const bool preferred = isPreferredDownloadPeer(node);
auto reqtime = ComputeRequestTime(node, m_txrequest, TX_REQUEST_PARAMS,
current_time, preferred);
m_txrequest.ReceivedInv(node.GetId(), txid, preferred, reqtime);
}
void PeerManagerImpl::AddProofAnnouncement(
const CNode &node, const avalanche::ProofId &proofid,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time, bool preferred) {
// For m_proofrequest
AssertLockHeld(cs_proofrequest);
if (TooManyAnnouncements(node, m_proofrequest, PROOF_REQUEST_PARAMS)) {
return;
}
auto reqtime = ComputeRequestTime(
node, m_proofrequest, PROOF_REQUEST_PARAMS, current_time, preferred);
m_proofrequest.ReceivedInv(node.GetId(), proofid, preferred, reqtime);
}
void PeerManagerImpl::UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(NodeId node,
int64_t time_in_seconds) {
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState *state = State(node);
if (state) {
state->m_last_block_announcement = time_in_seconds;
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::InitializeNode(const Config &config, CNode &node,
ServiceFlags our_services) {
NodeId nodeid = node.GetId();
{
LOCK(cs_main);
m_node_states.emplace_hint(m_node_states.end(),
std::piecewise_construct,
std::forward_as_tuple(nodeid),
std::forward_as_tuple(node.IsInboundConn()));
assert(m_txrequest.Count(nodeid) == 0);
}
PeerRef peer = std::make_shared<Peer>(nodeid, our_services, !!m_avalanche);
{
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
m_peer_map.emplace_hint(m_peer_map.end(), nodeid, peer);
}
if (!node.IsInboundConn()) {
PushNodeVersion(config, node, *peer);
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ReattemptInitialBroadcast(CScheduler &scheduler) {
std::set<TxId> unbroadcast_txids = m_mempool.GetUnbroadcastTxs();
for (const TxId &txid : unbroadcast_txids) {
// Sanity check: all unbroadcast txns should exist in the mempool
if (m_mempool.exists(txid)) {
RelayTransaction(txid);
} else {
m_mempool.RemoveUnbroadcastTx(txid, true);
}
}
if (m_avalanche) {
// Get and sanitize the list of proofids to broadcast. The RelayProof
// call is done in a second loop to avoid locking cs_vNodes while
// cs_peerManager is locked which would cause a potential deadlock due
// to reversed lock order.
auto unbroadcasted_proofids =
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
auto unbroadcasted_proofids = pm.getUnbroadcastProofs();
auto it = unbroadcasted_proofids.begin();
while (it != unbroadcasted_proofids.end()) {
// Sanity check: all unbroadcast proofs should be bound to a
// peer in the peermanager
if (!pm.isBoundToPeer(*it)) {
pm.removeUnbroadcastProof(*it);
it = unbroadcasted_proofids.erase(it);
continue;
}
++it;
}
return unbroadcasted_proofids;
});
// Remaining proofids are the ones to broadcast
for (const auto &proofid : unbroadcasted_proofids) {
RelayProof(proofid);
}
}
// Schedule next run for 10-15 minutes in the future.
// We add randomness on every cycle to avoid the possibility of P2P
// fingerprinting.
const auto reattemptBroadcastInterval = 10min + GetRandMillis(5min);
scheduler.scheduleFromNow([&] { ReattemptInitialBroadcast(scheduler); },
reattemptBroadcastInterval);
}
void PeerManagerImpl::UpdateAvalancheStatistics() const {
m_connman.ForEachNode([](CNode *pnode) {
pnode->updateAvailabilityScore(AVALANCHE_STATISTICS_DECAY_FACTOR);
});
if (!m_avalanche) {
// Not enabled or not ready yet
return;
}
// Generate a peer availability score by computing an exponentially
// weighted moving average of the average of node availability scores.
// This ensures the peer score is bound to the lifetime of its proof which
// incentivizes stable network activity.
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
pm.updateAvailabilityScores(
AVALANCHE_STATISTICS_DECAY_FACTOR, [&](NodeId nodeid) -> double {
double score{0.0};
m_connman.ForNode(nodeid, [&](CNode *pavanode) {
score = pavanode->getAvailabilityScore();
return true;
});
return score;
});
});
}
void PeerManagerImpl::AvalanchePeriodicNetworking(CScheduler &scheduler) const {
const auto now = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
std::vector<NodeId> avanode_ids;
bool fQuorumEstablished;
bool fShouldRequestMoreNodes;
if (!m_avalanche) {
// Not enabled or not ready yet, retry later
goto scheduleLater;
}
m_avalanche->sendDelayedAvahello();
fQuorumEstablished = m_avalanche->isQuorumEstablished();
fShouldRequestMoreNodes =
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.shouldRequestMoreNodes();
});
m_connman.ForEachNode([&](CNode *pnode) {
// Build a list of the avalanche peers nodeids
if (pnode->m_avalanche_enabled) {
avanode_ids.push_back(pnode->GetId());
}
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef(pnode->GetId());
if (peer == nullptr) {
return;
}
// If a proof radix tree timed out, cleanup
if (peer->m_proof_relay &&
now > (peer->m_proof_relay->lastSharedProofsUpdate.load() +
AVALANCHE_AVAPROOFS_TIMEOUT)) {
peer->m_proof_relay->sharedProofs = {};
}
});
if (avanode_ids.empty()) {
// No node is available for messaging, retry later
goto scheduleLater;
}
Shuffle(avanode_ids.begin(), avanode_ids.end(), FastRandomContext());
// Request avalanche addresses from our peers
for (NodeId avanodeId : avanode_ids) {
const bool sentGetavaaddr =
m_connman.ForNode(avanodeId, [&](CNode *pavanode) {
if (!fQuorumEstablished || !pavanode->IsInboundConn()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
pavanode, CNetMsgMaker(pavanode->GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::GETAVAADDR));
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef(avanodeId);
WITH_LOCK(peer->m_addr_token_bucket_mutex,
peer->m_addr_token_bucket +=
m_opts.max_addr_to_send);
return true;
}
return false;
});
// If we have no reason to believe that we need more nodes, only request
// addresses from one of our peers.
if (sentGetavaaddr && fQuorumEstablished && !fShouldRequestMoreNodes) {
break;
}
}
if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
// Don't request proofs while in IBD. We're likely to orphan them
// because we don't have the UTXOs.
goto scheduleLater;
}
// If we never had an avaproofs message yet, be kind and only request to a
// subset of our peers as we expect a ton of avaproofs message in the
// process.
if (m_avalanche->getAvaproofsNodeCounter() == 0) {
avanode_ids.resize(std::min<size_t>(avanode_ids.size(), 3));
}
for (NodeId nodeid : avanode_ids) {
// Send a getavaproofs to all of our peers
m_connman.ForNode(nodeid, [&](CNode *pavanode) {
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef(nodeid);
if (peer->m_proof_relay) {
m_connman.PushMessage(pavanode,
CNetMsgMaker(pavanode->GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::GETAVAPROOFS));
peer->m_proof_relay->compactproofs_requested = true;
}
return true;
});
}
scheduleLater:
// Schedule next run for 2-5 minutes in the future.
// We add randomness on every cycle to avoid the possibility of P2P
// fingerprinting.
const auto avalanchePeriodicNetworkingInterval = 2min + GetRandMillis(3min);
scheduler.scheduleFromNow([&] { AvalanchePeriodicNetworking(scheduler); },
avalanchePeriodicNetworkingInterval);
}
void PeerManagerImpl::FinalizeNode(const Config &config, const CNode &node) {
NodeId nodeid = node.GetId();
int misbehavior{0};
{
LOCK(cs_main);
{
// We remove the PeerRef from g_peer_map here, but we don't always
// destruct the Peer. Sometimes another thread is still holding a
// PeerRef, so the refcount is >= 1. Be careful not to do any
// processing here that assumes Peer won't be changed before it's
// destructed.
PeerRef peer = RemovePeer(nodeid);
assert(peer != nullptr);
misbehavior = WITH_LOCK(peer->m_misbehavior_mutex,
return peer->m_misbehavior_score);
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
m_peer_map.erase(nodeid);
}
CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
assert(state != nullptr);
if (state->fSyncStarted) {
nSyncStarted--;
}
for (const QueuedBlock &entry : state->vBlocksInFlight) {
mapBlocksInFlight.erase(entry.pindex->GetBlockHash());
}
m_mempool.withOrphanage([nodeid](TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
orphanage.EraseForPeer(nodeid);
});
m_txrequest.DisconnectedPeer(nodeid);
m_num_preferred_download_peers -= state->fPreferredDownload;
m_peers_downloading_from -= (state->nBlocksInFlight != 0);
assert(m_peers_downloading_from >= 0);
m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect -=
state->m_chain_sync.m_protect;
assert(m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect >= 0);
m_node_states.erase(nodeid);
if (m_node_states.empty()) {
// Do a consistency check after the last peer is removed.
assert(mapBlocksInFlight.empty());
assert(m_num_preferred_download_peers == 0);
assert(m_peers_downloading_from == 0);
assert(m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect == 0);
assert(m_txrequest.Size() == 0);
assert(m_mempool.withOrphanage([](const TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.Size();
}) == 0);
}
}
if (node.fSuccessfullyConnected && misbehavior == 0 &&
!node.IsBlockOnlyConn() && !node.IsInboundConn()) {
// Only change visible addrman state for full outbound peers. We don't
// call Connected() for feeler connections since they don't have
// fSuccessfullyConnected set.
m_addrman.Connected(node.addr);
}
{
LOCK(m_headers_presync_mutex);
m_headers_presync_stats.erase(nodeid);
}
WITH_LOCK(cs_proofrequest, m_proofrequest.DisconnectedPeer(nodeid));
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Cleared nodestate for peer=%d\n", nodeid);
}
PeerRef PeerManagerImpl::GetPeerRef(NodeId id) const {
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
auto it = m_peer_map.find(id);
return it != m_peer_map.end() ? it->second : nullptr;
}
PeerRef PeerManagerImpl::RemovePeer(NodeId id) {
PeerRef ret;
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
auto it = m_peer_map.find(id);
if (it != m_peer_map.end()) {
ret = std::move(it->second);
m_peer_map.erase(it);
}
return ret;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::GetNodeStateStats(NodeId nodeid,
CNodeStateStats &stats) const {
{
LOCK(cs_main);
const CNodeState *state = State(nodeid);
if (state == nullptr) {
return false;
}
stats.nSyncHeight = state->pindexBestKnownBlock
? state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nHeight
: -1;
stats.nCommonHeight = state->pindexLastCommonBlock
? state->pindexLastCommonBlock->nHeight
: -1;
for (const QueuedBlock &queue : state->vBlocksInFlight) {
if (queue.pindex) {
stats.vHeightInFlight.push_back(queue.pindex->nHeight);
}
}
}
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef(nodeid);
if (peer == nullptr) {
return false;
}
stats.their_services = peer->m_their_services;
stats.m_starting_height = peer->m_starting_height;
// It is common for nodes with good ping times to suddenly become lagged,
// due to a new block arriving or other large transfer.
// Merely reporting pingtime might fool the caller into thinking the node
// was still responsive, since pingtime does not update until the ping is
// complete, which might take a while. So, if a ping is taking an unusually
// long time in flight, the caller can immediately detect that this is
// happening.
auto ping_wait{0us};
if ((0 != peer->m_ping_nonce_sent) &&
(0 != peer->m_ping_start.load().count())) {
ping_wait =
GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>() - peer->m_ping_start.load();
}
if (auto tx_relay = peer->GetTxRelay()) {
stats.m_relay_txs = WITH_LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex,
return tx_relay->m_relay_txs);
stats.m_fee_filter_received = tx_relay->m_fee_filter_received.load();
} else {
stats.m_relay_txs = false;
stats.m_fee_filter_received = Amount::zero();
}
stats.m_ping_wait = ping_wait;
stats.m_addr_processed = peer->m_addr_processed.load();
stats.m_addr_rate_limited = peer->m_addr_rate_limited.load();
stats.m_addr_relay_enabled = peer->m_addr_relay_enabled.load();
{
LOCK(peer->m_headers_sync_mutex);
if (peer->m_headers_sync) {
stats.presync_height = peer->m_headers_sync->GetPresyncHeight();
}
}
return true;
}
void PeerManagerImpl::AddToCompactExtraTransactions(const CTransactionRef &tx) {
if (m_opts.max_extra_txs <= 0) {
return;
}
if (!vExtraTxnForCompact.size()) {
vExtraTxnForCompact.resize(m_opts.max_extra_txs);
}
vExtraTxnForCompact[vExtraTxnForCompactIt] =
std::make_pair(tx->GetHash(), tx);
vExtraTxnForCompactIt = (vExtraTxnForCompactIt + 1) % m_opts.max_extra_txs;
}
void PeerManagerImpl::Misbehaving(Peer &peer, int howmuch,
const std::string &message) {
assert(howmuch > 0);
LOCK(peer.m_misbehavior_mutex);
const int score_before{peer.m_misbehavior_score};
peer.m_misbehavior_score += howmuch;
const int score_now{peer.m_misbehavior_score};
const std::string message_prefixed =
message.empty() ? "" : (": " + message);
std::string warning;
if (score_now >= DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD &&
score_before < DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD) {
warning = " DISCOURAGE THRESHOLD EXCEEDED";
peer.m_should_discourage = true;
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Misbehaving: peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s%s\n", peer.m_id,
score_before, score_now, warning, message_prefixed);
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid,
const BlockValidationState &state,
bool via_compact_block,
const std::string &message) {
PeerRef peer{GetPeerRef(nodeid)};
switch (state.GetResult()) {
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RESULT_UNSET:
break;
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_HEADER_LOW_WORK:
// We didn't try to process the block because the header chain may
// have too little work.
break;
// The node is providing invalid data:
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS:
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED:
if (!via_compact_block) {
if (peer) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, message);
}
return true;
}
break;
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID: {
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState *node_state = State(nodeid);
if (node_state == nullptr) {
break;
}
// Ban outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain.
// Exempt HB compact block peers. Manual connections are always
// protected from discouragement.
if (!via_compact_block && !node_state->m_is_inbound) {
if (peer) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, message);
}
return true;
}
break;
}
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER:
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT:
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV:
if (peer) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, message);
}
return true;
// Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV:
// TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super
// arbitrary)
if (peer) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 10, message);
}
return true;
case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE:
break;
}
if (message != "") {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message);
}
return false;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::MaybePunishNodeForTx(NodeId nodeid,
const TxValidationState &state,
const std::string &message) {
PeerRef peer{GetPeerRef(nodeid)};
switch (state.GetResult()) {
case TxValidationResult::TX_RESULT_UNSET:
break;
// The node is providing invalid data:
case TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS:
if (peer) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, message);
}
return true;
// Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
case TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD:
case TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD:
case TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS:
case TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND:
case TxValidationResult::TX_DUPLICATE:
case TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT:
case TxValidationResult::TX_CHILD_BEFORE_PARENT:
case TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY:
case TxValidationResult::TX_NO_MEMPOOL:
case TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE:
+ case TxValidationResult::TX_AVALANCHE_RECONSIDERABLE:
case TxValidationResult::TX_UNKNOWN:
break;
}
if (message != "") {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message);
}
return false;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::BlockRequestAllowed(const CBlockIndex *pindex) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (m_chainman.ActiveChain().Contains(pindex)) {
return true;
}
return pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::SCRIPTS) &&
(m_chainman.m_best_header != nullptr) &&
(m_chainman.m_best_header->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() <
STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT) &&
(GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(
*m_chainman.m_best_header, *pindex, *m_chainman.m_best_header,
m_chainparams.GetConsensus()) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT);
}
std::optional<std::string>
PeerManagerImpl::FetchBlock(const Config &config, NodeId peer_id,
const CBlockIndex &block_index) {
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
return "Loading blocks ...";
}
LOCK(cs_main);
// Ensure this peer exists and hasn't been disconnected
CNodeState *state = State(peer_id);
if (state == nullptr) {
return "Peer does not exist";
}
// Mark block as in-flight unless it already is (for this peer).
// If a block was already in-flight for a different peer, its BLOCKTXN
// response will be dropped.
if (!BlockRequested(config, peer_id, block_index)) {
return "Already requested from this peer";
}
// Construct message to request the block
const BlockHash &hash{block_index.GetBlockHash()};
const std::vector<CInv> invs{CInv(MSG_BLOCK, hash)};
// Send block request message to the peer
if (!m_connman.ForNode(peer_id, [this, &invs](CNode *node) {
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(node->GetCommonVersion());
this->m_connman.PushMessage(
node, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, invs));
return true;
})) {
return "Node not fully connected";
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting block %s from peer=%d\n", hash.ToString(),
peer_id);
return std::nullopt;
}
std::unique_ptr<PeerManager>
PeerManager::make(CConnman &connman, AddrMan &addrman, BanMan *banman,
ChainstateManager &chainman, CTxMemPool &pool,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche, Options opts) {
return std::make_unique<PeerManagerImpl>(connman, addrman, banman, chainman,
pool, avalanche, opts);
}
PeerManagerImpl::PeerManagerImpl(CConnman &connman, AddrMan &addrman,
BanMan *banman, ChainstateManager &chainman,
CTxMemPool &pool,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche,
Options opts)
: m_rng{opts.deterministic_rng},
m_fee_filter_rounder{CFeeRate{DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE_PER_KB}, m_rng},
m_chainparams(chainman.GetParams()), m_connman(connman),
m_addrman(addrman), m_banman(banman), m_chainman(chainman),
m_mempool(pool), m_avalanche(avalanche), m_opts{opts} {}
void PeerManagerImpl::StartScheduledTasks(CScheduler &scheduler) {
// Stale tip checking and peer eviction are on two different timers, but we
// don't want them to get out of sync due to drift in the scheduler, so we
// combine them in one function and schedule at the quicker (peer-eviction)
// timer.
static_assert(
EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL < STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL,
"peer eviction timer should be less than stale tip check timer");
scheduler.scheduleEvery(
[this]() {
this->CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers();
return true;
},
std::chrono::seconds{EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL});
// schedule next run for 10-15 minutes in the future
const auto reattemptBroadcastInterval = 10min + GetRandMillis(5min);
scheduler.scheduleFromNow([&] { ReattemptInitialBroadcast(scheduler); },
reattemptBroadcastInterval);
// Update the avalanche statistics on a schedule
scheduler.scheduleEvery(
[this]() {
UpdateAvalancheStatistics();
return true;
},
AVALANCHE_STATISTICS_REFRESH_PERIOD);
// schedule next run for 2-5 minutes in the future
const auto avalanchePeriodicNetworkingInterval = 2min + GetRandMillis(3min);
scheduler.scheduleFromNow([&] { AvalanchePeriodicNetworking(scheduler); },
avalanchePeriodicNetworkingInterval);
}
/**
* Evict orphan txn pool entries based on a newly connected
* block, remember the recently confirmed transactions, and delete tracked
* announcements for them. Also save the time of the last tip update and
* possibly reduce dynamic block stalling timeout.
*/
void PeerManagerImpl::BlockConnected(
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock, const CBlockIndex *pindex) {
m_mempool.withOrphanage([&pblock](TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
orphanage.EraseForBlock(*pblock);
});
m_mempool.withConflicting([&pblock](TxConflicting &conflicting) {
conflicting.EraseForBlock(*pblock);
});
m_last_tip_update = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
{
LOCK(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex);
for (const CTransactionRef &ptx : pblock->vtx) {
m_recent_confirmed_transactions.insert(ptx->GetId());
}
}
{
LOCK(cs_main);
for (const auto &ptx : pblock->vtx) {
m_txrequest.ForgetInvId(ptx->GetId());
}
}
// In case the dynamic timeout was doubled once or more, reduce it slowly
// back to its default value
auto stalling_timeout = m_block_stalling_timeout.load();
Assume(stalling_timeout >= BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT);
if (stalling_timeout != BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT) {
const auto new_timeout =
std::max(std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::seconds>(
stalling_timeout * 0.85),
BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT);
if (m_block_stalling_timeout.compare_exchange_strong(stalling_timeout,
new_timeout)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Decreased stalling timeout to %d seconds\n",
count_seconds(new_timeout));
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::BlockDisconnected(
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &block, const CBlockIndex *pindex) {
// To avoid relay problems with transactions that were previously
// confirmed, clear our filter of recently confirmed transactions whenever
// there's a reorg.
// This means that in a 1-block reorg (where 1 block is disconnected and
// then another block reconnected), our filter will drop to having only one
// block's worth of transactions in it, but that should be fine, since
// presumably the most common case of relaying a confirmed transaction
// should be just after a new block containing it is found.
LOCK(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex);
m_recent_confirmed_transactions.reset();
}
/**
* Maintain state about the best-seen block and fast-announce a compact block
* to compatible peers.
*/
void PeerManagerImpl::NewPoWValidBlock(
const CBlockIndex *pindex, const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock) {
std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> pcmpctblock =
std::make_shared<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs>(*pblock);
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(PROTOCOL_VERSION);
LOCK(cs_main);
if (pindex->nHeight <= m_highest_fast_announce) {
return;
}
m_highest_fast_announce = pindex->nHeight;
BlockHash hashBlock(pblock->GetHash());
const std::shared_future<CSerializedNetMsg> lazy_ser{
std::async(std::launch::deferred, [&] {
return msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, *pcmpctblock);
})};
{
LOCK(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
m_most_recent_block_hash = hashBlock;
m_most_recent_block = pblock;
m_most_recent_compact_block = pcmpctblock;
}
m_connman.ForEachNode(
[this, pindex, &lazy_ser, &hashBlock](CNode *pnode)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
if (pnode->GetCommonVersion() < INVALID_CB_NO_BAN_VERSION ||
pnode->fDisconnect) {
return;
}
ProcessBlockAvailability(pnode->GetId());
CNodeState &state = *State(pnode->GetId());
// If the peer has, or we announced to them the previous block
// already, but we don't think they have this one, go ahead and
// announce it.
if (state.m_requested_hb_cmpctblocks &&
!PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex) &&
PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex->pprev)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"%s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d\n",
"PeerManager::NewPoWValidBlock",
hashBlock.ToString(), pnode->GetId());
const CSerializedNetMsg &ser_cmpctblock{lazy_ser.get()};
m_connman.PushMessage(pnode, ser_cmpctblock.Copy());
state.pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex;
}
});
}
/**
* Update our best height and announce any block hashes which weren't previously
* in m_chainman.ActiveChain() to our peers.
*/
void PeerManagerImpl::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew,
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork,
bool fInitialDownload) {
SetBestHeight(pindexNew->nHeight);
SetServiceFlagsIBDCache(!fInitialDownload);
// Don't relay inventory during initial block download.
if (fInitialDownload) {
return;
}
// Find the hashes of all blocks that weren't previously in the best chain.
std::vector<BlockHash> vHashes;
const CBlockIndex *pindexToAnnounce = pindexNew;
while (pindexToAnnounce != pindexFork) {
vHashes.push_back(pindexToAnnounce->GetBlockHash());
pindexToAnnounce = pindexToAnnounce->pprev;
if (vHashes.size() == MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE) {
// Limit announcements in case of a huge reorganization. Rely on the
// peer's synchronization mechanism in that case.
break;
}
}
{
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
for (auto &it : m_peer_map) {
Peer &peer = *it.second;
LOCK(peer.m_block_inv_mutex);
for (const BlockHash &hash : reverse_iterate(vHashes)) {
peer.m_blocks_for_headers_relay.push_back(hash);
}
}
}
m_connman.WakeMessageHandler();
}
/**
* Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning, maintain which
* peers announce compact blocks.
*/
void PeerManagerImpl::BlockChecked(const CBlock &block,
const BlockValidationState &state) {
LOCK(cs_main);
const BlockHash hash = block.GetHash();
std::map<BlockHash, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>::iterator it =
mapBlockSource.find(hash);
// If the block failed validation, we know where it came from and we're
// still connected to that peer, maybe punish.
if (state.IsInvalid() && it != mapBlockSource.end() &&
State(it->second.first)) {
MaybePunishNodeForBlock(/*nodeid=*/it->second.first, state,
/*via_compact_block=*/!it->second.second);
}
// Check that:
// 1. The block is valid
// 2. We're not in initial block download
// 3. This is currently the best block we're aware of. We haven't updated
// the tip yet so we have no way to check this directly here. Instead we
// just check that there are currently no other blocks in flight.
else if (state.IsValid() &&
!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload() &&
mapBlocksInFlight.count(hash) == mapBlocksInFlight.size()) {
if (it != mapBlockSource.end()) {
MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs(it->second.first);
}
}
if (it != mapBlockSource.end()) {
mapBlockSource.erase(it);
}
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Messages
//
bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const TxId &txid,
bool include_reconsiderable) {
if (m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->GetBlockHash() !=
hashRecentRejectsChainTip) {
// If the chain tip has changed previously rejected transactions
// might be now valid, e.g. due to a nLockTime'd tx becoming
// valid, or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give
// those txs a second chance.
hashRecentRejectsChainTip =
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->GetBlockHash();
m_recent_rejects.reset();
m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.reset();
}
if (m_mempool.withOrphanage([&txid](const TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.HaveTx(txid);
})) {
return true;
}
if (m_mempool.withConflicting([&txid](const TxConflicting &conflicting) {
return conflicting.HaveTx(txid);
})) {
return true;
}
if (include_reconsiderable &&
m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.contains(txid)) {
return true;
}
{
LOCK(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex);
if (m_recent_confirmed_transactions.contains(txid)) {
return true;
}
}
return m_recent_rejects.contains(txid) || m_mempool.exists(txid);
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveBlock(const BlockHash &block_hash) {
return m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(block_hash) != nullptr;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveProof(const avalanche::ProofId &proofid) {
assert(m_avalanche);
auto localProof = m_avalanche->getLocalProof();
if (localProof && localProof->getId() == proofid) {
return true;
}
return m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&proofid](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.exists(proofid) || pm.isInvalid(proofid);
});
}
void PeerManagerImpl::SendPings() {
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
for (auto &it : m_peer_map) {
it.second->m_ping_queued = true;
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::RelayTransaction(const TxId &txid) {
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
for (auto &it : m_peer_map) {
Peer &peer = *it.second;
auto tx_relay = peer.GetTxRelay();
if (!tx_relay) {
continue;
}
LOCK(tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_mutex);
if (!tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_known_filter.contains(txid)) {
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_to_send.insert(txid);
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::RelayProof(const avalanche::ProofId &proofid) {
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
for (auto &it : m_peer_map) {
Peer &peer = *it.second;
if (!peer.m_proof_relay) {
continue;
}
LOCK(peer.m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_mutex);
if (!peer.m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_known_filter.contains(
proofid)) {
peer.m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_to_send.insert(proofid);
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::RelayAddress(NodeId originator, const CAddress &addr,
bool fReachable) {
// We choose the same nodes within a given 24h window (if the list of
// connected nodes does not change) and we don't relay to nodes that already
// know an address. So within 24h we will likely relay a given address once.
// This is to prevent a peer from unjustly giving their address better
// propagation by sending it to us repeatedly.
if (!fReachable && !addr.IsRelayable()) {
return;
}
// Relay to a limited number of other nodes
// Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours
// at a time so the m_addr_knowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
const uint64_t hash_addr{CServiceHash(0, 0)(addr)};
const auto current_time{GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>()};
// Adding address hash makes exact rotation time different per address,
// while preserving periodicity.
const uint64_t time_addr{
(static_cast<uint64_t>(count_seconds(current_time)) + hash_addr) /
count_seconds(ROTATE_ADDR_RELAY_DEST_INTERVAL)};
const CSipHasher hasher{
m_connman.GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY)
.Write(hash_addr)
.Write(time_addr)};
// Relay reachable addresses to 2 peers. Unreachable addresses are relayed
// randomly to 1 or 2 peers.
unsigned int nRelayNodes = (fReachable || (hasher.Finalize() & 1)) ? 2 : 1;
std::array<std::pair<uint64_t, Peer *>, 2> best{
{{0, nullptr}, {0, nullptr}}};
assert(nRelayNodes <= best.size());
LOCK(m_peer_mutex);
for (auto &[id, peer] : m_peer_map) {
if (peer->m_addr_relay_enabled && id != originator &&
IsAddrCompatible(*peer, addr)) {
uint64_t hashKey = CSipHasher(hasher).Write(id).Finalize();
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nRelayNodes; i++) {
if (hashKey > best[i].first) {
std::copy(best.begin() + i, best.begin() + nRelayNodes - 1,
best.begin() + i + 1);
best[i] = std::make_pair(hashKey, peer.get());
break;
}
}
}
};
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nRelayNodes && best[i].first != 0; i++) {
PushAddress(*best[i].second, addr);
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessGetBlockData(const Config &config, CNode &pfrom,
Peer &peer, const CInv &inv) {
const BlockHash hash(inv.hash);
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> a_recent_block;
std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> a_recent_compact_block;
{
LOCK(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
a_recent_block = m_most_recent_block;
a_recent_compact_block = m_most_recent_compact_block;
}
bool need_activate_chain = false;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
const CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash);
if (pindex) {
if (pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded() &&
!pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::SCRIPTS) &&
pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::TREE)) {
// If we have the block and all of its parents, but have not yet
// validated it, we might be in the middle of connecting it (ie
// in the unlock of cs_main before ActivateBestChain but after
// AcceptBlock). In this case, we need to run ActivateBestChain
// prior to checking the relay conditions below.
need_activate_chain = true;
}
}
} // release cs_main before calling ActivateBestChain
if (need_activate_chain) {
BlockValidationState state;
if (!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().ActivateBestChain(
state, a_recent_block, m_avalanche)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n",
state.ToString());
}
}
LOCK(cs_main);
const CBlockIndex *pindex = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash);
if (!pindex) {
return;
}
if (!BlockRequestAllowed(pindex)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"%s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old "
"block that isn't in the main chain\n",
__func__, pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetCommonVersion());
// Disconnect node in case we have reached the outbound limit for serving
// historical blocks.
if (m_connman.OutboundTargetReached(true) &&
(((m_chainman.m_best_header != nullptr) &&
(m_chainman.m_best_header->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() >
HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE)) ||
inv.IsMsgFilteredBlk()) &&
// nodes with the download permission may exceed target
!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Download)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"historical block serving limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
// Avoid leaking prune-height by never sending blocks below the
// NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold.
// Add two blocks buffer extension for possible races
if (!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan) &&
((((peer.m_our_services & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) ==
NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) &&
((peer.m_our_services & NODE_NETWORK) != NODE_NETWORK) &&
(m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nHeight - pindex->nHeight >
(int)NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS + 2)))) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Ignore block request below NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED "
"threshold, disconnect peer=%d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
// disconnect node and prevent it from stalling (would otherwise wait
// for the missing block)
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
// Pruned nodes may have deleted the block, so check whether it's available
// before trying to send.
if (!pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
return;
}
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock;
if (a_recent_block && a_recent_block->GetHash() == pindex->GetBlockHash()) {
pblock = a_recent_block;
} else {
// Send block from disk
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockRead = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
if (!m_chainman.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(*pblockRead, *pindex)) {
assert(!"cannot load block from disk");
}
pblock = pblockRead;
}
if (inv.IsMsgBlk()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::BLOCK, *pblock));
} else if (inv.IsMsgFilteredBlk()) {
bool sendMerkleBlock = false;
CMerkleBlock merkleBlock;
if (auto tx_relay = peer.GetTxRelay()) {
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
if (tx_relay->m_bloom_filter) {
sendMerkleBlock = true;
merkleBlock = CMerkleBlock(*pblock, *tx_relay->m_bloom_filter);
}
}
if (sendMerkleBlock) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::MERKLEBLOCK, merkleBlock));
// CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any
// transactions in the block the client did not see. This avoids
// hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip.
// Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any
// single transactions we didn't send here - they must either
// disconnect and retry or request the full block. Thus, the
// protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate
// txn here, however we MUST always provide at least what the
// remote peer needs.
typedef std::pair<size_t, uint256> PairType;
for (PairType &pair : merkleBlock.vMatchedTxn) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::TX, *pblock->vtx[pair.first]));
}
}
// else
// no response
} else if (inv.IsMsgCmpctBlk()) {
// If a peer is asking for old blocks, we're almost guaranteed they
// won't have a useful mempool to match against a compact block, and
// we don't feel like constructing the object for them, so instead
// we respond with the full, non-compact block.
int nSendFlags = 0;
if (CanDirectFetch() &&
pindex->nHeight >=
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Height() - MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH) {
if (a_recent_compact_block &&
a_recent_compact_block->header.GetHash() ==
pindex->GetBlockHash()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK,
*a_recent_compact_block));
} else {
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock(*pblock);
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK,
cmpctblock));
}
} else {
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::BLOCK, *pblock));
}
}
{
LOCK(peer.m_block_inv_mutex);
// Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next
// batch of inventory.
if (hash == peer.m_continuation_block) {
// Send immediately. This must send even if redundant, and
// we want it right after the last block so they don't wait for
// other stuff first.
std::vector<CInv> vInv;
vInv.push_back(CInv(
MSG_BLOCK, m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->GetBlockHash()));
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv));
peer.m_continuation_block = BlockHash();
}
}
}
CTransactionRef
PeerManagerImpl::FindTxForGetData(const Peer &peer, const TxId &txid,
const std::chrono::seconds mempool_req,
const std::chrono::seconds now) {
auto txinfo = m_mempool.info(txid);
if (txinfo.tx) {
// If a TX could have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request,
// or is older than UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY, permit the request
// unconditionally.
if ((mempool_req.count() && txinfo.m_time <= mempool_req) ||
txinfo.m_time <= now - UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY) {
return std::move(txinfo.tx);
}
}
{
LOCK(cs_main);
// Otherwise, the transaction must have been announced recently.
if (Assume(peer.GetTxRelay())
->m_recently_announced_invs.contains(txid)) {
// If it was, it can be relayed from either the mempool...
if (txinfo.tx) {
return std::move(txinfo.tx);
}
// ... or the relay pool.
auto mi = mapRelay.find(txid);
if (mi != mapRelay.end()) {
return mi->second;
}
}
}
return {};
}
//! Determine whether or not a peer can request a proof, and return it (or
//! nullptr if not found or not allowed).
avalanche::ProofRef
PeerManagerImpl::FindProofForGetData(const Peer &peer,
const avalanche::ProofId &proofid,
const std::chrono::seconds now) {
avalanche::ProofRef proof;
bool send_unconditionally =
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](const avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.forPeer(proofid, [&](const avalanche::Peer &peer) {
proof = peer.proof;
// If we know that proof for long enough, allow for requesting
// it.
return peer.registration_time <=
now - UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY;
});
});
if (!proof) {
// Always send our local proof if it gets requested, assuming it's
// valid. This will make it easier to bind with peers upon startup where
// the status of our proof is unknown pending for a block. Note that it
// still needs to have been announced first (presumably via an avahello
// message).
proof = m_avalanche->getLocalProof();
}
// We don't have this proof
if (!proof) {
return avalanche::ProofRef();
}
if (send_unconditionally) {
return proof;
}
// Otherwise, the proofs must have been announced recently.
if (peer.m_proof_relay->m_recently_announced_proofs.contains(proofid)) {
return proof;
}
return avalanche::ProofRef();
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessGetData(
const Config &config, CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer,
const std::atomic<bool> &interruptMsgProc) {
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
auto tx_relay = peer.GetTxRelay();
std::deque<CInv>::iterator it = peer.m_getdata_requests.begin();
std::vector<CInv> vNotFound;
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetCommonVersion());
const auto now{GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>()};
// Get last mempool request time
const auto mempool_req = tx_relay != nullptr
? tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req.load()
: std::chrono::seconds::min();
// Process as many TX or AVA_PROOF items from the front of the getdata
// queue as possible, since they're common and it's efficient to batch
// process them.
while (it != peer.m_getdata_requests.end()) {
if (interruptMsgProc) {
return;
}
// The send buffer provides backpressure. If there's no space in
// the buffer, pause processing until the next call.
if (pfrom.fPauseSend) {
break;
}
const CInv &inv = *it;
if (it->IsMsgStakeContender()) {
// Ignore requests for stake contenders. This type is only used for
// polling.
++it;
continue;
}
if (it->IsMsgProof()) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
vNotFound.push_back(inv);
++it;
continue;
}
const avalanche::ProofId proofid(inv.hash);
auto proof = FindProofForGetData(peer, proofid, now);
if (proof) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::AVAPROOF, *proof));
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
pm.removeUnbroadcastProof(proofid);
});
} else {
vNotFound.push_back(inv);
}
++it;
continue;
}
if (it->IsMsgTx()) {
if (tx_relay == nullptr) {
// Ignore GETDATA requests for transactions from
// block-relay-only peers and peers that asked us not to
// announce transactions.
continue;
}
const TxId txid(inv.hash);
CTransactionRef tx = FindTxForGetData(peer, txid, mempool_req, now);
if (tx) {
int nSendFlags = 0;
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *tx));
m_mempool.RemoveUnbroadcastTx(txid);
// As we're going to send tx, make sure its unconfirmed parents
// are made requestable.
std::vector<TxId> parent_ids_to_add;
{
LOCK(m_mempool.cs);
auto txiter = m_mempool.GetIter(tx->GetId());
if (txiter) {
auto &pentry = *txiter;
const CTxMemPoolEntry::Parents &parents =
(*pentry)->GetMemPoolParentsConst();
parent_ids_to_add.reserve(parents.size());
for (const auto &parent : parents) {
if (parent.get()->GetTime() >
now - UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY) {
parent_ids_to_add.push_back(
parent.get()->GetTx().GetId());
}
}
}
}
for (const TxId &parent_txid : parent_ids_to_add) {
// Relaying a transaction with a recent but unconfirmed
// parent.
if (WITH_LOCK(tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_mutex,
return !tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_known_filter
.contains(parent_txid))) {
tx_relay->m_recently_announced_invs.insert(parent_txid);
}
}
} else {
vNotFound.push_back(inv);
}
++it;
continue;
}
// It's neither a proof nor a transaction
break;
}
// Only process one BLOCK item per call, since they're uncommon and can be
// expensive to process.
if (it != peer.m_getdata_requests.end() && !pfrom.fPauseSend) {
const CInv &inv = *it++;
if (inv.IsGenBlkMsg()) {
ProcessGetBlockData(config, pfrom, peer, inv);
}
// else: If the first item on the queue is an unknown type, we erase it
// and continue processing the queue on the next call.
}
peer.m_getdata_requests.erase(peer.m_getdata_requests.begin(), it);
if (!vNotFound.empty()) {
// Let the peer know that we didn't find what it asked for, so it
// doesn't have to wait around forever. SPV clients care about this
// message: it's needed when they are recursively walking the
// dependencies of relevant unconfirmed transactions. SPV clients want
// to do that because they want to know about (and store and rebroadcast
// and risk analyze) the dependencies of transactions relevant to them,
// without having to download the entire memory pool. Also, other nodes
// can use these messages to automatically request a transaction from
// some other peer that annnounced it, and stop waiting for us to
// respond. In normal operation, we often send NOTFOUND messages for
// parents of transactions that we relay; if a peer is missing a parent,
// they may assume we have them and request the parents from us.
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::NOTFOUND, vNotFound));
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::SendBlockTransactions(
CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer, const CBlock &block,
const BlockTransactionsRequest &req) {
BlockTransactions resp(req);
for (size_t i = 0; i < req.indices.size(); i++) {
if (req.indices[i] >= block.vtx.size()) {
Misbehaving(peer, 100, "getblocktxn with out-of-bounds tx indices");
return;
}
resp.txn[i] = block.vtx[req.indices[i]];
}
LOCK(cs_main);
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetCommonVersion());
int nSendFlags = 0;
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, resp));
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::CheckHeadersPoW(const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers,
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams,
Peer &peer) {
// Do these headers have proof-of-work matching what's claimed?
if (!HasValidProofOfWork(headers, consensusParams)) {
Misbehaving(peer, 100, "header with invalid proof of work");
return false;
}
// Are these headers connected to each other?
if (!CheckHeadersAreContinuous(headers)) {
Misbehaving(peer, 20, "non-continuous headers sequence");
return false;
}
return true;
}
arith_uint256 PeerManagerImpl::GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold() {
arith_uint256 near_chaintip_work = 0;
LOCK(cs_main);
if (m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip() != nullptr) {
const CBlockIndex *tip = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip();
// Use a 144 block buffer, so that we'll accept headers that fork from
// near our tip.
near_chaintip_work =
tip->nChainWork -
std::min<arith_uint256>(144 * GetBlockProof(*tip), tip->nChainWork);
}
return std::max(near_chaintip_work, m_chainman.MinimumChainWork());
}
/**
* Special handling for unconnecting headers that might be part of a block
* announcement.
*
* We'll send a getheaders message in response to try to connect the chain.
*
* The peer can send up to MAX_NUM_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS_MSGS in a row that
* don't connect before being given DoS points.
*
* Once a headers message is received that is valid and does connect,
* m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs gets reset back to 0.
*/
void PeerManagerImpl::HandleFewUnconnectingHeaders(
CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer, const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers) {
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetCommonVersion());
peer.m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs++;
// Try to fill in the missing headers.
const CBlockIndex *best_header{
WITH_LOCK(cs_main, return m_chainman.m_best_header)};
if (MaybeSendGetHeaders(pfrom, GetLocator(best_header), peer)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"received header %s: missing prev block %s, sending getheaders "
"(%d) to end (peer=%d, m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs=%d)\n",
headers[0].GetHash().ToString(),
headers[0].hashPrevBlock.ToString(), best_header->nHeight,
pfrom.GetId(), peer.m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs);
}
// Set hashLastUnknownBlock for this peer, so that if we
// eventually get the headers - even from a different peer -
// we can use this peer to download.
WITH_LOCK(cs_main,
UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom.GetId(), headers.back().GetHash()));
// The peer may just be broken, so periodically assign DoS points if this
// condition persists.
if (peer.m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs %
MAX_NUM_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS_MSGS ==
0) {
Misbehaving(peer, 20,
strprintf("%d non-connecting headers",
peer.m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs));
}
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::CheckHeadersAreContinuous(
const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers) const {
BlockHash hashLastBlock;
for (const CBlockHeader &header : headers) {
if (!hashLastBlock.IsNull() && header.hashPrevBlock != hashLastBlock) {
return false;
}
hashLastBlock = header.GetHash();
}
return true;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::IsContinuationOfLowWorkHeadersSync(
Peer &peer, CNode &pfrom, std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers) {
if (peer.m_headers_sync) {
auto result = peer.m_headers_sync->ProcessNextHeaders(
headers, headers.size() == MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS);
if (result.request_more) {
auto locator = peer.m_headers_sync->NextHeadersRequestLocator();
// If we were instructed to ask for a locator, it should not be
// empty.
Assume(!locator.vHave.empty());
if (!locator.vHave.empty()) {
// It should be impossible for the getheaders request to fail,
// because we should have cleared the last getheaders timestamp
// when processing the headers that triggered this call. But
// it may be possible to bypass this via compactblock
// processing, so check the result before logging just to be
// safe.
bool sent_getheaders =
MaybeSendGetHeaders(pfrom, locator, peer);
if (sent_getheaders) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"more getheaders (from %s) to peer=%d\n",
locator.vHave.front().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"error sending next getheaders (from %s) to "
"continue sync with peer=%d\n",
locator.vHave.front().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
}
}
}
if (peer.m_headers_sync->GetState() == HeadersSyncState::State::FINAL) {
peer.m_headers_sync.reset(nullptr);
// Delete this peer's entry in m_headers_presync_stats.
// If this is m_headers_presync_bestpeer, it will be replaced later
// by the next peer that triggers the else{} branch below.
LOCK(m_headers_presync_mutex);
m_headers_presync_stats.erase(pfrom.GetId());
} else {
// Build statistics for this peer's sync.
HeadersPresyncStats stats;
stats.first = peer.m_headers_sync->GetPresyncWork();
if (peer.m_headers_sync->GetState() ==
HeadersSyncState::State::PRESYNC) {
stats.second = {peer.m_headers_sync->GetPresyncHeight(),
peer.m_headers_sync->GetPresyncTime()};
}
// Update statistics in stats.
LOCK(m_headers_presync_mutex);
m_headers_presync_stats[pfrom.GetId()] = stats;
auto best_it =
m_headers_presync_stats.find(m_headers_presync_bestpeer);
bool best_updated = false;
if (best_it == m_headers_presync_stats.end()) {
// If the cached best peer is outdated, iterate over all
// remaining ones (including newly updated one) to find the best
// one.
NodeId peer_best{-1};
const HeadersPresyncStats *stat_best{nullptr};
for (const auto &[_peer, _stat] : m_headers_presync_stats) {
if (!stat_best || _stat > *stat_best) {
peer_best = _peer;
stat_best = &_stat;
}
}
m_headers_presync_bestpeer = peer_best;
best_updated = (peer_best == pfrom.GetId());
} else if (best_it->first == pfrom.GetId() ||
stats > best_it->second) {
// pfrom was and remains the best peer, or pfrom just became
// best.
m_headers_presync_bestpeer = pfrom.GetId();
best_updated = true;
}
if (best_updated && stats.second.has_value()) {
// If the best peer updated, and it is in its first phase,
// signal.
m_headers_presync_should_signal = true;
}
}
if (result.success) {
// We only overwrite the headers passed in if processing was
// successful.
headers.swap(result.pow_validated_headers);
}
return result.success;
}
// Either we didn't have a sync in progress, or something went wrong
// processing these headers, or we are returning headers to the caller to
// process.
return false;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::TryLowWorkHeadersSync(
Peer &peer, CNode &pfrom, const CBlockIndex *chain_start_header,
std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers) {
// Calculate the total work on this chain.
arith_uint256 total_work =
chain_start_header->nChainWork + CalculateHeadersWork(headers);
// Our dynamic anti-DoS threshold (minimum work required on a headers chain
// before we'll store it)
arith_uint256 minimum_chain_work = GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold();
// Avoid DoS via low-difficulty-headers by only processing if the headers
// are part of a chain with sufficient work.
if (total_work < minimum_chain_work) {
// Only try to sync with this peer if their headers message was full;
// otherwise they don't have more headers after this so no point in
// trying to sync their too-little-work chain.
if (headers.size() == MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS) {
// Note: we could advance to the last header in this set that is
// known to us, rather than starting at the first header (which we
// may already have); however this is unlikely to matter much since
// ProcessHeadersMessage() already handles the case where all
// headers in a received message are already known and are
// ancestors of m_best_header or chainActive.Tip(), by skipping
// this logic in that case. So even if the first header in this set
// of headers is known, some header in this set must be new, so
// advancing to the first unknown header would be a small effect.
LOCK(peer.m_headers_sync_mutex);
peer.m_headers_sync.reset(
new HeadersSyncState(peer.m_id, m_chainparams.GetConsensus(),
chain_start_header, minimum_chain_work));
// Now a HeadersSyncState object for tracking this synchronization
// is created, process the headers using it as normal.
return IsContinuationOfLowWorkHeadersSync(peer, pfrom, headers);
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Ignoring low-work chain (height=%u) from peer=%d\n",
chain_start_header->nHeight + headers.size(), pfrom.GetId());
// Since this is a low-work headers chain, no further processing is
// required.
headers = {};
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::IsAncestorOfBestHeaderOrTip(const CBlockIndex *header) {
return header != nullptr &&
((m_chainman.m_best_header != nullptr &&
header ==
m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(header->nHeight)) ||
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Contains(header));
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSendGetHeaders(CNode &pfrom,
const CBlockLocator &locator,
Peer &peer) {
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetCommonVersion());
const auto current_time = NodeClock::now();
// Only allow a new getheaders message to go out if we don't have a recent
// one already in-flight
if (current_time - peer.m_last_getheaders_timestamp >
HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, locator, uint256()));
peer.m_last_getheaders_timestamp = current_time;
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Given a new headers tip ending in pindexLast, potentially request blocks
* towards that tip. We require that the given tip have at least as much work as
* our tip, and for our current tip to be "close to synced" (see
* CanDirectFetch()).
*/
void PeerManagerImpl::HeadersDirectFetchBlocks(const Config &config,
CNode &pfrom,
const CBlockIndex *pindexLast) {
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetCommonVersion());
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom.GetId());
if (CanDirectFetch() && pindexLast->IsValid(BlockValidity::TREE) &&
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork <= pindexLast->nChainWork) {
std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> vToFetch;
const CBlockIndex *pindexWalk = pindexLast;
// Calculate all the blocks we'd need to switch to pindexLast, up to
// a limit.
while (pindexWalk && !m_chainman.ActiveChain().Contains(pindexWalk) &&
vToFetch.size() <= MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) {
if (!pindexWalk->nStatus.hasData() &&
!IsBlockRequested(pindexWalk->GetBlockHash())) {
// We don't have this block, and it's not yet in flight.
vToFetch.push_back(pindexWalk);
}
pindexWalk = pindexWalk->pprev;
}
// If pindexWalk still isn't on our main chain, we're looking at a
// very large reorg at a time we think we're close to caught up to
// the main chain -- this shouldn't really happen. Bail out on the
// direct fetch and rely on parallel download instead.
if (!m_chainman.ActiveChain().Contains(pindexWalk)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Large reorg, won't direct fetch to %s (%d)\n",
pindexLast->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
pindexLast->nHeight);
} else {
std::vector<CInv> vGetData;
// Download as much as possible, from earliest to latest.
for (const CBlockIndex *pindex : reverse_iterate(vToFetch)) {
if (nodestate->nBlocksInFlight >=
MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) {
// Can't download any more from this peer
break;
}
vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
BlockRequested(config, pfrom.GetId(), *pindex);
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting block %s from peer=%d\n",
pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
}
if (vGetData.size() > 1) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Downloading blocks toward %s (%d) via headers "
"direct fetch\n",
pindexLast->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
pindexLast->nHeight);
}
if (vGetData.size() > 0) {
if (!m_opts.ignore_incoming_txs &&
nodestate->m_provides_cmpctblocks && vGetData.size() == 1 &&
mapBlocksInFlight.size() == 1 &&
pindexLast->pprev->IsValid(BlockValidity::CHAIN)) {
// In any case, we want to download using a compact
// block, not a regular one.
vGetData[0] = CInv(MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK, vGetData[0].hash);
}
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData));
}
}
}
}
/**
* Given receipt of headers from a peer ending in pindexLast, along with
* whether that header was new and whether the headers message was full,
* update the state we keep for the peer.
*/
void PeerManagerImpl::UpdatePeerStateForReceivedHeaders(
CNode &pfrom, Peer &peer, const CBlockIndex *pindexLast,
bool received_new_header, bool may_have_more_headers) {
if (peer.m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs > 0) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"peer=%d: resetting m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs (%d -> 0)\n",
pfrom.GetId(), peer.m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs);
}
peer.m_num_unconnecting_headers_msgs = 0;
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom.GetId());
assert(pindexLast);
UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom.GetId(), pindexLast->GetBlockHash());
// From here, pindexBestKnownBlock should be guaranteed to be non-null,
// because it is set in UpdateBlockAvailability. Some nullptr checks are
// still present, however, as belt-and-suspenders.
if (received_new_header &&
pindexLast->nChainWork > m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork) {
nodestate->m_last_block_announcement = GetTime();
}
// If we're in IBD, we want outbound peers that will serve us a useful
// chain. Disconnect peers that are on chains with insufficient work.
if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload() &&
!may_have_more_headers) {
// When nCount < MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS, we know we have no more
// headers to fetch from this peer.
if (nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock &&
nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork <
m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
// This peer has too little work on their headers chain to help
// us sync -- disconnect if it is an outbound disconnection
// candidate.
// Note: We compare their tip to the minimum chain work (rather than
// m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()) because we won't start block
// download until we have a headers chain that has at least
// the minimum chain work, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
// as an anti-DoS measure.
if (pfrom.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn()) {
LogPrintf("Disconnecting outbound peer %d -- headers "
"chain has insufficient work\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
}
}
}
// If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should
// protect it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
// Note that outbound block-relay peers are excluded from this
// protection, and thus always subject to eviction under the bad/lagging
// chain logic.
// See ChainSyncTimeoutState.
if (!pfrom.fDisconnect && pfrom.IsFullOutboundConn() &&
nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr) {
if (m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect <
MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT &&
nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >=
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork &&
!nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n",
pfrom.GetId());
nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true;
++m_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect;
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessHeadersMessage(const Config &config, CNode &pfrom,
Peer &peer,
std::vector<CBlockHeader> &&headers,
bool via_compact_block) {
size_t nCount = headers.size();
if (nCount == 0) {
// Nothing interesting. Stop asking this peers for more headers.
// If we were in the middle of headers sync, receiving an empty headers
// message suggests that the peer suddenly has nothing to give us
// (perhaps it reorged to our chain). Clear download state for this
// peer.
LOCK(peer.m_headers_sync_mutex);
if (peer.m_headers_sync) {
peer.m_headers_sync.reset(nullptr);
LOCK(m_headers_presync_mutex);
m_headers_presync_stats.erase(pfrom.GetId());
}
return;
}
// Before we do any processing, make sure these pass basic sanity checks.
// We'll rely on headers having valid proof-of-work further down, as an
// anti-DoS criteria (note: this check is required before passing any
// headers into HeadersSyncState).
if (!CheckHeadersPoW(headers, m_chainparams.GetConsensus(), peer)) {
// Misbehaving() calls are handled within CheckHeadersPoW(), so we can
// just return. (Note that even if a header is announced via compact
// block, the header itself should be valid, so this type of error can
// always be punished.)
return;
}
const CBlockIndex *pindexLast = nullptr;
// We'll set already_validated_work to true if these headers are
// successfully processed as part of a low-work headers sync in progress
// (either in PRESYNC or REDOWNLOAD phase).
// If true, this will mean that any headers returned to us (ie during
// REDOWNLOAD) can be validated without further anti-DoS checks.
bool already_validated_work = false;
// If we're in the middle of headers sync, let it do its magic.
bool have_headers_sync = false;
{
LOCK(peer.m_headers_sync_mutex);
already_validated_work =
IsContinuationOfLowWorkHeadersSync(peer, pfrom, headers);
// The headers we passed in may have been:
// - untouched, perhaps if no headers-sync was in progress, or some
// failure occurred
// - erased, such as if the headers were successfully processed and no
// additional headers processing needs to take place (such as if we
// are still in PRESYNC)
// - replaced with headers that are now ready for validation, such as
// during the REDOWNLOAD phase of a low-work headers sync.
// So just check whether we still have headers that we need to process,
// or not.
if (headers.empty()) {
return;
}
have_headers_sync = !!peer.m_headers_sync;
}
// Do these headers connect to something in our block index?
const CBlockIndex *chain_start_header{
WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(
headers[0].hashPrevBlock))};
bool headers_connect_blockindex{chain_start_header != nullptr};
if (!headers_connect_blockindex) {
if (nCount <= MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE) {
// If this looks like it could be a BIP 130 block announcement, use
// special logic for handling headers that don't connect, as this
// could be benign.
HandleFewUnconnectingHeaders(pfrom, peer, headers);
} else {
Misbehaving(peer, 10, "invalid header received");
}
return;
}
// If the headers we received are already in memory and an ancestor of
// m_best_header or our tip, skip anti-DoS checks. These headers will not
// use any more memory (and we are not leaking information that could be
// used to fingerprint us).
const CBlockIndex *last_received_header{nullptr};
{
LOCK(cs_main);
last_received_header =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(headers.back().GetHash());
if (IsAncestorOfBestHeaderOrTip(last_received_header)) {
already_validated_work = true;
}
}
// If our peer has NetPermissionFlags::NoBan privileges, then bypass our
// anti-DoS logic (this saves bandwidth when we connect to a trusted peer
// on startup).
if (pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan)) {
already_validated_work = true;
}
// At this point, the headers connect to something in our block index.
// Do anti-DoS checks to determine if we should process or store for later
// processing.
if (!already_validated_work &&
TryLowWorkHeadersSync(peer, pfrom, chain_start_header, headers)) {
// If we successfully started a low-work headers sync, then there
// should be no headers to process any further.
Assume(headers.empty());
return;
}
// At this point, we have a set of headers with sufficient work on them
// which can be processed.
// If we don't have the last header, then this peer will have given us
// something new (if these headers are valid).
bool received_new_header{last_received_header == nullptr};
// Now process all the headers.
BlockValidationState state;
if (!m_chainman.ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, /*min_pow_checked=*/true,
state, &pindexLast)) {
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom.GetId(), state, via_compact_block,
"invalid header received");
return;
}
}
Assume(pindexLast);
// Consider fetching more headers if we are not using our headers-sync
// mechanism.
if (nCount == MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS && !have_headers_sync) {
// Headers message had its maximum size; the peer may have more headers.
if (MaybeSendGetHeaders(pfrom, GetLocator(pindexLast), peer)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"more getheaders (%d) to end to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n",
pindexLast->nHeight, pfrom.GetId(), peer.m_starting_height);
}
}
UpdatePeerStateForReceivedHeaders(pfrom, peer, pindexLast,
received_new_header,
nCount == MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS);
// Consider immediately downloading blocks.
HeadersDirectFetchBlocks(config, pfrom, pindexLast);
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessInvalidTx(NodeId nodeid,
const CTransactionRef &ptx,
const TxValidationState &state,
bool maybe_add_extra_compact_tx) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_peer_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const TxId &txid = ptx->GetId();
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n",
txid.ToString(), nodeid, state.ToString());
if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
return;
}
if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE) {
// If the result is TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE, add it to
// m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable because we should not
// download or submit this transaction by itself again, but may submit
// it as part of a package later.
m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.insert(txid);
} else {
m_recent_rejects.insert(txid);
}
m_txrequest.ForgetInvId(txid);
if (maybe_add_extra_compact_tx && RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) {
AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx);
}
MaybePunishNodeForTx(nodeid, state);
// If the tx failed in ProcessOrphanTx, it should be removed from the
// orphanage unless the tx was still missing inputs. If the tx was not in
// the orphanage, EraseTx does nothing and returns 0.
if (m_mempool.withOrphanage([&txid](TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.EraseTx(txid);
}) > 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " removed orphan tx %s\n",
txid.ToString());
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessValidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef &tx) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_peer_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// As this version of the transaction was acceptable, we can forget about
// any requests for it. No-op if the tx is not in txrequest.
m_txrequest.ForgetInvId(tx->GetId());
m_mempool.withOrphanage([&tx](TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
orphanage.AddChildrenToWorkSet(*tx);
// If it came from the orphanage, remove it. No-op if the tx is not in
// txorphanage.
orphanage.EraseTx(tx->GetId());
});
LogPrint(
BCLog::MEMPOOL,
"AcceptToMemoryPool: peer=%d: accepted %s (poolsz %u txn, %u kB)\n",
nodeid, tx->GetId().ToString(), m_mempool.size(),
m_mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000);
RelayTransaction(tx->GetId());
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessPackageResult(
const PackageToValidate &package_to_validate,
const PackageMempoolAcceptResult &package_result) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_peer_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const auto &package = package_to_validate.m_txns;
const auto &senders = package_to_validate.m_senders;
if (package_result.m_state.IsInvalid()) {
m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.insert(GetPackageHash(package));
}
// We currently only expect to process 1-parent-1-child packages. Remove if
// this changes.
if (!Assume(package.size() == 2)) {
return;
}
// Iterate backwards to erase in-package descendants from the orphanage
// before they become relevant in AddChildrenToWorkSet.
auto package_iter = package.rbegin();
auto senders_iter = senders.rbegin();
while (package_iter != package.rend()) {
const auto &tx = *package_iter;
const NodeId nodeid = *senders_iter;
const auto it_result{package_result.m_tx_results.find(tx->GetId())};
// It is not guaranteed that a result exists for every transaction.
if (it_result != package_result.m_tx_results.end()) {
const auto &tx_result = it_result->second;
switch (tx_result.m_result_type) {
case MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID: {
ProcessValidTx(nodeid, tx);
break;
}
case MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID: {
// Don't add to vExtraTxnForCompact, as these transactions
// should have already been added there when added to the
// orphanage or rejected for TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE.
// This should be updated if package submission is ever used
// for transactions that haven't already been validated
// before.
ProcessInvalidTx(nodeid, tx, tx_result.m_state,
/*maybe_add_extra_compact_tx=*/false);
break;
}
case MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::MEMPOOL_ENTRY: {
// AlreadyHaveTx() should be catching transactions that are
// already in mempool.
Assume(false);
break;
}
}
}
package_iter++;
senders_iter++;
}
}
std::optional<PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate>
PeerManagerImpl::Find1P1CPackage(const CTransactionRef &ptx, NodeId nodeid) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_peer_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const auto &parent_txid{ptx->GetId()};
Assume(m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.contains(parent_txid));
// Prefer children from this peer. This helps prevent censorship attempts in
// which an attacker sends lots of fake children for the parent, and we
// (unluckily) keep selecting the fake children instead of the real one
// provided by the honest peer.
const auto cpfp_candidates_same_peer{
m_mempool.withOrphanage([&ptx, nodeid](const TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.GetChildrenFromSamePeer(ptx, nodeid);
})};
// These children should be sorted from newest to oldest.
for (const auto &child : cpfp_candidates_same_peer) {
Package maybe_cpfp_package{ptx, child};
if (!m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.contains(
GetPackageHash(maybe_cpfp_package))) {
return PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate{ptx, child, nodeid,
nodeid};
}
}
// If no suitable candidate from the same peer is found, also try children
// that were provided by a different peer. This is useful because sometimes
// multiple peers announce both transactions to us, and we happen to
// download them from different peers (we wouldn't have known that these 2
// transactions are related). We still want to find 1p1c packages then.
//
// If we start tracking all announcers of orphans, we can restrict this
// logic to parent + child pairs in which both were provided by the same
// peer, i.e. delete this step.
const auto cpfp_candidates_different_peer{
m_mempool.withOrphanage([&ptx, nodeid](const TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.GetChildrenFromDifferentPeer(ptx, nodeid);
})};
// Find the first 1p1c that hasn't already been rejected. We randomize the
// order to not create a bias that attackers can use to delay package
// acceptance.
//
// Create a random permutation of the indices.
std::vector<size_t> tx_indices(cpfp_candidates_different_peer.size());
std::iota(tx_indices.begin(), tx_indices.end(), 0);
Shuffle(tx_indices.begin(), tx_indices.end(), m_rng);
for (const auto index : tx_indices) {
// If we already tried a package and failed for any reason, the combined
// hash was cached in m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.
const auto [child_tx, child_sender] =
cpfp_candidates_different_peer.at(index);
Package maybe_cpfp_package{ptx, child_tx};
if (!m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.contains(
GetPackageHash(maybe_cpfp_package))) {
return PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate{ptx, child_tx, nodeid,
child_sender};
}
}
return std::nullopt;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::ProcessOrphanTx(const Config &config, Peer &peer) {
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
LOCK(cs_main);
while (CTransactionRef porphanTx =
m_mempool.withOrphanage([&peer](TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.GetTxToReconsider(peer.m_id);
})) {
const MempoolAcceptResult result =
m_chainman.ProcessTransaction(porphanTx);
const TxValidationState &state = result.m_state;
const TxId &orphanTxId = porphanTx->GetId();
if (result.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, " accepted orphan tx %s\n",
orphanTxId.ToString());
ProcessValidTx(peer.m_id, porphanTx);
return true;
}
if (state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES,
" invalid orphan tx %s from peer=%d. %s\n",
orphanTxId.ToString(), peer.m_id, state.ToString());
if (Assume(state.IsInvalid() &&
state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_NO_MEMPOOL &&
state.GetResult() !=
TxValidationResult::TX_RESULT_UNSET)) {
ProcessInvalidTx(peer.m_id, porphanTx, state,
/*maybe_add_extra_compact_tx=*/false);
}
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::PrepareBlockFilterRequest(
CNode &node, Peer &peer, BlockFilterType filter_type, uint32_t start_height,
const BlockHash &stop_hash, uint32_t max_height_diff,
const CBlockIndex *&stop_index, BlockFilterIndex *&filter_index) {
const bool supported_filter_type =
(filter_type == BlockFilterType::BASIC &&
(peer.m_our_services & NODE_COMPACT_FILTERS));
if (!supported_filter_type) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"peer %d requested unsupported block filter type: %d\n",
node.GetId(), static_cast<uint8_t>(filter_type));
node.fDisconnect = true;
return false;
}
{
LOCK(cs_main);
stop_index = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(stop_hash);
// Check that the stop block exists and the peer would be allowed to
// fetch it.
if (!stop_index || !BlockRequestAllowed(stop_index)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer %d requested invalid block hash: %s\n",
node.GetId(), stop_hash.ToString());
node.fDisconnect = true;
return false;
}
}
uint32_t stop_height = stop_index->nHeight;
if (start_height > stop_height) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"peer %d sent invalid getcfilters/getcfheaders with " /* Continued
*/
"start height %d and stop height %d\n",
node.GetId(), start_height, stop_height);
node.fDisconnect = true;
return false;
}
if (stop_height - start_height >= max_height_diff) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"peer %d requested too many cfilters/cfheaders: %d / %d\n",
node.GetId(), stop_height - start_height + 1, max_height_diff);
node.fDisconnect = true;
return false;
}
filter_index = GetBlockFilterIndex(filter_type);
if (!filter_index) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Filter index for supported type %s not found\n",
BlockFilterTypeName(filter_type));
return false;
}
return true;
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessGetCFilters(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
CDataStream &vRecv) {
uint8_t filter_type_ser;
uint32_t start_height;
BlockHash stop_hash;
vRecv >> filter_type_ser >> start_height >> stop_hash;
const BlockFilterType filter_type =
static_cast<BlockFilterType>(filter_type_ser);
const CBlockIndex *stop_index;
BlockFilterIndex *filter_index;
if (!PrepareBlockFilterRequest(node, peer, filter_type, start_height,
stop_hash, MAX_GETCFILTERS_SIZE, stop_index,
filter_index)) {
return;
}
std::vector<BlockFilter> filters;
if (!filter_index->LookupFilterRange(start_height, stop_index, filters)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Failed to find block filter in index: filter_type=%s, "
"start_height=%d, stop_hash=%s\n",
BlockFilterTypeName(filter_type), start_height,
stop_hash.ToString());
return;
}
for (const auto &filter : filters) {
CSerializedNetMsg msg = CNetMsgMaker(node.GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::CFILTER, filter);
m_connman.PushMessage(&node, std::move(msg));
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessGetCFHeaders(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
CDataStream &vRecv) {
uint8_t filter_type_ser;
uint32_t start_height;
BlockHash stop_hash;
vRecv >> filter_type_ser >> start_height >> stop_hash;
const BlockFilterType filter_type =
static_cast<BlockFilterType>(filter_type_ser);
const CBlockIndex *stop_index;
BlockFilterIndex *filter_index;
if (!PrepareBlockFilterRequest(node, peer, filter_type, start_height,
stop_hash, MAX_GETCFHEADERS_SIZE, stop_index,
filter_index)) {
return;
}
uint256 prev_header;
if (start_height > 0) {
const CBlockIndex *const prev_block =
stop_index->GetAncestor(static_cast<int>(start_height - 1));
if (!filter_index->LookupFilterHeader(prev_block, prev_header)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Failed to find block filter header in index: "
"filter_type=%s, block_hash=%s\n",
BlockFilterTypeName(filter_type),
prev_block->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return;
}
}
std::vector<uint256> filter_hashes;
if (!filter_index->LookupFilterHashRange(start_height, stop_index,
filter_hashes)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Failed to find block filter hashes in index: filter_type=%s, "
"start_height=%d, stop_hash=%s\n",
BlockFilterTypeName(filter_type), start_height,
stop_hash.ToString());
return;
}
CSerializedNetMsg msg =
CNetMsgMaker(node.GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::CFHEADERS, filter_type_ser,
stop_index->GetBlockHash(), prev_header, filter_hashes);
m_connman.PushMessage(&node, std::move(msg));
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessGetCFCheckPt(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
CDataStream &vRecv) {
uint8_t filter_type_ser;
BlockHash stop_hash;
vRecv >> filter_type_ser >> stop_hash;
const BlockFilterType filter_type =
static_cast<BlockFilterType>(filter_type_ser);
const CBlockIndex *stop_index;
BlockFilterIndex *filter_index;
if (!PrepareBlockFilterRequest(
node, peer, filter_type, /*start_height=*/0, stop_hash,
/*max_height_diff=*/std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max(),
stop_index, filter_index)) {
return;
}
std::vector<uint256> headers(stop_index->nHeight / CFCHECKPT_INTERVAL);
// Populate headers.
const CBlockIndex *block_index = stop_index;
for (int i = headers.size() - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
int height = (i + 1) * CFCHECKPT_INTERVAL;
block_index = block_index->GetAncestor(height);
if (!filter_index->LookupFilterHeader(block_index, headers[i])) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Failed to find block filter header in index: "
"filter_type=%s, block_hash=%s\n",
BlockFilterTypeName(filter_type),
block_index->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return;
}
}
CSerializedNetMsg msg = CNetMsgMaker(node.GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::CFCHECKPT, filter_type_ser,
stop_index->GetBlockHash(), headers);
m_connman.PushMessage(&node, std::move(msg));
}
bool IsAvalancheMessageType(const std::string &msg_type) {
return msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAHELLO ||
msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPOLL ||
msg_type == NetMsgType::AVARESPONSE ||
msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPROOF ||
msg_type == NetMsgType::GETAVAADDR ||
msg_type == NetMsgType::GETAVAPROOFS ||
msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPROOFS ||
msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPROOFSREQ;
}
uint32_t
PeerManagerImpl::GetAvalancheVoteForBlock(const BlockHash &hash) const {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const CBlockIndex *pindex = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash);
// Unknown block.
if (!pindex) {
return -1;
}
// Invalid block
if (pindex->nStatus.isInvalid()) {
return 1;
}
// Parked block
if (pindex->nStatus.isOnParkedChain()) {
return 2;
}
const CBlockIndex *pindexTip = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip();
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork = LastCommonAncestor(pindex, pindexTip);
// Active block.
if (pindex == pindexFork) {
return 0;
}
// Fork block.
if (pindexFork != pindexTip) {
return 3;
}
// Missing block data.
if (!pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
return -2;
}
// This block is built on top of the tip, we have the data, it
// is pending connection or rejection.
return -3;
};
uint32_t PeerManagerImpl::GetAvalancheVoteForTx(const TxId &id) const {
// Accepted in mempool, or in a recent block
if (m_mempool.exists(id) ||
WITH_LOCK(m_recent_confirmed_transactions_mutex,
return m_recent_confirmed_transactions.contains(id))) {
return 0;
}
// Conflicting tx
if (m_mempool.withConflicting([&id](const TxConflicting &conflicting) {
return conflicting.HaveTx(id);
})) {
return 2;
}
// Invalid tx
if (m_recent_rejects.contains(id)) {
return 1;
}
// Orphan tx
if (m_mempool.withOrphanage([&id](const TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.HaveTx(id);
})) {
return -2;
}
// Unknown tx
return -1;
};
/**
* Decide a response for an Avalanche poll about the given proof.
*
* @param[in] id The id of the proof being polled for
* @return Our current vote for the proof
*/
static uint32_t getAvalancheVoteForProof(const avalanche::Processor &avalanche,
const avalanche::ProofId &id) {
return avalanche.withPeerManager([&id](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
// Rejected proof
if (pm.isInvalid(id)) {
return 1;
}
// The proof is actively bound to a peer
if (pm.isBoundToPeer(id)) {
return 0;
}
// Unknown proof
if (!pm.exists(id)) {
return -1;
}
// Immature proof
if (pm.isImmature(id)) {
return 2;
}
// Not immature, but in conflict with an actively bound proof
if (pm.isInConflictingPool(id)) {
return 3;
}
// The proof is known, not rejected, not immature, not a conflict, but
// for some reason unbound. This should not happen if the above pools
// are managed correctly, but added for robustness.
return -2;
});
};
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessBlock(const Config &config, CNode &node,
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &block,
bool force_processing,
bool min_pow_checked) {
bool new_block{false};
m_chainman.ProcessNewBlock(block, force_processing, min_pow_checked,
&new_block, m_avalanche);
if (new_block) {
node.m_last_block_time = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
} else {
LOCK(cs_main);
mapBlockSource.erase(block->GetHash());
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(
const Config &config, CNode &pfrom, const std::string &msg_type,
CDataStream &vRecv, const std::chrono::microseconds time_received,
const std::atomic<bool> &interruptMsgProc) {
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
LogPrint(BCLog::NETDEBUG, "received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d\n",
SanitizeString(msg_type), vRecv.size(), pfrom.GetId());
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef(pfrom.GetId());
if (peer == nullptr) {
return;
}
if (IsAvalancheMessageType(msg_type)) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Avalanche is not initialized, ignoring %s message\n",
msg_type);
return;
}
if (!m_avalanche) {
// If avalanche is not enabled, ignore avalanche messages
return;
}
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::VERSION) {
// Each connection can only send one version message
if (pfrom.nVersion != 0) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 1, "redundant version message");
return;
}
int64_t nTime;
CService addrMe;
uint64_t nNonce = 1;
ServiceFlags nServices;
int nVersion;
std::string cleanSubVer;
int starting_height = -1;
bool fRelay = true;
uint64_t nExtraEntropy = 1;
vRecv >> nVersion >> Using<CustomUintFormatter<8>>(nServices) >> nTime;
if (nTime < 0) {
nTime = 0;
}
// Ignore the addrMe service bits sent by the peer
vRecv.ignore(8);
vRecv >> addrMe;
if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
m_addrman.SetServices(pfrom.addr, nServices);
}
if (pfrom.ExpectServicesFromConn() &&
!HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(nServices)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"peer=%d does not offer the expected services "
"(%08x offered, %08x expected); disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId(), nServices,
GetDesirableServiceFlags(nServices));
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
if (pfrom.IsAvalancheOutboundConnection() &&
!(nServices & NODE_AVALANCHE)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"peer=%d does not offer the avalanche service; disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
if (nVersion < MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION) {
// disconnect from peers older than this proto version
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"peer=%d using obsolete version %i; disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId(), nVersion);
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
if (!vRecv.empty()) {
// The version message includes information about the sending node
// which we don't use:
// - 8 bytes (service bits)
// - 16 bytes (ipv6 address)
// - 2 bytes (port)
vRecv.ignore(26);
vRecv >> nNonce;
}
if (!vRecv.empty()) {
std::string strSubVer;
vRecv >> LIMITED_STRING(strSubVer, MAX_SUBVERSION_LENGTH);
cleanSubVer = SanitizeString(strSubVer);
}
if (!vRecv.empty()) {
vRecv >> starting_height;
}
if (!vRecv.empty()) {
vRecv >> fRelay;
}
if (!vRecv.empty()) {
vRecv >> nExtraEntropy;
}
// Disconnect if we connected to ourself
if (pfrom.IsInboundConn() && !m_connman.CheckIncomingNonce(nNonce)) {
LogPrintf("connected to self at %s, disconnecting\n",
pfrom.addr.ToString());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
if (pfrom.IsInboundConn() && addrMe.IsRoutable()) {
SeenLocal(addrMe);
}
// Inbound peers send us their version message when they connect.
// We send our version message in response.
if (pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
PushNodeVersion(config, pfrom, *peer);
}
// Change version
const int greatest_common_version =
std::min(nVersion, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
pfrom.SetCommonVersion(greatest_common_version);
pfrom.nVersion = nVersion;
const CNetMsgMaker msg_maker(greatest_common_version);
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom, msg_maker.Make(NetMsgType::VERACK));
// Signal ADDRv2 support (BIP155).
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom, msg_maker.Make(NetMsgType::SENDADDRV2));
pfrom.m_has_all_wanted_services =
HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(nServices);
peer->m_their_services = nServices;
pfrom.SetAddrLocal(addrMe);
{
LOCK(pfrom.m_subver_mutex);
pfrom.cleanSubVer = cleanSubVer;
}
peer->m_starting_height = starting_height;
// We only initialize the m_tx_relay data structure if:
// - this isn't an outbound block-relay-only connection; and
// - fRelay=true or we're offering NODE_BLOOM to this peer
// (NODE_BLOOM means that the peer may turn on tx relay later)
if (!pfrom.IsBlockOnlyConn() &&
(fRelay || (peer->m_our_services & NODE_BLOOM))) {
auto *const tx_relay = peer->SetTxRelay();
{
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
// set to true after we get the first filter* message
tx_relay->m_relay_txs = fRelay;
}
if (fRelay) {
pfrom.m_relays_txs = true;
}
}
pfrom.nRemoteHostNonce = nNonce;
pfrom.nRemoteExtraEntropy = nExtraEntropy;
// Potentially mark this peer as a preferred download peer.
{
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState *state = State(pfrom.GetId());
state->fPreferredDownload =
(!pfrom.IsInboundConn() ||
pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan)) &&
!pfrom.IsAddrFetchConn() && CanServeBlocks(*peer);
m_num_preferred_download_peers += state->fPreferredDownload;
}
// Self advertisement & GETADDR logic
if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn() && SetupAddressRelay(pfrom, *peer)) {
// For outbound peers, we try to relay our address (so that other
// nodes can try to find us more quickly, as we have no guarantee
// that an outbound peer is even aware of how to reach us) and do a
// one-time address fetch (to help populate/update our addrman). If
// we're starting up for the first time, our addrman may be pretty
// empty and no one will know who we are, so these mechanisms are
// important to help us connect to the network.
//
// We skip this for block-relay-only peers. We want to avoid
// potentially leaking addr information and we do not want to
// indicate to the peer that we will participate in addr relay.
if (fListen &&
!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
CAddress addr{GetLocalAddress(pfrom.addr), peer->m_our_services,
AdjustedTime()};
if (addr.IsRoutable()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"ProcessMessages: advertising address %s\n",
addr.ToString());
PushAddress(*peer, addr);
} else if (IsPeerAddrLocalGood(&pfrom)) {
// Override just the address with whatever the peer sees us
// as. Leave the port in addr as it was returned by
// GetLocalAddress() above, as this is an outbound
// connection and the peer cannot observe our listening
// port.
addr.SetIP(addrMe);
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"ProcessMessages: advertising address %s\n",
addr.ToString());
PushAddress(*peer, addr);
}
}
// Get recent addresses
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(greatest_common_version)
.Make(NetMsgType::GETADDR));
peer->m_getaddr_sent = true;
// When requesting a getaddr, accept an additional MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND
// addresses in response (bypassing the
// MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET limit).
WITH_LOCK(peer->m_addr_token_bucket_mutex,
peer->m_addr_token_bucket += m_opts.max_addr_to_send);
}
if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
// For non-inbound connections, we update the addrman to record
// connection success so that addrman will have an up-to-date
// notion of which peers are online and available.
//
// While we strive to not leak information about block-relay-only
// connections via the addrman, not moving an address to the tried
// table is also potentially detrimental because new-table entries
// are subject to eviction in the event of addrman collisions. We
// mitigate the information-leak by never calling
// AddrMan::Connected() on block-relay-only peers; see
// FinalizeNode().
//
// This moves an address from New to Tried table in Addrman,
// resolves tried-table collisions, etc.
m_addrman.Good(pfrom.addr);
}
std::string remoteAddr;
if (fLogIPs) {
remoteAddr = ", peeraddr=" + pfrom.addr.ToString();
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"receive version message: [%s] %s: version %d, blocks=%d, "
"us=%s, txrelay=%d, peer=%d%s\n",
pfrom.addr.ToString(), cleanSubVer, pfrom.nVersion,
peer->m_starting_height, addrMe.ToString(), fRelay,
pfrom.GetId(), remoteAddr);
int64_t currentTime = GetTime();
int64_t nTimeOffset = nTime - currentTime;
pfrom.nTimeOffset = nTimeOffset;
if (nTime < int64_t(m_chainparams.GenesisBlock().nTime)) {
// Ignore time offsets that are improbable (before the Genesis
// block) and may underflow our adjusted time.
Misbehaving(*peer, 20,
"Ignoring invalid timestamp in version message");
} else if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
// Don't use timedata samples from inbound peers to make it
// harder for others to tamper with our adjusted time.
AddTimeData(pfrom.addr, nTimeOffset);
}
// Feeler connections exist only to verify if address is online.
if (pfrom.IsFeelerConn()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"feeler connection completed peer=%d; disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
}
return;
}
if (pfrom.nVersion == 0) {
// Must have a version message before anything else
Misbehaving(*peer, 10, "non-version message before version handshake");
return;
}
// At this point, the outgoing message serialization version can't change.
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom.GetCommonVersion());
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::VERACK) {
if (pfrom.fSuccessfullyConnected) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"ignoring redundant verack message from peer=%d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
LogPrintf(
"New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, "
"peer=%d%s (%s)\n",
pfrom.nVersion.load(), peer->m_starting_height, pfrom.GetId(),
(fLogIPs ? strprintf(", peeraddr=%s", pfrom.addr.ToString())
: ""),
pfrom.ConnectionTypeAsString());
}
if (pfrom.GetCommonVersion() >= SHORT_IDS_BLOCKS_VERSION) {
// Tell our peer we are willing to provide version 1
// cmpctblocks. However, we do not request new block announcements
// using cmpctblock messages. We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers
// as well, because they may wish to request compact blocks from us.
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT, /*high_bandwidth=*/false,
/*version=*/CMPCTBLOCKS_VERSION));
}
if (m_avalanche) {
if (m_avalanche->sendHello(&pfrom)) {
auto localProof = m_avalanche->getLocalProof();
if (localProof) {
AddKnownProof(*peer, localProof->getId());
// Add our proof id to the list or the recently announced
// proof INVs to this peer. This is used for filtering which
// INV can be requested for download.
peer->m_proof_relay->m_recently_announced_proofs.insert(
localProof->getId());
}
}
}
pfrom.fSuccessfullyConnected = true;
return;
}
if (!pfrom.fSuccessfullyConnected) {
// Must have a verack message before anything else
Misbehaving(*peer, 10, "non-verack message before version handshake");
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::ADDR || msg_type == NetMsgType::ADDRV2) {
int stream_version = vRecv.GetVersion();
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::ADDRV2) {
// Add ADDRV2_FORMAT to the version so that the CNetAddr and
// CAddress unserialize methods know that an address in v2 format is
// coming.
stream_version |= ADDRV2_FORMAT;
}
OverrideStream<CDataStream> s(&vRecv, vRecv.GetType(), stream_version);
std::vector<CAddress> vAddr;
s >> vAddr;
if (!SetupAddressRelay(pfrom, *peer)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "ignoring %s message from %s peer=%d\n",
msg_type, pfrom.ConnectionTypeAsString(), pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
if (vAddr.size() > m_opts.max_addr_to_send) {
Misbehaving(
*peer, 20,
strprintf("%s message size = %u", msg_type, vAddr.size()));
return;
}
// Store the new addresses
std::vector<CAddress> vAddrOk;
const auto current_a_time{AdjustedTime()};
// Update/increment addr rate limiting bucket.
const auto current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>();
{
LOCK(peer->m_addr_token_bucket_mutex);
if (peer->m_addr_token_bucket < MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET) {
// Don't increment bucket if it's already full
const auto time_diff =
std::max(current_time - peer->m_addr_token_timestamp, 0us);
const double increment =
CountSecondsDouble(time_diff) * MAX_ADDR_RATE_PER_SECOND;
peer->m_addr_token_bucket =
std::min<double>(peer->m_addr_token_bucket + increment,
MAX_ADDR_PROCESSING_TOKEN_BUCKET);
}
}
peer->m_addr_token_timestamp = current_time;
const bool rate_limited =
!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Addr);
uint64_t num_proc = 0;
uint64_t num_rate_limit = 0;
Shuffle(vAddr.begin(), vAddr.end(), m_rng);
for (CAddress &addr : vAddr) {
if (interruptMsgProc) {
return;
}
{
LOCK(peer->m_addr_token_bucket_mutex);
// Apply rate limiting.
if (peer->m_addr_token_bucket < 1.0) {
if (rate_limited) {
++num_rate_limit;
continue;
}
} else {
peer->m_addr_token_bucket -= 1.0;
}
}
// We only bother storing full nodes, though this may include things
// which we would not make an outbound connection to, in part
// because we may make feeler connections to them.
if (!MayHaveUsefulAddressDB(addr.nServices) &&
!HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(addr.nServices)) {
continue;
}
if (addr.nTime <= NodeSeconds{100000000s} ||
addr.nTime > current_a_time + 10min) {
addr.nTime = current_a_time - 5 * 24h;
}
AddAddressKnown(*peer, addr);
if (m_banman &&
(m_banman->IsDiscouraged(addr) || m_banman->IsBanned(addr))) {
// Do not process banned/discouraged addresses beyond
// remembering we received them
continue;
}
++num_proc;
bool fReachable = IsReachable(addr);
if (addr.nTime > current_a_time - 10min && !peer->m_getaddr_sent &&
vAddr.size() <= 10 && addr.IsRoutable()) {
// Relay to a limited number of other nodes
RelayAddress(pfrom.GetId(), addr, fReachable);
}
// Do not store addresses outside our network
if (fReachable) {
vAddrOk.push_back(addr);
}
}
peer->m_addr_processed += num_proc;
peer->m_addr_rate_limited += num_rate_limit;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Received addr: %u addresses (%u processed, %u rate-limited) "
"from peer=%d\n",
vAddr.size(), num_proc, num_rate_limit, pfrom.GetId());
m_addrman.Add(vAddrOk, pfrom.addr, 2h);
if (vAddr.size() < 1000) {
peer->m_getaddr_sent = false;
}
// AddrFetch: Require multiple addresses to avoid disconnecting on
// self-announcements
if (pfrom.IsAddrFetchConn() && vAddr.size() > 1) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"addrfetch connection completed peer=%d; disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::SENDADDRV2) {
peer->m_wants_addrv2 = true;
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::SENDHEADERS) {
peer->m_prefers_headers = true;
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::SENDCMPCT) {
bool sendcmpct_hb{false};
uint64_t sendcmpct_version{0};
vRecv >> sendcmpct_hb >> sendcmpct_version;
if (sendcmpct_version != CMPCTBLOCKS_VERSION) {
return;
}
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom.GetId());
nodestate->m_provides_cmpctblocks = true;
nodestate->m_requested_hb_cmpctblocks = sendcmpct_hb;
// save whether peer selects us as BIP152 high-bandwidth peer
// (receiving sendcmpct(1) signals high-bandwidth,
// sendcmpct(0) low-bandwidth)
pfrom.m_bip152_highbandwidth_from = sendcmpct_hb;
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::INV) {
std::vector<CInv> vInv;
vRecv >> vInv;
if (vInv.size() > MAX_INV_SZ) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 20,
strprintf("inv message size = %u", vInv.size()));
return;
}
// Reject tx INVs when the -blocksonly setting is enabled, or this is a
// block-relay-only peer
bool reject_tx_invs{m_opts.ignore_incoming_txs ||
pfrom.IsBlockOnlyConn()};
// Allow peers with relay permission to send data other than blocks
// in blocks only mode
if (pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Relay)) {
reject_tx_invs = false;
}
const auto current_time{GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>()};
std::optional<BlockHash> best_block;
auto logInv = [&](const CInv &inv, bool fAlreadyHave) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "got inv: %s %s peer=%d\n", inv.ToString(),
fAlreadyHave ? "have" : "new", pfrom.GetId());
};
for (CInv &inv : vInv) {
if (interruptMsgProc) {
return;
}
if (inv.IsMsgStakeContender()) {
// Ignore invs with stake contenders. This type is only used for
// polling.
continue;
}
if (inv.IsMsgBlk()) {
LOCK(cs_main);
const bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHaveBlock(BlockHash(inv.hash));
logInv(inv, fAlreadyHave);
BlockHash hash{inv.hash};
UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom.GetId(), hash);
if (!fAlreadyHave && !m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks() &&
!IsBlockRequested(hash)) {
// Headers-first is the primary method of announcement on
// the network. If a node fell back to sending blocks by
// inv, it may be for a re-org, or because we haven't
// completed initial headers sync. The final block hash
// provided should be the highest, so send a getheaders and
// then fetch the blocks we need to catch up.
best_block = std::move(hash);
}
continue;
}
if (inv.IsMsgProof()) {
const avalanche::ProofId proofid(inv.hash);
const bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHaveProof(proofid);
logInv(inv, fAlreadyHave);
AddKnownProof(*peer, proofid);
if (!fAlreadyHave && m_avalanche &&
!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
const bool preferred = isPreferredDownloadPeer(pfrom);
LOCK(cs_proofrequest);
AddProofAnnouncement(pfrom, proofid, current_time,
preferred);
}
continue;
}
if (inv.IsMsgTx()) {
LOCK(cs_main);
const TxId txid(inv.hash);
const bool fAlreadyHave =
AlreadyHaveTx(txid, /*include_reconsiderable=*/true);
logInv(inv, fAlreadyHave);
AddKnownTx(*peer, txid);
if (reject_tx_invs) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of "
"protocol, disconnecting peer=%d\n",
txid.ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
} else if (!fAlreadyHave && !m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()
.IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
AddTxAnnouncement(pfrom, txid, current_time);
}
continue;
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Unknown inv type \"%s\" received from peer=%d\n",
inv.ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
}
if (best_block) {
// If we haven't started initial headers-sync with this peer, then
// consider sending a getheaders now. On initial startup, there's a
// reliability vs bandwidth tradeoff, where we are only trying to do
// initial headers sync with one peer at a time, with a long
// timeout (at which point, if the sync hasn't completed, we will
// disconnect the peer and then choose another). In the meantime,
// as new blocks are found, we are willing to add one new peer per
// block to sync with as well, to sync quicker in the case where
// our initial peer is unresponsive (but less bandwidth than we'd
// use if we turned on sync with all peers).
LOCK(::cs_main);
CNodeState &state{*Assert(State(pfrom.GetId()))};
if (state.fSyncStarted ||
(!peer->m_inv_triggered_getheaders_before_sync &&
*best_block != m_last_block_inv_triggering_headers_sync)) {
if (MaybeSendGetHeaders(
pfrom, GetLocator(m_chainman.m_best_header), *peer)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getheaders (%d) %s to peer=%d\n",
m_chainman.m_best_header->nHeight,
best_block->ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
}
if (!state.fSyncStarted) {
peer->m_inv_triggered_getheaders_before_sync = true;
// Update the last block hash that triggered a new headers
// sync, so that we don't turn on headers sync with more
// than 1 new peer every new block.
m_last_block_inv_triggering_headers_sync = *best_block;
}
}
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETDATA) {
std::vector<CInv> vInv;
vRecv >> vInv;
if (vInv.size() > MAX_INV_SZ) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 20,
strprintf("getdata message size = %u", vInv.size()));
return;
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received getdata (%u invsz) peer=%d\n",
vInv.size(), pfrom.GetId());
if (vInv.size() > 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received getdata for: %s peer=%d\n",
vInv[0].ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
}
{
LOCK(peer->m_getdata_requests_mutex);
peer->m_getdata_requests.insert(peer->m_getdata_requests.end(),
vInv.begin(), vInv.end());
ProcessGetData(config, pfrom, *peer, interruptMsgProc);
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETBLOCKS) {
CBlockLocator locator;
uint256 hashStop;
vRecv >> locator >> hashStop;
if (locator.vHave.size() > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"getblocks locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d\n",
locator.vHave.size(), MAX_LOCATOR_SZ, pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
// We might have announced the currently-being-connected tip using a
// compact block, which resulted in the peer sending a getblocks
// request, which we would otherwise respond to without the new block.
// To avoid this situation we simply verify that we are on our best
// known chain now. This is super overkill, but we handle it better
// for getheaders requests, and there are no known nodes which support
// compact blocks but still use getblocks to request blocks.
{
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> a_recent_block;
{
LOCK(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
a_recent_block = m_most_recent_block;
}
BlockValidationState state;
if (!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().ActivateBestChain(
state, a_recent_block, m_avalanche)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n",
state.ToString());
}
}
LOCK(cs_main);
// Find the last block the caller has in the main chain
const CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().FindForkInGlobalIndex(locator);
// Send the rest of the chain
if (pindex) {
pindex = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Next(pindex);
}
int nLimit = 500;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getblocks %d to %s limit %d from peer=%d\n",
(pindex ? pindex->nHeight : -1),
hashStop.IsNull() ? "end" : hashStop.ToString(), nLimit,
pfrom.GetId());
for (; pindex; pindex = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Next(pindex)) {
if (pindex->GetBlockHash() == hashStop) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, " getblocks stopping at %d %s\n",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
break;
}
// If pruning, don't inv blocks unless we have on disk and are
// likely to still have for some reasonable time window (1 hour)
// that block relay might require.
const int nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave =
MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP -
3600 / m_chainparams.GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing;
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.IsPruneMode() &&
(!pindex->nStatus.hasData() ||
pindex->nHeight <= m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nHeight -
nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
" getblocks stopping, pruned or too old block at %d %s\n",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
break;
}
WITH_LOCK(
peer->m_block_inv_mutex,
peer->m_blocks_for_inv_relay.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHash()));
if (--nLimit <= 0) {
// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
// trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
WITH_LOCK(peer->m_block_inv_mutex, {
peer->m_continuation_block = pindex->GetBlockHash();
});
break;
}
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETBLOCKTXN) {
BlockTransactionsRequest req;
vRecv >> req;
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> recent_block;
{
LOCK(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
if (m_most_recent_block_hash == req.blockhash) {
recent_block = m_most_recent_block;
}
// Unlock m_most_recent_block_mutex to avoid cs_main lock inversion
}
if (recent_block) {
SendBlockTransactions(pfrom, *peer, *recent_block, req);
return;
}
{
LOCK(cs_main);
const CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(req.blockhash);
if (!pindex || !pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block we don't have\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
if (pindex->nHeight >=
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Height() - MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH) {
CBlock block;
const bool ret{
m_chainman.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindex)};
assert(ret);
SendBlockTransactions(pfrom, *peer, block, req);
return;
}
}
// If an older block is requested (should never happen in practice,
// but can happen in tests) send a block response instead of a
// blocktxn response. Sending a full block response instead of a
// small blocktxn response is preferable in the case where a peer
// might maliciously send lots of getblocktxn requests to trigger
// expensive disk reads, because it will require the peer to
// actually receive all the data read from disk over the network.
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block > %i deep\n",
pfrom.GetId(), MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH);
CInv inv;
inv.type = MSG_BLOCK;
inv.hash = req.blockhash;
WITH_LOCK(peer->m_getdata_requests_mutex,
peer->m_getdata_requests.push_back(inv));
// The message processing loop will go around again (without pausing)
// and we'll respond then (without cs_main)
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETHEADERS) {
CBlockLocator locator;
BlockHash hashStop;
vRecv >> locator >> hashStop;
if (locator.vHave.size() > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"getheaders locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d\n",
locator.vHave.size(), MAX_LOCATOR_SZ, pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d while importing/reindexing\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
LOCK(cs_main);
// Note that if we were to be on a chain that forks from the
// checkpointed chain, then serving those headers to a peer that has
// seen the checkpointed chain would cause that peer to disconnect us.
// Requiring that our chainwork exceed the minimum chainwork is a
// protection against being fed a bogus chain when we started up for
// the first time and getting partitioned off the honest network for
// serving that chain to others.
if (m_chainman.ActiveTip() == nullptr ||
(m_chainman.ActiveTip()->nChainWork <
m_chainman.MinimumChainWork() &&
!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Download))) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because active chain "
"has too little work; sending empty response\n",
pfrom.GetId());
// Just respond with an empty headers message, to tell the peer to
// go away but not treat us as unresponsive.
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::HEADERS,
std::vector<CBlock>()));
return;
}
CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom.GetId());
const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr;
if (locator.IsNull()) {
// If locator is null, return the hashStop block
pindex = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hashStop);
if (!pindex) {
return;
}
if (!BlockRequestAllowed(pindex)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"%s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old block "
"header that isn't in the main chain\n",
__func__, pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
} else {
// Find the last block the caller has in the main chain
pindex =
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().FindForkInGlobalIndex(locator);
if (pindex) {
pindex = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Next(pindex);
}
}
// we must use CBlocks, as CBlockHeaders won't include the 0x00 nTx
// count at the end
std::vector<CBlock> vHeaders;
int nLimit = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "getheaders %d to %s from peer=%d\n",
(pindex ? pindex->nHeight : -1),
hashStop.IsNull() ? "end" : hashStop.ToString(),
pfrom.GetId());
for (; pindex; pindex = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Next(pindex)) {
vHeaders.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHeader());
if (--nLimit <= 0 || pindex->GetBlockHash() == hashStop) {
break;
}
}
// pindex can be nullptr either if we sent
// m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip() OR if our peer has
// m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip() (and thus we are sending an empty
// headers message). In both cases it's safe to update
// pindexBestHeaderSent to be our tip.
//
// It is important that we simply reset the BestHeaderSent value here,
// and not max(BestHeaderSent, newHeaderSent). We might have announced
// the currently-being-connected tip using a compact block, which
// resulted in the peer sending a headers request, which we respond to
// without the new block. By resetting the BestHeaderSent, we ensure we
// will re-announce the new block via headers (or compact blocks again)
// in the SendMessages logic.
nodestate->pindexBestHeaderSent =
pindex ? pindex : m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip();
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::HEADERS, vHeaders));
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::TX) {
// Stop processing the transaction early if
// 1) We are in blocks only mode and peer has no relay permission; OR
// 2) This peer is a block-relay-only peer
if ((m_opts.ignore_incoming_txs &&
!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Relay)) ||
pfrom.IsBlockOnlyConn()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=%d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
// Stop processing the transaction early if we are still in IBD since we
// don't have enough information to validate it yet. Sending unsolicited
// transactions is not considered a protocol violation, so don't punish
// the peer.
if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
return;
}
CTransactionRef ptx;
vRecv >> ptx;
const CTransaction &tx = *ptx;
const TxId &txid = tx.GetId();
AddKnownTx(*peer, txid);
LOCK(cs_main);
m_txrequest.ReceivedResponse(pfrom.GetId(), txid);
if (AlreadyHaveTx(txid, /*include_reconsiderable=*/true)) {
if (pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::ForceRelay)) {
// Always relay transactions received from peers with
// forcerelay permission, even if they were already in the
// mempool, allowing the node to function as a gateway for
// nodes hidden behind it.
if (!m_mempool.exists(tx.GetId())) {
LogPrintf("Not relaying non-mempool transaction %s from "
"forcerelay peer=%d\n",
tx.GetId().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
} else {
LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from peer=%d\n",
tx.GetId().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
RelayTransaction(tx.GetId());
}
}
if (m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.contains(txid)) {
// When a transaction is already in
// m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable, we shouldn't submit
// it by itself again. However, look for a matching child in the
// orphanage, as it is possible that they succeed as a package.
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES,
"found tx %s in reconsiderable rejects, looking for "
"child in orphanage\n",
txid.ToString());
if (auto package_to_validate{
Find1P1CPackage(ptx, pfrom.GetId())}) {
const auto package_result{ProcessNewPackage(
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate(), m_mempool,
package_to_validate->m_txns, /*test_accept=*/false)};
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES,
"package evaluation for %s: %s (%s)\n",
package_to_validate->ToString(),
package_result.m_state.IsValid()
? "package accepted"
: "package rejected",
package_result.m_state.ToString());
ProcessPackageResult(package_to_validate.value(),
package_result);
}
}
// If a tx is detected by m_recent_rejects it is ignored. Because we
// haven't submitted the tx to our mempool, we won't have computed a
// DoS score for it or determined exactly why we consider it
// invalid.
//
// This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a
// DoSy tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us)
// because we have to account for m_recent_rejects showing false
// positives. In other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we
// aren't *sure* they submitted a DoSy tx.
//
// Note that m_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
// transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may
// be due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket
// penalize a peer simply for relaying a tx that our
// m_recent_rejects has caught, regardless of false positives.
return;
}
const MempoolAcceptResult result = m_chainman.ProcessTransaction(ptx);
const TxValidationState &state = result.m_state;
if (result.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
ProcessValidTx(pfrom.GetId(), ptx);
pfrom.m_last_tx_time = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
} else if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
// It may be the case that the orphans parents have all been
// rejected.
bool fRejectedParents = false;
// Deduplicate parent txids, so that we don't have to loop over
// the same parent txid more than once down below.
std::vector<TxId> unique_parents;
unique_parents.reserve(tx.vin.size());
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
// We start with all parents, and then remove duplicates below.
unique_parents.push_back(txin.prevout.GetTxId());
}
std::sort(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end());
unique_parents.erase(
std::unique(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end()),
unique_parents.end());
// Distinguish between parents in m_recent_rejects and
// m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable. We can tolerate having
// up to 1 parent in m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable since
// we submit 1p1c packages. However, fail immediately if any are in
// m_recent_rejects.
std::optional<TxId> rejected_parent_reconsiderable;
for (const TxId &parent_txid : unique_parents) {
if (m_recent_rejects.contains(parent_txid)) {
fRejectedParents = true;
break;
}
if (m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable.contains(
parent_txid) &&
!m_mempool.exists(parent_txid)) {
// More than 1 parent in
// m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable:
// 1p1c will not be sufficient to accept this package, so
// just give up here.
if (rejected_parent_reconsiderable.has_value()) {
fRejectedParents = true;
break;
}
rejected_parent_reconsiderable = parent_txid;
}
}
if (!fRejectedParents) {
const auto current_time{GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>()};
for (const TxId &parent_txid : unique_parents) {
// FIXME: MSG_TX should use a TxHash, not a TxId.
AddKnownTx(*peer, parent_txid);
// Exclude m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable: the
// missing parent may have been previously rejected for
// being too low feerate. This orphan might CPFP it.
if (!AlreadyHaveTx(parent_txid,
/*include_reconsiderable=*/false)) {
AddTxAnnouncement(pfrom, parent_txid, current_time);
}
}
// NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS because we can't annotate for
// g_msgproc_mutex
if (unsigned int nEvicted =
m_mempool.withOrphanage(
[&](TxOrphanage &orphanage)
NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS {
if (orphanage.AddTx(ptx, pfrom.GetId())) {
AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx);
}
return orphanage.LimitTxs(
m_opts.max_orphan_txs, m_rng);
}) > 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES,
"orphanage overflow, removed %u tx\n", nEvicted);
}
// Once added to the orphan pool, a tx is considered
// AlreadyHave, and we shouldn't request it anymore.
m_txrequest.ForgetInvId(tx.GetId());
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL,
"not keeping orphan with rejected parents %s\n",
tx.GetId().ToString());
// We will continue to reject this tx since it has rejected
// parents so avoid re-requesting it from other peers.
m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetId());
m_txrequest.ForgetInvId(tx.GetId());
}
}
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
ProcessInvalidTx(pfrom.GetId(), ptx, state,
/*maybe_add_extra_compact_tx=*/true);
}
// When a transaction fails for TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE, look for a
// matching child in the orphanage, as it is possible that they succeed
// as a package.
if (state.GetResult() ==
TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE) {
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES,
"tx %s failed but reconsiderable, looking for child in "
"orphanage\n",
txid.ToString());
if (auto package_to_validate{Find1P1CPackage(ptx, pfrom.GetId())}) {
const auto package_result{ProcessNewPackage(
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate(), m_mempool,
package_to_validate->m_txns, /*test_accept=*/false)};
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES,
"package evaluation for %s: %s (%s)\n",
package_to_validate->ToString(),
package_result.m_state.IsValid() ? "package accepted"
: "package rejected",
package_result.m_state.ToString());
ProcessPackageResult(package_to_validate.value(),
package_result);
}
}
- if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT) {
+ if (state.GetResult() ==
+ TxValidationResult::TX_AVALANCHE_RECONSIDERABLE) {
unsigned int nEvicted{0};
// NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS because of g_msgproc_mutex required in
// the lambda for m_rng
m_mempool.withConflicting(
[&](TxConflicting &conflicting) NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS {
conflicting.AddTx(ptx, pfrom.GetId());
nEvicted =
conflicting.LimitTxs(m_opts.max_conflicting_txs, m_rng);
});
if (nEvicted > 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES,
"conflicting pool overflow, removed %u tx\n",
nEvicted);
}
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK) {
// Ignore cmpctblock received while importing
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Unexpected cmpctblock message received from peer %d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock;
try {
vRecv >> cmpctblock;
} catch (std::ios_base::failure &e) {
// This block has non contiguous or overflowing indexes
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "cmpctblock-bad-indexes");
return;
}
bool received_new_header = false;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
const CBlockIndex *prev_block =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(
cmpctblock.header.hashPrevBlock);
if (!prev_block) {
// Doesn't connect (or is genesis), instead of DoSing in
// AcceptBlockHeader, request deeper headers
if (!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
MaybeSendGetHeaders(
pfrom, GetLocator(m_chainman.m_best_header), *peer);
}
return;
}
if (prev_block->nChainWork +
CalculateHeadersWork({cmpctblock.header}) <
GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
// If we get a low-work header in a compact block, we can ignore
// it.
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Ignoring low-work compact block from peer %d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
if (!m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(
cmpctblock.header.GetHash())) {
received_new_header = true;
}
}
const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr;
BlockValidationState state;
if (!m_chainman.ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header},
/*min_pow_checked=*/true, state,
&pindex)) {
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom.GetId(), state,
/*via_compact_block*/ true,
"invalid header via cmpctblock");
return;
}
}
// When we succeed in decoding a block's txids from a cmpctblock
// message we typically jump to the BLOCKTXN handling code, with a
// dummy (empty) BLOCKTXN message, to re-use the logic there in
// completing processing of the putative block (without cs_main).
bool fProcessBLOCKTXN = false;
CDataStream blockTxnMsg(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
// If we end up treating this as a plain headers message, call that as
// well
// without cs_main.
bool fRevertToHeaderProcessing = false;
// Keep a CBlock for "optimistic" compactblock reconstructions (see
// below)
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
bool fBlockReconstructed = false;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
// If AcceptBlockHeader returned true, it set pindex
assert(pindex);
UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom.GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash());
CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom.GetId());
// If this was a new header with more work than our tip, update the
// peer's last block announcement time
if (received_new_header &&
pindex->nChainWork >
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork) {
nodestate->m_last_block_announcement = GetTime();
}
std::map<BlockHash,
std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator>>::
iterator blockInFlightIt =
mapBlocksInFlight.find(pindex->GetBlockHash());
bool fAlreadyInFlight = blockInFlightIt != mapBlocksInFlight.end();
if (pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
// Nothing to do here
return;
}
if (pindex->nChainWork <=
m_chainman.ActiveChain()
.Tip()
->nChainWork || // We know something better
pindex->nTx != 0) {
// We had this block at some point, but pruned it
if (fAlreadyInFlight) {
// We requested this block for some reason, but our mempool
// will probably be useless so we just grab the block via
// normal getdata.
std::vector<CInv> vInv(1);
vInv[0] = CInv(MSG_BLOCK, cmpctblock.header.GetHash());
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vInv));
}
return;
}
// If we're not close to tip yet, give up and let parallel block
// fetch work its magic.
if (!fAlreadyInFlight && !CanDirectFetch()) {
return;
}
// We want to be a bit conservative just to be extra careful about
// DoS possibilities in compact block processing...
if (pindex->nHeight <= m_chainman.ActiveChain().Height() + 2) {
if ((!fAlreadyInFlight && nodestate->nBlocksInFlight <
MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) ||
(fAlreadyInFlight &&
blockInFlightIt->second.first == pfrom.GetId())) {
std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator *queuedBlockIt = nullptr;
if (!BlockRequested(config, pfrom.GetId(), *pindex,
&queuedBlockIt)) {
if (!(*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock) {
(*queuedBlockIt)
->partialBlock.reset(
new PartiallyDownloadedBlock(config,
&m_mempool));
} else {
// The block was already in flight using compact
// blocks from the same peer.
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Peer sent us compact block "
"we were already syncing!\n");
return;
}
}
PartiallyDownloadedBlock &partialBlock =
*(*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock;
ReadStatus status =
partialBlock.InitData(cmpctblock, vExtraTxnForCompact);
if (status == READ_STATUS_INVALID) {
// Reset in-flight state in case Misbehaving does not
// result in a disconnect
RemoveBlockRequest(pindex->GetBlockHash());
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "invalid compact block");
return;
} else if (status == READ_STATUS_FAILED) {
// Duplicate txindices, the block is now in-flight, so
// just request it.
std::vector<CInv> vInv(1);
vInv[0] = CInv(MSG_BLOCK, cmpctblock.header.GetHash());
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vInv));
return;
}
BlockTransactionsRequest req;
for (size_t i = 0; i < cmpctblock.BlockTxCount(); i++) {
if (!partialBlock.IsTxAvailable(i)) {
req.indices.push_back(i);
}
}
if (req.indices.empty()) {
// Dirty hack to jump to BLOCKTXN code (TODO: move
// message handling into their own functions)
BlockTransactions txn;
txn.blockhash = cmpctblock.header.GetHash();
blockTxnMsg << txn;
fProcessBLOCKTXN = true;
} else {
req.blockhash = pindex->GetBlockHash();
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETBLOCKTXN, req));
}
} else {
// This block is either already in flight from a different
// peer, or this peer has too many blocks outstanding to
// download from. Optimistically try to reconstruct anyway
// since we might be able to without any round trips.
PartiallyDownloadedBlock tempBlock(config, &m_mempool);
ReadStatus status =
tempBlock.InitData(cmpctblock, vExtraTxnForCompact);
if (status != READ_STATUS_OK) {
// TODO: don't ignore failures
return;
}
std::vector<CTransactionRef> dummy;
status = tempBlock.FillBlock(*pblock, dummy);
if (status == READ_STATUS_OK) {
fBlockReconstructed = true;
}
}
} else {
if (fAlreadyInFlight) {
// We requested this block, but its far into the future, so
// our mempool will probably be useless - request the block
// normally.
std::vector<CInv> vInv(1);
vInv[0] = CInv(MSG_BLOCK, cmpctblock.header.GetHash());
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vInv));
return;
} else {
// If this was an announce-cmpctblock, we want the same
// treatment as a header message.
fRevertToHeaderProcessing = true;
}
}
} // cs_main
if (fProcessBLOCKTXN) {
return ProcessMessage(config, pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN,
blockTxnMsg, time_received, interruptMsgProc);
}
if (fRevertToHeaderProcessing) {
// Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be
// relayed before full validation (see BIP 152), so we don't want to
// disconnect the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid
// block. Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain,
// that will be detected and the peer will be banned.
return ProcessHeadersMessage(config, pfrom, *peer,
{cmpctblock.header},
/*via_compact_block=*/true);
}
if (fBlockReconstructed) {
// If we got here, we were able to optimistically reconstruct a
// block that is in flight from some other peer.
{
LOCK(cs_main);
mapBlockSource.emplace(pblock->GetHash(),
std::make_pair(pfrom.GetId(), false));
}
// Setting force_processing to true means that we bypass some of
// our anti-DoS protections in AcceptBlock, which filters
// unrequested blocks that might be trying to waste our resources
// (eg disk space). Because we only try to reconstruct blocks when
// we're close to caught up (via the CanDirectFetch() requirement
// above, combined with the behavior of not requesting blocks until
// we have a chain with at least the minimum chain work), and we
// ignore compact blocks with less work than our tip, it is safe to
// treat reconstructed compact blocks as having been requested.
ProcessBlock(config, pfrom, pblock, /*force_processing=*/true,
/*min_pow_checked=*/true);
// hold cs_main for CBlockIndex::IsValid()
LOCK(cs_main);
if (pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS)) {
// Clear download state for this block, which is in process from
// some other peer. We do this after calling. ProcessNewBlock so
// that a malleated cmpctblock announcement can't be used to
// interfere with block relay.
RemoveBlockRequest(pblock->GetHash());
}
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN) {
// Ignore blocktxn received while importing
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Unexpected blocktxn message received from peer %d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
BlockTransactions resp;
vRecv >> resp;
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
bool fBlockRead = false;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
std::map<BlockHash,
std::pair<NodeId, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator>>::
iterator it = mapBlocksInFlight.find(resp.blockhash);
if (it == mapBlocksInFlight.end() ||
!it->second.second->partialBlock ||
it->second.first != pfrom.GetId()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Peer %d sent us block transactions for block "
"we weren't expecting\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
PartiallyDownloadedBlock &partialBlock =
*it->second.second->partialBlock;
ReadStatus status = partialBlock.FillBlock(*pblock, resp.txn);
if (status == READ_STATUS_INVALID) {
// Reset in-flight state in case of Misbehaving does not
// result in a disconnect.
RemoveBlockRequest(resp.blockhash);
Misbehaving(
*peer, 100,
"invalid compact block/non-matching block transactions");
return;
} else if (status == READ_STATUS_FAILED) {
// Might have collided, fall back to getdata now :(
std::vector<CInv> invs;
invs.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, resp.blockhash));
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, invs));
} else {
// Block is either okay, or possibly we received
// READ_STATUS_CHECKBLOCK_FAILED.
// Note that CheckBlock can only fail for one of a few reasons:
// 1. bad-proof-of-work (impossible here, because we've already
// accepted the header)
// 2. merkleroot doesn't match the transactions given (already
// caught in FillBlock with READ_STATUS_FAILED, so
// impossible here)
// 3. the block is otherwise invalid (eg invalid coinbase,
// block is too big, too many sigChecks, etc).
// So if CheckBlock failed, #3 is the only possibility.
// Under BIP 152, we don't DoS-ban unless proof of work is
// invalid (we don't require all the stateless checks to have
// been run). This is handled below, so just treat this as
// though the block was successfully read, and rely on the
// handling in ProcessNewBlock to ensure the block index is
// updated, etc.
// it is now an empty pointer
RemoveBlockRequest(resp.blockhash);
fBlockRead = true;
// mapBlockSource is used for potentially punishing peers and
// updating which peers send us compact blocks, so the race
// between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
// BIP 152 permits peers to relay compact blocks after
// validating the header only; we should not punish peers
// if the block turns out to be invalid.
mapBlockSource.emplace(resp.blockhash,
std::make_pair(pfrom.GetId(), false));
}
} // Don't hold cs_main when we call into ProcessNewBlock
if (fBlockRead) {
// Since we requested this block (it was in mapBlocksInFlight),
// force it to be processed, even if it would not be a candidate for
// new tip (missing previous block, chain not long enough, etc)
// This bypasses some anti-DoS logic in AcceptBlock (eg to prevent
// disk-space attacks), but this should be safe due to the
// protections in the compact block handler -- see related comment
// in compact block optimistic reconstruction handling.
ProcessBlock(config, pfrom, pblock, /*force_processing=*/true,
/*min_pow_checked=*/true);
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::HEADERS) {
// Ignore headers received while importing
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Unexpected headers message received from peer %d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
// Assume that this is in response to any outstanding getheaders
// request we may have sent, and clear out the time of our last request
peer->m_last_getheaders_timestamp = {};
std::vector<CBlockHeader> headers;
// Bypass the normal CBlock deserialization, as we don't want to risk
// deserializing 2000 full blocks.
unsigned int nCount = ReadCompactSize(vRecv);
if (nCount > MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 20,
strprintf("too-many-headers: headers message size = %u",
nCount));
return;
}
headers.resize(nCount);
for (unsigned int n = 0; n < nCount; n++) {
vRecv >> headers[n];
// Ignore tx count; assume it is 0.
ReadCompactSize(vRecv);
}
ProcessHeadersMessage(config, pfrom, *peer, std::move(headers),
/*via_compact_block=*/false);
// Check if the headers presync progress needs to be reported to
// validation. This needs to be done without holding the
// m_headers_presync_mutex lock.
if (m_headers_presync_should_signal.exchange(false)) {
HeadersPresyncStats stats;
{
LOCK(m_headers_presync_mutex);
auto it =
m_headers_presync_stats.find(m_headers_presync_bestpeer);
if (it != m_headers_presync_stats.end()) {
stats = it->second;
}
}
if (stats.second) {
m_chainman.ReportHeadersPresync(
stats.first, stats.second->first, stats.second->second);
}
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::BLOCK) {
// Ignore block received while importing
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Unexpected block message received from peer %d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
vRecv >> *pblock;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received block %s peer=%d\n",
pblock->GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
// Process all blocks from whitelisted peers, even if not requested,
// unless we're still syncing with the network. Such an unrequested
// block may still be processed, subject to the conditions in
// AcceptBlock().
bool forceProcessing =
pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan) &&
!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload();
const BlockHash hash = pblock->GetHash();
bool min_pow_checked = false;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
// Always process the block if we requested it, since we may
// need it even when it's not a candidate for a new best tip.
forceProcessing = IsBlockRequested(hash);
RemoveBlockRequest(hash);
// mapBlockSource is only used for punishing peers and setting
// which peers send us compact blocks, so the race between here and
// cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
mapBlockSource.emplace(hash, std::make_pair(pfrom.GetId(), true));
// Check work on this block against our anti-dos thresholds.
const CBlockIndex *prev_block =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(pblock->hashPrevBlock);
if (prev_block &&
prev_block->nChainWork +
CalculateHeadersWork({pblock->GetBlockHeader()}) >=
GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
min_pow_checked = true;
}
}
ProcessBlock(config, pfrom, pblock, forceProcessing, min_pow_checked);
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAHELLO) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
return;
}
{
LOCK(pfrom.cs_avalanche_pubkey);
if (pfrom.m_avalanche_pubkey.has_value()) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Ignoring avahello from peer %d: already in our node set\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
avalanche::Delegation delegation;
vRecv >> delegation;
// A delegation with an all zero limited id indicates that the peer
// has no proof, so we're done.
if (delegation.getLimitedProofId() != uint256::ZERO) {
avalanche::DelegationState state;
CPubKey pubkey;
if (!delegation.verify(state, pubkey)) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "invalid-delegation");
return;
}
pfrom.m_avalanche_pubkey = std::move(pubkey);
HashWriter sighasher{};
sighasher << delegation.getId();
sighasher << pfrom.nRemoteHostNonce;
sighasher << pfrom.GetLocalNonce();
sighasher << pfrom.nRemoteExtraEntropy;
sighasher << pfrom.GetLocalExtraEntropy();
SchnorrSig sig;
vRecv >> sig;
if (!(*pfrom.m_avalanche_pubkey)
.VerifySchnorr(sighasher.GetHash(), sig)) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "invalid-avahello-signature");
return;
}
// If we don't know this proof already, add it to the tracker so
// it can be requested.
const avalanche::ProofId proofid(delegation.getProofId());
if (!AlreadyHaveProof(proofid)) {
const bool preferred = isPreferredDownloadPeer(pfrom);
LOCK(cs_proofrequest);
AddProofAnnouncement(pfrom, proofid,
GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>(),
preferred);
}
// Don't check the return value. If it fails we probably don't
// know about the proof yet.
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.addNode(pfrom.GetId(), proofid);
});
}
pfrom.m_avalanche_enabled = true;
}
// Send getavaaddr and getavaproofs to our avalanche outbound or
// manual connections
if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETAVAADDR));
WITH_LOCK(peer->m_addr_token_bucket_mutex,
peer->m_addr_token_bucket += m_opts.max_addr_to_send);
if (peer->m_proof_relay &&
!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETAVAPROOFS));
peer->m_proof_relay->compactproofs_requested = true;
}
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPOLL) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
return;
}
const auto now = Now<SteadyMilliseconds>();
const auto last_poll = pfrom.m_last_poll;
pfrom.m_last_poll = now;
if (now <
last_poll + std::chrono::milliseconds(m_opts.avalanche_cooldown)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Ignoring repeated avapoll from peer %d: cooldown not "
"elapsed\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
const bool quorum_established = m_avalanche->isQuorumEstablished();
uint64_t round;
Unserialize(vRecv, round);
unsigned int nCount = ReadCompactSize(vRecv);
if (nCount > AVALANCHE_MAX_ELEMENT_POLL) {
Misbehaving(
*peer, 20,
strprintf("too-many-ava-poll: poll message size = %u", nCount));
return;
}
std::vector<avalanche::Vote> votes;
votes.reserve(nCount);
for (unsigned int n = 0; n < nCount; n++) {
CInv inv;
vRecv >> inv;
// Default vote for unknown inv type
uint32_t vote = -1;
// We don't vote definitively until we have an established quorum
if (!quorum_established) {
votes.emplace_back(vote, inv.hash);
continue;
}
// If inv's type is known, get a vote for its hash
switch (inv.type) {
case MSG_TX: {
if (m_opts.avalanche_preconsensus) {
vote = WITH_LOCK(cs_main, return GetAvalancheVoteForTx(
TxId(inv.hash)));
}
} break;
case MSG_BLOCK: {
vote = WITH_LOCK(cs_main, return GetAvalancheVoteForBlock(
BlockHash(inv.hash)));
} break;
case MSG_AVA_PROOF: {
vote = getAvalancheVoteForProof(
*m_avalanche, avalanche::ProofId(inv.hash));
} break;
default: {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"poll inv type %d unknown from peer=%d\n",
inv.type, pfrom.GetId());
}
}
votes.emplace_back(vote, inv.hash);
}
// Send the query to the node.
m_avalanche->sendResponse(
&pfrom, avalanche::Response(round, m_opts.avalanche_cooldown,
std::move(votes)));
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::AVARESPONSE) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
return;
}
// As long as QUIC is not implemented, we need to sign response and
// verify response's signatures in order to avoid any manipulation of
// messages at the transport level.
CHashVerifier<CDataStream> verifier(&vRecv);
avalanche::Response response;
verifier >> response;
SchnorrSig sig;
vRecv >> sig;
{
LOCK(pfrom.cs_avalanche_pubkey);
if (!pfrom.m_avalanche_pubkey.has_value() ||
!(*pfrom.m_avalanche_pubkey)
.VerifySchnorr(verifier.GetHash(), sig)) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "invalid-ava-response-signature");
return;
}
}
auto now = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
std::vector<avalanche::VoteItemUpdate> updates;
int banscore{0};
std::string error;
if (!m_avalanche->registerVotes(pfrom.GetId(), response, updates,
banscore, error)) {
if (banscore > 0) {
// If the banscore was set, just increase the node ban score
Misbehaving(*peer, banscore, error);
return;
}
// Otherwise the node may have got a network issue. Increase the
// fault counter instead and only ban if we reached a threshold.
// This allows for fault tolerance should there be a temporary
// outage while still preventing DoS'ing behaviors, as the counter
// is reset if no fault occured over some time period.
pfrom.m_avalanche_message_fault_counter++;
pfrom.m_avalanche_last_message_fault = now;
// Allow up to 12 messages before increasing the ban score. Since
// the queries are cleared after 10s, this is at least 2 minutes
// of network outage tolerance over the 1h window.
if (pfrom.m_avalanche_message_fault_counter > 12) {
Misbehaving(*peer, 2, error);
return;
}
}
// If no fault occurred within the last hour, reset the fault counter
if (now > (pfrom.m_avalanche_last_message_fault.load() + 1h)) {
pfrom.m_avalanche_message_fault_counter = 0;
}
pfrom.invsVoted(response.GetVotes().size());
auto logVoteUpdate = [](const auto &voteUpdate,
const std::string &voteItemTypeStr,
const auto &voteItemId) {
std::string voteOutcome;
switch (voteUpdate.getStatus()) {
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Invalid:
voteOutcome = "invalidated";
break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Rejected:
voteOutcome = "rejected";
break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Accepted:
voteOutcome = "accepted";
break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Finalized:
voteOutcome = "finalized";
break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Stale:
voteOutcome = "stalled";
break;
// No default case, so the compiler can warn about missing
// cases
}
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE, "Avalanche %s %s %s\n", voteOutcome,
voteItemTypeStr, voteItemId.ToString());
};
bool shouldActivateBestChain = false;
for (const auto &u : updates) {
const avalanche::AnyVoteItem &item = u.getVoteItem();
// Don't use a visitor here as we want to ignore unsupported item
// types. This comes in handy when adding new types.
if (auto pitem = std::get_if<const avalanche::ProofRef>(&item)) {
avalanche::ProofRef proof = *pitem;
const avalanche::ProofId &proofid = proof->getId();
logVoteUpdate(u, "proof", proofid);
auto rejectionMode =
avalanche::PeerManager::RejectionMode::DEFAULT;
auto nextCooldownTimePoint = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
switch (u.getStatus()) {
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Invalid:
m_avalanche->withPeerManager(
[&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
pm.setInvalid(proofid);
});
// Fallthrough
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Stale:
// Invalidate mode removes the proof from all proof
// pools
rejectionMode =
avalanche::PeerManager::RejectionMode::INVALIDATE;
// Fallthrough
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Rejected:
if (!m_avalanche->withPeerManager(
[&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.rejectProof(proofid,
rejectionMode);
})) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"ERROR: Failed to reject proof: %s\n",
proofid.GetHex());
}
break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Finalized:
nextCooldownTimePoint += std::chrono::seconds(
m_opts.avalanche_peer_replacement_cooldown);
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Accepted:
if (!m_avalanche->withPeerManager(
[&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
pm.registerProof(
proof,
avalanche::PeerManager::
RegistrationMode::FORCE_ACCEPT);
return pm.forPeer(
proofid,
[&](const avalanche::Peer &peer) {
pm.updateNextPossibleConflictTime(
peer.peerid,
nextCooldownTimePoint);
if (u.getStatus() ==
avalanche::VoteStatus::
Finalized) {
pm.setFinalized(peer.peerid);
}
// Only fail if the peer was not
// created
return true;
});
})) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"ERROR: Failed to accept proof: %s\n",
proofid.GetHex());
}
break;
}
}
if (auto pitem = std::get_if<const CBlockIndex *>(&item)) {
CBlockIndex *pindex = const_cast<CBlockIndex *>(*pitem);
shouldActivateBestChain = true;
logVoteUpdate(u, "block", pindex->GetBlockHash());
switch (u.getStatus()) {
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Invalid:
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Rejected: {
BlockValidationState state;
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().ParkBlock(state, pindex);
if (!state.IsValid()) {
LogPrintf("ERROR: Database error: %s\n",
state.GetRejectReason());
return;
}
} break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Accepted: {
LOCK(cs_main);
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().UnparkBlock(pindex);
} break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Finalized: {
{
LOCK(cs_main);
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().UnparkBlock(pindex);
}
if (m_opts.avalanche_preconsensus) {
// First check if the block is cached before reading
// from disk.
auto pblock = WITH_LOCK(m_most_recent_block_mutex,
return m_most_recent_block);
if (!pblock ||
pblock->GetHash() != pindex->GetBlockHash()) {
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockRead =
std::make_shared<CBlock>();
if (!m_chainman.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(
*pblockRead, *pindex)) {
assert(!"cannot load block from disk");
}
pblock = pblockRead;
}
assert(pblock);
LOCK(m_mempool.cs);
m_mempool.removeForFinalizedBlock(pblock->vtx);
}
m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().AvalancheFinalizeBlock(
pindex, *m_avalanche);
} break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Stale:
// Fall back on Nakamoto consensus in the absence of
// Avalanche votes for other competing or descendant
// blocks.
break;
}
}
if (!m_opts.avalanche_preconsensus) {
continue;
}
if (auto pitem = std::get_if<const CTransactionRef>(&item)) {
const CTransactionRef tx = *pitem;
assert(tx != nullptr);
const TxId &txid = tx->GetId();
logVoteUpdate(u, "tx", txid);
switch (u.getStatus()) {
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Rejected:
break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Invalid: {
// Remove from the mempool and the finalized tree, as
// well as all the children txs.
// FIXME Remember the tx has been invalidated so we
// don't poll for it again and again.
LOCK(m_mempool.cs);
auto it = m_mempool.GetIter(txid);
if (it.has_value()) {
m_mempool.removeRecursive(
*tx, MemPoolRemovalReason::AVALANCHE);
}
break;
}
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Accepted:
break;
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Finalized: {
LOCK(m_mempool.cs);
auto it = m_mempool.GetIter(txid);
if (!it.has_value()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Error: finalized tx (%s) is not in the "
"mempool\n",
txid.ToString());
break;
}
m_mempool.setAvalancheFinalized(**it);
break;
}
case avalanche::VoteStatus::Stale:
break;
}
}
}
if (shouldActivateBestChain) {
BlockValidationState state;
if (!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().ActivateBestChain(
state, /*pblock=*/nullptr, m_avalanche)) {
LogPrintf("failed to activate chain (%s)\n", state.ToString());
}
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPROOF) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
return;
}
auto proof = RCUPtr<avalanche::Proof>::make();
vRecv >> *proof;
ReceivedAvalancheProof(pfrom, *peer, proof);
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETAVAPROOFS) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
return;
}
if (peer->m_proof_relay == nullptr) {
return;
}
peer->m_proof_relay->lastSharedProofsUpdate =
GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
peer->m_proof_relay->sharedProofs =
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](const avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.getShareableProofsSnapshot();
});
avalanche::CompactProofs compactProofs(
peer->m_proof_relay->sharedProofs);
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::AVAPROOFS, compactProofs));
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPROOFS) {
if (!m_avalanche) {
return;
}
if (peer->m_proof_relay == nullptr) {
return;
}
// Only process the compact proofs if we requested them
if (!peer->m_proof_relay->compactproofs_requested) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE, "Ignoring unsollicited avaproofs\n");
return;
}
peer->m_proof_relay->compactproofs_requested = false;
avalanche::CompactProofs compactProofs;
try {
vRecv >> compactProofs;
} catch (std::ios_base::failure &e) {
// This compact proofs have non contiguous or overflowing indexes
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "avaproofs-bad-indexes");
return;
}
// If there are prefilled proofs, process them first
std::set<uint32_t> prefilledIndexes;
for (const auto &prefilledProof : compactProofs.getPrefilledProofs()) {
if (!ReceivedAvalancheProof(pfrom, *peer, prefilledProof.proof)) {
// If we got an invalid proof, the peer is getting banned and we
// can bail out.
return;
}
}
// If there is no shortid, avoid parsing/responding/accounting for the
// message.
if (compactProofs.getShortIDs().size() == 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Got an avaproofs message with no shortid (peer %d)\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
// To determine the chance that the number of entries in a bucket
// exceeds N, we use the fact that the number of elements in a single
// bucket is binomially distributed (with n = the number of shorttxids
// S, and p = 1 / the number of buckets), that in the worst case the
// number of buckets is equal to S (due to std::unordered_map having a
// default load factor of 1.0), and that the chance for any bucket to
// exceed N elements is at most buckets * (the chance that any given
// bucket is above N elements). Thus:
// P(max_elements_per_bucket > N) <=
// S * (1 - cdf(binomial(n=S,p=1/S), N))
// If we assume up to 21000000, allowing 15 elements per bucket should
// only fail once per ~2.5 million avaproofs transfers (per peer and
// connection).
// TODO re-evaluate the bucket count to a more realistic value.
// TODO: In the case of a shortid-collision, we should request all the
// proofs which collided. For now, we only request one, which is not
// that bad considering this event is expected to be very rare.
auto shortIdProcessor =
avalanche::ProofShortIdProcessor(compactProofs.getPrefilledProofs(),
compactProofs.getShortIDs(), 15);
if (shortIdProcessor.hasOutOfBoundIndex()) {
// This should be catched by deserialization, but catch it here as
// well as a good measure.
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "avaproofs-bad-indexes");
return;
}
if (!shortIdProcessor.isEvenlyDistributed()) {
// This is suspicious, don't ban but bail out
return;
}
std::vector<std::pair<avalanche::ProofId, bool>> remoteProofsStatus;
m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](const avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
pm.forEachPeer([&](const avalanche::Peer &peer) {
assert(peer.proof);
uint64_t shortid = compactProofs.getShortID(peer.getProofId());
int added =
shortIdProcessor.matchKnownItem(shortid, peer.proof);
// No collision
if (added >= 0) {
// Because we know the proof, we can determine if our peer
// has it (added = 1) or not (added = 0) and update the
// remote proof status accordingly.
remoteProofsStatus.emplace_back(peer.getProofId(),
added > 0);
}
// In order to properly determine which proof is missing, we
// need to keep scanning for all our proofs.
return true;
});
});
avalanche::ProofsRequest req;
for (size_t i = 0; i < compactProofs.size(); i++) {
if (shortIdProcessor.getItem(i) == nullptr) {
req.indices.push_back(i);
}
}
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::AVAPROOFSREQ, req));
const NodeId nodeid = pfrom.GetId();
// We want to keep a count of how many nodes we successfully requested
// avaproofs from as this is used to determine when we are confident our
// quorum is close enough to the other participants.
m_avalanche->avaproofsSent(nodeid);
// Only save remote proofs from stakers
if (WITH_LOCK(pfrom.cs_avalanche_pubkey,
return pfrom.m_avalanche_pubkey.has_value())) {
m_avalanche->withPeerManager(
[&remoteProofsStatus, nodeid](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
for (const auto &[proofid, present] : remoteProofsStatus) {
pm.saveRemoteProof(proofid, nodeid, present);
}
});
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::AVAPROOFSREQ) {
if (peer->m_proof_relay == nullptr) {
return;
}
avalanche::ProofsRequest proofreq;
vRecv >> proofreq;
auto requestedIndiceIt = proofreq.indices.begin();
uint32_t treeIndice = 0;
peer->m_proof_relay->sharedProofs.forEachLeaf([&](const auto &proof) {
if (requestedIndiceIt == proofreq.indices.end()) {
// No more indice to process
return false;
}
if (treeIndice++ == *requestedIndiceIt) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::AVAPROOF, *proof));
requestedIndiceIt++;
}
return true;
});
peer->m_proof_relay->sharedProofs = {};
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETADDR) {
// This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was
// introduced to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send
// specific fake addresses to users' AddrMan and later request them by
// sending getaddr messages. Making nodes which are behind NAT and can
// only make outgoing connections ignore the getaddr message mitigates
// the attack.
if (!pfrom.IsInboundConn()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Ignoring \"getaddr\" from %s connection. peer=%d\n",
pfrom.ConnectionTypeAsString(), pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
// Since this must be an inbound connection, SetupAddressRelay will
// never fail.
Assume(SetupAddressRelay(pfrom, *peer));
// Only send one GetAddr response per connection to reduce resource
// waste and discourage addr stamping of INV announcements.
if (peer->m_getaddr_recvd) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring repeated \"getaddr\". peer=%d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
peer->m_getaddr_recvd = true;
peer->m_addrs_to_send.clear();
std::vector<CAddress> vAddr;
const size_t maxAddrToSend = m_opts.max_addr_to_send;
if (pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Addr)) {
vAddr = m_connman.GetAddresses(maxAddrToSend, MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND,
/* network */ std::nullopt);
} else {
vAddr = m_connman.GetAddresses(pfrom, maxAddrToSend,
MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND);
}
for (const CAddress &addr : vAddr) {
PushAddress(*peer, addr);
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETAVAADDR) {
auto now = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
if (now < pfrom.m_nextGetAvaAddr) {
// Prevent a peer from exhausting our resources by spamming
// getavaaddr messages.
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Ignoring repeated getavaaddr from peer %d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
// Only accept a getavaaddr every GETAVAADDR_INTERVAL at most
pfrom.m_nextGetAvaAddr = now + GETAVAADDR_INTERVAL;
if (!SetupAddressRelay(pfrom, *peer)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Ignoring getavaaddr message from %s peer=%d\n",
pfrom.ConnectionTypeAsString(), pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
auto availabilityScoreComparator = [](const CNode *lhs,
const CNode *rhs) {
double scoreLhs = lhs->getAvailabilityScore();
double scoreRhs = rhs->getAvailabilityScore();
if (scoreLhs != scoreRhs) {
return scoreLhs > scoreRhs;
}
return lhs < rhs;
};
// Get up to MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND addresses of the nodes which are the
// most active in the avalanche network. Account for 0 availability as
// well so we can send addresses even if we did not start polling yet.
std::set<const CNode *, decltype(availabilityScoreComparator)> avaNodes(
availabilityScoreComparator);
m_connman.ForEachNode([&](const CNode *pnode) {
if (!pnode->m_avalanche_enabled ||
pnode->getAvailabilityScore() < 0.) {
return;
}
avaNodes.insert(pnode);
if (avaNodes.size() > m_opts.max_addr_to_send) {
avaNodes.erase(std::prev(avaNodes.end()));
}
});
peer->m_addrs_to_send.clear();
for (const CNode *pnode : avaNodes) {
PushAddress(*peer, pnode->addr);
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::MEMPOOL) {
if (!(peer->m_our_services & NODE_BLOOM) &&
!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Mempool)) {
if (!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"mempool request with bloom filters disabled, "
"disconnect peer=%d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
}
return;
}
if (m_connman.OutboundTargetReached(false) &&
!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Mempool)) {
if (!pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"mempool request with bandwidth limit reached, "
"disconnect peer=%d\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
}
return;
}
if (auto tx_relay = peer->GetTxRelay()) {
LOCK(tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_mutex);
tx_relay->m_send_mempool = true;
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::PING) {
if (pfrom.GetCommonVersion() > BIP0031_VERSION) {
uint64_t nonce = 0;
vRecv >> nonce;
// Echo the message back with the nonce. This allows for two useful
// features:
//
// 1) A remote node can quickly check if the connection is
// operational.
// 2) Remote nodes can measure the latency of the network thread. If
// this node is overloaded it won't respond to pings quickly and the
// remote node can avoid sending us more work, like chain download
// requests.
//
// The nonce stops the remote getting confused between different
// pings: without it, if the remote node sends a ping once per
// second and this node takes 5 seconds to respond to each, the 5th
// ping the remote sends would appear to return very quickly.
m_connman.PushMessage(&pfrom,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::PONG, nonce));
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::PONG) {
const auto ping_end = time_received;
uint64_t nonce = 0;
size_t nAvail = vRecv.in_avail();
bool bPingFinished = false;
std::string sProblem;
if (nAvail >= sizeof(nonce)) {
vRecv >> nonce;
// Only process pong message if there is an outstanding ping (old
// ping without nonce should never pong)
if (peer->m_ping_nonce_sent != 0) {
if (nonce == peer->m_ping_nonce_sent) {
// Matching pong received, this ping is no longer
// outstanding
bPingFinished = true;
const auto ping_time = ping_end - peer->m_ping_start.load();
if (ping_time.count() >= 0) {
// Let connman know about this successful ping-pong
pfrom.PongReceived(ping_time);
} else {
// This should never happen
sProblem = "Timing mishap";
}
} else {
// Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping
sProblem = "Nonce mismatch";
if (nonce == 0) {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation
// somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true;
sProblem = "Nonce zero";
}
}
} else {
sProblem = "Unsolicited pong without ping";
}
} else {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere;
// cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true;
sProblem = "Short payload";
}
if (!(sProblem.empty())) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"pong peer=%d: %s, %x expected, %x received, %u bytes\n",
pfrom.GetId(), sProblem, peer->m_ping_nonce_sent, nonce,
nAvail);
}
if (bPingFinished) {
peer->m_ping_nonce_sent = 0;
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::FILTERLOAD) {
if (!(peer->m_our_services & NODE_BLOOM)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"filterload received despite not offering bloom services "
"from peer=%d; disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
CBloomFilter filter;
vRecv >> filter;
if (!filter.IsWithinSizeConstraints()) {
// There is no excuse for sending a too-large filter
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "too-large bloom filter");
} else if (auto tx_relay = peer->GetTxRelay()) {
{
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
tx_relay->m_bloom_filter.reset(new CBloomFilter(filter));
tx_relay->m_relay_txs = true;
}
pfrom.m_bloom_filter_loaded = true;
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::FILTERADD) {
if (!(peer->m_our_services & NODE_BLOOM)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"filteradd received despite not offering bloom services "
"from peer=%d; disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> vData;
vRecv >> vData;
// Nodes must NEVER send a data item > 520 bytes (the max size for a
// script data object, and thus, the maximum size any matched object can
// have) in a filteradd message.
bool bad = false;
if (vData.size() > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE) {
bad = true;
} else if (auto tx_relay = peer->GetTxRelay()) {
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
if (tx_relay->m_bloom_filter) {
tx_relay->m_bloom_filter->insert(vData);
} else {
bad = true;
}
}
if (bad) {
// The structure of this code doesn't really allow for a good error
// code. We'll go generic.
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "bad filteradd message");
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::FILTERCLEAR) {
if (!(peer->m_our_services & NODE_BLOOM)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"filterclear received despite not offering bloom services "
"from peer=%d; disconnecting\n",
pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
auto tx_relay = peer->GetTxRelay();
if (!tx_relay) {
return;
}
{
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
tx_relay->m_bloom_filter = nullptr;
tx_relay->m_relay_txs = true;
}
pfrom.m_bloom_filter_loaded = false;
pfrom.m_relays_txs = true;
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::FEEFILTER) {
Amount newFeeFilter = Amount::zero();
vRecv >> newFeeFilter;
if (MoneyRange(newFeeFilter)) {
if (auto tx_relay = peer->GetTxRelay()) {
tx_relay->m_fee_filter_received = newFeeFilter;
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: feefilter of %s from peer=%d\n",
CFeeRate(newFeeFilter).ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
}
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETCFILTERS) {
ProcessGetCFilters(pfrom, *peer, vRecv);
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETCFHEADERS) {
ProcessGetCFHeaders(pfrom, *peer, vRecv);
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::GETCFCHECKPT) {
ProcessGetCFCheckPt(pfrom, *peer, vRecv);
return;
}
if (msg_type == NetMsgType::NOTFOUND) {
std::vector<CInv> vInv;
vRecv >> vInv;
// A peer might send up to 1 notfound per getdata request, but no more
if (vInv.size() <= PROOF_REQUEST_PARAMS.max_peer_announcements +
TX_REQUEST_PARAMS.max_peer_announcements +
MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) {
for (CInv &inv : vInv) {
if (inv.IsMsgTx()) {
// If we receive a NOTFOUND message for a tx we requested,
// mark the announcement for it as completed in
// InvRequestTracker.
LOCK(::cs_main);
m_txrequest.ReceivedResponse(pfrom.GetId(), TxId(inv.hash));
continue;
}
if (inv.IsMsgProof()) {
LOCK(cs_proofrequest);
m_proofrequest.ReceivedResponse(
pfrom.GetId(), avalanche::ProofId(inv.hash));
}
}
}
return;
}
// Ignore unknown commands for extensibility
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unknown command \"%s\" from peer=%d\n",
SanitizeString(msg_type), pfrom.GetId());
return;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(CNode &pnode, Peer &peer) {
{
LOCK(peer.m_misbehavior_mutex);
// There's nothing to do if the m_should_discourage flag isn't set
if (!peer.m_should_discourage) {
return false;
}
peer.m_should_discourage = false;
} // peer.m_misbehavior_mutex
if (pnode.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan)) {
// We never disconnect or discourage peers for bad behavior if they have
// NetPermissionFlags::NoBan permission
LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing noban peer %d!\n", peer.m_id);
return false;
}
if (pnode.IsManualConn()) {
// We never disconnect or discourage manual peers for bad behavior
LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing manually connected peer %d!\n",
peer.m_id);
return false;
}
if (pnode.addr.IsLocal()) {
// We disconnect local peers for bad behavior but don't discourage
// (since that would discourage all peers on the same local address)
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"Warning: disconnecting but not discouraging %s peer %d!\n",
pnode.m_inbound_onion ? "inbound onion" : "local", peer.m_id);
pnode.fDisconnect = true;
return true;
}
// Normal case: Disconnect the peer and discourage all nodes sharing the
// address
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Disconnecting and discouraging peer %d!\n",
peer.m_id);
if (m_banman) {
m_banman->Discourage(pnode.addr);
}
m_connman.DisconnectNode(pnode.addr);
return true;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessages(const Config &config, CNode *pfrom,
std::atomic<bool> &interruptMsgProc) {
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
//
// Message format
// (4) message start
// (12) command
// (4) size
// (4) checksum
// (x) data
//
bool fMoreWork = false;
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef(pfrom->GetId());
if (peer == nullptr) {
return false;
}
{
LOCK(peer->m_getdata_requests_mutex);
if (!peer->m_getdata_requests.empty()) {
ProcessGetData(config, *pfrom, *peer, interruptMsgProc);
}
}
const bool processed_orphan = ProcessOrphanTx(config, *peer);
if (pfrom->fDisconnect) {
return false;
}
if (processed_orphan) {
return true;
}
// this maintains the order of responses and prevents m_getdata_requests to
// grow unbounded
{
LOCK(peer->m_getdata_requests_mutex);
if (!peer->m_getdata_requests.empty()) {
return true;
}
}
// Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway
if (pfrom->fPauseSend) {
return false;
}
std::list<CNetMessage> msgs;
{
LOCK(pfrom->cs_vProcessMsg);
if (pfrom->vProcessMsg.empty()) {
return false;
}
// Just take one message
msgs.splice(msgs.begin(), pfrom->vProcessMsg,
pfrom->vProcessMsg.begin());
pfrom->nProcessQueueSize -= msgs.front().m_raw_message_size;
pfrom->fPauseRecv =
pfrom->nProcessQueueSize > m_connman.GetReceiveFloodSize();
fMoreWork = !pfrom->vProcessMsg.empty();
}
CNetMessage &msg(msgs.front());
TRACE6(net, inbound_message, pfrom->GetId(), pfrom->m_addr_name.c_str(),
pfrom->ConnectionTypeAsString().c_str(), msg.m_type.c_str(),
msg.m_recv.size(), msg.m_recv.data());
if (m_opts.capture_messages) {
CaptureMessage(pfrom->addr, msg.m_type, MakeUCharSpan(msg.m_recv),
/*is_incoming=*/true);
}
msg.SetVersion(pfrom->GetCommonVersion());
// Check network magic
if (!msg.m_valid_netmagic) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"PROCESSMESSAGE: INVALID MESSAGESTART %s peer=%d\n",
SanitizeString(msg.m_type), pfrom->GetId());
// Make sure we discourage where that come from for some time.
if (m_banman) {
m_banman->Discourage(pfrom->addr);
}
m_connman.DisconnectNode(pfrom->addr);
pfrom->fDisconnect = true;
return false;
}
// Check header
if (!msg.m_valid_header) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: ERRORS IN HEADER %s peer=%d\n",
SanitizeString(msg.m_type), pfrom->GetId());
return fMoreWork;
}
// Checksum
CDataStream &vRecv = msg.m_recv;
if (!msg.m_valid_checksum) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): CHECKSUM ERROR peer=%d\n",
__func__, SanitizeString(msg.m_type), msg.m_message_size,
pfrom->GetId());
if (m_banman) {
m_banman->Discourage(pfrom->addr);
}
m_connman.DisconnectNode(pfrom->addr);
return fMoreWork;
}
try {
ProcessMessage(config, *pfrom, msg.m_type, vRecv, msg.m_time,
interruptMsgProc);
if (interruptMsgProc) {
return false;
}
{
LOCK(peer->m_getdata_requests_mutex);
if (!peer->m_getdata_requests.empty()) {
fMoreWork = true;
}
}
// Does this peer has an orphan ready to reconsider?
// (Note: we may have provided a parent for an orphan provided by
// another peer that was already processed; in that case, the extra work
// may not be noticed, possibly resulting in an unnecessary 100ms delay)
if (m_mempool.withOrphanage([&peer](TxOrphanage &orphanage) {
return orphanage.HaveTxToReconsider(peer->m_id);
})) {
fMoreWork = true;
}
} catch (const std::exception &e) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' (%s) caught\n",
__func__, SanitizeString(msg.m_type), msg.m_message_size,
e.what(), typeid(e).name());
} catch (...) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Unknown exception caught\n",
__func__, SanitizeString(msg.m_type), msg.m_message_size);
}
return fMoreWork;
}
void PeerManagerImpl::ConsiderEviction(CNode &pto, Peer &peer,
std::chrono::seconds time_in_seconds) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
CNodeState &state = *State(pto.GetId());
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pto.GetCommonVersion());
if (!state.m_chain_sync.m_protect && pto.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn() &&
state.fSyncStarted) {
// This is an outbound peer subject to disconnection if they don't
// announce a block with as much work as the current tip within
// CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds (note: if their
// chain has more work than ours, we should sync to it, unless it's
// invalid, in which case we should find that out and disconnect from
// them elsewhere).
if (state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr &&
state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >=
m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork) {
if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout != 0s) {
state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout = 0s;
state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header = nullptr;
state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = false;
}
} else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout == 0s ||
(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header != nullptr &&
state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr &&
state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >=
state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->nChainWork)) {
// Our best block known by this peer is behind our tip, and we're
// either noticing that for the first time, OR this peer was able to
// catch up to some earlier point where we checked against our tip.
// Either way, set a new timeout based on current tip.
state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout = time_in_seconds + CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT;
state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip();
state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = false;
} else if (state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout > 0s &&
time_in_seconds > state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout) {
// No evidence yet that our peer has synced to a chain with work
// equal to that of our tip, when we first detected it was behind.
// Send a single getheaders message to give the peer a chance to
// update us.
if (state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders) {
// They've run out of time to catch up!
LogPrintf(
"Disconnecting outbound peer %d for old chain, best known "
"block = %s\n",
pto.GetId(),
state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr
? state.pindexBestKnownBlock->GetBlockHash().ToString()
: "<none>");
pto.fDisconnect = true;
} else {
assert(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header);
// Here, we assume that the getheaders message goes out,
// because it'll either go out or be skipped because of a
// getheaders in-flight already, in which case the peer should
// still respond to us with a sufficiently high work chain tip.
MaybeSendGetHeaders(
pto, GetLocator(state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->pprev),
peer);
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"sending getheaders to outbound peer=%d to verify chain "
"work (current best known block:%s, benchmark blockhash: "
"%s)\n",
pto.GetId(),
state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr
? state.pindexBestKnownBlock->GetBlockHash().ToString()
: "<none>",
state.m_chain_sync.m_work_header->GetBlockHash()
.ToString());
state.m_chain_sync.m_sent_getheaders = true;
// Bump the timeout to allow a response, which could clear the
// timeout (if the response shows the peer has synced), reset
// the timeout (if the peer syncs to the required work but not
// to our tip), or result in disconnect (if we advance to the
// timeout and pindexBestKnownBlock has not sufficiently
// progressed)
state.m_chain_sync.m_timeout =
time_in_seconds + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME;
}
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::EvictExtraOutboundPeers(std::chrono::seconds now) {
// If we have any extra block-relay-only peers, disconnect the youngest
// unless it's given us a block -- in which case, compare with the
// second-youngest, and out of those two, disconnect the peer who least
// recently gave us a block.
// The youngest block-relay-only peer would be the extra peer we connected
// to temporarily in order to sync our tip; see net.cpp.
// Note that we use higher nodeid as a measure for most recent connection.
if (m_connman.GetExtraBlockRelayCount() > 0) {
std::pair<NodeId, std::chrono::seconds> youngest_peer{-1, 0},
next_youngest_peer{-1, 0};
m_connman.ForEachNode([&](CNode *pnode) {
if (!pnode->IsBlockOnlyConn() || pnode->fDisconnect) {
return;
}
if (pnode->GetId() > youngest_peer.first) {
next_youngest_peer = youngest_peer;
youngest_peer.first = pnode->GetId();
youngest_peer.second = pnode->m_last_block_time;
}
});
NodeId to_disconnect = youngest_peer.first;
if (youngest_peer.second > next_youngest_peer.second) {
// Our newest block-relay-only peer gave us a block more recently;
// disconnect our second youngest.
to_disconnect = next_youngest_peer.first;
}
m_connman.ForNode(
to_disconnect,
[&](CNode *pnode) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
// Make sure we're not getting a block right now, and that we've
// been connected long enough for this eviction to happen at
// all. Note that we only request blocks from a peer if we learn
// of a valid headers chain with at least as much work as our
// tip.
CNodeState *node_state = State(pnode->GetId());
if (node_state == nullptr ||
(now - pnode->m_connected >= MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME &&
node_state->nBlocksInFlight == 0)) {
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"disconnecting extra block-relay-only peer=%d "
"(last block received at time %d)\n",
pnode->GetId(),
count_seconds(pnode->m_last_block_time));
return true;
} else {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"keeping block-relay-only peer=%d chosen for eviction "
"(connect time: %d, blocks_in_flight: %d)\n",
pnode->GetId(), count_seconds(pnode->m_connected),
node_state->nBlocksInFlight);
}
return false;
});
}
// Check whether we have too many OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY peers
if (m_connman.GetExtraFullOutboundCount() <= 0) {
return;
}
// If we have more OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY peers than we target, disconnect one.
// Pick the OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY peer that least recently announced us a new
// block, with ties broken by choosing the more recent connection (higher
// node id)
NodeId worst_peer = -1;
int64_t oldest_block_announcement = std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max();
m_connman.ForEachNode([&](CNode *pnode) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(
::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
// Only consider OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY peers that are not already marked
// for disconnection
if (!pnode->IsFullOutboundConn() || pnode->fDisconnect) {
return;
}
CNodeState *state = State(pnode->GetId());
if (state == nullptr) {
// shouldn't be possible, but just in case
return;
}
// Don't evict our protected peers
if (state->m_chain_sync.m_protect) {
return;
}
if (state->m_last_block_announcement < oldest_block_announcement ||
(state->m_last_block_announcement == oldest_block_announcement &&
pnode->GetId() > worst_peer)) {
worst_peer = pnode->GetId();
oldest_block_announcement = state->m_last_block_announcement;
}
});
if (worst_peer == -1) {
return;
}
bool disconnected = m_connman.ForNode(
worst_peer, [&](CNode *pnode) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
// Only disconnect a peer that has been connected to us for some
// reasonable fraction of our check-frequency, to give it time for
// new information to have arrived. Also don't disconnect any peer
// we're trying to download a block from.
CNodeState &state = *State(pnode->GetId());
if (now - pnode->m_connected > MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME &&
state.nBlocksInFlight == 0) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"disconnecting extra outbound peer=%d (last block "
"announcement received at time %d)\n",
pnode->GetId(), oldest_block_announcement);
pnode->fDisconnect = true;
return true;
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"keeping outbound peer=%d chosen for eviction "
"(connect time: %d, blocks_in_flight: %d)\n",
pnode->GetId(), count_seconds(pnode->m_connected),
state.nBlocksInFlight);
return false;
}
});
if (disconnected) {
// If we disconnected an extra peer, that means we successfully
// connected to at least one peer after the last time we detected a
// stale tip. Don't try any more extra peers until we next detect a
// stale tip, to limit the load we put on the network from these extra
// connections.
m_connman.SetTryNewOutboundPeer(false);
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers() {
LOCK(cs_main);
auto now{GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>()};
EvictExtraOutboundPeers(now);
if (now > m_stale_tip_check_time) {
// Check whether our tip is stale, and if so, allow using an extra
// outbound peer.
if (!m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks() &&
m_connman.GetNetworkActive() && m_connman.GetUseAddrmanOutgoing() &&
TipMayBeStale()) {
LogPrintf("Potential stale tip detected, will try using extra "
"outbound peer (last tip update: %d seconds ago)\n",
count_seconds(now - m_last_tip_update.load()));
m_connman.SetTryNewOutboundPeer(true);
} else if (m_connman.GetTryNewOutboundPeer()) {
m_connman.SetTryNewOutboundPeer(false);
}
m_stale_tip_check_time = now + STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL;
}
if (!m_initial_sync_finished && CanDirectFetch()) {
m_connman.StartExtraBlockRelayPeers();
m_initial_sync_finished = true;
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSendPing(CNode &node_to, Peer &peer,
std::chrono::microseconds now) {
if (m_connman.ShouldRunInactivityChecks(
node_to, std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::seconds>(now)) &&
peer.m_ping_nonce_sent &&
now > peer.m_ping_start.load() + TIMEOUT_INTERVAL) {
// The ping timeout is using mocktime. To disable the check during
// testing, increase -peertimeout.
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "ping timeout: %fs peer=%d\n",
0.000001 * count_microseconds(now - peer.m_ping_start.load()),
peer.m_id);
node_to.fDisconnect = true;
return;
}
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(node_to.GetCommonVersion());
bool pingSend = false;
if (peer.m_ping_queued) {
// RPC ping request by user
pingSend = true;
}
if (peer.m_ping_nonce_sent == 0 &&
now > peer.m_ping_start.load() + PING_INTERVAL) {
// Ping automatically sent as a latency probe & keepalive.
pingSend = true;
}
if (pingSend) {
uint64_t nonce;
do {
nonce = GetRand<uint64_t>();
} while (nonce == 0);
peer.m_ping_queued = false;
peer.m_ping_start = now;
if (node_to.GetCommonVersion() > BIP0031_VERSION) {
peer.m_ping_nonce_sent = nonce;
m_connman.PushMessage(&node_to,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::PING, nonce));
} else {
// Peer is too old to support ping command with nonce, pong will
// never arrive.
peer.m_ping_nonce_sent = 0;
m_connman.PushMessage(&node_to, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::PING));
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSendAddr(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
std::chrono::microseconds current_time) {
// Nothing to do for non-address-relay peers
if (!peer.m_addr_relay_enabled) {
return;
}
LOCK(peer.m_addr_send_times_mutex);
if (fListen && !m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload() &&
peer.m_next_local_addr_send < current_time) {
// If we've sent before, clear the bloom filter for the peer, so
// that our self-announcement will actually go out. This might
// be unnecessary if the bloom filter has already rolled over
// since our last self-announcement, but there is only a small
// bandwidth cost that we can incur by doing this (which happens
// once a day on average).
if (peer.m_next_local_addr_send != 0us) {
peer.m_addr_known->reset();
}
if (std::optional<CService> local_service = GetLocalAddrForPeer(node)) {
CAddress local_addr{*local_service, peer.m_our_services,
AdjustedTime()};
PushAddress(peer, local_addr);
}
peer.m_next_local_addr_send = GetExponentialRand(
current_time, AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
}
// We sent an `addr` message to this peer recently. Nothing more to do.
if (current_time <= peer.m_next_addr_send) {
return;
}
peer.m_next_addr_send =
GetExponentialRand(current_time, AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
const size_t max_addr_to_send = m_opts.max_addr_to_send;
if (!Assume(peer.m_addrs_to_send.size() <= max_addr_to_send)) {
// Should be impossible since we always check size before adding to
// m_addrs_to_send. Recover by trimming the vector.
peer.m_addrs_to_send.resize(max_addr_to_send);
}
// Remove addr records that the peer already knows about, and add new
// addrs to the m_addr_known filter on the same pass.
auto addr_already_known =
[&peer](const CAddress &addr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(g_msgproc_mutex) {
bool ret = peer.m_addr_known->contains(addr.GetKey());
if (!ret) {
peer.m_addr_known->insert(addr.GetKey());
}
return ret;
};
peer.m_addrs_to_send.erase(std::remove_if(peer.m_addrs_to_send.begin(),
peer.m_addrs_to_send.end(),
addr_already_known),
peer.m_addrs_to_send.end());
// No addr messages to send
if (peer.m_addrs_to_send.empty()) {
return;
}
const char *msg_type;
int make_flags;
if (peer.m_wants_addrv2) {
msg_type = NetMsgType::ADDRV2;
make_flags = ADDRV2_FORMAT;
} else {
msg_type = NetMsgType::ADDR;
make_flags = 0;
}
m_connman.PushMessage(
&node, CNetMsgMaker(node.GetCommonVersion())
.Make(make_flags, msg_type, peer.m_addrs_to_send));
peer.m_addrs_to_send.clear();
// we only send the big addr message once
if (peer.m_addrs_to_send.capacity() > 40) {
peer.m_addrs_to_send.shrink_to_fit();
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSendSendHeaders(CNode &node, Peer &peer) {
// Delay sending SENDHEADERS (BIP 130) until we're done with an
// initial-headers-sync with this peer. Receiving headers announcements for
// new blocks while trying to sync their headers chain is problematic,
// because of the state tracking done.
if (!peer.m_sent_sendheaders &&
node.GetCommonVersion() >= SENDHEADERS_VERSION) {
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState &state = *State(node.GetId());
if (state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr &&
state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >
m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
// Tell our peer we prefer to receive headers rather than inv's
// We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because even
// non-NODE NETWORK peers can announce blocks (such as pruning
// nodes)
m_connman.PushMessage(&node, CNetMsgMaker(node.GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::SENDHEADERS));
peer.m_sent_sendheaders = true;
}
}
}
void PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSendFeefilter(
CNode &pto, Peer &peer, std::chrono::microseconds current_time) {
if (m_opts.ignore_incoming_txs) {
return;
}
if (pto.GetCommonVersion() < FEEFILTER_VERSION) {
return;
}
// peers with the forcerelay permission should not filter txs to us
if (pto.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::ForceRelay)) {
return;
}
// Don't send feefilter messages to outbound block-relay-only peers since
// they should never announce transactions to us, regardless of feefilter
// state.
if (pto.IsBlockOnlyConn()) {
return;
}
Amount currentFilter = m_mempool.GetMinFee().GetFeePerK();
if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
// Received tx-inv messages are discarded when the active
// chainstate is in IBD, so tell the peer to not send them.
currentFilter = MAX_MONEY;
} else {
static const Amount MAX_FILTER{m_fee_filter_rounder.round(MAX_MONEY)};
if (peer.m_fee_filter_sent == MAX_FILTER) {
// Send the current filter if we sent MAX_FILTER previously
// and made it out of IBD.
peer.m_next_send_feefilter = 0us;
}
}
if (current_time > peer.m_next_send_feefilter) {
Amount filterToSend = m_fee_filter_rounder.round(currentFilter);
// We always have a fee filter of at least the min relay fee
filterToSend =
std::max(filterToSend, m_mempool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFeePerK());
if (filterToSend != peer.m_fee_filter_sent) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
&pto, CNetMsgMaker(pto.GetCommonVersion())
.Make(NetMsgType::FEEFILTER, filterToSend));
peer.m_fee_filter_sent = filterToSend;
}
peer.m_next_send_feefilter =
GetExponentialRand(current_time, AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
}
// If the fee filter has changed substantially and it's still more than
// MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY until scheduled broadcast, then move the
// broadcast to within MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY.
else if (current_time + MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY <
peer.m_next_send_feefilter &&
(currentFilter < 3 * peer.m_fee_filter_sent / 4 ||
currentFilter > 4 * peer.m_fee_filter_sent / 3)) {
peer.m_next_send_feefilter =
current_time + GetRandomDuration<std::chrono::microseconds>(
MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY);
}
}
namespace {
class CompareInvMempoolOrder {
CTxMemPool *mp;
public:
explicit CompareInvMempoolOrder(CTxMemPool *_mempool) : mp(_mempool) {}
bool operator()(std::set<TxId>::iterator a, std::set<TxId>::iterator b) {
/**
* As std::make_heap produces a max-heap, we want the entries which
* are topologically earlier to sort later.
*/
return mp->CompareTopologically(*b, *a);
}
};
} // namespace
bool PeerManagerImpl::SetupAddressRelay(const CNode &node, Peer &peer) {
// We don't participate in addr relay with outbound block-relay-only
// connections to prevent providing adversaries with the additional
// information of addr traffic to infer the link.
if (node.IsBlockOnlyConn()) {
return false;
}
if (!peer.m_addr_relay_enabled.exchange(true)) {
// First addr message we have received from the peer, initialize
// m_addr_known
peer.m_addr_known = std::make_unique<CRollingBloomFilter>(5000, 0.001);
}
return true;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::SendMessages(const Config &config, CNode *pto) {
AssertLockHeld(g_msgproc_mutex);
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef(pto->GetId());
if (!peer) {
return false;
}
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams = m_chainparams.GetConsensus();
// We must call MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect first, to ensure that we'll
// disconnect misbehaving peers even before the version handshake is
// complete.
if (MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect(*pto, *peer)) {
return true;
}
// Don't send anything until the version handshake is complete
if (!pto->fSuccessfullyConnected || pto->fDisconnect) {
return true;
}
// If we get here, the outgoing message serialization version is set and
// can't change.
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pto->GetCommonVersion());
const auto current_time{GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>()};
if (pto->IsAddrFetchConn() &&
current_time - pto->m_connected > 10 * AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"addrfetch connection timeout; disconnecting peer=%d\n",
pto->GetId());
pto->fDisconnect = true;
return true;
}
MaybeSendPing(*pto, *peer, current_time);
// MaybeSendPing may have marked peer for disconnection
if (pto->fDisconnect) {
return true;
}
bool sync_blocks_and_headers_from_peer = false;
MaybeSendAddr(*pto, *peer, current_time);
MaybeSendSendHeaders(*pto, *peer);
{
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId());
// Start block sync
if (m_chainman.m_best_header == nullptr) {
m_chainman.m_best_header = m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip();
}
// Determine whether we might try initial headers sync or parallel
// block download from this peer -- this mostly affects behavior while
// in IBD (once out of IBD, we sync from all peers).
if (state.fPreferredDownload) {
sync_blocks_and_headers_from_peer = true;
} else if (CanServeBlocks(*peer) && !pto->IsAddrFetchConn()) {
// Typically this is an inbound peer. If we don't have any outbound
// peers, or if we aren't downloading any blocks from such peers,
// then allow block downloads from this peer, too.
// We prefer downloading blocks from outbound peers to avoid
// putting undue load on (say) some home user who is just making
// outbound connections to the network, but if our only source of
// the latest blocks is from an inbound peer, we have to be sure to
// eventually download it (and not just wait indefinitely for an
// outbound peer to have it).
if (m_num_preferred_download_peers == 0 ||
mapBlocksInFlight.empty()) {
sync_blocks_and_headers_from_peer = true;
}
}
if (!state.fSyncStarted && CanServeBlocks(*peer) &&
!m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
// Only actively request headers from a single peer, unless we're
// close to today.
if ((nSyncStarted == 0 && sync_blocks_and_headers_from_peer) ||
m_chainman.m_best_header->Time() > GetAdjustedTime() - 24h) {
const CBlockIndex *pindexStart = m_chainman.m_best_header;
/**
* If possible, start at the block preceding the currently best
* known header. This ensures that we always get a non-empty
* list of headers back as long as the peer is up-to-date. With
* a non-empty response, we can initialise the peer's known best
* block. This wouldn't be possible if we requested starting at
* m_best_header and got back an empty response.
*/
if (pindexStart->pprev) {
pindexStart = pindexStart->pprev;
}
if (MaybeSendGetHeaders(*pto, GetLocator(pindexStart), *peer)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"initial getheaders (%d) to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n",
pindexStart->nHeight, pto->GetId(),
peer->m_starting_height);
state.fSyncStarted = true;
peer->m_headers_sync_timeout =
current_time + HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE +
(
// Convert HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER to
// microseconds before scaling to maintain precision
std::chrono::microseconds{
HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER} *
Ticks<std::chrono::seconds>(
GetAdjustedTime() -
m_chainman.m_best_header->Time()) /
consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing);
nSyncStarted++;
}
}
}
//
// Try sending block announcements via headers
//
{
// If we have less than MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE in our list of block
// hashes we're relaying, and our peer wants headers announcements,
// then find the first header not yet known to our peer but would
// connect, and send. If no header would connect, or if we have too
// many blocks, or if the peer doesn't want headers, just add all to
// the inv queue.
LOCK(peer->m_block_inv_mutex);
std::vector<CBlock> vHeaders;
bool fRevertToInv =
((!peer->m_prefers_headers &&
(!state.m_requested_hb_cmpctblocks ||
peer->m_blocks_for_headers_relay.size() > 1)) ||
peer->m_blocks_for_headers_relay.size() >
MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE);
// last header queued for delivery
const CBlockIndex *pBestIndex = nullptr;
// ensure pindexBestKnownBlock is up-to-date
ProcessBlockAvailability(pto->GetId());
if (!fRevertToInv) {
bool fFoundStartingHeader = false;
// Try to find first header that our peer doesn't have, and then
// send all headers past that one. If we come across an headers
// that aren't on m_chainman.ActiveChain(), give up.
for (const BlockHash &hash : peer->m_blocks_for_headers_relay) {
const CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash);
assert(pindex);
if (m_chainman.ActiveChain()[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) {
// Bail out if we reorged away from this block
fRevertToInv = true;
break;
}
if (pBestIndex != nullptr && pindex->pprev != pBestIndex) {
// This means that the list of blocks to announce don't
// connect to each other. This shouldn't really be
// possible to hit during regular operation (because
// reorgs should take us to a chain that has some block
// not on the prior chain, which should be caught by the
// prior check), but one way this could happen is by
// using invalidateblock / reconsiderblock repeatedly on
// the tip, causing it to be added multiple times to
// m_blocks_for_headers_relay. Robustly deal with this
// rare situation by reverting to an inv.
fRevertToInv = true;
break;
}
pBestIndex = pindex;
if (fFoundStartingHeader) {
// add this to the headers message
vHeaders.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHeader());
} else if (PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex)) {
// Keep looking for the first new block.
continue;
} else if (pindex->pprev == nullptr ||
PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex->pprev)) {
// Peer doesn't have this header but they do have the
// prior one. Start sending headers.
fFoundStartingHeader = true;
vHeaders.push_back(pindex->GetBlockHeader());
} else {
// Peer doesn't have this header or the prior one --
// nothing will connect, so bail out.
fRevertToInv = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (!fRevertToInv && !vHeaders.empty()) {
if (vHeaders.size() == 1 && state.m_requested_hb_cmpctblocks) {
// We only send up to 1 block as header-and-ids, as
// otherwise probably means we're doing an initial-ish-sync
// or they're slow.
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"%s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d\n",
__func__, vHeaders.front().GetHash().ToString(),
pto->GetId());
std::optional<CSerializedNetMsg> cached_cmpctblock_msg;
{
LOCK(m_most_recent_block_mutex);
if (m_most_recent_block_hash ==
pBestIndex->GetBlockHash()) {
cached_cmpctblock_msg =
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK,
*m_most_recent_compact_block);
}
}
if (cached_cmpctblock_msg.has_value()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
pto, std::move(cached_cmpctblock_msg.value()));
} else {
CBlock block;
const bool ret{m_chainman.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(
block, *pBestIndex)};
assert(ret);
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock(block);
m_connman.PushMessage(
pto,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::CMPCTBLOCK, cmpctblock));
}
state.pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex;
} else if (peer->m_prefers_headers) {
if (vHeaders.size() > 1) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"%s: %u headers, range (%s, %s), to peer=%d\n",
__func__, vHeaders.size(),
vHeaders.front().GetHash().ToString(),
vHeaders.back().GetHash().ToString(),
pto->GetId());
} else {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"%s: sending header %s to peer=%d\n", __func__,
vHeaders.front().GetHash().ToString(),
pto->GetId());
}
m_connman.PushMessage(
pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::HEADERS, vHeaders));
state.pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex;
} else {
fRevertToInv = true;
}
}
if (fRevertToInv) {
// If falling back to using an inv, just try to inv the tip. The
// last entry in m_blocks_for_headers_relay was our tip at some
// point in the past.
if (!peer->m_blocks_for_headers_relay.empty()) {
const BlockHash &hashToAnnounce =
peer->m_blocks_for_headers_relay.back();
const CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hashToAnnounce);
assert(pindex);
// Warn if we're announcing a block that is not on the main
// chain. This should be very rare and could be optimized
// out. Just log for now.
if (m_chainman.ActiveChain()[pindex->nHeight] != pindex) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"Announcing block %s not on main chain (tip=%s)\n",
hashToAnnounce.ToString(),
m_chainman.ActiveChain()
.Tip()
->GetBlockHash()
.ToString());
}
// If the peer's chain has this block, don't inv it back.
if (!PeerHasHeader(&state, pindex)) {
peer->m_blocks_for_inv_relay.push_back(hashToAnnounce);
LogPrint(BCLog::NET,
"%s: sending inv peer=%d hash=%s\n", __func__,
pto->GetId(), hashToAnnounce.ToString());
}
}
}
peer->m_blocks_for_headers_relay.clear();
}
} // release cs_main
//
// Message: inventory
//
std::vector<CInv> vInv;
auto addInvAndMaybeFlush = [&](uint32_t type, const uint256 &hash) {
vInv.emplace_back(type, hash);
if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, std::move(vInv)));
vInv.clear();
}
};
{
LOCK(cs_main);
{
LOCK(peer->m_block_inv_mutex);
vInv.reserve(std::max<size_t>(peer->m_blocks_for_inv_relay.size(),
INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX_PER_MB *
config.GetMaxBlockSize() /
1000000));
// Add blocks
for (const BlockHash &hash : peer->m_blocks_for_inv_relay) {
addInvAndMaybeFlush(MSG_BLOCK, hash);
}
peer->m_blocks_for_inv_relay.clear();
}
auto computeNextInvSendTime =
[&](std::chrono::microseconds &next) -> bool {
bool fSendTrickle = pto->HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan);
if (next < current_time) {
fSendTrickle = true;
if (pto->IsInboundConn()) {
next = NextInvToInbounds(
current_time, INBOUND_INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
} else {
// Skip delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy
// concern for them.
next = current_time;
}
}
return fSendTrickle;
};
// Add proofs to inventory
if (peer->m_proof_relay != nullptr) {
LOCK(peer->m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_mutex);
if (computeNextInvSendTime(
peer->m_proof_relay->m_next_inv_send_time)) {
auto it =
peer->m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_to_send.begin();
while (it !=
peer->m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_to_send.end()) {
const avalanche::ProofId proofid = *it;
it = peer->m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_to_send.erase(
it);
if (peer->m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_known_filter
.contains(proofid)) {
continue;
}
peer->m_proof_relay->m_proof_inventory_known_filter.insert(
proofid);
addInvAndMaybeFlush(MSG_AVA_PROOF, proofid);
peer->m_proof_relay->m_recently_announced_proofs.insert(
proofid);
}
}
}
if (auto tx_relay = peer->GetTxRelay()) {
LOCK(tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_mutex);
// Check whether periodic sends should happen
const bool fSendTrickle =
computeNextInvSendTime(tx_relay->m_next_inv_send_time);
// Time to send but the peer has requested we not relay
// transactions.
if (fSendTrickle) {
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
if (!tx_relay->m_relay_txs) {
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_to_send.clear();
}
}
// Respond to BIP35 mempool requests
if (fSendTrickle && tx_relay->m_send_mempool) {
auto vtxinfo = m_mempool.infoAll();
tx_relay->m_send_mempool = false;
const CFeeRate filterrate{
tx_relay->m_fee_filter_received.load()};
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
for (const auto &txinfo : vtxinfo) {
const TxId &txid = txinfo.tx->GetId();
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_to_send.erase(txid);
// Don't send transactions that peers will not put into
// their mempool
if (txinfo.fee < filterrate.GetFee(txinfo.vsize)) {
continue;
}
if (tx_relay->m_bloom_filter &&
!tx_relay->m_bloom_filter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(
*txinfo.tx)) {
continue;
}
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_known_filter.insert(txid);
// Responses to MEMPOOL requests bypass the
// m_recently_announced_invs filter.
addInvAndMaybeFlush(MSG_TX, txid);
}
tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req =
std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::seconds>(
current_time);
}
// Determine transactions to relay
if (fSendTrickle) {
// Produce a vector with all candidates for sending
std::vector<std::set<TxId>::iterator> vInvTx;
vInvTx.reserve(tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_to_send.size());
for (std::set<TxId>::iterator it =
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_to_send.begin();
it != tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_to_send.end(); it++) {
vInvTx.push_back(it);
}
const CFeeRate filterrate{
tx_relay->m_fee_filter_received.load()};
// Send out the inventory in the order of admission to our
// mempool, which is guaranteed to be a topological sort order.
// A heap is used so that not all items need sorting if only a
// few are being sent.
CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder(&m_mempool);
std::make_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(),
compareInvMempoolOrder);
// No reason to drain out at many times the network's
// capacity, especially since we have many peers and some
// will draw much shorter delays.
unsigned int nRelayedTransactions = 0;
LOCK(tx_relay->m_bloom_filter_mutex);
while (!vInvTx.empty() &&
nRelayedTransactions < INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX_PER_MB *
config.GetMaxBlockSize() /
1000000) {
// Fetch the top element from the heap
std::pop_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(),
compareInvMempoolOrder);
std::set<TxId>::iterator it = vInvTx.back();
vInvTx.pop_back();
const TxId txid = *it;
// Remove it from the to-be-sent set
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_to_send.erase(it);
// Check if not in the filter already
if (tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_known_filter.contains(txid)) {
continue;
}
// Not in the mempool anymore? don't bother sending it.
auto txinfo = m_mempool.info(txid);
if (!txinfo.tx) {
continue;
}
// Peer told you to not send transactions at that
// feerate? Don't bother sending it.
if (txinfo.fee < filterrate.GetFee(txinfo.vsize)) {
continue;
}
if (tx_relay->m_bloom_filter &&
!tx_relay->m_bloom_filter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(
*txinfo.tx)) {
continue;
}
// Send
tx_relay->m_recently_announced_invs.insert(txid);
addInvAndMaybeFlush(MSG_TX, txid);
nRelayedTransactions++;
{
// Expire old relay messages
while (!g_relay_expiration.empty() &&
g_relay_expiration.front().first <
current_time) {
mapRelay.erase(g_relay_expiration.front().second);
g_relay_expiration.pop_front();
}
auto ret = mapRelay.insert(
std::make_pair(txid, std::move(txinfo.tx)));
if (ret.second) {
g_relay_expiration.push_back(std::make_pair(
current_time + RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME, ret.first));
}
}
tx_relay->m_tx_inventory_known_filter.insert(txid);
}
}
}
} // release cs_main
if (!vInv.empty()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv));
}
{
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId());
// Detect whether we're stalling
auto stalling_timeout = m_block_stalling_timeout.load();
if (state.m_stalling_since.count() &&
state.m_stalling_since < current_time - stalling_timeout) {
// Stalling only triggers when the block download window cannot
// move. During normal steady state, the download window should be
// much larger than the to-be-downloaded set of blocks, so
// disconnection should only happen during initial block download.
LogPrintf("Peer=%d is stalling block download, disconnecting\n",
pto->GetId());
pto->fDisconnect = true;
// Increase timeout for the next peer so that we don't disconnect
// multiple peers if our own bandwidth is insufficient.
const auto new_timeout =
std::min(2 * stalling_timeout, BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT_MAX);
if (stalling_timeout != new_timeout &&
m_block_stalling_timeout.compare_exchange_strong(
stalling_timeout, new_timeout)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::NET,
"Increased stalling timeout temporarily to %d seconds\n",
count_seconds(new_timeout));
}
return true;
}
// In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for
// block_interval * (1 + 0.5 * N) (with N the number of peers from which
// we're downloading validated blocks), disconnect due to timeout.
// We compensate for other peers to prevent killing off peers due to our
// own downstream link being saturated. We only count validated
// in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes
// to unreasonably increase our timeout.
if (state.vBlocksInFlight.size() > 0) {
QueuedBlock &queuedBlock = state.vBlocksInFlight.front();
int nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads =
m_peers_downloading_from - 1;
if (current_time >
state.m_downloading_since +
std::chrono::seconds{consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing} *
(BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE +
BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER *
nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads)) {
LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, "
"disconnecting\n",
queuedBlock.pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
pto->GetId());
pto->fDisconnect = true;
return true;
}
}
// Check for headers sync timeouts
if (state.fSyncStarted &&
peer->m_headers_sync_timeout < std::chrono::microseconds::max()) {
// Detect whether this is a stalling initial-headers-sync peer
if (m_chainman.m_best_header->Time() <= GetAdjustedTime() - 24h) {
if (current_time > peer->m_headers_sync_timeout &&
nSyncStarted == 1 &&
(m_num_preferred_download_peers -
state.fPreferredDownload >=
1)) {
// Disconnect a peer (without NetPermissionFlags::NoBan
// permission) if it is our only sync peer, and we have
// others we could be using instead. Note: If all our peers
// are inbound, then we won't disconnect our sync peer for
// stalling; we have bigger problems if we can't get any
// outbound peers.
if (!pto->HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::NoBan)) {
LogPrintf("Timeout downloading headers from peer=%d, "
"disconnecting\n",
pto->GetId());
pto->fDisconnect = true;
return true;
} else {
LogPrintf("Timeout downloading headers from noban "
"peer=%d, not disconnecting\n",
pto->GetId());
// Reset the headers sync state so that we have a chance
// to try downloading from a different peer. Note: this
// will also result in at least one more getheaders
// message to be sent to this peer (eventually).
state.fSyncStarted = false;
nSyncStarted--;
peer->m_headers_sync_timeout = 0us;
}
}
} else {
// After we've caught up once, reset the timeout so we can't
// trigger disconnect later.
peer->m_headers_sync_timeout = std::chrono::microseconds::max();
}
}
// Check that outbound peers have reasonable chains GetTime() is used by
// this anti-DoS logic so we can test this using mocktime.
ConsiderEviction(*pto, *peer, GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>());
} // release cs_main
std::vector<CInv> vGetData;
//
// Message: getdata (blocks)
//
{
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId());
if (CanServeBlocks(*peer) &&
((sync_blocks_and_headers_from_peer && !IsLimitedPeer(*peer)) ||
!m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) &&
state.nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) {
std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> vToDownload;
NodeId staller = -1;
FindNextBlocksToDownload(pto->GetId(),
MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER -
state.nBlocksInFlight,
vToDownload, staller);
for (const CBlockIndex *pindex : vToDownload) {
vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
BlockRequested(config, pto->GetId(), *pindex);
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting block %s (%d) peer=%d\n",
pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindex->nHeight,
pto->GetId());
}
if (state.nBlocksInFlight == 0 && staller != -1) {
if (State(staller)->m_stalling_since == 0us) {
State(staller)->m_stalling_since = current_time;
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Stall started peer=%d\n", staller);
}
}
}
} // release cs_main
auto addGetDataAndMaybeFlush = [&](uint32_t type, const uint256 &hash) {
CInv inv(type, hash);
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting %s from peer=%d\n", inv.ToString(),
pto->GetId());
vGetData.push_back(std::move(inv));
if (vGetData.size() >= MAX_GETDATA_SZ) {
m_connman.PushMessage(
pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, std::move(vGetData)));
vGetData.clear();
}
};
//
// Message: getdata (proof)
//
{
LOCK(cs_proofrequest);
std::vector<std::pair<NodeId, avalanche::ProofId>> expired;
auto requestable =
m_proofrequest.GetRequestable(pto->GetId(), current_time, &expired);
for (const auto &entry : expired) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"timeout of inflight proof %s from peer=%d\n",
entry.second.ToString(), entry.first);
}
for (const auto &proofid : requestable) {
if (!AlreadyHaveProof(proofid)) {
addGetDataAndMaybeFlush(MSG_AVA_PROOF, proofid);
m_proofrequest.RequestedData(
pto->GetId(), proofid,
current_time + PROOF_REQUEST_PARAMS.getdata_interval);
} else {
// We have already seen this proof, no need to download.
// This is just a belt-and-suspenders, as this should
// already be called whenever a proof becomes
// AlreadyHaveProof().
m_proofrequest.ForgetInvId(proofid);
}
}
} // release cs_proofrequest
//
// Message: getdata (transactions)
//
{
LOCK(cs_main);
std::vector<std::pair<NodeId, TxId>> expired;
auto requestable =
m_txrequest.GetRequestable(pto->GetId(), current_time, &expired);
for (const auto &entry : expired) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "timeout of inflight tx %s from peer=%d\n",
entry.second.ToString(), entry.first);
}
for (const TxId &txid : requestable) {
// Exclude m_recent_rejects_package_reconsiderable: we may be
// requesting a missing parent that was previously rejected for
// being too low feerate.
if (!AlreadyHaveTx(txid, /*include_reconsiderable=*/false)) {
addGetDataAndMaybeFlush(MSG_TX, txid);
m_txrequest.RequestedData(
pto->GetId(), txid,
current_time + TX_REQUEST_PARAMS.getdata_interval);
} else {
// We have already seen this transaction, no need to download.
// This is just a belt-and-suspenders, as this should already be
// called whenever a transaction becomes AlreadyHaveTx().
m_txrequest.ForgetInvId(txid);
}
}
if (!vGetData.empty()) {
m_connman.PushMessage(pto,
msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData));
}
} // release cs_main
MaybeSendFeefilter(*pto, *peer, current_time);
return true;
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::ReceivedAvalancheProof(CNode &node, Peer &peer,
const avalanche::ProofRef &proof) {
assert(proof != nullptr);
const avalanche::ProofId &proofid = proof->getId();
AddKnownProof(peer, proofid);
if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
// We cannot reliably verify proofs during IBD, so bail out early and
// keep the inventory as pending so it can be requested when the node
// has synced.
return true;
}
const NodeId nodeid = node.GetId();
const bool isStaker = WITH_LOCK(node.cs_avalanche_pubkey,
return node.m_avalanche_pubkey.has_value());
auto saveProofIfStaker = [this, isStaker](const CNode &node,
const avalanche::ProofId &proofid,
const NodeId nodeid) -> bool {
if (isStaker) {
return m_avalanche->withPeerManager(
[&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.saveRemoteProof(proofid, nodeid, true);
});
}
return false;
};
{
LOCK(cs_proofrequest);
m_proofrequest.ReceivedResponse(nodeid, proofid);
if (AlreadyHaveProof(proofid)) {
m_proofrequest.ForgetInvId(proofid);
saveProofIfStaker(node, proofid, nodeid);
return true;
}
}
// registerProof should not be called while cs_proofrequest because it
// holds cs_main and that creates a potential deadlock during shutdown
avalanche::ProofRegistrationState state;
if (m_avalanche->withPeerManager([&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) {
return pm.registerProof(proof, state);
})) {
WITH_LOCK(cs_proofrequest, m_proofrequest.ForgetInvId(proofid));
RelayProof(proofid);
node.m_last_proof_time = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "New avalanche proof: peer=%d, proofid %s\n",
nodeid, proofid.ToString());
}
if (state.GetResult() == avalanche::ProofRegistrationResult::INVALID) {
m_avalanche->withPeerManager(
[&](avalanche::PeerManager &pm) { pm.setInvalid(proofid); });
Misbehaving(peer, 100, state.GetRejectReason());
return false;
}
if (state.GetResult() == avalanche::ProofRegistrationResult::MISSING_UTXO) {
// This is possible that a proof contains a utxo we don't know yet, so
// don't ban for this.
return false;
}
if (!m_avalanche->reconcileOrFinalize(proof)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"Not polling the avalanche proof (%s): peer=%d, proofid %s\n",
state.IsValid() ? "not-worth-polling"
: state.GetRejectReason(),
nodeid, proofid.ToString());
}
saveProofIfStaker(node, proofid, nodeid);
return true;
}
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index dd0b6f479..26f3844e5 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -1,6936 +1,6939 @@
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Copyright (c) 2017-2020 The Bitcoin developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include <validation.h>
#include <kernel/chainparams.h>
#include <kernel/coinstats.h>
#include <kernel/disconnected_transactions.h>
#include <kernel/mempool_entry.h>
#include <kernel/mempool_persist.h>
#include <arith_uint256.h>
#include <avalanche/avalanche.h>
#include <avalanche/processor.h>
#include <blockvalidity.h>
#include <chainparams.h>
#include <checkpoints.h>
#include <checkqueue.h>
#include <common/args.h>
#include <config.h>
#include <consensus/activation.h>
#include <consensus/amount.h>
#include <consensus/merkle.h>
#include <consensus/tx_check.h>
#include <consensus/tx_verify.h>
#include <consensus/validation.h>
#include <hash.h>
#include <kernel/notifications_interface.h>
#include <logging.h>
#include <logging/timer.h>
#include <minerfund.h>
#include <node/blockstorage.h>
#include <node/utxo_snapshot.h>
#include <policy/block/minerfund.h>
#include <policy/block/preconsensus.h>
#include <policy/block/stakingrewards.h>
#include <policy/policy.h>
#include <policy/settings.h>
#include <pow/pow.h>
#include <primitives/block.h>
#include <primitives/transaction.h>
#include <random.h>
#include <reverse_iterator.h>
#include <script/script.h>
#include <script/scriptcache.h>
#include <script/sigcache.h>
#include <shutdown.h>
#include <tinyformat.h>
#include <txdb.h>
#include <txmempool.h>
#include <undo.h>
#include <util/check.h> // For NDEBUG compile time check
#include <util/fs.h>
#include <util/fs_helpers.h>
#include <util/strencodings.h>
#include <util/string.h>
#include <util/time.h>
#include <util/trace.h>
#include <util/translation.h>
#include <validationinterface.h>
#include <warnings.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <atomic>
#include <cassert>
#include <chrono>
#include <deque>
#include <numeric>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
#include <thread>
using kernel::CCoinsStats;
using kernel::CoinStatsHashType;
using kernel::ComputeUTXOStats;
using kernel::LoadMempool;
using kernel::Notifications;
using fsbridge::FopenFn;
using node::BLOCKFILE_CHUNK_SIZE;
using node::BlockManager;
using node::BlockMap;
using node::fReindex;
using node::SnapshotMetadata;
using node::UNDOFILE_CHUNK_SIZE;
#define MICRO 0.000001
#define MILLI 0.001
/** Time to wait between writing blocks/block index to disk. */
static constexpr std::chrono::hours DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL{1};
/** Time to wait between flushing chainstate to disk. */
static constexpr std::chrono::hours DATABASE_FLUSH_INTERVAL{24};
const std::vector<std::string> CHECKLEVEL_DOC{
"level 0 reads the blocks from disk",
"level 1 verifies block validity",
"level 2 verifies undo data",
"level 3 checks disconnection of tip blocks",
"level 4 tries to reconnect the blocks",
"each level includes the checks of the previous levels",
};
/**
* The number of blocks to keep below the deepest prune lock.
* There is nothing special about this number. It is higher than what we
* expect to see in regular mainnet reorgs, but not so high that it would
* noticeably interfere with the pruning mechanism.
* */
static constexpr int PRUNE_LOCK_BUFFER{10};
GlobalMutex g_best_block_mutex;
std::condition_variable g_best_block_cv;
const CBlockIndex *g_best_block;
BlockValidationOptions::BlockValidationOptions(const Config &config)
: excessiveBlockSize(config.GetMaxBlockSize()), checkPoW(true),
checkMerkleRoot(true) {}
const CBlockIndex *
Chainstate::FindForkInGlobalIndex(const CBlockLocator &locator) const {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Find the latest block common to locator and chain - we expect that
// locator.vHave is sorted descending by height.
for (const BlockHash &hash : locator.vHave) {
const CBlockIndex *pindex{m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash)};
if (pindex) {
if (m_chain.Contains(pindex)) {
return pindex;
}
if (pindex->GetAncestor(m_chain.Height()) == m_chain.Tip()) {
return m_chain.Tip();
}
}
}
return m_chain.Genesis();
}
static uint32_t GetNextBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex *pindex,
const ChainstateManager &chainman);
namespace {
/**
* A helper which calculates heights of inputs of a given transaction.
*
* @param[in] tip The current chain tip. If an input belongs to a mempool
* transaction, we assume it will be confirmed in the next
* block.
* @param[in] coins Any CCoinsView that provides access to the relevant coins.
* @param[in] tx The transaction being evaluated.
*
* @returns A vector of input heights or nullopt, in case of an error.
*/
std::optional<std::vector<int>> CalculatePrevHeights(const CBlockIndex &tip,
const CCoinsView &coins,
const CTransaction &tx) {
std::vector<int> prev_heights;
prev_heights.resize(tx.vin.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i) {
const CTxIn &txin = tx.vin[i];
Coin coin;
if (!coins.GetCoin(txin.prevout, coin)) {
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: Missing input %d in transaction \'%s\'\n",
__func__, i, tx.GetId().GetHex());
return std::nullopt;
}
if (coin.GetHeight() == MEMPOOL_HEIGHT) {
// Assume all mempool transaction confirm in the next block.
prev_heights[i] = tip.nHeight + 1;
} else {
prev_heights[i] = coin.GetHeight();
}
}
return prev_heights;
}
} // namespace
std::optional<LockPoints> CalculateLockPointsAtTip(CBlockIndex *tip,
const CCoinsView &coins_view,
const CTransaction &tx) {
assert(tip);
auto prev_heights{CalculatePrevHeights(*tip, coins_view, tx)};
if (!prev_heights.has_value()) {
return std::nullopt;
}
CBlockIndex next_tip;
next_tip.pprev = tip;
// When SequenceLocks() is called within ConnectBlock(), the height
// of the block *being* evaluated is what is used.
// Thus if we want to know if a transaction can be part of the
// *next* block, we need to use one more than
// active_chainstate.m_chain.Height()
next_tip.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1;
const auto [min_height, min_time] = CalculateSequenceLocks(
tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, prev_heights.value(), next_tip);
return LockPoints{min_height, min_time};
}
bool CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(CBlockIndex *tip, const LockPoints &lock_points) {
assert(tip != nullptr);
CBlockIndex index;
index.pprev = tip;
// CheckSequenceLocksAtTip() uses active_chainstate.m_chain.Height()+1 to
// evaluate height based locks because when SequenceLocks() is called within
// ConnectBlock(), the height of the block *being* evaluated is what is
// used. Thus if we want to know if a transaction can be part of the *next*
// block, we need to use one more than active_chainstate.m_chain.Height()
index.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1;
return EvaluateSequenceLocks(index, {lock_points.height, lock_points.time});
}
// Command-line argument "-replayprotectionactivationtime=<timestamp>" will
// cause the node to switch to replay protected SigHash ForkID value when the
// median timestamp of the previous 11 blocks is greater than or equal to
// <timestamp>. Defaults to the pre-defined timestamp when not set.
static bool IsReplayProtectionEnabled(const Consensus::Params &params,
int64_t nMedianTimePast) {
return nMedianTimePast >= gArgs.GetIntArg("-replayprotectionactivationtime",
params.augustoActivationTime);
}
static bool IsReplayProtectionEnabled(const Consensus::Params &params,
const CBlockIndex *pindexPrev) {
if (pindexPrev == nullptr) {
return false;
}
return IsReplayProtectionEnabled(params, pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast());
}
/**
* Checks to avoid mempool polluting consensus critical paths since cached
* signature and script validity results will be reused if we validate this
* transaction again during block validation.
*/
static bool CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(
const CTransaction &tx, TxValidationState &state,
const CCoinsViewCache &view, const CTxMemPool &pool, const uint32_t flags,
PrecomputedTransactionData &txdata, int &nSigChecksOut,
CCoinsViewCache &coins_tip) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, pool.cs) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(pool.cs);
assert(!tx.IsCoinBase());
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
const Coin &coin = view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
// This coin was checked in PreChecks and MemPoolAccept
// has been holding cs_main since then.
Assume(!coin.IsSpent());
if (coin.IsSpent()) {
return false;
}
// If the Coin is available, there are 2 possibilities:
// it is available in our current ChainstateActive UTXO set,
// or it's a UTXO provided by a transaction in our mempool.
// Ensure the scriptPubKeys in Coins from CoinsView are correct.
const CTransactionRef &txFrom = pool.get(txin.prevout.GetTxId());
if (txFrom) {
assert(txFrom->GetId() == txin.prevout.GetTxId());
assert(txFrom->vout.size() > txin.prevout.GetN());
assert(txFrom->vout[txin.prevout.GetN()] == coin.GetTxOut());
} else {
const Coin &coinFromUTXOSet = coins_tip.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
assert(!coinFromUTXOSet.IsSpent());
assert(coinFromUTXOSet.GetTxOut() == coin.GetTxOut());
}
}
// Call CheckInputScripts() to cache signature and script validity against
// current tip consensus rules.
return CheckInputScripts(tx, state, view, flags, /*sigCacheStore=*/true,
/*scriptCacheStore=*/true, txdata, nSigChecksOut);
}
namespace {
class MemPoolAccept {
public:
MemPoolAccept(CTxMemPool &mempool, Chainstate &active_chainstate)
: m_pool(mempool), m_view(&m_dummy),
m_viewmempool(&active_chainstate.CoinsTip(), m_pool),
m_active_chainstate(active_chainstate) {}
// We put the arguments we're handed into a struct, so we can pass them
// around easier.
struct ATMPArgs {
const Config &m_config;
const int64_t m_accept_time;
const bool m_bypass_limits;
/*
* Return any outpoints which were not previously present in the coins
* cache, but were added as a result of validating the tx for mempool
* acceptance. This allows the caller to optionally remove the cache
* additions if the associated transaction ends up being rejected by
* the mempool.
*/
std::vector<COutPoint> &m_coins_to_uncache;
const bool m_test_accept;
const unsigned int m_heightOverride;
/**
* When true, the mempool will not be trimmed when any transactions are
* submitted in Finalize(). Instead, limits should be enforced at the
* end to ensure the package is not partially submitted.
*/
const bool m_package_submission;
/**
* When true, use package feerates instead of individual transaction
* feerates for fee-based policies such as mempool min fee and min relay
* fee.
*/
const bool m_package_feerates;
/** Parameters for single transaction mempool validation. */
static ATMPArgs SingleAccept(const Config &config, int64_t accept_time,
bool bypass_limits,
std::vector<COutPoint> &coins_to_uncache,
bool test_accept,
unsigned int heightOverride) {
return ATMPArgs{
config,
accept_time,
bypass_limits,
coins_to_uncache,
test_accept,
heightOverride,
/*package_submission=*/false,
/*package_feerates=*/false,
};
}
/**
* Parameters for test package mempool validation through
* testmempoolaccept.
*/
static ATMPArgs
PackageTestAccept(const Config &config, int64_t accept_time,
std::vector<COutPoint> &coins_to_uncache) {
return ATMPArgs{
config,
accept_time,
/*bypass_limits=*/false,
coins_to_uncache,
/*test_accept=*/true,
/*height_override=*/0,
// not submitting to mempool
/*package_submission=*/false,
/*package_feerates=*/false,
};
}
/** Parameters for child-with-unconfirmed-parents package validation. */
static ATMPArgs
PackageChildWithParents(const Config &config, int64_t accept_time,
std::vector<COutPoint> &coins_to_uncache) {
return ATMPArgs{
config,
accept_time,
/*bypass_limits=*/false,
coins_to_uncache,
/*test_accept=*/false,
/*height_override=*/0,
/*package_submission=*/true,
/*package_feerates=*/true,
};
}
/** Parameters for a single transaction within a package. */
static ATMPArgs SingleInPackageAccept(const ATMPArgs &package_args) {
return ATMPArgs{
/*config=*/package_args.m_config,
/*accept_time=*/package_args.m_accept_time,
/*bypass_limits=*/false,
/*coins_to_uncache=*/package_args.m_coins_to_uncache,
/*test_accept=*/package_args.m_test_accept,
/*height_override=*/package_args.m_heightOverride,
// do not LimitMempoolSize in Finalize()
/*package_submission=*/true,
// only 1 transaction
/*package_feerates=*/false,
};
}
private:
// Private ctor to avoid exposing details to clients and allowing the
// possibility of mixing up the order of the arguments. Use static
// functions above instead.
ATMPArgs(const Config &config, int64_t accept_time, bool bypass_limits,
std::vector<COutPoint> &coins_to_uncache, bool test_accept,
unsigned int height_override, bool package_submission,
bool package_feerates)
: m_config{config}, m_accept_time{accept_time},
m_bypass_limits{bypass_limits},
m_coins_to_uncache{coins_to_uncache}, m_test_accept{test_accept},
m_heightOverride{height_override},
m_package_submission{package_submission},
m_package_feerates(package_feerates) {}
};
// Single transaction acceptance
MempoolAcceptResult AcceptSingleTransaction(const CTransactionRef &ptx,
ATMPArgs &args)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Multiple transaction acceptance. Transactions may or may not be
* interdependent, but must not conflict with each other, and the
* transactions cannot already be in the mempool. Parents must come
* before children if any dependencies exist.
*/
PackageMempoolAcceptResult
AcceptMultipleTransactions(const std::vector<CTransactionRef> &txns,
ATMPArgs &args)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Submission of a subpackage.
* If subpackage size == 1, calls AcceptSingleTransaction() with adjusted
* ATMPArgs to avoid package policy restrictions like no CPFP carve out
* (PackageMempoolChecks), and creates a PackageMempoolAcceptResult wrapping
* the result.
*
* If subpackage size > 1, calls AcceptMultipleTransactions() with the
* provided ATMPArgs.
*
* Also cleans up all non-chainstate coins from m_view at the end.
*/
PackageMempoolAcceptResult
AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef> &subpackage,
ATMPArgs &args)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
/**
* Package (more specific than just multiple transactions) acceptance.
* Package must be a child with all of its unconfirmed parents, and
* topologically sorted.
*/
PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptPackage(const Package &package,
ATMPArgs &args)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
private:
// All the intermediate state that gets passed between the various levels
// of checking a given transaction.
struct Workspace {
Workspace(const CTransactionRef &ptx,
const uint32_t next_block_script_verify_flags)
: m_ptx(ptx),
m_next_block_script_verify_flags(next_block_script_verify_flags) {
}
/**
* Mempool entry constructed for this transaction.
* Constructed in PreChecks() but not inserted into the mempool until
* Finalize().
*/
std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry> m_entry;
/**
* Virtual size of the transaction as used by the mempool, calculated
* using serialized size of the transaction and sigchecks.
*/
int64_t m_vsize;
/**
* Fees paid by this transaction: total input amounts subtracted by
* total output amounts.
*/
Amount m_base_fees;
/**
* Base fees + any fee delta set by the user with
* prioritisetransaction.
*/
Amount m_modified_fees;
/**
* If we're doing package validation (i.e. m_package_feerates=true), the
* "effective" package feerate of this transaction is the total fees
* divided by the total size of transactions (which may include its
* ancestors and/or descendants).
*/
CFeeRate m_package_feerate{Amount::zero()};
const CTransactionRef &m_ptx;
TxValidationState m_state;
/**
* A temporary cache containing serialized transaction data for
* signature verification.
* Reused across PreChecks and ConsensusScriptChecks.
*/
PrecomputedTransactionData m_precomputed_txdata;
// ABC specific flags that are used in both PreChecks and
// ConsensusScriptChecks
const uint32_t m_next_block_script_verify_flags;
int m_sig_checks_standard;
};
// Run the policy checks on a given transaction, excluding any script
// checks. Looks up inputs, calculates feerate, considers replacement,
// evaluates package limits, etc. As this function can be invoked for "free"
// by a peer, only tests that are fast should be done here (to avoid CPU
// DoS).
bool PreChecks(ATMPArgs &args, Workspace &ws)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
// Re-run the script checks, using consensus flags, and try to cache the
// result in the scriptcache. This should be done after
// PolicyScriptChecks(). This requires that all inputs either be in our
// utxo set or in the mempool.
bool ConsensusScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs &args, Workspace &ws)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
// Try to add the transaction to the mempool, removing any conflicts first.
// Returns true if the transaction is in the mempool after any size
// limiting is performed, false otherwise.
bool Finalize(const ATMPArgs &args, Workspace &ws)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
// Submit all transactions to the mempool and call ConsensusScriptChecks to
// add to the script cache - should only be called after successful
// validation of all transactions in the package.
// Does not call LimitMempoolSize(), so mempool max_size_bytes may be
// temporarily exceeded.
bool SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs &args, std::vector<Workspace> &workspaces,
PackageValidationState &package_state,
std::map<TxId, MempoolAcceptResult> &results)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
// Compare a package's feerate against minimum allowed.
bool CheckFeeRate(size_t package_size, size_t package_vsize,
Amount package_fee, TxValidationState &state)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, m_pool.cs) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
const Amount mempoolRejectFee =
m_pool.GetMinFee().GetFee(package_vsize);
if (mempoolRejectFee > Amount::zero() &&
package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) {
return state.Invalid(
TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE,
"mempool min fee not met",
strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
}
// Do not change this to use virtualsize without coordinating a network
// policy upgrade.
if (package_fee < m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(package_size)) {
return state.Invalid(
TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE,
"min relay fee not met",
strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee,
m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(package_size)));
}
return true;
}
private:
CTxMemPool &m_pool;
CCoinsViewCache m_view;
CCoinsViewMemPool m_viewmempool;
CCoinsView m_dummy;
Chainstate &m_active_chainstate;
};
bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs &args, Workspace &ws) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
const CTransactionRef &ptx = ws.m_ptx;
const CTransaction &tx = *ws.m_ptx;
const TxId &txid = ws.m_ptx->GetId();
// Copy/alias what we need out of args
const int64_t nAcceptTime = args.m_accept_time;
const bool bypass_limits = args.m_bypass_limits;
std::vector<COutPoint> &coins_to_uncache = args.m_coins_to_uncache;
const unsigned int heightOverride = args.m_heightOverride;
// Alias what we need out of ws
TxValidationState &state = ws.m_state;
// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction.
if (!CheckRegularTransaction(tx, state)) {
// state filled in by CheckRegularTransaction.
return false;
}
// Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet)
std::string reason;
if (m_pool.m_require_standard &&
!IsStandardTx(tx, m_pool.m_max_datacarrier_bytes,
m_pool.m_permit_bare_multisig,
m_pool.m_dust_relay_feerate, reason)) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, reason);
}
// Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next
// block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
// be mined yet.
TxValidationState ctxState;
if (!ContextualCheckTransactionForCurrentBlock(
*Assert(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip()),
args.m_config.GetChainParams().GetConsensus(), tx, ctxState)) {
// We copy the state from a dummy to ensure we don't increase the
// ban score of peer for transaction that could be valid in the future.
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND,
ctxState.GetRejectReason(),
ctxState.GetDebugMessage());
}
// Is it already in the memory pool?
if (m_pool.exists(txid)) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_DUPLICATE,
"txn-already-in-mempool");
}
// Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
- const CTransactionRef ptxConflicting =
- m_pool.GetConflictTx(txin.prevout);
- if (ptxConflicting) {
- // Disable replacement feature for good
- return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT,
- "txn-mempool-conflict");
+ if (const auto ptxConflicting = m_pool.GetConflictTx(txin.prevout)) {
+ if (m_pool.isAvalancheFinalized(ptxConflicting->GetId())) {
+ return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT,
+ "finalized-tx-conflict");
+ }
+
+ return state.Invalid(
+ TxValidationResult::TX_AVALANCHE_RECONSIDERABLE,
+ "txn-mempool-conflict");
}
}
m_view.SetBackend(m_viewmempool);
const CCoinsViewCache &coins_cache = m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip();
// Do all inputs exist?
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
if (!coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(txin.prevout)) {
coins_to_uncache.push_back(txin.prevout);
}
// Note: this call may add txin.prevout to the coins cache
// (coins_cache.cacheCoins) by way of FetchCoin(). It should be
// removed later (via coins_to_uncache) if this tx turns out to be
// invalid.
if (!m_view.HaveCoin(txin.prevout)) {
// Are inputs missing because we already have the tx?
for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
// Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for
// outputs.
if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(txid, out))) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_DUPLICATE,
"txn-already-known");
}
}
// Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just
// haven't seen parents yet.
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS,
"bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent");
}
}
// Are the actual inputs available?
if (!m_view.HaveInputs(tx)) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY,
"bad-txns-inputs-spent");
}
// Bring the best block into scope.
m_view.GetBestBlock();
// we have all inputs cached now, so switch back to dummy (to protect
// against bugs where we pull more inputs from disk that miss being
// added to coins_to_uncache)
m_view.SetBackend(m_dummy);
assert(m_active_chainstate.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(
m_view.GetBestBlock()) == m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip());
// Only accept BIP68 sequence locked transactions that can be mined in
// the next block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions
// that can't be mined yet.
// Pass in m_view which has all of the relevant inputs cached. Note that,
// since m_view's backend was removed, it no longer pulls coins from the
// mempool.
const std::optional<LockPoints> lock_points{CalculateLockPointsAtTip(
m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), m_view, tx)};
if (!lock_points.has_value() ||
!CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(),
*lock_points)) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND,
"non-BIP68-final");
}
// The mempool holds txs for the next block, so pass height+1 to
// CheckTxInputs
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view,
m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() + 1,
ws.m_base_fees)) {
// state filled in by CheckTxInputs
return false;
}
// Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
if (m_pool.m_require_standard &&
!AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view, ws.m_next_block_script_verify_flags)) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
"bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
}
// ws.m_modified_fess includes any fee deltas from PrioritiseTransaction
ws.m_modified_fees = ws.m_base_fees;
m_pool.ApplyDelta(txid, ws.m_modified_fees);
unsigned int nSize = tx.GetTotalSize();
// Validate input scripts against standard script flags.
const uint32_t scriptVerifyFlags =
ws.m_next_block_script_verify_flags | STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS;
ws.m_precomputed_txdata = PrecomputedTransactionData{tx};
if (!CheckInputScripts(tx, state, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags, true, false,
ws.m_precomputed_txdata, ws.m_sig_checks_standard)) {
// State filled in by CheckInputScripts
return false;
}
ws.m_entry = std::make_unique<CTxMemPoolEntry>(
ptx, ws.m_base_fees, nAcceptTime,
heightOverride ? heightOverride : m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Height(),
ws.m_sig_checks_standard, lock_points.value());
ws.m_vsize = ws.m_entry->GetTxVirtualSize();
// No individual transactions are allowed below the min relay feerate except
// from disconnected blocks. This requirement, unlike CheckFeeRate, cannot
// be bypassed using m_package_feerates because, while a tx could be package
// CPFP'd when entering the mempool, we do not have a DoS-resistant method
// of ensuring the tx remains bumped. For example, the fee-bumping child
// could disappear due to a replacement.
if (!bypass_limits &&
ws.m_modified_fees <
m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(ws.m_ptx->GetTotalSize())) {
// Even though this is a fee-related failure, this result is
// TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, not TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE, because it cannot
// be bypassed using package validation.
return state.Invalid(
TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "min relay fee not met",
strprintf("%d < %d", ws.m_modified_fees,
m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(nSize)));
}
// No individual transactions are allowed below the mempool min feerate
// except from disconnected blocks and transactions in a package. Package
// transactions will be checked using package feerate later.
if (!bypass_limits && !args.m_package_feerates &&
!CheckFeeRate(nSize, ws.m_vsize, ws.m_modified_fees, state)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool MemPoolAccept::ConsensusScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs &args, Workspace &ws) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
const CTransaction &tx = *ws.m_ptx;
const TxId &txid = tx.GetId();
TxValidationState &state = ws.m_state;
// Check again against the next block's script verification flags
// to cache our script execution flags.
//
// This is also useful in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause
// transactions to pass as valid when they're actually invalid. For
// instance the STRICTENC flag was incorrectly allowing certain CHECKSIG
// NOT scripts to pass, even though they were invalid.
//
// There is a similar check in CreateNewBlock() to prevent creating
// invalid blocks (using TestBlockValidity), however allowing such
// transactions into the mempool can be exploited as a DoS attack.
int nSigChecksConsensus;
if (!CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(
tx, state, m_view, m_pool, ws.m_next_block_script_verify_flags,
ws.m_precomputed_txdata, nSigChecksConsensus,
m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip())) {
// This can occur under some circumstances, if the node receives an
// unrequested tx which is invalid due to new consensus rules not
// being activated yet (during IBD).
LogPrintf("BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! CheckInputScripts failed against "
"latest-block but not STANDARD flags %s, %s\n",
txid.ToString(), state.ToString());
return Assume(false);
}
if (ws.m_sig_checks_standard != nSigChecksConsensus) {
// We can't accept this transaction as we've used the standard count
// for the mempool/mining, but the consensus count will be enforced
// in validation (we don't want to produce bad block templates).
return error(
"%s: BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! SigChecks count differed between "
"standard and consensus flags in %s",
__func__, txid.ToString());
}
return true;
}
bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(const ATMPArgs &args, Workspace &ws) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
const TxId &txid = ws.m_ptx->GetId();
TxValidationState &state = ws.m_state;
const bool bypass_limits = args.m_bypass_limits;
// Store transaction in memory
CTxMemPoolEntry *pentry = ws.m_entry.release();
auto entry = CTxMemPoolEntryRef::acquire(pentry);
m_pool.addUnchecked(entry);
// Trim mempool and check if tx was trimmed.
// If we are validating a package, don't trim here because we could evict a
// previous transaction in the package. LimitMempoolSize() should be called
// at the very end to make sure the mempool is still within limits and
// package submission happens atomically.
if (!args.m_package_submission && !bypass_limits) {
m_pool.LimitSize(m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
if (!m_pool.exists(txid)) {
// The tx no longer meets our (new) mempool minimum feerate but
// could be reconsidered in a package.
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE,
"mempool full");
}
}
return true;
}
// Get the coins spent by ptx from the coins_view. Assumes coins are present.
static std::vector<Coin> getSpentCoins(const CTransactionRef &ptx,
const CCoinsViewCache &coins_view) {
std::vector<Coin> spent_coins;
spent_coins.reserve(ptx->vin.size());
for (const CTxIn &input : ptx->vin) {
Coin coin;
const bool coinFound = coins_view.GetCoin(input.prevout, coin);
Assume(coinFound);
spent_coins.push_back(std::move(coin));
}
return spent_coins;
}
bool MemPoolAccept::SubmitPackage(
const ATMPArgs &args, std::vector<Workspace> &workspaces,
PackageValidationState &package_state,
std::map<TxId, MempoolAcceptResult> &results) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
// Sanity check: none of the transactions should be in the mempool.
assert(std::all_of(
workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(),
[this](const auto &ws) { return !m_pool.exists(ws.m_ptx->GetId()); }));
bool all_submitted = true;
// ConsensusScriptChecks adds to the script cache and is therefore
// consensus-critical; CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache asserts that
// transactions only spend coins available from the mempool or UTXO set.
// Submit each transaction to the mempool immediately after calling
// ConsensusScriptChecks to make the outputs available for subsequent
// transactions.
for (Workspace &ws : workspaces) {
if (!ConsensusScriptChecks(args, ws)) {
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetId(),
MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
// Since PreChecks() passed, this should never fail.
all_submitted = false;
package_state.Invalid(
PackageValidationResult::PCKG_MEMPOOL_ERROR,
strprintf("BUG! PolicyScriptChecks succeeded but "
"ConsensusScriptChecks failed: %s",
ws.m_ptx->GetId().ToString()));
}
// If we call LimitMempoolSize() for each individual Finalize(), the
// mempool will not take the transaction's descendant feerate into
// account because it hasn't seen them yet. Also, we risk evicting a
// transaction that a subsequent package transaction depends on.
// Instead, allow the mempool to temporarily bypass limits, the maximum
// package size) while submitting transactions individually and then
// trim at the very end.
if (!Finalize(args, ws)) {
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetId(),
MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
// Since LimitMempoolSize() won't be called, this should never fail.
all_submitted = false;
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_MEMPOOL_ERROR,
strprintf("BUG! Adding to mempool failed: %s",
ws.m_ptx->GetId().ToString()));
}
}
// It may or may not be the case that all the transactions made it into the
// mempool. Regardless, make sure we haven't exceeded max mempool size.
m_pool.LimitSize(m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
std::vector<TxId> all_package_txids;
all_package_txids.reserve(workspaces.size());
std::transform(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(),
std::back_inserter(all_package_txids),
[](const auto &ws) { return ws.m_ptx->GetId(); });
// Add successful results. The returned results may change later if
// LimitMempoolSize() evicts them.
for (Workspace &ws : workspaces) {
const auto effective_feerate =
args.m_package_feerates
? ws.m_package_feerate
: CFeeRate{ws.m_modified_fees,
static_cast<uint32_t>(ws.m_vsize)};
const auto effective_feerate_txids =
args.m_package_feerates ? all_package_txids
: std::vector<TxId>({ws.m_ptx->GetId()});
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetId(),
MempoolAcceptResult::Success(ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees,
effective_feerate,
effective_feerate_txids));
GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool(
ws.m_ptx,
std::make_shared<const std::vector<Coin>>(
getSpentCoins(ws.m_ptx, m_view)),
m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence());
}
return all_submitted;
}
MempoolAcceptResult
MemPoolAccept::AcceptSingleTransaction(const CTransactionRef &ptx,
ATMPArgs &args) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// mempool "read lock" (held through
// GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool())
LOCK(m_pool.cs);
const CBlockIndex *tip = m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip();
Workspace ws(ptx,
GetNextBlockScriptFlags(tip, m_active_chainstate.m_chainman));
const std::vector<TxId> single_txid{ws.m_ptx->GetId()};
// Perform the inexpensive checks first and avoid hashing and signature
// verification unless those checks pass, to mitigate CPU exhaustion
// denial-of-service attacks.
if (!PreChecks(args, ws)) {
if (ws.m_state.GetResult() ==
TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE) {
// Failed for fee reasons. Provide the effective feerate and which
// tx was included.
return MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(
ws.m_state, CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize),
single_txid);
}
return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state);
}
if (!ConsensusScriptChecks(args, ws)) {
return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state);
}
const TxId txid = ptx->GetId();
// Mempool sanity check -- in our new mempool no tx can be added if its
// outputs are already spent in the mempool (that is, no children before
// parents allowed; the mempool must be consistent at all times).
//
// This means that on reorg, the disconnectpool *must* always import
// the existing mempool tx's, clear the mempool, and then re-add
// remaining tx's in topological order via this function. Our new mempool
// has fast adds, so this is ok.
if (auto it = m_pool.mapNextTx.lower_bound(COutPoint{txid, 0});
it != m_pool.mapNextTx.end() && it->first->GetTxId() == txid) {
LogPrintf("%s: BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! Attempt to add txid %s, but "
"its outputs are already spent in the "
"mempool\n",
__func__, txid.ToString());
ws.m_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CHILD_BEFORE_PARENT,
"txn-child-before-parent");
return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state);
}
const CFeeRate effective_feerate{ws.m_modified_fees,
static_cast<uint32_t>(ws.m_vsize)};
// Tx was accepted, but not added
if (args.m_test_accept) {
return MempoolAcceptResult::Success(ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees,
effective_feerate, single_txid);
}
if (!Finalize(args, ws)) {
// The only possible failure reason is fee-related (mempool full).
// Failed for fee reasons. Provide the effective feerate and which txns
// were included.
Assume(ws.m_state.GetResult() ==
TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE);
return MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(
ws.m_state, CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize), single_txid);
}
GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool(
ptx,
std::make_shared<const std::vector<Coin>>(getSpentCoins(ptx, m_view)),
m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence());
return MempoolAcceptResult::Success(ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees,
effective_feerate, single_txid);
}
PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptMultipleTransactions(
const std::vector<CTransactionRef> &txns, ATMPArgs &args) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// These context-free package limits can be done before taking the mempool
// lock.
PackageValidationState package_state;
if (!CheckPackage(txns, package_state)) {
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, {});
}
std::vector<Workspace> workspaces{};
workspaces.reserve(txns.size());
std::transform(
txns.cbegin(), txns.cend(), std::back_inserter(workspaces),
[this](const auto &tx) {
return Workspace(
tx, GetNextBlockScriptFlags(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(),
m_active_chainstate.m_chainman));
});
std::map<TxId, MempoolAcceptResult> results;
LOCK(m_pool.cs);
// Do all PreChecks first and fail fast to avoid running expensive script
// checks when unnecessary.
std::vector<TxId> valid_txids;
for (Workspace &ws : workspaces) {
if (!PreChecks(args, ws)) {
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX,
"transaction failed");
// Exit early to avoid doing pointless work. Update the failed tx
// result; the rest are unfinished.
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetId(),
MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state,
std::move(results));
}
// Make the coins created by this transaction available for subsequent
// transactions in the package to spend.
m_viewmempool.PackageAddTransaction(ws.m_ptx);
valid_txids.push_back(ws.m_ptx->GetId());
}
// Transactions must meet two minimum feerates: the mempool minimum fee and
// min relay fee. For transactions consisting of exactly one child and its
// parents, it suffices to use the package feerate
// (total modified fees / total size or vsize) to check this requirement.
// Note that this is an aggregate feerate; this function has not checked
// that there are transactions too low feerate to pay for themselves, or
// that the child transactions are higher feerate than their parents. Using
// aggregate feerate may allow "parents pay for child" behavior and permit
// a child that is below mempool minimum feerate. To avoid these behaviors,
// callers of AcceptMultipleTransactions need to restrict txns topology
// (e.g. to ancestor sets) and check the feerates of individuals and
// subsets.
const auto m_total_size = std::accumulate(
workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), int64_t{0},
[](int64_t sum, auto &ws) { return sum + ws.m_ptx->GetTotalSize(); });
const auto m_total_vsize =
std::accumulate(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), int64_t{0},
[](int64_t sum, auto &ws) { return sum + ws.m_vsize; });
const auto m_total_modified_fees = std::accumulate(
workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), Amount::zero(),
[](Amount sum, auto &ws) { return sum + ws.m_modified_fees; });
const CFeeRate package_feerate(m_total_modified_fees, m_total_vsize);
std::vector<TxId> all_package_txids;
all_package_txids.reserve(workspaces.size());
std::transform(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(),
std::back_inserter(all_package_txids),
[](const auto &ws) { return ws.m_ptx->GetId(); });
TxValidationState placeholder_state;
if (args.m_package_feerates &&
!CheckFeeRate(m_total_size, m_total_vsize, m_total_modified_fees,
placeholder_state)) {
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX,
"transaction failed");
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(
package_state, {{workspaces.back().m_ptx->GetId(),
MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(
placeholder_state,
CFeeRate(m_total_modified_fees, m_total_vsize),
all_package_txids)}});
}
for (Workspace &ws : workspaces) {
ws.m_package_feerate = package_feerate;
const TxId &ws_txid = ws.m_ptx->GetId();
if (args.m_test_accept &&
std::find(valid_txids.begin(), valid_txids.end(), ws_txid) !=
valid_txids.end()) {
const auto effective_feerate =
args.m_package_feerates
? ws.m_package_feerate
: CFeeRate{ws.m_modified_fees,
static_cast<uint32_t>(ws.m_vsize)};
const auto effective_feerate_txids =
args.m_package_feerates ? all_package_txids
: std::vector<TxId>{ws.m_ptx->GetId()};
// When test_accept=true, transactions that pass PreChecks
// are valid because there are no further mempool checks (passing
// PreChecks implies passing ConsensusScriptChecks).
results.emplace(ws_txid,
MempoolAcceptResult::Success(
ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate,
effective_feerate_txids));
}
}
if (args.m_test_accept) {
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
}
if (!SubmitPackage(args, workspaces, package_state, results)) {
// PackageValidationState filled in by SubmitPackage().
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
}
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
}
PackageMempoolAcceptResult
MemPoolAccept::AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef> &subpackage,
ATMPArgs &args) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
auto result = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, m_pool.cs) {
if (subpackage.size() > 1) {
return AcceptMultipleTransactions(subpackage, args);
}
const auto &tx = subpackage.front();
ATMPArgs single_args = ATMPArgs::SingleInPackageAccept(args);
const auto single_res = AcceptSingleTransaction(tx, single_args);
PackageValidationState package_state_wrapped;
if (single_res.m_result_type !=
MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
package_state_wrapped.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX,
"transaction failed");
}
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_wrapped,
{{tx->GetId(), single_res}});
}();
// Clean up m_view and m_viewmempool so that other subpackage evaluations
// don't have access to coins they shouldn't. Keep some coins in order to
// minimize re-fetching coins from the UTXO set.
//
// There are 3 kinds of coins in m_view:
// (1) Temporary coins from the transactions in subpackage, constructed by
// m_viewmempool.
// (2) Mempool coins from transactions in the mempool, constructed by
// m_viewmempool.
// (3) Confirmed coins fetched from our current UTXO set.
//
// (1) Temporary coins need to be removed, regardless of whether the
// transaction was submitted. If the transaction was submitted to the
// mempool, m_viewmempool will be able to fetch them from there. If it
// wasn't submitted to mempool, it is incorrect to keep them - future calls
// may try to spend those coins that don't actually exist.
// (2) Mempool coins also need to be removed. If the mempool contents have
// changed as a result of submitting or replacing transactions, coins
// previously fetched from mempool may now be spent or nonexistent. Those
// coins need to be deleted from m_view.
// (3) Confirmed coins don't need to be removed. The chainstate has not
// changed (we are holding cs_main and no blocks have been processed) so the
// confirmed tx cannot disappear like a mempool tx can. The coin may now be
// spent after we submitted a tx to mempool, but we have already checked
// that the package does not have 2 transactions spending the same coin.
// Keeping them in m_view is an optimization to not re-fetch confirmed coins
// if we later look up inputs for this transaction again.
for (const auto &outpoint : m_viewmempool.GetNonBaseCoins()) {
// In addition to resetting m_viewmempool, we also need to manually
// delete these coins from m_view because it caches copies of the coins
// it fetched from m_viewmempool previously.
m_view.Uncache(outpoint);
}
// This deletes the temporary and mempool coins.
m_viewmempool.Reset();
return result;
}
PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package &package,
ATMPArgs &args) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Used if returning a PackageMempoolAcceptResult directly from this
// function.
PackageValidationState package_state_quit_early;
// Check that the package is well-formed. If it isn't, we won't try to
// validate any of the transactions and thus won't return any
// MempoolAcceptResults, just a package-wide error.
// Context-free package checks.
if (!CheckPackage(package, package_state_quit_early)) {
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {});
}
// All transactions in the package must be a parent of the last transaction.
// This is just an opportunity for us to fail fast on a context-free check
// without taking the mempool lock.
if (!IsChildWithParents(package)) {
package_state_quit_early.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY,
"package-not-child-with-parents");
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {});
}
// IsChildWithParents() guarantees the package is > 1 transactions.
assert(package.size() > 1);
// The package must be 1 child with all of its unconfirmed parents. The
// package is expected to be sorted, so the last transaction is the child.
const auto &child = package.back();
std::unordered_set<TxId, SaltedTxIdHasher> unconfirmed_parent_txids;
std::transform(
package.cbegin(), package.cend() - 1,
std::inserter(unconfirmed_parent_txids, unconfirmed_parent_txids.end()),
[](const auto &tx) { return tx->GetId(); });
// All child inputs must refer to a preceding package transaction or a
// confirmed UTXO. The only way to verify this is to look up the child's
// inputs in our current coins view (not including mempool), and enforce
// that all parents not present in the package be available at chain tip.
// Since this check can bring new coins into the coins cache, keep track of
// these coins and uncache them if we don't end up submitting this package
// to the mempool.
const CCoinsViewCache &coins_tip_cache = m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip();
for (const auto &input : child->vin) {
if (!coins_tip_cache.HaveCoinInCache(input.prevout)) {
args.m_coins_to_uncache.push_back(input.prevout);
}
}
// Using the MemPoolAccept m_view cache allows us to look up these same
// coins faster later. This should be connecting directly to CoinsTip, not
// to m_viewmempool, because we specifically require inputs to be confirmed
// if they aren't in the package.
m_view.SetBackend(m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
const auto package_or_confirmed = [this, &unconfirmed_parent_txids](
const auto &input) {
return unconfirmed_parent_txids.count(input.prevout.GetTxId()) > 0 ||
m_view.HaveCoin(input.prevout);
};
if (!std::all_of(child->vin.cbegin(), child->vin.cend(),
package_or_confirmed)) {
package_state_quit_early.Invalid(
PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY,
"package-not-child-with-unconfirmed-parents");
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {});
}
// Protect against bugs where we pull more inputs from disk that miss being
// added to coins_to_uncache. The backend will be connected again when
// needed in PreChecks.
m_view.SetBackend(m_dummy);
LOCK(m_pool.cs);
// Stores results from which we will create the returned
// PackageMempoolAcceptResult. A result may be changed if a mempool
// transaction is evicted later due to LimitMempoolSize().
std::map<TxId, MempoolAcceptResult> results_final;
// Results from individual validation which will be returned if no other
// result is available for this transaction. "Nonfinal" because if a
// transaction fails by itself but succeeds later (i.e. when evaluated with
// a fee-bumping child), the result in this map may be discarded.
std::map<TxId, MempoolAcceptResult> individual_results_nonfinal;
bool quit_early{false};
std::vector<CTransactionRef> txns_package_eval;
for (const auto &tx : package) {
const auto &txid = tx->GetId();
// An already confirmed tx is treated as one not in mempool, because all
// we know is that the inputs aren't available.
if (m_pool.exists(txid)) {
// Exact transaction already exists in the mempool.
// Node operators are free to set their mempool policies however
// they please, nodes may receive transactions in different orders,
// and malicious counterparties may try to take advantage of policy
// differences to pin or delay propagation of transactions. As such,
// it's possible for some package transaction(s) to already be in
// the mempool, and we don't want to reject the entire package in
// that case (as that could be a censorship vector). De-duplicate
// the transactions that are already in the mempool, and only call
// AcceptMultipleTransactions() with the new transactions. This
// ensures we don't double-count transaction counts and sizes when
// checking ancestor/descendant limits, or double-count transaction
// fees for fee-related policy.
auto iter = m_pool.GetIter(txid);
assert(iter != std::nullopt);
results_final.emplace(txid, MempoolAcceptResult::MempoolTx(
(*iter.value())->GetTxSize(),
(*iter.value())->GetFee()));
} else {
// Transaction does not already exist in the mempool.
// Try submitting the transaction on its own.
const auto single_package_res = AcceptSubPackage({tx}, args);
const auto &single_res = single_package_res.m_tx_results.at(txid);
if (single_res.m_result_type ==
MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
// The transaction succeeded on its own and is now in the
// mempool. Don't include it in package validation, because its
// fees should only be "used" once.
assert(m_pool.exists(txid));
results_final.emplace(txid, single_res);
} else if (single_res.m_state.GetResult() !=
TxValidationResult::TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE &&
single_res.m_state.GetResult() !=
TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
// Package validation policy only differs from individual policy
// in its evaluation of feerate. For example, if a transaction
// fails here due to violation of a consensus rule, the result
// will not change when it is submitted as part of a package. To
// minimize the amount of repeated work, unless the transaction
// fails due to feerate or missing inputs (its parent is a
// previous transaction in the package that failed due to
// feerate), don't run package validation. Note that this
// decision might not make sense if different types of packages
// are allowed in the future. Continue individually validating
// the rest of the transactions, because some of them may still
// be valid.
quit_early = true;
package_state_quit_early.Invalid(
PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
individual_results_nonfinal.emplace(txid, single_res);
} else {
individual_results_nonfinal.emplace(txid, single_res);
txns_package_eval.push_back(tx);
}
}
}
auto multi_submission_result =
quit_early || txns_package_eval.empty()
? PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {})
: AcceptSubPackage(txns_package_eval, args);
PackageValidationState &package_state_final =
multi_submission_result.m_state;
// Make sure we haven't exceeded max mempool size.
// Package transactions that were submitted to mempool or already in mempool
// may be evicted.
m_pool.LimitSize(m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
for (const auto &tx : package) {
const auto &txid = tx->GetId();
if (multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.count(txid) > 0) {
// We shouldn't have re-submitted if the tx result was already in
// results_final.
Assume(results_final.count(txid) == 0);
// If it was submitted, check to see if the tx is still in the
// mempool. It could have been evicted due to LimitMempoolSize()
// above.
const auto &txresult =
multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.at(txid);
if (txresult.m_result_type ==
MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID &&
!m_pool.exists(txid)) {
package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX,
"transaction failed");
TxValidationState mempool_full_state;
mempool_full_state.Invalid(
TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
results_final.emplace(
txid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state));
} else {
results_final.emplace(txid, txresult);
}
} else if (const auto final_it{results_final.find(txid)};
final_it != results_final.end()) {
// Already-in-mempool transaction. Check to see if it's still there,
// as it could have been evicted when LimitMempoolSize() was called.
Assume(final_it->second.m_result_type !=
MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
Assume(individual_results_nonfinal.count(txid) == 0);
if (!m_pool.exists(tx->GetId())) {
package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX,
"transaction failed");
TxValidationState mempool_full_state;
mempool_full_state.Invalid(
TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
// Replace the previous result.
results_final.erase(txid);
results_final.emplace(
txid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state));
}
} else if (const auto non_final_it{
individual_results_nonfinal.find(txid)};
non_final_it != individual_results_nonfinal.end()) {
Assume(non_final_it->second.m_result_type ==
MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
// Interesting result from previous processing.
results_final.emplace(txid, non_final_it->second);
}
}
Assume(results_final.size() == package.size());
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_final,
std::move(results_final));
}
} // namespace
MempoolAcceptResult AcceptToMemoryPool(Chainstate &active_chainstate,
const CTransactionRef &tx,
int64_t accept_time, bool bypass_limits,
bool test_accept,
unsigned int heightOverride) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
assert(active_chainstate.GetMempool() != nullptr);
CTxMemPool &pool{*active_chainstate.GetMempool()};
std::vector<COutPoint> coins_to_uncache;
auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::SingleAccept(
active_chainstate.m_chainman.GetConfig(), accept_time, bypass_limits,
coins_to_uncache, test_accept, heightOverride);
const MempoolAcceptResult result = MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate)
.AcceptSingleTransaction(tx, args);
if (result.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
// Remove coins that were not present in the coins cache before calling
// ATMPW; this is to prevent memory DoS in case we receive a large
// number of invalid transactions that attempt to overrun the in-memory
// coins cache
// (`CCoinsViewCache::cacheCoins`).
for (const COutPoint &outpoint : coins_to_uncache) {
active_chainstate.CoinsTip().Uncache(outpoint);
}
}
// After we've (potentially) uncached entries, ensure our coins cache is
// still within its size limits
BlockValidationState stateDummy;
active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(stateDummy, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC);
return result;
}
PackageMempoolAcceptResult ProcessNewPackage(Chainstate &active_chainstate,
CTxMemPool &pool,
const Package &package,
bool test_accept) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
assert(!package.empty());
assert(std::all_of(package.cbegin(), package.cend(),
[](const auto &tx) { return tx != nullptr; }));
const Config &config = active_chainstate.m_chainman.GetConfig();
std::vector<COutPoint> coins_to_uncache;
const auto result = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (test_accept) {
auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::PackageTestAccept(
config, GetTime(), coins_to_uncache);
return MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate)
.AcceptMultipleTransactions(package, args);
} else {
auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::PackageChildWithParents(
config, GetTime(), coins_to_uncache);
return MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate)
.AcceptPackage(package, args);
}
}();
// Uncache coins pertaining to transactions that were not submitted to the
// mempool.
if (test_accept || result.m_state.IsInvalid()) {
for (const COutPoint &hashTx : coins_to_uncache) {
active_chainstate.CoinsTip().Uncache(hashTx);
}
}
// Ensure the coins cache is still within limits.
BlockValidationState state_dummy;
active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(state_dummy, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC);
return result;
}
Amount GetBlockSubsidy(int nHeight, const Consensus::Params &consensusParams) {
int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;
// Force block reward to zero when right shift is undefined.
if (halvings >= 64) {
return Amount::zero();
}
Amount nSubsidy = 50 * COIN;
// Subsidy is cut in half every 210,000 blocks which will occur
// approximately every 4 years.
return ((nSubsidy / SATOSHI) >> halvings) * SATOSHI;
}
CoinsViews::CoinsViews(DBParams db_params, CoinsViewOptions options)
: m_dbview{std::move(db_params), std::move(options)},
m_catcherview(&m_dbview) {}
void CoinsViews::InitCache() {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
m_cacheview = std::make_unique<CCoinsViewCache>(&m_catcherview);
}
Chainstate::Chainstate(CTxMemPool *mempool, BlockManager &blockman,
ChainstateManager &chainman,
std::optional<BlockHash> from_snapshot_blockhash)
: m_mempool(mempool), m_blockman(blockman), m_chainman(chainman),
m_from_snapshot_blockhash(from_snapshot_blockhash) {}
void Chainstate::InitCoinsDB(size_t cache_size_bytes, bool in_memory,
bool should_wipe, std::string leveldb_name) {
if (m_from_snapshot_blockhash) {
leveldb_name += node::SNAPSHOT_CHAINSTATE_SUFFIX;
}
m_coins_views = std::make_unique<CoinsViews>(
DBParams{.path = m_chainman.m_options.datadir / leveldb_name,
.cache_bytes = cache_size_bytes,
.memory_only = in_memory,
.wipe_data = should_wipe,
.obfuscate = true,
.options = m_chainman.m_options.coins_db},
m_chainman.m_options.coins_view);
}
void Chainstate::InitCoinsCache(size_t cache_size_bytes) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
assert(m_coins_views != nullptr);
m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes = cache_size_bytes;
m_coins_views->InitCache();
}
// Note that though this is marked const, we may end up modifying
// `m_cached_finished_ibd`, which is a performance-related implementation
// detail. This function must be marked `const` so that `CValidationInterface`
// clients (which are given a `const Chainstate*`) can call it.
//
bool Chainstate::IsInitialBlockDownload() const {
// Optimization: pre-test latch before taking the lock.
if (m_cached_finished_ibd.load(std::memory_order_relaxed)) {
return false;
}
LOCK(cs_main);
if (m_cached_finished_ibd.load(std::memory_order_relaxed)) {
return false;
}
if (m_chainman.m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
return true;
}
if (m_chain.Tip() == nullptr) {
return true;
}
if (m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
return true;
}
if (m_chain.Tip()->Time() <
Now<NodeSeconds>() - m_chainman.m_options.max_tip_age) {
return true;
}
LogPrintf("Leaving InitialBlockDownload (latching to false)\n");
m_cached_finished_ibd.store(true, std::memory_order_relaxed);
return false;
}
void Chainstate::CheckForkWarningConditions() {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Before we get past initial download, we cannot reliably alert about forks
// (we assume we don't get stuck on a fork before finishing our initial
// sync)
if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
return;
}
// If our best fork is no longer within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one
// mines it) of our head, or if it is back on the active chain, drop it
if (m_best_fork_tip && (m_chain.Height() - m_best_fork_tip->nHeight >= 72 ||
m_chain.Contains(m_best_fork_tip))) {
m_best_fork_tip = nullptr;
}
if (m_best_fork_tip ||
(m_chainman.m_best_invalid &&
m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork >
m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork + (GetBlockProof(*m_chain.Tip()) * 6))) {
if (!GetfLargeWorkForkFound() && m_best_fork_base) {
std::string warning =
std::string("'Warning: Large-work fork detected, forking after "
"block ") +
m_best_fork_base->phashBlock->ToString() + std::string("'");
m_chainman.GetNotifications().warning(warning);
}
if (m_best_fork_tip && m_best_fork_base) {
LogPrintf("%s: Warning: Large fork found\n forking the "
"chain at height %d (%s)\n lasting to height %d "
"(%s).\nChain state database corruption likely.\n",
__func__, m_best_fork_base->nHeight,
m_best_fork_base->phashBlock->ToString(),
m_best_fork_tip->nHeight,
m_best_fork_tip->phashBlock->ToString());
SetfLargeWorkForkFound(true);
} else {
LogPrintf("%s: Warning: Found invalid chain at least ~6 blocks "
"longer than our best chain.\nChain state database "
"corruption likely.\n",
__func__);
SetfLargeWorkInvalidChainFound(true);
}
} else {
SetfLargeWorkForkFound(false);
SetfLargeWorkInvalidChainFound(false);
}
}
void Chainstate::CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(
CBlockIndex *pindexNewForkTip) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// If we are on a fork that is sufficiently large, set a warning flag.
const CBlockIndex *pfork = m_chain.FindFork(pindexNewForkTip);
// We define a condition where we should warn the user about as a fork of at
// least 7 blocks with a tip within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines
// it) of ours. We use 7 blocks rather arbitrarily as it represents just
// under 10% of sustained network hash rate operating on the fork, or a
// chain that is entirely longer than ours and invalid (note that this
// should be detected by both). We define it this way because it allows us
// to only store the highest fork tip (+ base) which meets the 7-block
// condition and from this always have the most-likely-to-cause-warning fork
if (pfork &&
(!m_best_fork_tip ||
pindexNewForkTip->nHeight > m_best_fork_tip->nHeight) &&
pindexNewForkTip->nChainWork - pfork->nChainWork >
(GetBlockProof(*pfork) * 7) &&
m_chain.Height() - pindexNewForkTip->nHeight < 72) {
m_best_fork_tip = pindexNewForkTip;
m_best_fork_base = pfork;
}
CheckForkWarningConditions();
}
// Called both upon regular invalid block discovery *and* InvalidateBlock
void Chainstate::InvalidChainFound(CBlockIndex *pindexNew) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (!m_chainman.m_best_invalid ||
pindexNew->nChainWork > m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork) {
m_chainman.m_best_invalid = pindexNew;
}
if (m_chainman.m_best_header != nullptr &&
m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(pindexNew->nHeight) ==
pindexNew) {
m_chainman.m_best_header = m_chain.Tip();
}
// If the invalid chain found is supposed to be finalized, we need to move
// back the finalization point.
if (IsBlockAvalancheFinalized(pindexNew)) {
LOCK(cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex = pindexNew->pprev;
}
LogPrintf("%s: invalid block=%s height=%d log2_work=%f date=%s\n",
__func__, pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
pindexNew->nHeight,
log(pindexNew->nChainWork.getdouble()) / log(2.0),
FormatISO8601DateTime(pindexNew->GetBlockTime()));
CBlockIndex *tip = m_chain.Tip();
assert(tip);
LogPrintf("%s: current best=%s height=%d log2_work=%f date=%s\n",
__func__, tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), m_chain.Height(),
log(tip->nChainWork.getdouble()) / log(2.0),
FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()));
}
// Same as InvalidChainFound, above, except not called directly from
// InvalidateBlock, which does its own setBlockIndexCandidates management.
void Chainstate::InvalidBlockFound(CBlockIndex *pindex,
const BlockValidationState &state) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (state.GetResult() != BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
pindex->nStatus = pindex->nStatus.withFailed();
m_chainman.m_failed_blocks.insert(pindex);
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
InvalidChainFound(pindex);
}
}
void SpendCoins(CCoinsViewCache &view, const CTransaction &tx, CTxUndo &txundo,
int nHeight) {
// Mark inputs spent.
if (tx.IsCoinBase()) {
return;
}
txundo.vprevout.reserve(tx.vin.size());
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
txundo.vprevout.emplace_back();
bool is_spent = view.SpendCoin(txin.prevout, &txundo.vprevout.back());
assert(is_spent);
}
}
void UpdateCoins(CCoinsViewCache &view, const CTransaction &tx, CTxUndo &txundo,
int nHeight) {
SpendCoins(view, tx, txundo, nHeight);
AddCoins(view, tx, nHeight);
}
bool CScriptCheck::operator()() {
const CScript &scriptSig = ptxTo->vin[nIn].scriptSig;
if (!VerifyScript(scriptSig, m_tx_out.scriptPubKey, nFlags,
CachingTransactionSignatureChecker(
ptxTo, nIn, m_tx_out.nValue, cacheStore, txdata),
metrics, &error)) {
return false;
}
if ((pTxLimitSigChecks &&
!pTxLimitSigChecks->consume_and_check(metrics.nSigChecks)) ||
(pBlockLimitSigChecks &&
!pBlockLimitSigChecks->consume_and_check(metrics.nSigChecks))) {
// we can't assign a meaningful script error (since the script
// succeeded), but remove the ScriptError::OK which could be
// misinterpreted.
error = ScriptError::SIGCHECKS_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction &tx, TxValidationState &state,
const CCoinsViewCache &inputs, const uint32_t flags,
bool sigCacheStore, bool scriptCacheStore,
const PrecomputedTransactionData &txdata,
int &nSigChecksOut, TxSigCheckLimiter &txLimitSigChecks,
CheckInputsLimiter *pBlockLimitSigChecks,
std::vector<CScriptCheck> *pvChecks) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
assert(!tx.IsCoinBase());
if (pvChecks) {
pvChecks->reserve(tx.vin.size());
}
// First check if script executions have been cached with the same flags.
// Note that this assumes that the inputs provided are correct (ie that the
// transaction hash which is in tx's prevouts properly commits to the
// scriptPubKey in the inputs view of that transaction).
ScriptCacheKey hashCacheEntry(tx, flags);
if (IsKeyInScriptCache(hashCacheEntry, !scriptCacheStore, nSigChecksOut)) {
if (!txLimitSigChecks.consume_and_check(nSigChecksOut) ||
(pBlockLimitSigChecks &&
!pBlockLimitSigChecks->consume_and_check(nSigChecksOut))) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS,
"too-many-sigchecks");
}
return true;
}
int nSigChecksTotal = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) {
const COutPoint &prevout = tx.vin[i].prevout;
const Coin &coin = inputs.AccessCoin(prevout);
assert(!coin.IsSpent());
// We very carefully only pass in things to CScriptCheck which are
// clearly committed to by tx's hash. This provides a sanity
// check that our caching is not introducing consensus failures through
// additional data in, eg, the coins being spent being checked as a part
// of CScriptCheck.
// Verify signature
CScriptCheck check(coin.GetTxOut(), tx, i, flags, sigCacheStore, txdata,
&txLimitSigChecks, pBlockLimitSigChecks);
// If pvChecks is not null, defer the check execution to the caller.
if (pvChecks) {
pvChecks->push_back(std::move(check));
continue;
}
if (!check()) {
ScriptError scriptError = check.GetScriptError();
// Compute flags without the optional standardness flags.
// This differs from MANDATORY_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS as it contains
// additional upgrade flags (see AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker variable
// extraFlags).
uint32_t mandatoryFlags =
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS;
if (flags != mandatoryFlags) {
// Check whether the failure was caused by a non-mandatory
// script verification check. If so, ensure we return
// NOT_STANDARD instead of CONSENSUS to avoid downstream users
// splitting the network between upgraded and non-upgraded nodes
// by banning CONSENSUS-failing data providers.
CScriptCheck check2(coin.GetTxOut(), tx, i, mandatoryFlags,
sigCacheStore, txdata);
if (check2()) {
return state.Invalid(
TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD,
strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)",
ScriptErrorString(scriptError)));
}
// update the error message to reflect the mandatory violation.
scriptError = check2.GetScriptError();
}
// MANDATORY flag failures correspond to
// TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS failures are
// the most serious case of validation failures, we may need to
// consider using RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE for any script failure
// that could be due to non-upgraded nodes which we may want to
// support, to avoid splitting the network (but this depends on the
// details of how net_processing handles such errors).
return state.Invalid(
TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS,
strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)",
ScriptErrorString(scriptError)));
}
nSigChecksTotal += check.GetScriptExecutionMetrics().nSigChecks;
}
nSigChecksOut = nSigChecksTotal;
if (scriptCacheStore && !pvChecks) {
// We executed all of the provided scripts, and were told to cache the
// result. Do so now.
AddKeyInScriptCache(hashCacheEntry, nSigChecksTotal);
}
return true;
}
bool AbortNode(BlockValidationState &state, const std::string &strMessage,
const bilingual_str &userMessage) {
AbortNode(strMessage, userMessage);
return state.Error(strMessage);
}
/** Restore the UTXO in a Coin at a given COutPoint. */
DisconnectResult UndoCoinSpend(Coin &&undo, CCoinsViewCache &view,
const COutPoint &out) {
bool fClean = true;
if (view.HaveCoin(out)) {
// Overwriting transaction output.
fClean = false;
}
if (undo.GetHeight() == 0) {
// Missing undo metadata (height and coinbase). Older versions included
// this information only in undo records for the last spend of a
// transactions' outputs. This implies that it must be present for some
// other output of the same tx.
const Coin &alternate = AccessByTxid(view, out.GetTxId());
if (alternate.IsSpent()) {
// Adding output for transaction without known metadata
return DisconnectResult::FAILED;
}
// This is somewhat ugly, but hopefully utility is limited. This is only
// useful when working from legacy on disck data. In any case, putting
// the correct information in there doesn't hurt.
const_cast<Coin &>(undo) = Coin(undo.GetTxOut(), alternate.GetHeight(),
alternate.IsCoinBase());
}
// If the coin already exists as an unspent coin in the cache, then the
// possible_overwrite parameter to AddCoin must be set to true. We have
// already checked whether an unspent coin exists above using HaveCoin, so
// we don't need to guess. When fClean is false, an unspent coin already
// existed and it is an overwrite.
view.AddCoin(out, std::move(undo), !fClean);
return fClean ? DisconnectResult::OK : DisconnectResult::UNCLEAN;
}
/**
* Undo the effects of this block (with given index) on the UTXO set represented
* by coins. When FAILED is returned, view is left in an indeterminate state.
*/
DisconnectResult Chainstate::DisconnectBlock(const CBlock &block,
const CBlockIndex *pindex,
CCoinsViewCache &view) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
CBlockUndo blockUndo;
if (!m_blockman.UndoReadFromDisk(blockUndo, *pindex)) {
error("DisconnectBlock(): failure reading undo data");
return DisconnectResult::FAILED;
}
return ApplyBlockUndo(std::move(blockUndo), block, pindex, view);
}
DisconnectResult ApplyBlockUndo(CBlockUndo &&blockUndo, const CBlock &block,
const CBlockIndex *pindex,
CCoinsViewCache &view) {
bool fClean = true;
if (blockUndo.vtxundo.size() + 1 != block.vtx.size()) {
error("DisconnectBlock(): block and undo data inconsistent");
return DisconnectResult::FAILED;
}
// First, restore inputs.
for (size_t i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) {
const CTransaction &tx = *(block.vtx[i]);
CTxUndo &txundo = blockUndo.vtxundo[i - 1];
if (txundo.vprevout.size() != tx.vin.size()) {
error("DisconnectBlock(): transaction and undo data inconsistent");
return DisconnectResult::FAILED;
}
for (size_t j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++) {
const COutPoint &out = tx.vin[j].prevout;
DisconnectResult res =
UndoCoinSpend(std::move(txundo.vprevout[j]), view, out);
if (res == DisconnectResult::FAILED) {
return DisconnectResult::FAILED;
}
fClean = fClean && res != DisconnectResult::UNCLEAN;
}
// At this point, all of txundo.vprevout should have been moved out.
}
// Second, revert created outputs.
for (const auto &ptx : block.vtx) {
const CTransaction &tx = *ptx;
const TxId &txid = tx.GetId();
const bool is_coinbase = tx.IsCoinBase();
// Check that all outputs are available and match the outputs in the
// block itself exactly.
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx.vout.size(); o++) {
if (tx.vout[o].scriptPubKey.IsUnspendable()) {
continue;
}
COutPoint out(txid, o);
Coin coin;
bool is_spent = view.SpendCoin(out, &coin);
if (!is_spent || tx.vout[o] != coin.GetTxOut() ||
uint32_t(pindex->nHeight) != coin.GetHeight() ||
is_coinbase != coin.IsCoinBase()) {
// transaction output mismatch
fClean = false;
}
}
}
// Move best block pointer to previous block.
view.SetBestBlock(block.hashPrevBlock);
return fClean ? DisconnectResult::OK : DisconnectResult::UNCLEAN;
}
static CCheckQueue<CScriptCheck> scriptcheckqueue(128);
void StartScriptCheckWorkerThreads(int threads_num) {
scriptcheckqueue.StartWorkerThreads(threads_num);
}
void StopScriptCheckWorkerThreads() {
scriptcheckqueue.StopWorkerThreads();
}
// Returns the script flags which should be checked for the block after
// the given block.
static uint32_t GetNextBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex *pindex,
const ChainstateManager &chainman) {
const Consensus::Params &consensusparams = chainman.GetConsensus();
uint32_t flags = SCRIPT_VERIFY_NONE;
// Enforce P2SH (BIP16)
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindex, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_P2SH)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH;
}
// Enforce the DERSIG (BIP66) rule.
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindex, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_DERSIG;
}
// Start enforcing CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (BIP65) rule.
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindex, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY;
}
// Start enforcing CSV (BIP68, BIP112 and BIP113) rule.
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindex, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY;
}
// If the UAHF is enabled, we start accepting replay protected txns
if (IsUAHFenabled(consensusparams, pindex)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_STRICTENC;
flags |= SCRIPT_ENABLE_SIGHASH_FORKID;
}
// If the DAA HF is enabled, we start rejecting transaction that use a high
// s in their signature. We also make sure that signature that are supposed
// to fail (for instance in multisig or other forms of smart contracts) are
// null.
if (IsDAAEnabled(consensusparams, pindex)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S;
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_NULLFAIL;
}
// When the magnetic anomaly fork is enabled, we start accepting
// transactions using the OP_CHECKDATASIG opcode and it's verify
// alternative. We also start enforcing push only signatures and
// clean stack.
if (IsMagneticAnomalyEnabled(consensusparams, pindex)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_SIGPUSHONLY;
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK;
}
if (IsGravitonEnabled(consensusparams, pindex)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_ENABLE_SCHNORR_MULTISIG;
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_MINIMALDATA;
}
if (IsPhononEnabled(consensusparams, pindex)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_ENFORCE_SIGCHECKS;
}
// We make sure this node will have replay protection during the next hard
// fork.
if (IsReplayProtectionEnabled(consensusparams, pindex)) {
flags |= SCRIPT_ENABLE_REPLAY_PROTECTION;
}
return flags;
}
static int64_t nTimeCheck = 0;
static int64_t nTimeForks = 0;
static int64_t nTimeVerify = 0;
static int64_t nTimeConnect = 0;
static int64_t nTimeIndex = 0;
static int64_t nTimeTotal = 0;
static int64_t nBlocksTotal = 0;
/**
* Apply the effects of this block (with given index) on the UTXO set
* represented by coins. Validity checks that depend on the UTXO set are also
* done; ConnectBlock() can fail if those validity checks fail (among other
* reasons).
*/
bool Chainstate::ConnectBlock(const CBlock &block, BlockValidationState &state,
CBlockIndex *pindex, CCoinsViewCache &view,
BlockValidationOptions options, Amount *blockFees,
bool fJustCheck) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
assert(pindex);
const BlockHash block_hash{block.GetHash()};
assert(*pindex->phashBlock == block_hash);
int64_t nTimeStart = GetTimeMicros();
const CChainParams &params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
// Check it again in case a previous version let a bad block in
// NOTE: We don't currently (re-)invoke ContextualCheckBlock() or
// ContextualCheckBlockHeader() here. This means that if we add a new
// consensus rule that is enforced in one of those two functions, then we
// may have let in a block that violates the rule prior to updating the
// software, and we would NOT be enforcing the rule here. Fully solving
// upgrade from one software version to the next after a consensus rule
// change is potentially tricky and issue-specific.
// Also, currently the rule against blocks more than 2 hours in the future
// is enforced in ContextualCheckBlockHeader(); we wouldn't want to
// re-enforce that rule here (at least until we make it impossible for
// m_adjusted_time_callback() to go backward).
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, consensusParams,
options.withCheckPoW(!fJustCheck)
.withCheckMerkleRoot(!fJustCheck))) {
if (state.GetResult() == BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
// We don't write down blocks to disk if they may have been
// corrupted, so this should be impossible unless we're having
// hardware problems.
return AbortNode(state, "Corrupt block found indicating potential "
"hardware failure; shutting down");
}
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
// Verify that the view's current state corresponds to the previous block
BlockHash hashPrevBlock =
pindex->pprev == nullptr ? BlockHash() : pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash();
assert(hashPrevBlock == view.GetBestBlock());
nBlocksTotal++;
// Special case for the genesis block, skipping connection of its
// transactions (its coinbase is unspendable)
if (block_hash == consensusParams.hashGenesisBlock) {
if (!fJustCheck) {
view.SetBestBlock(pindex->GetBlockHash());
}
return true;
}
bool fScriptChecks = true;
if (!m_chainman.AssumedValidBlock().IsNull()) {
// We've been configured with the hash of a block which has been
// externally verified to have a valid history. A suitable default value
// is included with the software and updated from time to time. Because
// validity relative to a piece of software is an objective fact these
// defaults can be easily reviewed. This setting doesn't force the
// selection of any particular chain but makes validating some faster by
// effectively caching the result of part of the verification.
BlockMap::const_iterator it{
m_blockman.m_block_index.find(m_chainman.AssumedValidBlock())};
if (it != m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) {
if (it->second.GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex &&
m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) ==
pindex &&
m_chainman.m_best_header->nChainWork >=
m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
// This block is a member of the assumed verified chain and an
// ancestor of the best header.
// Script verification is skipped when connecting blocks under
// the assumevalid block. Assuming the assumevalid block is
// valid this is safe because block merkle hashes are still
// computed and checked, Of course, if an assumed valid block is
// invalid due to false scriptSigs this optimization would allow
// an invalid chain to be accepted.
// The equivalent time check discourages hash power from
// extorting the network via DOS attack into accepting an
// invalid block through telling users they must manually set
// assumevalid. Requiring a software change or burying the
// invalid block, regardless of the setting, makes it hard to
// hide the implication of the demand. This also avoids having
// release candidates that are hardly doing any signature
// verification at all in testing without having to artificially
// set the default assumed verified block further back. The test
// against the minimum chain work prevents the skipping when
// denied access to any chain at least as good as the expected
// chain.
fScriptChecks = (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(
*m_chainman.m_best_header, *pindex,
*m_chainman.m_best_header,
consensusParams) <= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2);
}
}
}
int64_t nTime1 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeCheck += nTime1 - nTimeStart;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Sanity checks: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
MILLI * (nTime1 - nTimeStart), nTimeCheck * MICRO,
nTimeCheck * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
// Do not allow blocks that contain transactions which 'overwrite' older
// transactions, unless those are already completely spent. If such
// overwrites are allowed, coinbases and transactions depending upon those
// can be duplicated to remove the ability to spend the first instance --
// even after being sent to another address.
// See BIP30, CVE-2012-1909, and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html
// for more information. This rule was originally applied to all blocks
// with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC. Now that the whole
// chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks
// except the two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting
// the issue against nodes during their initial block download.
bool fEnforceBIP30 = !((pindex->nHeight == 91842 &&
pindex->GetBlockHash() ==
uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763"
"b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
(pindex->nHeight == 91880 &&
pindex->GetBlockHash() ==
uint256S("0x00000000000743f190a18c5577a3c2d2a1f"
"610ae9601ac046a38084ccb7cd721")));
// Once BIP34 activated it was not possible to create new duplicate
// coinbases and thus other than starting with the 2 existing duplicate
// coinbase pairs, not possible to create overwriting txs. But by the time
// BIP34 activated, in each of the existing pairs the duplicate coinbase had
// overwritten the first before the first had been spent. Since those
// coinbases are sufficiently buried it's no longer possible to create
// further duplicate transactions descending from the known pairs either. If
// we're on the known chain at height greater than where BIP34 activated, we
// can save the db accesses needed for the BIP30 check.
// BIP34 requires that a block at height X (block X) has its coinbase
// scriptSig start with a CScriptNum of X (indicated height X). The above
// logic of no longer requiring BIP30 once BIP34 activates is flawed in the
// case that there is a block X before the BIP34 height of 227,931 which has
// an indicated height Y where Y is greater than X. The coinbase for block
// X would also be a valid coinbase for block Y, which could be a BIP30
// violation. An exhaustive search of all mainnet coinbases before the
// BIP34 height which have an indicated height greater than the block height
// reveals many occurrences. The 3 lowest indicated heights found are
// 209,921, 490,897, and 1,983,702 and thus coinbases for blocks at these 3
// heights would be the first opportunity for BIP30 to be violated.
// The search reveals a great many blocks which have an indicated height
// greater than 1,983,702, so we simply remove the optimization to skip
// BIP30 checking for blocks at height 1,983,702 or higher. Before we reach
// that block in another 25 years or so, we should take advantage of a
// future consensus change to do a new and improved version of BIP34 that
// will actually prevent ever creating any duplicate coinbases in the
// future.
static constexpr int BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT = 1983702;
// There is no potential to create a duplicate coinbase at block 209,921
// because this is still before the BIP34 height and so explicit BIP30
// checking is still active.
// The final case is block 176,684 which has an indicated height of
// 490,897. Unfortunately, this issue was not discovered until about 2 weeks
// before block 490,897 so there was not much opportunity to address this
// case other than to carefully analyze it and determine it would not be a
// problem. Block 490,897 was, in fact, mined with a different coinbase than
// block 176,684, but it is important to note that even if it hadn't been or
// is remined on an alternate fork with a duplicate coinbase, we would still
// not run into a BIP30 violation. This is because the coinbase for 176,684
// is spent in block 185,956 in transaction
// d4f7fbbf92f4a3014a230b2dc70b8058d02eb36ac06b4a0736d9d60eaa9e8781. This
// spending transaction can't be duplicated because it also spends coinbase
// 0328dd85c331237f18e781d692c92de57649529bd5edf1d01036daea32ffde29. This
// coinbase has an indicated height of over 4.2 billion, and wouldn't be
// duplicatable until that height, and it's currently impossible to create a
// chain that long. Nevertheless we may wish to consider a future soft fork
// which retroactively prevents block 490,897 from creating a duplicate
// coinbase. The two historical BIP30 violations often provide a confusing
// edge case when manipulating the UTXO and it would be simpler not to have
// another edge case to deal with.
// testnet3 has no blocks before the BIP34 height with indicated heights
// post BIP34 before approximately height 486,000,000 and presumably will
// be reset before it reaches block 1,983,702 and starts doing unnecessary
// BIP30 checking again.
assert(pindex->pprev);
CBlockIndex *pindexBIP34height =
pindex->pprev->GetAncestor(consensusParams.BIP34Height);
// Only continue to enforce if we're below BIP34 activation height or the
// block hash at that height doesn't correspond.
fEnforceBIP30 =
fEnforceBIP30 &&
(!pindexBIP34height ||
!(pindexBIP34height->GetBlockHash() == consensusParams.BIP34Hash));
// TODO: Remove BIP30 checking from block height 1,983,702 on, once we have
// a consensus change that ensures coinbases at those heights can not
// duplicate earlier coinbases.
if (fEnforceBIP30 || pindex->nHeight >= BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT) {
for (const auto &tx : block.vtx) {
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetId(), o))) {
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite "
"transaction\n");
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-txns-BIP30");
}
}
}
}
// Enforce BIP68 (sequence locks).
int nLockTimeFlags = 0;
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, consensusParams,
Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
nLockTimeFlags |= LOCKTIME_VERIFY_SEQUENCE;
}
const uint32_t flags = GetNextBlockScriptFlags(pindex->pprev, m_chainman);
int64_t nTime2 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeForks += nTime2 - nTime1;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Fork checks: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
MILLI * (nTime2 - nTime1), nTimeForks * MICRO,
nTimeForks * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
std::vector<int> prevheights;
Amount nFees = Amount::zero();
int nInputs = 0;
// Limit the total executed signature operations in the block, a consensus
// rule. Tracking during the CPU-consuming part (validation of uncached
// inputs) is per-input atomic and validation in each thread stops very
// quickly after the limit is exceeded, so an adversary cannot cause us to
// exceed the limit by much at all.
CheckInputsLimiter nSigChecksBlockLimiter(
GetMaxBlockSigChecksCount(options.getExcessiveBlockSize()));
std::vector<TxSigCheckLimiter> nSigChecksTxLimiters;
nSigChecksTxLimiters.resize(block.vtx.size() - 1);
CBlockUndo blockundo;
blockundo.vtxundo.resize(block.vtx.size() - 1);
CCheckQueueControl<CScriptCheck> control(fScriptChecks ? &scriptcheckqueue
: nullptr);
// Add all outputs
try {
for (const auto &ptx : block.vtx) {
AddCoins(view, *ptx, pindex->nHeight);
}
} catch (const std::logic_error &e) {
// This error will be thrown from AddCoin if we try to connect a block
// containing duplicate transactions. Such a thing should normally be
// caught early nowadays (due to ContextualCheckBlock's CTOR
// enforcement) however some edge cases can escape that:
// - ContextualCheckBlock does not get re-run after saving the block to
// disk, and older versions may have saved a weird block.
// - its checks are not applied to pre-CTOR chains, which we might visit
// with checkpointing off.
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction\n");
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"tx-duplicate");
}
size_t txIndex = 0;
// nSigChecksRet may be accurate (found in cache) or 0 (checks were
// deferred into vChecks).
int nSigChecksRet;
for (const auto &ptx : block.vtx) {
const CTransaction &tx = *ptx;
const bool isCoinBase = tx.IsCoinBase();
nInputs += tx.vin.size();
{
Amount txfee = Amount::zero();
TxValidationState tx_state;
if (!isCoinBase &&
!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, tx_state, view, pindex->nHeight,
txfee)) {
// Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block
// consensus failure.
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__,
tx.GetId().ToString(), state.ToString());
}
nFees += txfee;
}
if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) {
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.\n",
__func__);
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
}
// The following checks do not apply to the coinbase.
if (isCoinBase) {
continue;
}
// Check that transaction is BIP68 final BIP68 lock checks (as
// opposed to nLockTime checks) must be in ConnectBlock because they
// require the UTXO set.
prevheights.resize(tx.vin.size());
for (size_t j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++) {
prevheights[j] = view.AccessCoin(tx.vin[j].prevout).GetHeight();
}
if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, prevheights, *pindex)) {
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction\n",
__func__);
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-txns-nonfinal");
}
// Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still
// consult the cache, though).
bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck;
const bool fEnforceSigCheck = flags & SCRIPT_ENFORCE_SIGCHECKS;
if (!fEnforceSigCheck) {
// Historically, there has been transactions with a very high
// sigcheck count, so we need to disable this check for such
// transactions.
nSigChecksTxLimiters[txIndex] = TxSigCheckLimiter::getDisabled();
}
std::vector<CScriptCheck> vChecks;
TxValidationState tx_state;
if (fScriptChecks &&
!CheckInputScripts(tx, tx_state, view, flags, fCacheResults,
fCacheResults, PrecomputedTransactionData(tx),
nSigChecksRet, nSigChecksTxLimiters[txIndex],
&nSigChecksBlockLimiter, &vChecks)) {
// Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block
// consensus failure
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
return error(
"ConnectBlock(): CheckInputScripts on %s failed with %s",
tx.GetId().ToString(), state.ToString());
}
control.Add(std::move(vChecks));
// Note: this must execute in the same iteration as CheckTxInputs (not
// in a separate loop) in order to detect double spends. However,
// this does not prevent double-spending by duplicated transaction
// inputs in the same transaction (cf. CVE-2018-17144) -- that check is
// done in CheckBlock (CheckRegularTransaction).
SpendCoins(view, tx, blockundo.vtxundo.at(txIndex), pindex->nHeight);
txIndex++;
}
int64_t nTime3 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeConnect += nTime3 - nTime2;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH,
" - Connect %u transactions: %.2fms (%.3fms/tx, %.3fms/txin) "
"[%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
(unsigned)block.vtx.size(), MILLI * (nTime3 - nTime2),
MILLI * (nTime3 - nTime2) / block.vtx.size(),
nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime3 - nTime2) / (nInputs - 1),
nTimeConnect * MICRO, nTimeConnect * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
const Amount blockReward =
nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, consensusParams);
if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward) {
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs "
"limit=%d)\n",
block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward);
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-cb-amount");
}
if (blockFees) {
*blockFees = nFees;
}
if (!control.Wait()) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"blk-bad-inputs", "parallel script check failed");
}
int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2;
LogPrint(
BCLog::BENCH,
" - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2),
nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs - 1),
nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
if (fJustCheck) {
return true;
}
if (!m_blockman.WriteUndoDataForBlock(blockundo, state, *pindex)) {
return false;
}
if (!pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::SCRIPTS)) {
pindex->RaiseValidity(BlockValidity::SCRIPTS);
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
}
// add this block to the view's block chain
view.SetBestBlock(pindex->GetBlockHash());
int64_t nTime5 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeIndex += nTime5 - nTime4;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Index writing: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
MILLI * (nTime5 - nTime4), nTimeIndex * MICRO,
nTimeIndex * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
TRACE6(validation, block_connected, block_hash.data(), pindex->nHeight,
block.vtx.size(), nInputs, nSigChecksRet,
// in microseconds (µs)
nTime5 - nTimeStart);
return true;
}
CoinsCacheSizeState Chainstate::GetCoinsCacheSizeState() {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
return this->GetCoinsCacheSizeState(m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes,
m_mempool ? m_mempool->m_max_size_bytes
: 0);
}
CoinsCacheSizeState
Chainstate::GetCoinsCacheSizeState(size_t max_coins_cache_size_bytes,
size_t max_mempool_size_bytes) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
int64_t nMempoolUsage = m_mempool ? m_mempool->DynamicMemoryUsage() : 0;
int64_t cacheSize = CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage();
int64_t nTotalSpace =
max_coins_cache_size_bytes +
std::max<int64_t>(int64_t(max_mempool_size_bytes) - nMempoolUsage, 0);
//! No need to periodic flush if at least this much space still available.
static constexpr int64_t MAX_BLOCK_COINSDB_USAGE_BYTES =
10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB
int64_t large_threshold = std::max(
(9 * nTotalSpace) / 10, nTotalSpace - MAX_BLOCK_COINSDB_USAGE_BYTES);
if (cacheSize > nTotalSpace) {
LogPrintf("Cache size (%s) exceeds total space (%s)\n", cacheSize,
nTotalSpace);
return CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL;
} else if (cacheSize > large_threshold) {
return CoinsCacheSizeState::LARGE;
}
return CoinsCacheSizeState::OK;
}
bool Chainstate::FlushStateToDisk(BlockValidationState &state,
FlushStateMode mode, int nManualPruneHeight) {
LOCK(cs_main);
assert(this->CanFlushToDisk());
std::set<int> setFilesToPrune;
bool full_flush_completed = false;
const size_t coins_count = CoinsTip().GetCacheSize();
const size_t coins_mem_usage = CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage();
try {
{
bool fFlushForPrune = false;
bool fDoFullFlush = false;
CoinsCacheSizeState cache_state = GetCoinsCacheSizeState();
LOCK(m_blockman.cs_LastBlockFile);
if (m_blockman.IsPruneMode() &&
(m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning || nManualPruneHeight > 0) &&
!fReindex) {
// Make sure we don't prune any of the prune locks bestblocks.
// Pruning is height-based.
int last_prune{m_chain.Height()};
// prune lock that actually was the limiting factor, only used
// for logging
std::optional<std::string> limiting_lock;
for (const auto &prune_lock : m_blockman.m_prune_locks) {
if (prune_lock.second.height_first ==
std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) {
continue;
}
// Remove the buffer and one additional block here to get
// actual height that is outside of the buffer
const int lock_height{prune_lock.second.height_first -
PRUNE_LOCK_BUFFER - 1};
last_prune = std::max(1, std::min(last_prune, lock_height));
if (last_prune == lock_height) {
limiting_lock = prune_lock.first;
}
}
if (limiting_lock) {
LogPrint(BCLog::PRUNE, "%s limited pruning to height %d\n",
limiting_lock.value(), last_prune);
}
if (nManualPruneHeight > 0) {
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY(
"find files to prune (manual)", BCLog::BENCH);
m_blockman.FindFilesToPruneManual(
setFilesToPrune,
std::min(last_prune, nManualPruneHeight),
m_chain.Height());
} else {
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("find files to prune",
BCLog::BENCH);
m_blockman.FindFilesToPrune(
setFilesToPrune,
m_chainman.GetParams().PruneAfterHeight(),
m_chain.Height(), last_prune, IsInitialBlockDownload());
m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning = false;
}
if (!setFilesToPrune.empty()) {
fFlushForPrune = true;
if (!m_blockman.m_have_pruned) {
m_blockman.m_block_tree_db->WriteFlag(
"prunedblockfiles", true);
m_blockman.m_have_pruned = true;
}
}
}
const auto nNow = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>();
// Avoid writing/flushing immediately after startup.
if (m_last_write.count() == 0) {
m_last_write = nNow;
}
if (m_last_flush.count() == 0) {
m_last_flush = nNow;
}
// The cache is large and we're within 10% and 10 MiB of the limit,
// but we have time now (not in the middle of a block processing).
bool fCacheLarge = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC &&
cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::LARGE;
// The cache is over the limit, we have to write now.
bool fCacheCritical = mode == FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED &&
cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL;
// It's been a while since we wrote the block index to disk. Do this
// frequently, so we don't need to redownload after a crash.
bool fPeriodicWrite = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC &&
nNow > m_last_write + DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL;
// It's been very long since we flushed the cache. Do this
// infrequently, to optimize cache usage.
bool fPeriodicFlush = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC &&
nNow > m_last_flush + DATABASE_FLUSH_INTERVAL;
// Combine all conditions that result in a full cache flush.
fDoFullFlush = (mode == FlushStateMode::ALWAYS) || fCacheLarge ||
fCacheCritical || fPeriodicFlush || fFlushForPrune;
// Write blocks and block index to disk.
if (fDoFullFlush || fPeriodicWrite) {
// Ensure we can write block index
if (!CheckDiskSpace(gArgs.GetBlocksDirPath())) {
return AbortNode(state, "Disk space is too low!",
_("Disk space is too low!"));
}
{
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY(
"write block and undo data to disk", BCLog::BENCH);
// First make sure all block and undo data is flushed to
// disk.
m_blockman.FlushBlockFile();
}
// Then update all block file information (which may refer to
// block and undo files).
{
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("write block index to disk",
BCLog::BENCH);
if (!m_blockman.WriteBlockIndexDB()) {
return AbortNode(
state, "Failed to write to block index database");
}
}
// Finally remove any pruned files
if (fFlushForPrune) {
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("unlink pruned files",
BCLog::BENCH);
m_blockman.UnlinkPrunedFiles(setFilesToPrune);
}
m_last_write = nNow;
}
// Flush best chain related state. This can only be done if the
// blocks / block index write was also done.
if (fDoFullFlush && !CoinsTip().GetBestBlock().IsNull()) {
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY(
strprintf("write coins cache to disk (%d coins, %.2fkB)",
coins_count, coins_mem_usage / 1000),
BCLog::BENCH);
// Typical Coin structures on disk are around 48 bytes in size.
// Pushing a new one to the database can cause it to be written
// twice (once in the log, and once in the tables). This is
// already an overestimation, as most will delete an existing
// entry or overwrite one. Still, use a conservative safety
// factor of 2.
if (!CheckDiskSpace(gArgs.GetDataDirNet(),
48 * 2 * 2 * CoinsTip().GetCacheSize())) {
return AbortNode(state, "Disk space is too low!",
_("Disk space is too low!"));
}
// Flush the chainstate (which may refer to block index
// entries).
if (!CoinsTip().Flush()) {
return AbortNode(state, "Failed to write to coin database");
}
m_last_flush = nNow;
full_flush_completed = true;
}
TRACE5(utxocache, flush,
// in microseconds (µs)
GetTimeMicros() - nNow.count(), uint32_t(mode), coins_count,
uint64_t(coins_mem_usage), fFlushForPrune);
}
if (full_flush_completed) {
// Update best block in wallet (so we can detect restored wallets).
GetMainSignals().ChainStateFlushed(m_chain.GetLocator());
}
} catch (const std::runtime_error &e) {
return AbortNode(state, std::string("System error while flushing: ") +
e.what());
}
return true;
}
void Chainstate::ForceFlushStateToDisk() {
BlockValidationState state;
if (!this->FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::ALWAYS)) {
LogPrintf("%s: failed to flush state (%s)\n", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
}
void Chainstate::PruneAndFlush() {
BlockValidationState state;
m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning = true;
if (!this->FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::NONE)) {
LogPrintf("%s: failed to flush state (%s)\n", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
}
static void UpdateTipLog(const CCoinsViewCache &coins_tip,
const CBlockIndex *tip, const CChainParams &params,
const std::string &func_name,
const std::string &prefix)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
LogPrintf("%s%s: new best=%s height=%d version=0x%08x log2_work=%f tx=%ld "
"date='%s' progress=%f cache=%.1fMiB(%utxo)\n",
prefix, func_name, tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), tip->nHeight,
tip->nVersion, log(tip->nChainWork.getdouble()) / log(2.0),
tip->GetChainTxCount(),
FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()),
GuessVerificationProgress(params.TxData(), tip),
coins_tip.DynamicMemoryUsage() * (1.0 / (1 << 20)),
coins_tip.GetCacheSize());
}
void Chainstate::UpdateTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
const auto &coins_tip = CoinsTip();
const CChainParams &params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
// The remainder of the function isn't relevant if we are not acting on
// the active chainstate, so return if need be.
if (this != &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) {
// Only log every so often so that we don't bury log messages at the
// tip.
constexpr int BACKGROUND_LOG_INTERVAL = 2000;
if (pindexNew->nHeight % BACKGROUND_LOG_INTERVAL == 0) {
UpdateTipLog(coins_tip, pindexNew, params, __func__,
"[background validation] ");
}
return;
}
// New best block
if (m_mempool) {
m_mempool->AddTransactionsUpdated(1);
}
{
LOCK(g_best_block_mutex);
g_best_block = pindexNew;
g_best_block_cv.notify_all();
}
UpdateTipLog(coins_tip, pindexNew, params, __func__, "");
}
/**
* Disconnect m_chain's tip.
* After calling, the mempool will be in an inconsistent state, with
* transactions from disconnected blocks being added to disconnectpool. You
* should make the mempool consistent again by calling updateMempoolForReorg.
* with cs_main held.
*
* If disconnectpool is nullptr, then no disconnected transactions are added to
* disconnectpool (note that the caller is responsible for mempool consistency
* in any case).
*/
bool Chainstate::DisconnectTip(BlockValidationState &state,
DisconnectedBlockTransactions *disconnectpool) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (m_mempool) {
AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
}
CBlockIndex *pindexDelete = m_chain.Tip();
assert(pindexDelete);
assert(pindexDelete->pprev);
// Read block from disk.
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
CBlock &block = *pblock;
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindexDelete)) {
return error("DisconnectTip(): Failed to read block");
}
// Apply the block atomically to the chain state.
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMicros();
{
CCoinsViewCache view(&CoinsTip());
assert(view.GetBestBlock() == pindexDelete->GetBlockHash());
if (DisconnectBlock(block, pindexDelete, view) !=
DisconnectResult::OK) {
return error("DisconnectTip(): DisconnectBlock %s failed",
pindexDelete->GetBlockHash().ToString());
}
bool flushed = view.Flush();
assert(flushed);
}
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, "- Disconnect block: %.2fms\n",
(GetTimeMicros() - nStart) * MILLI);
{
// Prune locks that began at or after the tip should be moved backward
// so they get a chance to reorg
const int max_height_first{pindexDelete->nHeight - 1};
for (auto &prune_lock : m_blockman.m_prune_locks) {
if (prune_lock.second.height_first <= max_height_first) {
continue;
}
prune_lock.second.height_first = max_height_first;
LogPrint(BCLog::PRUNE, "%s prune lock moved back to %d\n",
prune_lock.first, max_height_first);
}
}
// Write the chain state to disk, if necessary.
if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED)) {
return false;
}
if (m_mempool) {
// If this block is deactivating a fork, we move all mempool
// transactions in front of disconnectpool for reprocessing in a future
// updateMempoolForReorg call
if (pindexDelete->pprev != nullptr &&
GetNextBlockScriptFlags(pindexDelete, m_chainman) !=
GetNextBlockScriptFlags(pindexDelete->pprev, m_chainman)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL,
"Disconnecting mempool due to rewind of upgrade block\n");
if (disconnectpool) {
disconnectpool->importMempool(*m_mempool);
}
m_mempool->clear();
}
if (disconnectpool) {
disconnectpool->addForBlock(block.vtx, *m_mempool);
}
}
m_chain.SetTip(*pindexDelete->pprev);
UpdateTip(pindexDelete->pprev);
// Let wallets know transactions went from 1-confirmed to
// 0-confirmed or conflicted:
GetMainSignals().BlockDisconnected(pblock, pindexDelete);
return true;
}
static int64_t nTimeReadFromDisk = 0;
static int64_t nTimeConnectTotal = 0;
static int64_t nTimeFlush = 0;
static int64_t nTimeChainState = 0;
static int64_t nTimePostConnect = 0;
/**
* Connect a new block to m_chain. pblock is either nullptr or a pointer to
* a CBlock corresponding to pindexNew, to bypass loading it again from disk.
*/
bool Chainstate::ConnectTip(BlockValidationState &state,
BlockPolicyValidationState &blockPolicyState,
CBlockIndex *pindexNew,
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock,
DisconnectedBlockTransactions &disconnectpool,
const avalanche::Processor *const avalanche) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (m_mempool) {
AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
}
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams = m_chainman.GetConsensus();
assert(pindexNew->pprev == m_chain.Tip());
// Read block from disk.
int64_t nTime1 = GetTimeMicros();
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pthisBlock;
if (!pblock) {
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockNew = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(*pblockNew, *pindexNew)) {
return AbortNode(state, "Failed to read block");
}
pthisBlock = pblockNew;
} else {
pthisBlock = pblock;
}
const CBlock &blockConnecting = *pthisBlock;
// Apply the block atomically to the chain state.
int64_t nTime2 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeReadFromDisk += nTime2 - nTime1;
int64_t nTime3;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Load block from disk: %.2fms [%.2fs]\n",
(nTime2 - nTime1) * MILLI, nTimeReadFromDisk * MICRO);
{
Amount blockFees{Amount::zero()};
CCoinsViewCache view(&CoinsTip());
bool rv = ConnectBlock(blockConnecting, state, pindexNew, view,
BlockValidationOptions(m_chainman.GetConfig()),
&blockFees);
GetMainSignals().BlockChecked(blockConnecting, state);
if (!rv) {
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
InvalidBlockFound(pindexNew, state);
}
return error("%s: ConnectBlock %s failed, %s", __func__,
pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
state.ToString());
}
/**
* The block is valid by consensus rules so now we check if the block
* passes all block policy checks. If not, then park the block and bail.
*
* We check block parking policies before flushing changes to the UTXO
* set. This allows us to avoid rewinding everything immediately after.
*
* Only check block parking policies the first time the block is
* connected. Avalanche voting can override the parking decision made by
* these policies.
*/
const BlockHash blockhash = pindexNew->GetBlockHash();
if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() &&
!m_filterParkingPoliciesApplied.contains(blockhash)) {
m_filterParkingPoliciesApplied.insert(blockhash);
const Amount blockReward =
blockFees +
GetBlockSubsidy(pindexNew->nHeight, consensusParams);
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<ParkingPolicy>> parkingPolicies;
parkingPolicies.emplace_back(std::make_unique<MinerFundPolicy>(
consensusParams, *pindexNew, blockConnecting, blockReward));
if (avalanche) {
parkingPolicies.emplace_back(
std::make_unique<StakingRewardsPolicy>(
*avalanche, consensusParams, *pindexNew,
blockConnecting, blockReward));
if (m_mempool) {
parkingPolicies.emplace_back(
std::make_unique<PreConsensusPolicy>(
*pindexNew, blockConnecting, m_mempool));
}
}
// If any block policy is violated, bail on the first one found
if (std::find_if_not(parkingPolicies.begin(), parkingPolicies.end(),
[&](const auto &policy) {
bool ret = (*policy)(blockPolicyState);
if (!ret) {
LogPrintf(
"Park block because it "
"violated a block policy: %s\n",
blockPolicyState.ToString());
}
return ret;
}) != parkingPolicies.end()) {
pindexNew->nStatus = pindexNew->nStatus.withParked();
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindexNew);
return false;
}
}
nTime3 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeConnectTotal += nTime3 - nTime2;
assert(nBlocksTotal > 0);
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH,
" - Connect total: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
(nTime3 - nTime2) * MILLI, nTimeConnectTotal * MICRO,
nTimeConnectTotal * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
bool flushed = view.Flush();
assert(flushed);
}
int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeFlush += nTime4 - nTime3;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Flush: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
(nTime4 - nTime3) * MILLI, nTimeFlush * MICRO,
nTimeFlush * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
// Write the chain state to disk, if necessary.
if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED)) {
return false;
}
int64_t nTime5 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimeChainState += nTime5 - nTime4;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH,
" - Writing chainstate: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
(nTime5 - nTime4) * MILLI, nTimeChainState * MICRO,
nTimeChainState * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
// Remove conflicting transactions from the mempool;
if (m_mempool) {
disconnectpool.removeForBlock(blockConnecting.vtx, *m_mempool);
// If this block is activating a fork, we move all mempool transactions
// in front of disconnectpool for reprocessing in a future
// updateMempoolForReorg call
if (pindexNew->pprev != nullptr &&
GetNextBlockScriptFlags(pindexNew, m_chainman) !=
GetNextBlockScriptFlags(pindexNew->pprev, m_chainman)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::MEMPOOL,
"Disconnecting mempool due to acceptance of upgrade block\n");
disconnectpool.importMempool(*m_mempool);
}
}
// Update m_chain & related variables.
m_chain.SetTip(*pindexNew);
UpdateTip(pindexNew);
int64_t nTime6 = GetTimeMicros();
nTimePostConnect += nTime6 - nTime5;
nTimeTotal += nTime6 - nTime1;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH,
" - Connect postprocess: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
(nTime6 - nTime5) * MILLI, nTimePostConnect * MICRO,
nTimePostConnect * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, "- Connect block: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
(nTime6 - nTime1) * MILLI, nTimeTotal * MICRO,
nTimeTotal * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
// If we are the background validation chainstate, check to see if we are
// done validating the snapshot (i.e. our tip has reached the snapshot's
// base block).
if (this != &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) {
// This call may set `m_disabled`, which is referenced immediately
// afterwards in ActivateBestChain, so that we stop connecting blocks
// past the snapshot base.
m_chainman.MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation();
}
GetMainSignals().BlockConnected(pthisBlock, pindexNew);
return true;
}
/**
* Return the tip of the chain with the most work in it, that isn't known to be
* invalid (it's however far from certain to be valid).
*/
CBlockIndex *Chainstate::FindMostWorkChain(
std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> &blocksToReconcile, bool fAutoUnpark) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
do {
CBlockIndex *pindexNew = nullptr;
// Find the best candidate header.
{
std::set<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndexWorkComparator>::reverse_iterator
it = setBlockIndexCandidates.rbegin();
if (it == setBlockIndexCandidates.rend()) {
return nullptr;
}
pindexNew = *it;
}
// If this block will cause an avalanche finalized block to be reorged,
// then we park it.
{
LOCK(cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
if (m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex &&
!AreOnTheSameFork(pindexNew, m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex)) {
LogPrintf("Park block %s because it forks prior to the "
"avalanche finalized chaintip.\n",
pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString());
pindexNew->nStatus = pindexNew->nStatus.withParked();
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindexNew);
}
}
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(pindexNew);
// Check whether all blocks on the path between the currently active
// chain and the candidate are valid. Just going until the active chain
// is an optimization, as we know all blocks in it are valid already.
CBlockIndex *pindexTest = pindexNew;
bool hasValidAncestor = true;
while (hasValidAncestor && pindexTest && pindexTest != pindexFork) {
assert(pindexTest->HaveTxsDownloaded() || pindexTest->nHeight == 0);
// If this is a parked chain, but it has enough PoW, clear the park
// state.
bool fParkedChain = pindexTest->nStatus.isOnParkedChain();
if (fAutoUnpark && fParkedChain) {
const CBlockIndex *pindexTip = m_chain.Tip();
// During initialization, pindexTip and/or pindexFork may be
// null. In this case, we just ignore the fact that the chain is
// parked.
if (!pindexTip || !pindexFork) {
UnparkBlock(pindexTest);
continue;
}
// A parked chain can be unparked if it has twice as much PoW
// accumulated as the main chain has since the fork block.
CBlockIndex const *pindexExtraPow = pindexTip;
arith_uint256 requiredWork = pindexTip->nChainWork;
switch (pindexTip->nHeight - pindexFork->nHeight) {
// Limit the penality for depth 1, 2 and 3 to half a block
// worth of work to ensure we don't fork accidentally.
case 3:
case 2:
pindexExtraPow = pindexExtraPow->pprev;
// FALLTHROUGH
case 1: {
const arith_uint256 deltaWork =
pindexExtraPow->nChainWork - pindexFork->nChainWork;
requiredWork += (deltaWork >> 1);
break;
}
default:
requiredWork +=
pindexExtraPow->nChainWork - pindexFork->nChainWork;
break;
}
if (pindexNew->nChainWork > requiredWork) {
// We have enough, clear the parked state.
LogPrintf("Unpark chain up to block %s as it has "
"accumulated enough PoW.\n",
pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString());
fParkedChain = false;
UnparkBlock(pindexTest);
}
}
// Pruned nodes may have entries in setBlockIndexCandidates for
// which block files have been deleted. Remove those as candidates
// for the most work chain if we come across them; we can't switch
// to a chain unless we have all the non-active-chain parent blocks.
bool fInvalidChain = pindexTest->nStatus.isInvalid();
bool fMissingData = !pindexTest->nStatus.hasData();
if (!(fInvalidChain || fParkedChain || fMissingData)) {
// The current block is acceptable, move to the parent, up to
// the fork point.
pindexTest = pindexTest->pprev;
continue;
}
// Candidate chain is not usable (either invalid or parked or
// missing data)
hasValidAncestor = false;
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindexTest);
if (fInvalidChain && (m_chainman.m_best_invalid == nullptr ||
pindexNew->nChainWork >
m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork)) {
m_chainman.m_best_invalid = pindexNew;
}
if (fParkedChain && (m_chainman.m_best_parked == nullptr ||
pindexNew->nChainWork >
m_chainman.m_best_parked->nChainWork)) {
m_chainman.m_best_parked = pindexNew;
}
LogPrintf("Considered switching to better tip %s but that chain "
"contains a%s%s%s block.\n",
pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
fInvalidChain ? "n invalid" : "",
fParkedChain ? " parked" : "",
fMissingData ? " missing-data" : "");
CBlockIndex *pindexFailed = pindexNew;
// Remove the entire chain from the set.
while (pindexTest != pindexFailed) {
if (fInvalidChain || fParkedChain) {
pindexFailed->nStatus =
pindexFailed->nStatus.withFailedParent(fInvalidChain)
.withParkedParent(fParkedChain);
} else if (fMissingData) {
// If we're missing data, then add back to
// m_blocks_unlinked, so that if the block arrives in the
// future we can try adding to setBlockIndexCandidates
// again.
m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.insert(
std::make_pair(pindexFailed->pprev, pindexFailed));
}
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindexFailed);
pindexFailed = pindexFailed->pprev;
}
if (fInvalidChain || fParkedChain) {
// We discovered a new chain tip that is either parked or
// invalid, we may want to warn.
CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(pindexNew);
}
}
blocksToReconcile.push_back(pindexNew);
// We found a candidate that has valid ancestors. This is our guy.
if (hasValidAncestor) {
return pindexNew;
}
} while (true);
}
/**
* Delete all entries in setBlockIndexCandidates that are worse than the current
* tip.
*/
void Chainstate::PruneBlockIndexCandidates() {
// Note that we can't delete the current block itself, as we may need to
// return to it later in case a reorganization to a better block fails.
auto it = setBlockIndexCandidates.begin();
while (it != setBlockIndexCandidates.end() &&
setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(*it, m_chain.Tip())) {
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(it++);
}
// Either the current tip or a successor of it we're working towards is left
// in setBlockIndexCandidates.
assert(!setBlockIndexCandidates.empty());
}
/**
* Try to make some progress towards making pindexMostWork the active block.
* pblock is either nullptr or a pointer to a CBlock corresponding to
* pindexMostWork.
*
* @returns true unless a system error occurred
*/
bool Chainstate::ActivateBestChainStep(
BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindexMostWork,
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock, bool &fInvalidFound,
const avalanche::Processor *const avalanche) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (m_mempool) {
AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
}
const CBlockIndex *pindexOldTip = m_chain.Tip();
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(pindexMostWork);
// Disconnect active blocks which are no longer in the best chain.
bool fBlocksDisconnected = false;
DisconnectedBlockTransactions disconnectpool;
while (m_chain.Tip() && m_chain.Tip() != pindexFork) {
if (!fBlocksDisconnected) {
// Import and clear mempool; we must do this to preserve
// topological ordering in the mempool index. This is ok since
// inserts into the mempool are very fast now in our new
// implementation.
disconnectpool.importMempool(*m_mempool);
}
if (!DisconnectTip(state, &disconnectpool)) {
// This is likely a fatal error, but keep the mempool consistent,
// just in case. Only remove from the mempool in this case.
if (m_mempool) {
disconnectpool.updateMempoolForReorg(*this, false, *m_mempool);
}
// If we're unable to disconnect a block during normal operation,
// then that is a failure of our local system -- we should abort
// rather than stay on a less work chain.
AbortNode(state,
"Failed to disconnect block; see debug.log for details");
return false;
}
fBlocksDisconnected = true;
}
// Build list of new blocks to connect.
std::vector<CBlockIndex *> vpindexToConnect;
bool fContinue = true;
int nHeight = pindexFork ? pindexFork->nHeight : -1;
while (fContinue && nHeight != pindexMostWork->nHeight) {
// Don't iterate the entire list of potential improvements toward the
// best tip, as we likely only need a few blocks along the way.
int nTargetHeight = std::min(nHeight + 32, pindexMostWork->nHeight);
vpindexToConnect.clear();
vpindexToConnect.reserve(nTargetHeight - nHeight);
CBlockIndex *pindexIter = pindexMostWork->GetAncestor(nTargetHeight);
while (pindexIter && pindexIter->nHeight != nHeight) {
vpindexToConnect.push_back(pindexIter);
pindexIter = pindexIter->pprev;
}
nHeight = nTargetHeight;
// Connect new blocks.
for (CBlockIndex *pindexConnect : reverse_iterate(vpindexToConnect)) {
BlockPolicyValidationState blockPolicyState;
if (!ConnectTip(state, blockPolicyState, pindexConnect,
pindexConnect == pindexMostWork
? pblock
: std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>(),
disconnectpool, avalanche)) {
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
// The block violates a consensus rule.
if (state.GetResult() !=
BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
InvalidChainFound(vpindexToConnect.back());
}
state = BlockValidationState();
fInvalidFound = true;
fContinue = false;
break;
}
if (blockPolicyState.IsInvalid()) {
// The block violates a policy rule.
fContinue = false;
break;
}
// A system error occurred (disk space, database error, ...).
// Make the mempool consistent with the current tip, just in
// case any observers try to use it before shutdown.
if (m_mempool) {
disconnectpool.updateMempoolForReorg(*this, false,
*m_mempool);
}
return false;
} else {
PruneBlockIndexCandidates();
if (!pindexOldTip ||
m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork > pindexOldTip->nChainWork) {
// We're in a better position than we were. Return
// temporarily to release the lock.
fContinue = false;
break;
}
}
}
}
if (m_mempool) {
if (fBlocksDisconnected || !disconnectpool.isEmpty()) {
// If any blocks were disconnected, we need to update the mempool
// even if disconnectpool is empty. The disconnectpool may also be
// non-empty if the mempool was imported due to new validation rules
// being in effect.
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL,
"Updating mempool due to reorganization or "
"rules upgrade/downgrade\n");
disconnectpool.updateMempoolForReorg(*this, true, *m_mempool);
}
m_mempool->check(this->CoinsTip(), this->m_chain.Height() + 1);
}
// Callbacks/notifications for a new best chain.
if (fInvalidFound) {
CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(pindexMostWork);
} else {
CheckForkWarningConditions();
}
return true;
}
static SynchronizationState GetSynchronizationState(bool init) {
if (!init) {
return SynchronizationState::POST_INIT;
}
if (::fReindex) {
return SynchronizationState::INIT_REINDEX;
}
return SynchronizationState::INIT_DOWNLOAD;
}
static bool NotifyHeaderTip(Chainstate &chainstate) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) {
bool fNotify = false;
bool fInitialBlockDownload = false;
static CBlockIndex *pindexHeaderOld = nullptr;
CBlockIndex *pindexHeader = nullptr;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
pindexHeader = chainstate.m_chainman.m_best_header;
if (pindexHeader != pindexHeaderOld) {
fNotify = true;
fInitialBlockDownload = chainstate.IsInitialBlockDownload();
pindexHeaderOld = pindexHeader;
}
}
// Send block tip changed notifications without cs_main
if (fNotify) {
chainstate.m_chainman.GetNotifications().headerTip(
GetSynchronizationState(fInitialBlockDownload),
pindexHeader->nHeight, pindexHeader->nTime, false);
}
return fNotify;
}
static void LimitValidationInterfaceQueue() LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) {
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
if (GetMainSignals().CallbacksPending() > 10) {
SyncWithValidationInterfaceQueue();
}
}
bool Chainstate::ActivateBestChain(BlockValidationState &state,
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche,
bool skip_checkblockindex) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
// Note that while we're often called here from ProcessNewBlock, this is
// far from a guarantee. Things in the P2P/RPC will often end up calling
// us in the middle of ProcessNewBlock - do not assume pblock is set
// sanely for performance or correctness!
AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main);
// ABC maintains a fair degree of expensive-to-calculate internal state
// because this function periodically releases cs_main so that it does not
// lock up other threads for too long during large connects - and to allow
// for e.g. the callback queue to drain we use m_chainstate_mutex to enforce
// mutual exclusion so that only one caller may execute this function at a
// time
LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex);
// Belt-and-suspenders check that we aren't attempting to advance the
// background chainstate past the snapshot base block.
if (WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_disabled)) {
LogPrintf("m_disabled is set - this chainstate should not be in "
"operation. Please report this as a bug. %s\n",
PACKAGE_BUGREPORT);
return false;
}
CBlockIndex *pindexMostWork = nullptr;
CBlockIndex *pindexNewTip = nullptr;
int nStopAtHeight = gArgs.GetIntArg("-stopatheight", DEFAULT_STOPATHEIGHT);
do {
// Block until the validation queue drains. This should largely
// never happen in normal operation, however may happen during
// reindex, causing memory blowup if we run too far ahead.
// Note that if a validationinterface callback ends up calling
// ActivateBestChain this may lead to a deadlock! We should
// probably have a DEBUG_LOCKORDER test for this in the future.
LimitValidationInterfaceQueue();
std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> blocksToReconcile;
bool blocks_connected = false;
const bool fAutoUnpark =
gArgs.GetBoolArg("-automaticunparking", !avalanche);
{
LOCK(cs_main);
// Lock transaction pool for at least as long as it takes for
// updateMempoolForReorg to be executed if needed
LOCK(MempoolMutex());
CBlockIndex *starting_tip = m_chain.Tip();
do {
// We absolutely may not unlock cs_main until we've made forward
// progress (with the exception of shutdown due to hardware
// issues, low disk space, etc).
if (pindexMostWork == nullptr) {
pindexMostWork =
FindMostWorkChain(blocksToReconcile, fAutoUnpark);
}
// Whether we have anything to do at all.
if (pindexMostWork == nullptr ||
pindexMostWork == m_chain.Tip()) {
break;
}
bool fInvalidFound = false;
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> nullBlockPtr;
if (!ActivateBestChainStep(
state, pindexMostWork,
pblock && pblock->GetHash() ==
pindexMostWork->GetBlockHash()
? pblock
: nullBlockPtr,
fInvalidFound, avalanche)) {
// A system error occurred
return false;
}
blocks_connected = true;
if (fInvalidFound ||
(pindexMostWork && pindexMostWork->nStatus.isParked())) {
// Wipe cache, we may need another branch now.
pindexMostWork = nullptr;
}
pindexNewTip = m_chain.Tip();
// This will have been toggled in
// ActivateBestChainStep -> ConnectTip ->
// MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation, if at all, so we should
// catch it here.
//
// Break this do-while to ensure we don't advance past the base
// snapshot.
if (m_disabled) {
break;
}
} while (!m_chain.Tip() ||
(starting_tip && CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(
m_chain.Tip(), starting_tip)));
// Check the index once we're done with the above loop, since
// we're going to release cs_main soon. If the index is in a bad
// state now, then it's better to know immediately rather than
// randomly have it cause a problem in a race.
if (!skip_checkblockindex) {
CheckBlockIndex();
}
if (blocks_connected) {
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(starting_tip);
bool fInitialDownload = IsInitialBlockDownload();
// Notify external listeners about the new tip.
// Enqueue while holding cs_main to ensure that UpdatedBlockTip
// is called in the order in which blocks are connected
if (pindexFork != pindexNewTip) {
// Notify ValidationInterface subscribers
GetMainSignals().UpdatedBlockTip(pindexNewTip, pindexFork,
fInitialDownload);
// Always notify the UI if a new block tip was connected
m_chainman.GetNotifications().blockTip(
GetSynchronizationState(fInitialDownload),
*pindexNewTip);
}
}
}
// When we reach this point, we switched to a new tip (stored in
// pindexNewTip).
if (avalanche) {
for (const CBlockIndex *pindex : blocksToReconcile) {
avalanche->addToReconcile(pindex);
avalanche->computeStakingReward(pindex);
}
}
if (!blocks_connected) {
return true;
}
if (nStopAtHeight && pindexNewTip &&
pindexNewTip->nHeight >= nStopAtHeight) {
StartShutdown();
}
if (WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_disabled)) {
// Background chainstate has reached the snapshot base block, so
// exit.
break;
}
// We check shutdown only after giving ActivateBestChainStep a chance to
// run once so that we never shutdown before connecting the genesis
// block during LoadChainTip(). Previously this caused an assert()
// failure during shutdown in such cases as the UTXO DB flushing checks
// that the best block hash is non-null.
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
break;
}
} while (pindexNewTip != pindexMostWork);
// Write changes periodically to disk, after relay.
if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool Chainstate::PreciousBlock(BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindex,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main);
{
LOCK(cs_main);
if (pindex->nChainWork < m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork) {
// Nothing to do, this block is not at the tip.
return true;
}
if (m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork > nLastPreciousChainwork) {
// The chain has been extended since the last call, reset the
// counter.
nBlockReverseSequenceId = -1;
}
nLastPreciousChainwork = m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork;
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindex);
pindex->nSequenceId = nBlockReverseSequenceId;
if (nBlockReverseSequenceId > std::numeric_limits<int32_t>::min()) {
// We can't keep reducing the counter if somebody really wants to
// call preciousblock 2**31-1 times on the same set of tips...
nBlockReverseSequenceId--;
}
// In case this was parked, unpark it.
UnparkBlock(pindex);
// Make sure it is added to the candidate list if appropriate.
if (pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS) &&
pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded()) {
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex);
PruneBlockIndexCandidates();
}
}
return ActivateBestChain(state, /*pblock=*/nullptr, avalanche);
}
namespace {
// Leverage RAII to run a functor at scope end
template <typename Func> struct Defer {
Func func;
Defer(Func &&f) : func(std::move(f)) {}
~Defer() { func(); }
};
} // namespace
bool Chainstate::UnwindBlock(BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindex,
bool invalidate) {
// Genesis block can't be invalidated or parked
assert(pindex);
if (pindex->nHeight == 0) {
return false;
}
CBlockIndex *to_mark_failed_or_parked = pindex;
bool pindex_was_in_chain = false;
int disconnected = 0;
// We do not allow ActivateBestChain() to run while UnwindBlock() is
// running, as that could cause the tip to change while we disconnect
// blocks. (Note for backport of Core PR16849: we acquire
// LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex) in the Park, Invalidate and FinalizeBlock
// functions due to differences in our code)
AssertLockHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
// We'll be acquiring and releasing cs_main below, to allow the validation
// callbacks to run. However, we should keep the block index in a
// consistent state as we disconnect blocks -- in particular we need to
// add equal-work blocks to setBlockIndexCandidates as we disconnect.
// To avoid walking the block index repeatedly in search of candidates,
// build a map once so that we can look up candidate blocks by chain
// work as we go.
std::multimap<const arith_uint256, CBlockIndex *> candidate_blocks_by_work;
{
LOCK(cs_main);
for (auto &entry : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
CBlockIndex *candidate = &entry.second;
// We don't need to put anything in our active chain into the
// multimap, because those candidates will be found and considered
// as we disconnect.
// Instead, consider only non-active-chain blocks that have at
// least as much work as where we expect the new tip to end up.
if (!m_chain.Contains(candidate) &&
!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(candidate, pindex->pprev) &&
candidate->IsValid(BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS) &&
candidate->HaveTxsDownloaded()) {
candidate_blocks_by_work.insert(
std::make_pair(candidate->nChainWork, candidate));
}
}
}
{
LOCK(cs_main);
// Lock for as long as disconnectpool is in scope to make sure
// UpdateMempoolForReorg is called after DisconnectTip without unlocking
// in between
LOCK(MempoolMutex());
constexpr int maxDisconnectPoolBlocks = 10;
bool ret = false;
DisconnectedBlockTransactions disconnectpool;
// After 10 blocks this becomes nullptr, so that DisconnectTip will
// stop giving us unwound block txs if we are doing a deep unwind.
DisconnectedBlockTransactions *optDisconnectPool = &disconnectpool;
// Disable thread safety analysis because we can't require m_mempool->cs
// as m_mempool can be null. We keep the runtime analysis though.
Defer deferred([&]() NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (m_mempool && !disconnectpool.isEmpty()) {
AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
// DisconnectTip will add transactions to disconnectpool.
// When all unwinding is done and we are on a new tip, we must
// add all transactions back to the mempool against the new tip.
disconnectpool.updateMempoolForReorg(*this,
/* fAddToMempool = */ ret,
*m_mempool);
}
});
// Disconnect (descendants of) pindex, and mark them invalid.
while (true) {
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
break;
}
// Make sure the queue of validation callbacks doesn't grow
// unboundedly.
// FIXME this commented code is a regression and could cause OOM if
// a very old block is invalidated via the invalidateblock RPC.
// This can be uncommented if the main signals are moved away from
// cs_main or this code is refactored so that cs_main can be
// released at this point.
//
// LimitValidationInterfaceQueue();
if (!m_chain.Contains(pindex)) {
break;
}
if (m_mempool && disconnected == 0) {
// On first iteration, we grab all the mempool txs to preserve
// topological ordering. This has the side-effect of temporarily
// clearing the mempool, but we will re-add later in
// updateMempoolForReorg() (above). This technique guarantees
// mempool consistency as well as ensures that our topological
// entry_id index is always correct.
disconnectpool.importMempool(*m_mempool);
}
pindex_was_in_chain = true;
CBlockIndex *invalid_walk_tip = m_chain.Tip();
// ActivateBestChain considers blocks already in m_chain
// unconditionally valid already, so force disconnect away from it.
ret = DisconnectTip(state, optDisconnectPool);
++disconnected;
if (optDisconnectPool && disconnected > maxDisconnectPoolBlocks) {
// Stop using the disconnect pool after 10 blocks. After 10
// blocks we no longer add block tx's to the disconnectpool.
// However, when this scope ends we will reconcile what's
// in the pool with the new tip (in the deferred d'tor above).
optDisconnectPool = nullptr;
}
if (!ret) {
return false;
}
assert(invalid_walk_tip->pprev == m_chain.Tip());
// We immediately mark the disconnected blocks as invalid.
// This prevents a case where pruned nodes may fail to
// invalidateblock and be left unable to start as they have no tip
// candidates (as there are no blocks that meet the "have data and
// are not invalid per nStatus" criteria for inclusion in
// setBlockIndexCandidates).
invalid_walk_tip->nStatus =
invalidate ? invalid_walk_tip->nStatus.withFailed()
: invalid_walk_tip->nStatus.withParked();
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(invalid_walk_tip);
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(invalid_walk_tip->pprev);
if (invalid_walk_tip == to_mark_failed_or_parked->pprev &&
(invalidate ? to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus.hasFailed()
: to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus.isParked())) {
// We only want to mark the last disconnected block as
// Failed (or Parked); its children need to be FailedParent (or
// ParkedParent) instead.
to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus =
(invalidate
? to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus.withFailed(false)
.withFailedParent()
: to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus.withParked(false)
.withParkedParent());
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(to_mark_failed_or_parked);
}
// Add any equal or more work headers to setBlockIndexCandidates
auto candidate_it = candidate_blocks_by_work.lower_bound(
invalid_walk_tip->pprev->nChainWork);
while (candidate_it != candidate_blocks_by_work.end()) {
if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(candidate_it->second,
invalid_walk_tip->pprev)) {
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(candidate_it->second);
candidate_it = candidate_blocks_by_work.erase(candidate_it);
} else {
++candidate_it;
}
}
// Track the last disconnected block, so we can correct its
// FailedParent (or ParkedParent) status in future iterations, or,
// if it's the last one, call InvalidChainFound on it.
to_mark_failed_or_parked = invalid_walk_tip;
}
}
CheckBlockIndex();
{
LOCK(cs_main);
if (m_chain.Contains(to_mark_failed_or_parked)) {
// If the to-be-marked invalid block is in the active chain,
// something is interfering and we can't proceed.
return false;
}
// Mark pindex (or the last disconnected block) as invalid (or parked),
// even when it never was in the main chain.
to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus =
invalidate ? to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus.withFailed()
: to_mark_failed_or_parked->nStatus.withParked();
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(to_mark_failed_or_parked);
if (invalidate) {
m_chainman.m_failed_blocks.insert(to_mark_failed_or_parked);
}
// If any new blocks somehow arrived while we were disconnecting
// (above), then the pre-calculation of what should go into
// setBlockIndexCandidates may have missed entries. This would
// technically be an inconsistency in the block index, but if we clean
// it up here, this should be an essentially unobservable error.
// Loop back over all block index entries and add any missing entries
// to setBlockIndexCandidates.
for (auto &[_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
if (block_index.IsValid(BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS) &&
block_index.HaveTxsDownloaded() &&
!setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(&block_index,
m_chain.Tip())) {
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(&block_index);
}
}
if (invalidate) {
InvalidChainFound(to_mark_failed_or_parked);
}
}
// Only notify about a new block tip if the active chain was modified.
if (pindex_was_in_chain) {
m_chainman.GetNotifications().blockTip(
GetSynchronizationState(IsInitialBlockDownload()),
*to_mark_failed_or_parked->pprev);
}
return true;
}
bool Chainstate::InvalidateBlock(BlockValidationState &state,
CBlockIndex *pindex) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main);
// See 'Note for backport of Core PR16849' in Chainstate::UnwindBlock
LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex);
return UnwindBlock(state, pindex, true);
}
bool Chainstate::ParkBlock(BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindex) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main);
// See 'Note for backport of Core PR16849' in Chainstate::UnwindBlock
LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex);
return UnwindBlock(state, pindex, false);
}
template <typename F>
bool Chainstate::UpdateFlagsForBlock(CBlockIndex *pindexBase,
CBlockIndex *pindex, F f) {
BlockStatus newStatus = f(pindex->nStatus);
if (pindex->nStatus != newStatus &&
(!pindexBase ||
pindex->GetAncestor(pindexBase->nHeight) == pindexBase)) {
pindex->nStatus = newStatus;
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
if (newStatus.isValid()) {
m_chainman.m_failed_blocks.erase(pindex);
}
if (pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS) &&
pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded() &&
setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(m_chain.Tip(), pindex)) {
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex);
}
return true;
}
return false;
}
template <typename F, typename C, typename AC>
void Chainstate::UpdateFlags(CBlockIndex *pindex, CBlockIndex *&pindexReset,
F f, C fChild, AC fAncestorWasChanged) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Update the current block and ancestors; while we're doing this, identify
// which was the deepest ancestor we changed.
CBlockIndex *pindexDeepestChanged = pindex;
for (auto pindexAncestor = pindex; pindexAncestor != nullptr;
pindexAncestor = pindexAncestor->pprev) {
if (UpdateFlagsForBlock(nullptr, pindexAncestor, f)) {
pindexDeepestChanged = pindexAncestor;
}
}
if (pindexReset &&
pindexReset->GetAncestor(pindexDeepestChanged->nHeight) ==
pindexDeepestChanged) {
// reset pindexReset if it had a modified ancestor.
pindexReset = nullptr;
}
// Update all blocks under modified blocks.
for (auto &[_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
UpdateFlagsForBlock(pindex, &block_index, fChild);
UpdateFlagsForBlock(pindexDeepestChanged, &block_index,
fAncestorWasChanged);
}
}
void Chainstate::ResetBlockFailureFlags(CBlockIndex *pindex) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
UpdateFlags(
pindex, m_chainman.m_best_invalid,
[](const BlockStatus status) {
return status.withClearedFailureFlags();
},
[](const BlockStatus status) {
return status.withClearedFailureFlags();
},
[](const BlockStatus status) {
return status.withFailedParent(false);
});
}
void Chainstate::UnparkBlockImpl(CBlockIndex *pindex, bool fClearChildren) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
UpdateFlags(
pindex, m_chainman.m_best_parked,
[](const BlockStatus status) {
return status.withClearedParkedFlags();
},
[fClearChildren](const BlockStatus status) {
return fClearChildren ? status.withClearedParkedFlags()
: status.withParkedParent(false);
},
[](const BlockStatus status) {
return status.withParkedParent(false);
});
}
void Chainstate::UnparkBlockAndChildren(CBlockIndex *pindex) {
return UnparkBlockImpl(pindex, true);
}
void Chainstate::UnparkBlock(CBlockIndex *pindex) {
return UnparkBlockImpl(pindex, false);
}
bool Chainstate::AvalancheFinalizeBlock(CBlockIndex *pindex,
avalanche::Processor &avalanche) {
if (!pindex) {
return false;
}
if (!m_chain.Contains(pindex)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::AVALANCHE,
"The block to mark finalized by avalanche is not on the "
"active chain: %s\n",
pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return false;
}
avalanche.cleanupStakingRewards(pindex->nHeight);
if (IsBlockAvalancheFinalized(pindex)) {
return true;
}
{
LOCK(cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex = pindex;
}
GetMainSignals().BlockFinalized(pindex);
return true;
}
void Chainstate::ClearAvalancheFinalizedBlock() {
LOCK(cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex = nullptr;
}
bool Chainstate::IsBlockAvalancheFinalized(const CBlockIndex *pindex) const {
LOCK(cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
return pindex && m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex &&
m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) ==
pindex;
}
/**
* Mark a block as having its data received and checked (up to
* BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS).
*/
void Chainstate::ReceivedBlockTransactions(const CBlock &block,
CBlockIndex *pindexNew,
const FlatFilePos &pos) {
pindexNew->nTx = block.vtx.size();
pindexNew->nSize = ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
pindexNew->nFile = pos.nFile;
pindexNew->nDataPos = pos.nPos;
pindexNew->nUndoPos = 0;
pindexNew->nStatus = pindexNew->nStatus.withData();
pindexNew->RaiseValidity(BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS);
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindexNew);
if (pindexNew->UpdateChainStats()) {
// If pindexNew is the genesis block or all parents are
// BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS.
std::deque<CBlockIndex *> queue;
queue.push_back(pindexNew);
// Recursively process any descendant blocks that now may be eligible to
// be connected.
while (!queue.empty()) {
CBlockIndex *pindex = queue.front();
queue.pop_front();
pindex->UpdateChainStats();
if (pindex->nSequenceId == 0) {
// We assign a sequence is when transaction are received to
// prevent a miner from being able to broadcast a block but not
// its content. However, a sequence id may have been set
// manually, for instance via PreciousBlock, in which case, we
// don't need to assign one.
pindex->nSequenceId = nBlockSequenceId++;
}
if (m_chain.Tip() == nullptr ||
!setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(pindex, m_chain.Tip())) {
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex);
}
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator,
std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator>
range = m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.equal_range(pindex);
while (range.first != range.second) {
std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator it =
range.first;
queue.push_back(it->second);
range.first++;
m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.erase(it);
}
}
} else if (pindexNew->pprev &&
pindexNew->pprev->IsValid(BlockValidity::TREE)) {
m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.insert(
std::make_pair(pindexNew->pprev, pindexNew));
}
}
/**
* Return true if the provided block header is valid.
* Only verify PoW if blockValidationOptions is configured to do so.
* This allows validation of headers on which the PoW hasn't been done.
* For example: to validate template handed to mining software.
* Do not call this for any check that depends on the context.
* For context-dependent calls, see ContextualCheckBlockHeader.
*/
static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader &block,
BlockValidationState &state,
const Consensus::Params &params,
BlockValidationOptions validationOptions) {
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (validationOptions.shouldValidatePoW() &&
!CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, params)) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER,
"high-hash", "proof of work failed");
}
return true;
}
bool CheckBlock(const CBlock &block, BlockValidationState &state,
const Consensus::Params &params,
BlockValidationOptions validationOptions) {
// These are checks that are independent of context.
if (block.fChecked) {
return true;
}
// Check that the header is valid (particularly PoW). This is mostly
// redundant with the call in AcceptBlockHeader.
if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state, params, validationOptions)) {
return false;
}
// Check the merkle root.
if (validationOptions.shouldValidateMerkleRoot()) {
bool mutated;
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED,
"bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
}
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating
// sequences of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle
// root of a block, while still invalidating it.
if (mutated) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED,
"bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
}
}
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
// transaction validation, as otherwise we may mark the header as invalid
// because we receive the wrong transactions for it.
// First transaction must be coinbase.
if (block.vtx.empty()) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
}
// Size limits.
auto nMaxBlockSize = validationOptions.getExcessiveBlockSize();
// Bail early if there is no way this block is of reasonable size.
if ((block.vtx.size() * MIN_TRANSACTION_SIZE) > nMaxBlockSize) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
}
auto currentBlockSize = ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION);
if (currentBlockSize > nMaxBlockSize) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
}
// And a valid coinbase.
TxValidationState tx_state;
if (!CheckCoinbase(*block.vtx[0], tx_state)) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
strprintf("Coinbase check failed (txid %s) %s",
block.vtx[0]->GetId().ToString(),
tx_state.GetDebugMessage()));
}
// Check transactions for regularity, skipping the first. Note that this
// is the first time we check that all after the first are !IsCoinBase.
for (size_t i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) {
auto *tx = block.vtx[i].get();
if (!CheckRegularTransaction(*tx, tx_state)) {
return state.Invalid(
BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
strprintf("Transaction check failed (txid %s) %s",
tx->GetId().ToString(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage()));
}
}
if (validationOptions.shouldValidatePoW() &&
validationOptions.shouldValidateMerkleRoot()) {
block.fChecked = true;
}
return true;
}
bool HasValidProofOfWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers,
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams) {
return std::all_of(headers.cbegin(), headers.cend(),
[&](const auto &header) {
return CheckProofOfWork(
header.GetHash(), header.nBits, consensusParams);
});
}
arith_uint256 CalculateHeadersWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers) {
arith_uint256 total_work{0};
for (const CBlockHeader &header : headers) {
CBlockIndex dummy(header);
total_work += GetBlockProof(dummy);
}
return total_work;
}
/**
* Context-dependent validity checks.
* By "context", we mean only the previous block headers, but not the UTXO
* set; UTXO-related validity checks are done in ConnectBlock().
* NOTE: This function is not currently invoked by ConnectBlock(), so we
* should consider upgrade issues if we change which consensus rules are
* enforced in this function (eg by adding a new consensus rule). See comment
* in ConnectBlock().
* Note that -reindex-chainstate skips the validation that happens here!
*/
static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(
const CBlockHeader &block, BlockValidationState &state,
BlockManager &blockman, ChainstateManager &chainman,
const CBlockIndex *pindexPrev, NodeClock::time_point now,
const std::optional<CCheckpointData> &test_checkpoints = std::nullopt)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
assert(pindexPrev != nullptr);
const int nHeight = pindexPrev->nHeight + 1;
const CChainParams &params = chainman.GetParams();
// Check proof of work
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, params)) {
LogPrintf("bad bits after height: %d\n", pindexPrev->nHeight);
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER,
"bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
}
// Check against checkpoints
if (chainman.m_options.checkpoints_enabled) {
const CCheckpointData &checkpoints =
test_checkpoints ? test_checkpoints.value() : params.Checkpoints();
// Check that the block chain matches the known block chain up to a
// checkpoint.
if (!Checkpoints::CheckBlock(checkpoints, nHeight, block.GetHash())) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"ERROR: %s: rejected by checkpoint lock-in at %d\n",
__func__, nHeight);
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT,
"checkpoint mismatch");
}
// Don't accept any forks from the main chain prior to last checkpoint.
// GetLastCheckpoint finds the last checkpoint in MapCheckpoints that's
// in our BlockIndex().
const CBlockIndex *pcheckpoint =
blockman.GetLastCheckpoint(checkpoints);
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"ERROR: %s: forked chain older than last checkpoint "
"(height %d)\n",
__func__, nHeight);
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT,
"bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
}
}
// Check timestamp against prev
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER,
"time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
}
// Check timestamp
if (block.Time() > now + std::chrono::seconds{MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME}) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE,
"time-too-new",
"block timestamp too far in the future");
}
// Reject blocks with outdated version
if ((block.nVersion < 2 &&
DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman,
Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_HEIGHTINCB)) ||
(block.nVersion < 3 &&
DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman,
Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) ||
(block.nVersion < 4 &&
DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman,
Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV))) {
return state.Invalid(
BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER,
strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
}
return true;
}
bool ContextualCheckTransactionForCurrentBlock(
const CBlockIndex &active_chain_tip, const Consensus::Params &params,
const CTransaction &tx, TxValidationState &state) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// ContextualCheckTransactionForCurrentBlock() uses
// active_chain_tip.Height()+1 to evaluate nLockTime because when
// IsFinalTx() is called within AcceptBlock(), the height of the
// block *being* evaluated is what is used. Thus if we want to know if a
// transaction can be part of the *next* block, we need to call
// ContextualCheckTransaction() with one more than
// active_chain_tip.Height().
const int nBlockHeight = active_chain_tip.nHeight + 1;
// BIP113 will require that time-locked transactions have nLockTime set to
// less than the median time of the previous block they're contained in.
// When the next block is created its previous block will be the current
// chain tip, so we use that to calculate the median time passed to
// ContextualCheckTransaction().
// This time can also be used for consensus upgrades.
const int64_t nMedianTimePast{active_chain_tip.GetMedianTimePast()};
return ContextualCheckTransaction(params, tx, state, nBlockHeight,
nMedianTimePast);
}
/**
* NOTE: This function is not currently invoked by ConnectBlock(), so we
* should consider upgrade issues if we change which consensus rules are
* enforced in this function (eg by adding a new consensus rule). See comment
* in ConnectBlock().
* Note that -reindex-chainstate skips the validation that happens here!
*/
static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock &block,
BlockValidationState &state,
const ChainstateManager &chainman,
const CBlockIndex *pindexPrev) {
const int nHeight = pindexPrev == nullptr ? 0 : pindexPrev->nHeight + 1;
// Enforce BIP113 (Median Time Past).
bool enforce_locktime_median_time_past{false};
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman,
Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
assert(pindexPrev != nullptr);
enforce_locktime_median_time_past = true;
}
const int64_t nMedianTimePast =
pindexPrev == nullptr ? 0 : pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast();
const int64_t nLockTimeCutoff{enforce_locktime_median_time_past
? nMedianTimePast
: block.GetBlockTime()};
const Consensus::Params params = chainman.GetConsensus();
const bool fIsMagneticAnomalyEnabled =
IsMagneticAnomalyEnabled(params, pindexPrev);
// Check transactions:
// - canonical ordering
// - ensure they are finalized
// - check they have the minimum size
const CTransaction *prevTx = nullptr;
for (const auto &ptx : block.vtx) {
const CTransaction &tx = *ptx;
if (fIsMagneticAnomalyEnabled) {
if (prevTx && (tx.GetId() <= prevTx->GetId())) {
if (tx.GetId() == prevTx->GetId()) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"tx-duplicate",
strprintf("Duplicated transaction %s",
tx.GetId().ToString()));
}
return state.Invalid(
BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "tx-ordering",
strprintf("Transaction order is invalid (%s < %s)",
tx.GetId().ToString(),
prevTx->GetId().ToString()));
}
if (prevTx || !tx.IsCoinBase()) {
prevTx = &tx;
}
}
TxValidationState tx_state;
if (!ContextualCheckTransaction(params, tx, tx_state, nHeight,
nLockTimeCutoff)) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
}
}
// Enforce rule that the coinbase starts with serialized block height
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman,
Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_HEIGHTINCB)) {
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(),
block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
"bad-cb-height",
"block height mismatch in coinbase");
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* If the provided block header is valid, add it to the block index.
*
* Returns true if the block is successfully added to the block index.
*/
bool ChainstateManager::AcceptBlockHeader(
const CBlockHeader &block, BlockValidationState &state,
CBlockIndex **ppindex, bool min_pow_checked,
const std::optional<CCheckpointData> &test_checkpoints) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const Config &config = this->GetConfig();
const CChainParams &chainparams = config.GetChainParams();
// Check for duplicate
BlockHash hash = block.GetHash();
BlockMap::iterator miSelf{m_blockman.m_block_index.find(hash)};
if (hash != chainparams.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock) {
if (miSelf != m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) {
// Block header is already known.
CBlockIndex *pindex = &(miSelf->second);
if (ppindex) {
*ppindex = pindex;
}
if (pindex->nStatus.isInvalid()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: block %s is marked invalid\n",
__func__, hash.ToString());
return state.Invalid(
BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, "duplicate");
}
return true;
}
if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus(),
BlockValidationOptions(config))) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"%s: Consensus::CheckBlockHeader: %s, %s\n", __func__,
hash.ToString(), state.ToString());
return false;
}
// Get prev block index
BlockMap::iterator mi{
m_blockman.m_block_index.find(block.hashPrevBlock)};
if (mi == m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"header %s has prev block not found: %s\n",
hash.ToString(), block.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV,
"prev-blk-not-found");
}
CBlockIndex *pindexPrev = &((*mi).second);
assert(pindexPrev);
if (pindexPrev->nStatus.isInvalid()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"header %s has prev block invalid: %s\n", hash.ToString(),
block.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV,
"bad-prevblk");
}
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(
block, state, m_blockman, *this, pindexPrev,
m_options.adjusted_time_callback(), test_checkpoints)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s\n",
__func__, hash.ToString(), state.ToString());
return false;
}
/* Determine if this block descends from any block which has been found
* invalid (m_failed_blocks), then mark pindexPrev and any blocks
* between them as failed. For example:
*
* D3
* /
* B2 - C2
* / \
* A D2 - E2 - F2
* \
* B1 - C1 - D1 - E1
*
* In the case that we attempted to reorg from E1 to F2, only to find
* C2 to be invalid, we would mark D2, E2, and F2 as BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD
* but NOT D3 (it was not in any of our candidate sets at the time).
*
* In any case D3 will also be marked as BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD at restart
* in LoadBlockIndex.
*/
if (!pindexPrev->IsValid(BlockValidity::SCRIPTS)) {
// The above does not mean "invalid": it checks if the previous
// block hasn't been validated up to BlockValidity::SCRIPTS. This is
// a performance optimization, in the common case of adding a new
// block to the tip, we don't need to iterate over the failed blocks
// list.
for (const CBlockIndex *failedit : m_failed_blocks) {
if (pindexPrev->GetAncestor(failedit->nHeight) == failedit) {
assert(failedit->nStatus.hasFailed());
CBlockIndex *invalid_walk = pindexPrev;
while (invalid_walk != failedit) {
invalid_walk->nStatus =
invalid_walk->nStatus.withFailedParent();
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(invalid_walk);
invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev;
}
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"header %s has prev block invalid: %s\n",
hash.ToString(), block.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
return state.Invalid(
BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV,
"bad-prevblk");
}
}
}
}
if (!min_pow_checked) {
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION,
"%s: not adding new block header %s, missing anti-dos "
"proof-of-work validation\n",
__func__, hash.ToString());
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_HEADER_LOW_WORK,
"too-little-chainwork");
}
CBlockIndex *pindex{m_blockman.AddToBlockIndex(block, m_best_header)};
if (ppindex) {
*ppindex = pindex;
}
return true;
}
// Exposed wrapper for AcceptBlockHeader
bool ChainstateManager::ProcessNewBlockHeaders(
const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers, bool min_pow_checked,
BlockValidationState &state, const CBlockIndex **ppindex,
const std::optional<CCheckpointData> &test_checkpoints) {
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
{
LOCK(cs_main);
for (const CBlockHeader &header : headers) {
// Use a temp pindex instead of ppindex to avoid a const_cast
CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr;
bool accepted = AcceptBlockHeader(
header, state, &pindex, min_pow_checked, test_checkpoints);
ActiveChainstate().CheckBlockIndex();
if (!accepted) {
return false;
}
if (ppindex) {
*ppindex = pindex;
}
}
}
if (NotifyHeaderTip(ActiveChainstate())) {
if (ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload() && ppindex &&
*ppindex) {
const CBlockIndex &last_accepted{**ppindex};
const int64_t blocks_left{
(GetTime() - last_accepted.GetBlockTime()) /
this->GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing};
const double progress{100.0 * last_accepted.nHeight /
(last_accepted.nHeight + blocks_left)};
LogPrintf("Synchronizing blockheaders, height: %d (~%.2f%%)\n",
last_accepted.nHeight, progress);
}
}
return true;
}
void ChainstateManager::ReportHeadersPresync(const arith_uint256 &work,
int64_t height,
int64_t timestamp) {
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
const auto &chainstate = ActiveChainstate();
{
LOCK(cs_main);
// Don't report headers presync progress if we already have a
// post-minchainwork header chain.
// This means we lose reporting for potentially legimate, but unlikely,
// deep reorgs, but prevent attackers that spam low-work headers from
// filling our logs.
if (m_best_header->nChainWork >=
UintToArith256(GetConsensus().nMinimumChainWork)) {
return;
}
// Rate limit headers presync updates to 4 per second, as these are not
// subject to DoS protection.
auto now = Now<SteadyMilliseconds>();
if (now < m_last_presync_update + 250ms) {
return;
}
m_last_presync_update = now;
}
bool initial_download = chainstate.IsInitialBlockDownload();
GetNotifications().headerTip(GetSynchronizationState(initial_download),
height, timestamp, /*presync=*/true);
if (initial_download) {
const int64_t blocks_left{(GetTime() - timestamp) /
GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing};
const double progress{100.0 * height / (height + blocks_left)};
LogPrintf("Pre-synchronizing blockheaders, height: %d (~%.2f%%)\n",
height, progress);
}
}
/**
* Store a block on disk.
*
* @param[in,out] pblock The block we want to accept.
* @param[in] fRequested A boolean to indicate if this block was requested
* from our peers.
* @param[in] dbp If non-null, the disk position of the block.
* @param[in,out] fNewBlock True if block was first received via this call.
* @param[in] min_pow_checked True if proof-of-work anti-DoS checks have
* been done by caller for headers chain
* @return True if the block is accepted as a valid block and written to disk.
*/
bool Chainstate::AcceptBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock,
BlockValidationState &state, bool fRequested,
const FlatFilePos *dbp, bool *fNewBlock,
bool min_pow_checked) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const CBlock &block = *pblock;
if (fNewBlock) {
*fNewBlock = false;
}
CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr;
bool accepted_header{
m_chainman.AcceptBlockHeader(block, state, &pindex, min_pow_checked)};
CheckBlockIndex();
if (!accepted_header) {
return false;
}
// Try to process all requested blocks that we don't have, but only
// process an unrequested block if it's new and has enough work to
// advance our tip, and isn't too many blocks ahead.
bool fAlreadyHave = pindex->nStatus.hasData();
// TODO: deal better with return value and error conditions for duplicate
// and unrequested blocks.
if (fAlreadyHave) {
return true;
}
// Compare block header timestamps and received times of the block and the
// chaintip. If they have the same chain height, use these diffs as a
// tie-breaker, attempting to pick the more honestly-mined block.
int64_t newBlockTimeDiff = std::llabs(pindex->GetReceivedTimeDiff());
int64_t chainTipTimeDiff =
m_chain.Tip() ? std::llabs(m_chain.Tip()->GetReceivedTimeDiff()) : 0;
bool isSameHeight =
m_chain.Tip() && (pindex->nChainWork == m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork);
if (isSameHeight) {
LogPrintf("Chain tip timestamp-to-received-time difference: hash=%s, "
"diff=%d\n",
m_chain.Tip()->GetBlockHash().ToString(), chainTipTimeDiff);
LogPrintf("New block timestamp-to-received-time difference: hash=%s, "
"diff=%d\n",
pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), newBlockTimeDiff);
}
bool fHasMoreOrSameWork =
(m_chain.Tip() ? pindex->nChainWork >= m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork
: true);
// Blocks that are too out-of-order needlessly limit the effectiveness of
// pruning, because pruning will not delete block files that contain any
// blocks which are too close in height to the tip. Apply this test
// regardless of whether pruning is enabled; it should generally be safe to
// not process unrequested blocks.
bool fTooFarAhead{pindex->nHeight >
m_chain.Height() + int(MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP)};
// TODO: Decouple this function from the block download logic by removing
// fRequested
// This requires some new chain data structure to efficiently look up if a
// block is in a chain leading to a candidate for best tip, despite not
// being such a candidate itself.
// Note that this would break the getblockfrompeer RPC
// If we didn't ask for it:
if (!fRequested) {
// This is a previously-processed block that was pruned.
if (pindex->nTx != 0) {
return true;
}
// Don't process less-work chains.
if (!fHasMoreOrSameWork) {
return true;
}
// Block height is too high.
if (fTooFarAhead) {
return true;
}
// Protect against DoS attacks from low-work chains.
// If our tip is behind, a peer could try to send us
// low-work blocks on a fake chain that we would never
// request; don't process these.
if (pindex->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
return true;
}
}
const CChainParams &params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, consensusParams,
BlockValidationOptions(m_chainman.GetConfig())) ||
!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, m_chainman, pindex->pprev)) {
if (state.IsInvalid() &&
state.GetResult() != BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
pindex->nStatus = pindex->nStatus.withFailed();
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
}
return error("%s: %s (block %s)", __func__, state.ToString(),
block.GetHash().ToString());
}
// If connecting the new block would require rewinding more than one block
// from the active chain (i.e., a "deep reorg"), then mark the new block as
// parked. If it has enough work then it will be automatically unparked
// later, during FindMostWorkChain. We mark the block as parked at the very
// last minute so we can make sure everything is ready to be reorged if
// needed.
if (gArgs.GetBoolArg("-parkdeepreorg", true)) {
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(pindex);
if (pindexFork && pindexFork->nHeight + 1 < m_chain.Height()) {
LogPrintf("Park block %s as it would cause a deep reorg.\n",
pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
pindex->nStatus = pindex->nStatus.withParked();
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
}
}
// Header is valid/has work and the merkle tree is good.
// Relay now, but if it does not build on our best tip, let the
// SendMessages loop relay it.
if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() && m_chain.Tip() == pindex->pprev) {
GetMainSignals().NewPoWValidBlock(pindex, pblock);
}
// Write block to history file
if (fNewBlock) {
*fNewBlock = true;
}
try {
FlatFilePos blockPos{
m_blockman.SaveBlockToDisk(block, pindex->nHeight, m_chain, dbp)};
if (blockPos.IsNull()) {
state.Error(strprintf(
"%s: Failed to find position to write new block to disk",
__func__));
return false;
}
ReceivedBlockTransactions(block, pindex, blockPos);
} catch (const std::runtime_error &e) {
return AbortNode(state, std::string("System error: ") + e.what());
}
FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::NONE);
CheckBlockIndex();
return true;
}
bool ChainstateManager::ProcessNewBlock(
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &block, bool force_processing,
bool min_pow_checked, bool *new_block,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche) {
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
{
if (new_block) {
*new_block = false;
}
BlockValidationState state;
// CheckBlock() does not support multi-threaded block validation
// because CBlock::fChecked can cause data race.
// Therefore, the following critical section must include the
// CheckBlock() call as well.
LOCK(cs_main);
// Skipping AcceptBlock() for CheckBlock() failures means that we will
// never mark a block as invalid if CheckBlock() fails. This is
// protective against consensus failure if there are any unknown form
// s of block malleability that cause CheckBlock() to fail; see e.g.
// CVE-2012-2459 and
// https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-February/016697.html.
// Because CheckBlock() is not very expensive, the anti-DoS benefits of
// caching failure (of a definitely-invalid block) are not substantial.
bool ret = CheckBlock(*block, state, this->GetConsensus(),
BlockValidationOptions(this->GetConfig()));
if (ret) {
// Store to disk
ret = ActiveChainstate().AcceptBlock(block, state, force_processing,
nullptr, new_block,
min_pow_checked);
}
if (!ret) {
GetMainSignals().BlockChecked(*block, state);
return error("%s: AcceptBlock FAILED (%s)", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
}
NotifyHeaderTip(ActiveChainstate());
// Only used to report errors, not invalidity - ignore it
BlockValidationState state;
if (!ActiveChainstate().ActivateBestChain(state, block, avalanche)) {
return error("%s: ActivateBestChain failed (%s)", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
return true;
}
MempoolAcceptResult
ChainstateManager::ProcessTransaction(const CTransactionRef &tx,
bool test_accept) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
Chainstate &active_chainstate = ActiveChainstate();
if (!active_chainstate.GetMempool()) {
TxValidationState state;
state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NO_MEMPOOL, "no-mempool");
return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(state);
}
auto result = AcceptToMemoryPool(active_chainstate, tx, GetTime(),
/*bypass_limits=*/false, test_accept);
active_chainstate.GetMempool()->check(
active_chainstate.CoinsTip(), active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() + 1);
return result;
}
bool TestBlockValidity(
BlockValidationState &state, const CChainParams &params,
Chainstate &chainstate, const CBlock &block, CBlockIndex *pindexPrev,
const std::function<NodeClock::time_point()> &adjusted_time_callback,
BlockValidationOptions validationOptions) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
assert(pindexPrev && pindexPrev == chainstate.m_chain.Tip());
CCoinsViewCache viewNew(&chainstate.CoinsTip());
BlockHash block_hash(block.GetHash());
CBlockIndex indexDummy(block);
indexDummy.pprev = pindexPrev;
indexDummy.nHeight = pindexPrev->nHeight + 1;
indexDummy.phashBlock = &block_hash;
// NOTE: CheckBlockHeader is called by CheckBlock
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainstate.m_blockman,
chainstate.m_chainman, pindexPrev,
adjusted_time_callback())) {
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, params.GetConsensus(), validationOptions)) {
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
if (!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, chainstate.m_chainman,
pindexPrev)) {
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlock: %s", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
if (!chainstate.ConnectBlock(block, state, &indexDummy, viewNew,
validationOptions, nullptr, true)) {
return false;
}
assert(state.IsValid());
return true;
}
/* This function is called from the RPC code for pruneblockchain */
void PruneBlockFilesManual(Chainstate &active_chainstate,
int nManualPruneHeight) {
BlockValidationState state;
if (active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::NONE,
nManualPruneHeight)) {
LogPrintf("%s: failed to flush state (%s)\n", __func__,
state.ToString());
}
}
void Chainstate::LoadMempool(const fs::path &load_path,
FopenFn mockable_fopen_function) {
if (!m_mempool) {
return;
}
::LoadMempool(*m_mempool, load_path, *this, mockable_fopen_function);
m_mempool->SetLoadTried(!ShutdownRequested());
}
bool Chainstate::LoadChainTip() {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const CCoinsViewCache &coins_cache = CoinsTip();
// Never called when the coins view is empty
assert(!coins_cache.GetBestBlock().IsNull());
const CBlockIndex *tip = m_chain.Tip();
if (tip && tip->GetBlockHash() == coins_cache.GetBestBlock()) {
return true;
}
// Load pointer to end of best chain
CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(coins_cache.GetBestBlock());
if (!pindex) {
return false;
}
m_chain.SetTip(*pindex);
PruneBlockIndexCandidates();
tip = m_chain.Tip();
LogPrintf(
"Loaded best chain: hashBestChain=%s height=%d date=%s progress=%f\n",
tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), m_chain.Height(),
FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()),
GuessVerificationProgress(m_chainman.GetParams().TxData(), tip));
return true;
}
CVerifyDB::CVerifyDB(Notifications &notifications)
: m_notifications{notifications} {
m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), 0, false);
}
CVerifyDB::~CVerifyDB() {
m_notifications.progress(bilingual_str{}, 100, false);
}
VerifyDBResult CVerifyDB::VerifyDB(Chainstate &chainstate,
CCoinsView &coinsview, int nCheckLevel,
int nCheckDepth) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
const Config &config = chainstate.m_chainman.GetConfig();
const CChainParams &params = config.GetChainParams();
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
if (chainstate.m_chain.Tip() == nullptr ||
chainstate.m_chain.Tip()->pprev == nullptr) {
return VerifyDBResult::SUCCESS;
}
// Verify blocks in the best chain
if (nCheckDepth <= 0 || nCheckDepth > chainstate.m_chain.Height()) {
nCheckDepth = chainstate.m_chain.Height();
}
nCheckLevel = std::max(0, std::min(4, nCheckLevel));
LogPrintf("Verifying last %i blocks at level %i\n", nCheckDepth,
nCheckLevel);
CCoinsViewCache coins(&coinsview);
CBlockIndex *pindex;
CBlockIndex *pindexFailure = nullptr;
int nGoodTransactions = 0;
BlockValidationState state;
int reportDone = 0;
bool skipped_no_block_data{false};
bool skipped_l3_checks{false};
LogPrintf("Verification progress: 0%%\n");
const bool is_snapshot_cs{!chainstate.m_from_snapshot_blockhash};
for (pindex = chainstate.m_chain.Tip(); pindex && pindex->pprev;
pindex = pindex->pprev) {
const int percentageDone = std::max(
1, std::min(99, (int)(((double)(chainstate.m_chain.Height() -
pindex->nHeight)) /
(double)nCheckDepth *
(nCheckLevel >= 4 ? 50 : 100))));
if (reportDone < percentageDone / 10) {
// report every 10% step
LogPrintf("Verification progress: %d%%\n", percentageDone);
reportDone = percentageDone / 10;
}
m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), percentageDone, false);
if (pindex->nHeight <= chainstate.m_chain.Height() - nCheckDepth) {
break;
}
if ((chainstate.m_blockman.IsPruneMode() || is_snapshot_cs) &&
!pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
// If pruning or running under an assumeutxo snapshot, only go
// back as far as we have data.
LogPrintf("VerifyDB(): block verification stopping at height %d "
"(no data). This could be due to pruning or use of an "
"assumeutxo snapshot.\n",
pindex->nHeight);
skipped_no_block_data = true;
break;
}
CBlock block;
// check level 0: read from disk
if (!chainstate.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindex)) {
LogPrintf(
"Verification error: ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s\n",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
}
// check level 1: verify block validity
if (nCheckLevel >= 1 && !CheckBlock(block, state, consensusParams,
BlockValidationOptions(config))) {
LogPrintf(
"Verification error: found bad block at %d, hash=%s (%s)\n",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
state.ToString());
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
}
// check level 2: verify undo validity
if (nCheckLevel >= 2 && pindex) {
CBlockUndo undo;
if (!pindex->GetUndoPos().IsNull()) {
if (!chainstate.m_blockman.UndoReadFromDisk(undo, *pindex)) {
LogPrintf("Verification error: found bad undo data at %d, "
"hash=%s\n",
pindex->nHeight,
pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
}
}
}
// check level 3: check for inconsistencies during memory-only
// disconnect of tip blocks
size_t curr_coins_usage = coins.DynamicMemoryUsage() +
chainstate.CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage();
if (nCheckLevel >= 3) {
if (curr_coins_usage <= chainstate.m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes) {
assert(coins.GetBestBlock() == pindex->GetBlockHash());
DisconnectResult res =
chainstate.DisconnectBlock(block, pindex, coins);
if (res == DisconnectResult::FAILED) {
LogPrintf("Verification error: irrecoverable inconsistency "
"in block data at %d, hash=%s\n",
pindex->nHeight,
pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
}
if (res == DisconnectResult::UNCLEAN) {
nGoodTransactions = 0;
pindexFailure = pindex;
} else {
nGoodTransactions += block.vtx.size();
}
} else {
skipped_l3_checks = true;
}
}
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
return VerifyDBResult::INTERRUPTED;
}
}
if (pindexFailure) {
LogPrintf("Verification error: coin database inconsistencies found "
"(last %i blocks, %i good transactions before that)\n",
chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindexFailure->nHeight + 1,
nGoodTransactions);
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
}
if (skipped_l3_checks) {
LogPrintf("Skipped verification of level >=3 (insufficient database "
"cache size). Consider increasing -dbcache.\n");
}
// store block count as we move pindex at check level >= 4
int block_count = chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindex->nHeight;
// check level 4: try reconnecting blocks
if (nCheckLevel >= 4 && !skipped_l3_checks) {
while (pindex != chainstate.m_chain.Tip()) {
const int percentageDone = std::max(
1, std::min(99, 100 - int(double(chainstate.m_chain.Height() -
pindex->nHeight) /
double(nCheckDepth) * 50)));
if (reportDone < percentageDone / 10) {
// report every 10% step
LogPrintf("Verification progress: %d%%\n", percentageDone);
reportDone = percentageDone / 10;
}
m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), percentageDone,
false);
pindex = chainstate.m_chain.Next(pindex);
CBlock block;
if (!chainstate.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindex)) {
LogPrintf("Verification error: ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, "
"hash=%s\n",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
}
if (!chainstate.ConnectBlock(block, state, pindex, coins,
BlockValidationOptions(config))) {
LogPrintf("Verification error: found unconnectable block at "
"%d, hash=%s (%s)\n",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
state.ToString());
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
}
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
return VerifyDBResult::INTERRUPTED;
}
}
}
LogPrintf("Verification: No coin database inconsistencies in last %i "
"blocks (%i transactions)\n",
block_count, nGoodTransactions);
if (skipped_l3_checks) {
return VerifyDBResult::SKIPPED_L3_CHECKS;
}
if (skipped_no_block_data) {
return VerifyDBResult::SKIPPED_MISSING_BLOCKS;
}
return VerifyDBResult::SUCCESS;
}
/**
* Apply the effects of a block on the utxo cache, ignoring that it may already
* have been applied.
*/
bool Chainstate::RollforwardBlock(const CBlockIndex *pindex,
CCoinsViewCache &view) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// TODO: merge with ConnectBlock
CBlock block;
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindex)) {
return error("ReplayBlock(): ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s",
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
}
for (const CTransactionRef &tx : block.vtx) {
// Pass check = true as every addition may be an overwrite.
AddCoins(view, *tx, pindex->nHeight, true);
}
for (const CTransactionRef &tx : block.vtx) {
if (tx->IsCoinBase()) {
continue;
}
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx->vin) {
view.SpendCoin(txin.prevout);
}
}
return true;
}
bool Chainstate::ReplayBlocks() {
LOCK(cs_main);
CCoinsView &db = this->CoinsDB();
CCoinsViewCache cache(&db);
std::vector<BlockHash> hashHeads = db.GetHeadBlocks();
if (hashHeads.empty()) {
// We're already in a consistent state.
return true;
}
if (hashHeads.size() != 2) {
return error("ReplayBlocks(): unknown inconsistent state");
}
m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(_("Replaying blocks…"), 0, false);
LogPrintf("Replaying blocks\n");
// Old tip during the interrupted flush.
const CBlockIndex *pindexOld = nullptr;
// New tip during the interrupted flush.
const CBlockIndex *pindexNew;
// Latest block common to both the old and the new tip.
const CBlockIndex *pindexFork = nullptr;
if (m_blockman.m_block_index.count(hashHeads[0]) == 0) {
return error(
"ReplayBlocks(): reorganization to unknown block requested");
}
pindexNew = &(m_blockman.m_block_index[hashHeads[0]]);
if (!hashHeads[1].IsNull()) {
// The old tip is allowed to be 0, indicating it's the first flush.
if (m_blockman.m_block_index.count(hashHeads[1]) == 0) {
return error(
"ReplayBlocks(): reorganization from unknown block requested");
}
pindexOld = &(m_blockman.m_block_index[hashHeads[1]]);
pindexFork = LastCommonAncestor(pindexOld, pindexNew);
assert(pindexFork != nullptr);
}
// Rollback along the old branch.
while (pindexOld != pindexFork) {
if (pindexOld->nHeight > 0) {
// Never disconnect the genesis block.
CBlock block;
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindexOld)) {
return error("RollbackBlock(): ReadBlockFromDisk() failed at "
"%d, hash=%s",
pindexOld->nHeight,
pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString());
}
LogPrintf("Rolling back %s (%i)\n",
pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexOld->nHeight);
DisconnectResult res = DisconnectBlock(block, pindexOld, cache);
if (res == DisconnectResult::FAILED) {
return error(
"RollbackBlock(): DisconnectBlock failed at %d, hash=%s",
pindexOld->nHeight, pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString());
}
// If DisconnectResult::UNCLEAN is returned, it means a non-existing
// UTXO was deleted, or an existing UTXO was overwritten. It
// corresponds to cases where the block-to-be-disconnect never had
// all its operations applied to the UTXO set. However, as both
// writing a UTXO and deleting a UTXO are idempotent operations, the
// result is still a version of the UTXO set with the effects of
// that block undone.
}
pindexOld = pindexOld->pprev;
}
// Roll forward from the forking point to the new tip.
int nForkHeight = pindexFork ? pindexFork->nHeight : 0;
for (int nHeight = nForkHeight + 1; nHeight <= pindexNew->nHeight;
++nHeight) {
const CBlockIndex &pindex{*Assert(pindexNew->GetAncestor(nHeight))};
LogPrintf("Rolling forward %s (%i)\n", pindex.GetBlockHash().ToString(),
nHeight);
m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(
_("Replaying blocks…"),
(int)((nHeight - nForkHeight) * 100.0 /
(pindexNew->nHeight - nForkHeight)),
false);
if (!RollforwardBlock(&pindex, cache)) {
return false;
}
}
cache.SetBestBlock(pindexNew->GetBlockHash());
cache.Flush();
m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(bilingual_str{}, 100, false);
return true;
}
// May NOT be used after any connections are up as much of the peer-processing
// logic assumes a consistent block index state
void Chainstate::UnloadBlockIndex() {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
nBlockSequenceId = 1;
m_best_fork_tip = nullptr;
m_best_fork_base = nullptr;
setBlockIndexCandidates.clear();
}
bool ChainstateManager::LoadBlockIndex() {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Load block index from databases
bool needs_init = fReindex;
if (!fReindex) {
bool ret = m_blockman.LoadBlockIndexDB();
if (!ret) {
return false;
}
m_blockman.ScanAndUnlinkAlreadyPrunedFiles();
std::vector<CBlockIndex *> vSortedByHeight{
m_blockman.GetAllBlockIndices()};
std::sort(vSortedByHeight.begin(), vSortedByHeight.end(),
CBlockIndexHeightOnlyComparator());
// Find start of assumed-valid region.
int first_assumed_valid_height = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
for (const CBlockIndex *block : vSortedByHeight) {
if (block->IsAssumedValid()) {
auto chainstates = GetAll();
// If we encounter an assumed-valid block index entry, ensure
// that we have one chainstate that tolerates assumed-valid
// entries and another that does not (i.e. the background
// validation chainstate), since assumed-valid entries should
// always be pending validation by a fully-validated chainstate.
auto any_chain = [&](auto fnc) {
return std::any_of(chainstates.cbegin(), chainstates.cend(),
fnc);
};
assert(any_chain([](auto chainstate) {
return chainstate->reliesOnAssumedValid();
}));
assert(any_chain([](auto chainstate) {
return !chainstate->reliesOnAssumedValid();
}));
first_assumed_valid_height = block->nHeight;
LogPrintf("Saw first assumedvalid block at height %d (%s)\n",
first_assumed_valid_height, block->ToString());
break;
}
}
for (CBlockIndex *pindex : vSortedByHeight) {
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
return false;
}
if (pindex->IsAssumedValid() ||
(pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS) &&
(pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded() || pindex->pprev == nullptr))) {
// Fill each chainstate's block candidate set. Only add
// assumed-valid blocks to the tip candidate set if the
// chainstate is allowed to rely on assumed-valid blocks.
//
// If all setBlockIndexCandidates contained the assumed-valid
// blocks, the background chainstate's ActivateBestChain() call
// would add assumed-valid blocks to the chain (based on how
// FindMostWorkChain() works). Obviously we don't want this
// since the purpose of the background validation chain is to
// validate assumed-valid blocks.
//
// Note: This is considering all blocks whose height is greater
// or equal to the first assumed-valid block to be assumed-valid
// blocks, and excluding them from the background chainstate's
// setBlockIndexCandidates set. This does mean that some blocks
// which are not technically assumed-valid (later blocks on a
// fork beginning before the first assumed-valid block) might
// not get added to the background chainstate, but this is ok,
// because they will still be attached to the active chainstate
// if they actually contain more work.
//
// Instead of this height-based approach, an earlier attempt was
// made at detecting "holistically" whether the block index
// under consideration relied on an assumed-valid ancestor, but
// this proved to be too slow to be practical.
for (Chainstate *chainstate : GetAll()) {
if (chainstate->reliesOnAssumedValid() ||
pindex->nHeight < first_assumed_valid_height) {
chainstate->setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex);
}
}
}
if (pindex->nStatus.isInvalid() &&
(!m_best_invalid ||
pindex->nChainWork > m_best_invalid->nChainWork)) {
m_best_invalid = pindex;
}
if (pindex->nStatus.isOnParkedChain() &&
(!m_best_parked ||
pindex->nChainWork > m_best_parked->nChainWork)) {
m_best_parked = pindex;
}
if (pindex->IsValid(BlockValidity::TREE) &&
(m_best_header == nullptr ||
CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(m_best_header, pindex))) {
m_best_header = pindex;
}
}
needs_init = m_blockman.m_block_index.empty();
}
if (needs_init) {
// Everything here is for *new* reindex/DBs. Thus, though
// LoadBlockIndexDB may have set fReindex if we shut down
// mid-reindex previously, we don't check fReindex and
// instead only check it prior to LoadBlockIndexDB to set
// needs_init.
LogPrintf("Initializing databases...\n");
}
return true;
}
bool Chainstate::LoadGenesisBlock() {
LOCK(cs_main);
const CChainParams &params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
// Check whether we're already initialized by checking for genesis in
// m_blockman.m_block_index. Note that we can't use m_chain here, since it
// is set based on the coins db, not the block index db, which is the only
// thing loaded at this point.
if (m_blockman.m_block_index.count(params.GenesisBlock().GetHash())) {
return true;
}
try {
const CBlock &block = params.GenesisBlock();
FlatFilePos blockPos{
m_blockman.SaveBlockToDisk(block, 0, m_chain, nullptr)};
if (blockPos.IsNull()) {
return error("%s: writing genesis block to disk failed", __func__);
}
CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_blockman.AddToBlockIndex(block, m_chainman.m_best_header);
ReceivedBlockTransactions(block, pindex, blockPos);
} catch (const std::runtime_error &e) {
return error("%s: failed to write genesis block: %s", __func__,
e.what());
}
return true;
}
void Chainstate::LoadExternalBlockFile(
FILE *fileIn, FlatFilePos *dbp,
std::multimap<BlockHash, FlatFilePos> *blocks_with_unknown_parent,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche) {
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
// Either both should be specified (-reindex), or neither (-loadblock).
assert(!dbp == !blocks_with_unknown_parent);
int64_t nStart = GetTimeMillis();
const CChainParams &params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
int nLoaded = 0;
try {
// This takes over fileIn and calls fclose() on it in the CBufferedFile
// destructor. Make sure we have at least 2*MAX_TX_SIZE space in there
// so any transaction can fit in the buffer.
CBufferedFile blkdat(fileIn, 2 * MAX_TX_SIZE, MAX_TX_SIZE + 8, SER_DISK,
CLIENT_VERSION);
// nRewind indicates where to resume scanning in case something goes
// wrong, such as a block fails to deserialize.
uint64_t nRewind = blkdat.GetPos();
while (!blkdat.eof()) {
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
return;
}
blkdat.SetPos(nRewind);
// Start one byte further next time, in case of failure.
nRewind++;
// Remove former limit.
blkdat.SetLimit();
unsigned int nSize = 0;
try {
// Locate a header.
uint8_t buf[CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_START_SIZE];
blkdat.FindByte(std::byte(params.DiskMagic()[0]));
nRewind = blkdat.GetPos() + 1;
blkdat >> buf;
if (memcmp(buf, params.DiskMagic().data(),
CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_START_SIZE)) {
continue;
}
// Read size.
blkdat >> nSize;
if (nSize < 80) {
continue;
}
} catch (const std::exception &) {
// No valid block header found; don't complain.
// (this happens at the end of every blk.dat file)
break;
}
try {
// read block header
const uint64_t nBlockPos{blkdat.GetPos()};
if (dbp) {
dbp->nPos = nBlockPos;
}
blkdat.SetLimit(nBlockPos + nSize);
CBlockHeader header;
blkdat >> header;
const BlockHash hash{header.GetHash()};
// Skip the rest of this block (this may read from disk
// into memory); position to the marker before the next block,
// but it's still possible to rewind to the start of the
// current block (without a disk read).
nRewind = nBlockPos + nSize;
blkdat.SkipTo(nRewind);
// needs to remain available after the cs_main lock is released
// to avoid duplicate reads from disk
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock{};
{
LOCK(cs_main);
// detect out of order blocks, and store them for later
if (hash != params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock &&
!m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(header.hashPrevBlock)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::REINDEX,
"%s: Out of order block %s, parent %s not known\n",
__func__, hash.ToString(),
header.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
if (dbp && blocks_with_unknown_parent) {
blocks_with_unknown_parent->emplace(
header.hashPrevBlock, *dbp);
}
continue;
}
// process in case the block isn't known yet
const CBlockIndex *pindex =
m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash);
if (!pindex || !pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
// This block can be processed immediately; rewind to
// its start, read and deserialize it.
blkdat.SetPos(nBlockPos);
pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
blkdat >> *pblock;
nRewind = blkdat.GetPos();
BlockValidationState state;
if (AcceptBlock(pblock, state, true, dbp, nullptr,
true)) {
nLoaded++;
}
if (state.IsError()) {
break;
}
} else if (hash != params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock &&
pindex->nHeight % 1000 == 0) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::REINDEX,
"Block Import: already had block %s at height %d\n",
hash.ToString(), pindex->nHeight);
}
}
// Activate the genesis block so normal node progress can
// continue
if (hash == params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock) {
BlockValidationState state;
if (!ActivateBestChain(state, nullptr, avalanche)) {
break;
}
}
if (m_blockman.IsPruneMode() && !fReindex && pblock) {
// Must update the tip for pruning to work while importing
// with -loadblock. This is a tradeoff to conserve disk
// space at the expense of time spent updating the tip to be
// able to prune. Otherwise, ActivateBestChain won't be
// called by the import process until after all of the block
// files are loaded. ActivateBestChain can be called by
// concurrent network message processing, but that is not
// reliable for the purpose of pruning while importing.
BlockValidationState state;
if (!ActivateBestChain(state, pblock, avalanche)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::REINDEX,
"failed to activate chain (%s)\n",
state.ToString());
break;
}
}
NotifyHeaderTip(*this);
if (!blocks_with_unknown_parent) {
continue;
}
// Recursively process earlier encountered successors of this
// block
std::deque<BlockHash> queue;
queue.push_back(hash);
while (!queue.empty()) {
BlockHash head = queue.front();
queue.pop_front();
auto range = blocks_with_unknown_parent->equal_range(head);
while (range.first != range.second) {
std::multimap<BlockHash, FlatFilePos>::iterator it =
range.first;
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockrecursive =
std::make_shared<CBlock>();
if (m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(*pblockrecursive,
it->second)) {
LogPrint(
BCLog::REINDEX,
"%s: Processing out of order child %s of %s\n",
__func__, pblockrecursive->GetHash().ToString(),
head.ToString());
LOCK(cs_main);
BlockValidationState dummy;
if (AcceptBlock(pblockrecursive, dummy, true,
&it->second, nullptr, true)) {
nLoaded++;
queue.push_back(pblockrecursive->GetHash());
}
}
range.first++;
blocks_with_unknown_parent->erase(it);
NotifyHeaderTip(*this);
}
}
} catch (const std::exception &e) {
// Historical bugs added extra data to the block files that does
// not deserialize cleanly. Commonly this data is between
// readable blocks, but it does not really matter. Such data is
// not fatal to the import process. The code that reads the
// block files deals with invalid data by simply ignoring it. It
// continues to search for the next {4 byte magic message start
// bytes + 4 byte length + block} that does deserialize cleanly
// and passes all of the other block validation checks dealing
// with POW and the merkle root, etc... We merely note with this
// informational log message when unexpected data is
// encountered. We could also be experiencing a storage system
// read error, or a read of a previous bad write. These are
// possible, but less likely scenarios. We don't have enough
// information to tell a difference here. The reindex process is
// not the place to attempt to clean and/or compact the block
// files. If so desired, a studious node operator may use
// knowledge of the fact that the block files are not entirely
// pristine in order to prepare a set of pristine, and perhaps
// ordered, block files for later reindexing.
LogPrint(BCLog::REINDEX,
"%s: unexpected data at file offset 0x%x - %s. "
"continuing\n",
__func__, (nRewind - 1), e.what());
}
}
} catch (const std::runtime_error &e) {
AbortNode(std::string("System error: ") + e.what());
}
LogPrintf("Loaded %i blocks from external file in %dms\n", nLoaded,
GetTimeMillis() - nStart);
}
void Chainstate::CheckBlockIndex() {
if (!m_chainman.ShouldCheckBlockIndex()) {
return;
}
LOCK(cs_main);
// During a reindex, we read the genesis block and call CheckBlockIndex
// before ActivateBestChain, so we have the genesis block in
// m_blockman.m_block_index but no active chain. (A few of the tests when
// iterating the block tree require that m_chain has been initialized.)
if (m_chain.Height() < 0) {
assert(m_blockman.m_block_index.size() <= 1);
return;
}
// Build forward-pointing map of the entire block tree.
std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *> forward;
for (auto &[_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
forward.emplace(block_index.pprev, &block_index);
}
assert(forward.size() == m_blockman.m_block_index.size());
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator,
std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator>
rangeGenesis = forward.equal_range(nullptr);
CBlockIndex *pindex = rangeGenesis.first->second;
rangeGenesis.first++;
// There is only one index entry with parent nullptr.
assert(rangeGenesis.first == rangeGenesis.second);
// Iterate over the entire block tree, using depth-first search.
// Along the way, remember whether there are blocks on the path from genesis
// block being explored which are the first to have certain properties.
size_t nNodes = 0;
int nHeight = 0;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex which is invalid.
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstInvalid = nullptr;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex which is parked.
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstParked = nullptr;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have data available.
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstMissing = nullptr;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex for which nTx == 0.
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstNeverProcessed = nullptr;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_TREE
// (regardless of being valid or not).
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstNotTreeValid = nullptr;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS
// (regardless of being valid or not).
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = nullptr;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN
// (regardless of being valid or not).
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstNotChainValid = nullptr;
// Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS
// (regardless of being valid or not).
CBlockIndex *pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = nullptr;
while (pindex != nullptr) {
nNodes++;
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr && pindex->nStatus.hasFailed()) {
pindexFirstInvalid = pindex;
}
if (pindexFirstParked == nullptr && pindex->nStatus.isParked()) {
pindexFirstParked = pindex;
}
// Assumed-valid index entries will not have data since we haven't
// downloaded the full block yet.
if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr && !pindex->nStatus.hasData() &&
!pindex->IsAssumedValid()) {
pindexFirstMissing = pindex;
}
if (pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr && pindex->nTx == 0) {
pindexFirstNeverProcessed = pindex;
}
if (pindex->pprev != nullptr && pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr &&
pindex->nStatus.getValidity() < BlockValidity::TREE) {
pindexFirstNotTreeValid = pindex;
}
if (pindex->pprev != nullptr && !pindex->IsAssumedValid()) {
if (pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid == nullptr &&
pindex->nStatus.getValidity() < BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS) {
pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = pindex;
}
if (pindexFirstNotChainValid == nullptr &&
pindex->nStatus.getValidity() < BlockValidity::CHAIN) {
pindexFirstNotChainValid = pindex;
}
if (pindexFirstNotScriptsValid == nullptr &&
pindex->nStatus.getValidity() < BlockValidity::SCRIPTS) {
pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = pindex;
}
}
// Begin: actual consistency checks.
if (pindex->pprev == nullptr) {
// Genesis block checks.
// Genesis block's hash must match.
assert(pindex->GetBlockHash() ==
m_chainman.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock);
// The current active chain's genesis block must be this block.
assert(pindex == m_chain.Genesis());
}
if (!pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded()) {
// nSequenceId can't be set positive for blocks that aren't linked
// (negative is used for preciousblock)
assert(pindex->nSequenceId <= 0);
}
// VALID_TRANSACTIONS is equivalent to nTx > 0 for all nodes (whether or
// not pruning has occurred). HAVE_DATA is only equivalent to nTx > 0
// (or VALID_TRANSACTIONS) if no pruning has occurred.
// Unless these indexes are assumed valid and pending block download on
// a background chainstate.
if (!m_blockman.m_have_pruned && !pindex->IsAssumedValid()) {
// If we've never pruned, then HAVE_DATA should be equivalent to nTx
// > 0
assert(pindex->nStatus.hasData() == (pindex->nTx > 0));
assert(pindexFirstMissing == pindexFirstNeverProcessed);
} else if (pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
// If we have pruned, then we can only say that HAVE_DATA implies
// nTx > 0
assert(pindex->nTx > 0);
}
if (pindex->nStatus.hasUndo()) {
assert(pindex->nStatus.hasData());
}
if (pindex->IsAssumedValid()) {
// Assumed-valid blocks should have some nTx value.
assert(pindex->nTx > 0);
// Assumed-valid blocks should connect to the main chain.
assert(pindex->nStatus.getValidity() >= BlockValidity::TREE);
} else {
// Otherwise there should only be an nTx value if we have
// actually seen a block's transactions.
// This is pruning-independent.
assert((pindex->nStatus.getValidity() >=
BlockValidity::TRANSACTIONS) == (pindex->nTx > 0));
}
// All parents having had data (at some point) is equivalent to all
// parents being VALID_TRANSACTIONS, which is equivalent to
// HaveTxsDownloaded(). All parents having had data (at some point) is
// equivalent to all parents being VALID_TRANSACTIONS, which is
// equivalent to HaveTxsDownloaded().
assert((pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr) ==
(pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded()));
assert((pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid == nullptr) ==
(pindex->HaveTxsDownloaded()));
// nHeight must be consistent.
assert(pindex->nHeight == nHeight);
// For every block except the genesis block, the chainwork must be
// larger than the parent's.
assert(pindex->pprev == nullptr ||
pindex->nChainWork >= pindex->pprev->nChainWork);
// The pskip pointer must point back for all but the first 2 blocks.
assert(nHeight < 2 ||
(pindex->pskip && (pindex->pskip->nHeight < nHeight)));
// All m_blockman.m_block_index entries must at least be TREE valid
assert(pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr);
if (pindex->nStatus.getValidity() >= BlockValidity::TREE) {
// TREE valid implies all parents are TREE valid
assert(pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr);
}
if (pindex->nStatus.getValidity() >= BlockValidity::CHAIN) {
// CHAIN valid implies all parents are CHAIN valid
assert(pindexFirstNotChainValid == nullptr);
}
if (pindex->nStatus.getValidity() >= BlockValidity::SCRIPTS) {
// SCRIPTS valid implies all parents are SCRIPTS valid
assert(pindexFirstNotScriptsValid == nullptr);
}
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
// Checks for not-invalid blocks.
// The failed mask cannot be set for blocks without invalid parents.
assert(!pindex->nStatus.isInvalid());
}
if (pindexFirstParked == nullptr) {
// Checks for not-parked blocks.
// The parked mask cannot be set for blocks without parked parents.
// (i.e., hasParkedParent only if an ancestor is properly parked).
assert(!pindex->nStatus.isOnParkedChain());
}
if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(pindex, m_chain.Tip()) &&
pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr) {
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
// Don't perform this check for the background chainstate since
// its setBlockIndexCandidates shouldn't have some entries (i.e.
// those past the snapshot block) which do exist in the block
// index for the active chainstate.
if (this == &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) {
// If this block sorts at least as good as the current tip
// and is valid and we have all data for its parents, it
// must be in setBlockIndexCandidates or be parked.
if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr) {
assert(pindex->nStatus.isOnParkedChain() ||
setBlockIndexCandidates.count(pindex));
}
// m_chain.Tip() must also be there even if some data has
// been pruned.
if (pindex == m_chain.Tip()) {
assert(setBlockIndexCandidates.count(pindex));
}
}
// If some parent is missing, then it could be that this block
// was in setBlockIndexCandidates but had to be removed because
// of the missing data. In this case it must be in
// m_blocks_unlinked -- see test below.
}
} else {
// If this block sorts worse than the current tip or some ancestor's
// block has never been seen, it cannot be in
// setBlockIndexCandidates.
assert(setBlockIndexCandidates.count(pindex) == 0);
}
// Check whether this block is in m_blocks_unlinked.
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator,
std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator>
rangeUnlinked =
m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.equal_range(pindex->pprev);
bool foundInUnlinked = false;
while (rangeUnlinked.first != rangeUnlinked.second) {
assert(rangeUnlinked.first->first == pindex->pprev);
if (rangeUnlinked.first->second == pindex) {
foundInUnlinked = true;
break;
}
rangeUnlinked.first++;
}
if (pindex->pprev && pindex->nStatus.hasData() &&
pindexFirstNeverProcessed != nullptr &&
pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
// If this block has block data available, some parent was never
// received, and has no invalid parents, it must be in
// m_blocks_unlinked.
assert(foundInUnlinked);
}
if (!pindex->nStatus.hasData()) {
// Can't be in m_blocks_unlinked if we don't HAVE_DATA
assert(!foundInUnlinked);
}
if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr) {
// We aren't missing data for any parent -- cannot be in
// m_blocks_unlinked.
assert(!foundInUnlinked);
}
if (pindex->pprev && pindex->nStatus.hasData() &&
pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr &&
pindexFirstMissing != nullptr) {
// We HAVE_DATA for this block, have received data for all parents
// at some point, but we're currently missing data for some parent.
// We must have pruned.
assert(m_blockman.m_have_pruned);
// This block may have entered m_blocks_unlinked if:
// - it has a descendant that at some point had more work than the
// tip, and
// - we tried switching to that descendant but were missing
// data for some intermediate block between m_chain and the
// tip.
// So if this block is itself better than m_chain.Tip() and it
// wasn't in
// setBlockIndexCandidates, then it must be in m_blocks_unlinked.
if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(pindex, m_chain.Tip()) &&
setBlockIndexCandidates.count(pindex) == 0) {
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
assert(foundInUnlinked);
}
}
}
// Perhaps too slow
// assert(pindex->GetBlockHash() == pindex->GetBlockHeader().GetHash());
// End: actual consistency checks.
// Try descending into the first subnode.
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator,
std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator>
range = forward.equal_range(pindex);
if (range.first != range.second) {
// A subnode was found.
pindex = range.first->second;
nHeight++;
continue;
}
// This is a leaf node. Move upwards until we reach a node of which we
// have not yet visited the last child.
while (pindex) {
// We are going to either move to a parent or a sibling of pindex.
// If pindex was the first with a certain property, unset the
// corresponding variable.
if (pindex == pindexFirstInvalid) {
pindexFirstInvalid = nullptr;
}
if (pindex == pindexFirstParked) {
pindexFirstParked = nullptr;
}
if (pindex == pindexFirstMissing) {
pindexFirstMissing = nullptr;
}
if (pindex == pindexFirstNeverProcessed) {
pindexFirstNeverProcessed = nullptr;
}
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotTreeValid) {
pindexFirstNotTreeValid = nullptr;
}
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid) {
pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = nullptr;
}
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotChainValid) {
pindexFirstNotChainValid = nullptr;
}
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotScriptsValid) {
pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = nullptr;
}
// Find our parent.
CBlockIndex *pindexPar = pindex->pprev;
// Find which child we just visited.
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator,
std::multimap<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndex *>::iterator>
rangePar = forward.equal_range(pindexPar);
while (rangePar.first->second != pindex) {
// Our parent must have at least the node we're coming from as
// child.
assert(rangePar.first != rangePar.second);
rangePar.first++;
}
// Proceed to the next one.
rangePar.first++;
if (rangePar.first != rangePar.second) {
// Move to the sibling.
pindex = rangePar.first->second;
break;
} else {
// Move up further.
pindex = pindexPar;
nHeight--;
continue;
}
}
}
// Check that we actually traversed the entire map.
assert(nNodes == forward.size());
}
std::string Chainstate::ToString() {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
CBlockIndex *tip = m_chain.Tip();
return strprintf("Chainstate [%s] @ height %d (%s)",
m_from_snapshot_blockhash ? "snapshot" : "ibd",
tip ? tip->nHeight : -1,
tip ? tip->GetBlockHash().ToString() : "null");
}
bool Chainstate::ResizeCoinsCaches(size_t coinstip_size, size_t coinsdb_size) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
if (coinstip_size == m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes &&
coinsdb_size == m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes) {
// Cache sizes are unchanged, no need to continue.
return true;
}
size_t old_coinstip_size = m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes;
m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes = coinstip_size;
m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes = coinsdb_size;
CoinsDB().ResizeCache(coinsdb_size);
LogPrintf("[%s] resized coinsdb cache to %.1f MiB\n", this->ToString(),
coinsdb_size * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024));
LogPrintf("[%s] resized coinstip cache to %.1f MiB\n", this->ToString(),
coinstip_size * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024));
BlockValidationState state;
bool ret;
if (coinstip_size > old_coinstip_size) {
// Likely no need to flush if cache sizes have grown.
ret = FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED);
} else {
// Otherwise, flush state to disk and deallocate the in-memory coins
// map.
ret = FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::ALWAYS);
}
return ret;
}
//! Guess how far we are in the verification process at the given block index
//! require cs_main if pindex has not been validated yet (because the chain's
//! transaction count might be unset) This conditional lock requirement might be
//! confusing, see: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/15994
double GuessVerificationProgress(const ChainTxData &data,
const CBlockIndex *pindex) {
if (pindex == nullptr) {
return 0.0;
}
int64_t nNow = time(nullptr);
double fTxTotal;
if (pindex->GetChainTxCount() <= data.nTxCount) {
fTxTotal = data.nTxCount + (nNow - data.nTime) * data.dTxRate;
} else {
fTxTotal = pindex->GetChainTxCount() +
(nNow - pindex->GetBlockTime()) * data.dTxRate;
}
return std::min<double>(pindex->GetChainTxCount() / fTxTotal, 1.0);
}
std::optional<BlockHash> ChainstateManager::SnapshotBlockhash() const {
LOCK(::cs_main);
if (m_active_chainstate && m_active_chainstate->m_from_snapshot_blockhash) {
// If a snapshot chainstate exists, it will always be our active.
return m_active_chainstate->m_from_snapshot_blockhash;
}
return std::nullopt;
}
std::vector<Chainstate *> ChainstateManager::GetAll() {
LOCK(::cs_main);
std::vector<Chainstate *> out;
for (Chainstate *pchainstate :
{m_ibd_chainstate.get(), m_snapshot_chainstate.get()}) {
if (this->IsUsable(pchainstate)) {
out.push_back(pchainstate);
}
}
return out;
}
Chainstate &ChainstateManager::InitializeChainstate(CTxMemPool *mempool) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
assert(!m_ibd_chainstate);
assert(!m_active_chainstate);
m_ibd_chainstate = std::make_unique<Chainstate>(mempool, m_blockman, *this);
m_active_chainstate = m_ibd_chainstate.get();
return *m_active_chainstate;
}
const AssumeutxoData *ExpectedAssumeutxo(const int height,
const CChainParams &chainparams) {
const MapAssumeutxo &valid_assumeutxos_map = chainparams.Assumeutxo();
const auto assumeutxo_found = valid_assumeutxos_map.find(height);
if (assumeutxo_found != valid_assumeutxos_map.end()) {
return &assumeutxo_found->second;
}
return nullptr;
}
static bool DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(const fs::path &db_path, bool is_snapshot)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
if (is_snapshot) {
fs::path base_blockhash_path =
db_path / node::SNAPSHOT_BLOCKHASH_FILENAME;
try {
const bool existed{fs::remove(base_blockhash_path)};
if (!existed) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] snapshot chainstate dir being removed "
"lacks %s file\n",
fs::PathToString(node::SNAPSHOT_BLOCKHASH_FILENAME));
}
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error &e) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] failed to remove file %s: %s\n",
fs::PathToString(base_blockhash_path),
fsbridge::get_filesystem_error_message(e));
}
}
std::string path_str = fs::PathToString(db_path);
LogPrintf("Removing leveldb dir at %s\n", path_str);
// We have to destruct before this call leveldb::DB in order to release the
// db lock, otherwise `DestroyDB` will fail. See `leveldb::~DBImpl()`.
const bool destroyed = dbwrapper::DestroyDB(path_str, {}).ok();
if (!destroyed) {
LogPrintf("error: leveldb DestroyDB call failed on %s\n", path_str);
}
// Datadir should be removed from filesystem; otherwise initialization may
// detect it on subsequent statups and get confused.
//
// If the base_blockhash_path removal above fails in the case of snapshot
// chainstates, this will return false since leveldb won't remove a
// non-empty directory.
return destroyed && !fs::exists(db_path);
}
bool ChainstateManager::ActivateSnapshot(AutoFile &coins_file,
const SnapshotMetadata &metadata,
bool in_memory) {
BlockHash base_blockhash = metadata.m_base_blockhash;
if (this->SnapshotBlockhash()) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] can't activate a snapshot-based chainstate more "
"than once\n");
return false;
}
int64_t current_coinsdb_cache_size{0};
int64_t current_coinstip_cache_size{0};
// Cache percentages to allocate to each chainstate.
//
// These particular percentages don't matter so much since they will only be
// relevant during snapshot activation; caches are rebalanced at the
// conclusion of this function. We want to give (essentially) all available
// cache capacity to the snapshot to aid the bulk load later in this
// function.
static constexpr double IBD_CACHE_PERC = 0.01;
static constexpr double SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC = 0.99;
{
LOCK(::cs_main);
// Resize the coins caches to ensure we're not exceeding memory limits.
//
// Allocate the majority of the cache to the incoming snapshot
// chainstate, since (optimistically) getting to its tip will be the top
// priority. We'll need to call `MaybeRebalanceCaches()` once we're done
// with this function to ensure the right allocation (including the
// possibility that no snapshot was activated and that we should restore
// the active chainstate caches to their original size).
//
current_coinsdb_cache_size =
this->ActiveChainstate().m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes;
current_coinstip_cache_size =
this->ActiveChainstate().m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes;
// Temporarily resize the active coins cache to make room for the
// newly-created snapshot chain.
this->ActiveChainstate().ResizeCoinsCaches(
static_cast<size_t>(current_coinstip_cache_size * IBD_CACHE_PERC),
static_cast<size_t>(current_coinsdb_cache_size * IBD_CACHE_PERC));
}
auto snapshot_chainstate =
WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return std::make_unique<Chainstate>(
/* mempool */ nullptr, m_blockman, *this,
base_blockhash));
{
LOCK(::cs_main);
snapshot_chainstate->InitCoinsDB(
static_cast<size_t>(current_coinsdb_cache_size *
SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC),
in_memory, false, "chainstate");
snapshot_chainstate->InitCoinsCache(static_cast<size_t>(
current_coinstip_cache_size * SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC));
}
bool snapshot_ok = this->PopulateAndValidateSnapshot(*snapshot_chainstate,
coins_file, metadata);
// If not in-memory, persist the base blockhash for use during subsequent
// initialization.
if (!in_memory) {
LOCK(::cs_main);
if (!node::WriteSnapshotBaseBlockhash(*snapshot_chainstate)) {
snapshot_ok = false;
}
}
if (!snapshot_ok) {
LOCK(::cs_main);
this->MaybeRebalanceCaches();
// PopulateAndValidateSnapshot can return (in error) before the leveldb
// datadir has been created, so only attempt removal if we got that far.
if (auto snapshot_datadir = node::FindSnapshotChainstateDir()) {
// We have to destruct leveldb::DB in order to release the db lock,
// otherwise DestroyDB() (in DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk()) will fail. See
// `leveldb::~DBImpl()`. Destructing the chainstate (and so
// resetting the coinsviews object) does this.
snapshot_chainstate.reset();
bool removed =
DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(*snapshot_datadir, /*is_snapshot=*/true);
if (!removed) {
AbortNode(
strprintf("Failed to remove snapshot chainstate dir (%s). "
"Manually remove it before restarting.\n",
fs::PathToString(*snapshot_datadir)));
}
}
return false;
}
{
LOCK(::cs_main);
assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate);
m_snapshot_chainstate.swap(snapshot_chainstate);
const bool chaintip_loaded = m_snapshot_chainstate->LoadChainTip();
assert(chaintip_loaded);
m_active_chainstate = m_snapshot_chainstate.get();
LogPrintf("[snapshot] successfully activated snapshot %s\n",
base_blockhash.ToString());
LogPrintf("[snapshot] (%.2f MB)\n",
m_snapshot_chainstate->CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage() /
(1000 * 1000));
this->MaybeRebalanceCaches();
}
return true;
}
static void FlushSnapshotToDisk(CCoinsViewCache &coins_cache,
bool snapshot_loaded) {
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY_MSG_ONCE(
strprintf("%s (%.2f MB)",
snapshot_loaded ? "saving snapshot chainstate"
: "flushing coins cache",
coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000)),
BCLog::LogFlags::ALL);
coins_cache.Flush();
}
struct StopHashingException : public std::exception {
const char *what() const throw() override {
return "ComputeUTXOStats interrupted by shutdown.";
}
};
static void SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint() {
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
throw StopHashingException();
}
}
bool ChainstateManager::PopulateAndValidateSnapshot(
Chainstate &snapshot_chainstate, AutoFile &coins_file,
const SnapshotMetadata &metadata) {
// It's okay to release cs_main before we're done using `coins_cache`
// because we know that nothing else will be referencing the newly created
// snapshot_chainstate yet.
CCoinsViewCache &coins_cache =
*WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return &snapshot_chainstate.CoinsTip());
BlockHash base_blockhash = metadata.m_base_blockhash;
CBlockIndex *snapshot_start_block = WITH_LOCK(
::cs_main, return m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(base_blockhash));
if (!snapshot_start_block) {
// Needed for ComputeUTXOStats and ExpectedAssumeutxo to determine the
// height and to avoid a crash when base_blockhash.IsNull()
LogPrintf("[snapshot] Did not find snapshot start blockheader %s\n",
base_blockhash.ToString());
return false;
}
int base_height = snapshot_start_block->nHeight;
auto maybe_au_data = ExpectedAssumeutxo(base_height, GetParams());
if (!maybe_au_data) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] assumeutxo height in snapshot metadata not "
"recognized (%d) - refusing to load snapshot\n",
base_height);
return false;
}
const AssumeutxoData &au_data = *maybe_au_data;
COutPoint outpoint;
Coin coin;
const uint64_t coins_count = metadata.m_coins_count;
uint64_t coins_left = metadata.m_coins_count;
LogPrintf("[snapshot] loading coins from snapshot %s\n",
base_blockhash.ToString());
int64_t coins_processed{0};
while (coins_left > 0) {
try {
coins_file >> outpoint;
coins_file >> coin;
} catch (const std::ios_base::failure &) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot format or truncated snapshot "
"after deserializing %d coins\n",
coins_count - coins_left);
return false;
}
if (coin.GetHeight() > uint32_t(base_height) ||
// Avoid integer wrap-around in coinstats.cpp:ApplyHash
outpoint.GetN() >=
std::numeric_limits<decltype(outpoint.GetN())>::max()) {
LogPrintf(
"[snapshot] bad snapshot data after deserializing %d coins\n",
coins_count - coins_left);
return false;
}
coins_cache.EmplaceCoinInternalDANGER(std::move(outpoint),
std::move(coin));
--coins_left;
++coins_processed;
if (coins_processed % 1000000 == 0) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] %d coins loaded (%.2f%%, %.2f MB)\n",
coins_processed,
static_cast<float>(coins_processed) * 100 /
static_cast<float>(coins_count),
coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000));
}
// Batch write and flush (if we need to) every so often.
//
// If our average Coin size is roughly 41 bytes, checking every 120,000
// coins means <5MB of memory imprecision.
if (coins_processed % 120000 == 0) {
if (ShutdownRequested()) {
return false;
}
const auto snapshot_cache_state = WITH_LOCK(
::cs_main, return snapshot_chainstate.GetCoinsCacheSizeState());
if (snapshot_cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL) {
// This is a hack - we don't know what the actual best block is,
// but that doesn't matter for the purposes of flushing the
// cache here. We'll set this to its correct value
// (`base_blockhash`) below after the coins are loaded.
coins_cache.SetBestBlock(BlockHash{GetRandHash()});
// No need to acquire cs_main since this chainstate isn't being
// used yet.
FlushSnapshotToDisk(coins_cache, /*snapshot_loaded=*/false);
}
}
}
// Important that we set this. This and the coins_cache accesses above are
// sort of a layer violation, but either we reach into the innards of
// CCoinsViewCache here or we have to invert some of the Chainstate to
// embed them in a snapshot-activation-specific CCoinsViewCache bulk load
// method.
coins_cache.SetBestBlock(base_blockhash);
bool out_of_coins{false};
try {
coins_file >> outpoint;
} catch (const std::ios_base::failure &) {
// We expect an exception since we should be out of coins.
out_of_coins = true;
}
if (!out_of_coins) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot - coins left over after "
"deserializing %d coins\n",
coins_count);
return false;
}
LogPrintf("[snapshot] loaded %d (%.2f MB) coins from snapshot %s\n",
coins_count, coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000),
base_blockhash.ToString());
// No need to acquire cs_main since this chainstate isn't being used yet.
FlushSnapshotToDisk(coins_cache, /*snapshot_loaded=*/true);
assert(coins_cache.GetBestBlock() == base_blockhash);
// As above, okay to immediately release cs_main here since no other context
// knows about the snapshot_chainstate.
CCoinsViewDB *snapshot_coinsdb =
WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return &snapshot_chainstate.CoinsDB());
std::optional<CCoinsStats> maybe_stats;
try {
maybe_stats = ComputeUTXOStats(CoinStatsHashType::HASH_SERIALIZED,
snapshot_coinsdb, m_blockman,
SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint);
} catch (StopHashingException const &) {
return false;
}
if (!maybe_stats.has_value()) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] failed to generate coins stats\n");
return false;
}
// Assert that the deserialized chainstate contents match the expected
// assumeutxo value.
if (AssumeutxoHash{maybe_stats->hashSerialized} !=
au_data.hash_serialized) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot content hash: expected %s, got %s\n",
au_data.hash_serialized.ToString(),
maybe_stats->hashSerialized.ToString());
return false;
}
snapshot_chainstate.m_chain.SetTip(*snapshot_start_block);
// The remainder of this function requires modifying data protected by
// cs_main.
LOCK(::cs_main);
// Fake various pieces of CBlockIndex state:
CBlockIndex *index = nullptr;
// Don't make any modifications to the genesis block.
// This is especially important because we don't want to erroneously
// apply ASSUMED_VALID_FLAG to genesis, which would happen if we didn't
// skip it here (since it apparently isn't BlockValidity::SCRIPTS).
constexpr int AFTER_GENESIS_START{1};
for (int i = AFTER_GENESIS_START; i <= snapshot_chainstate.m_chain.Height();
++i) {
index = snapshot_chainstate.m_chain[i];
// Fake nTx so that LoadBlockIndex() loads assumed-valid CBlockIndex
// entries (among other things)
if (!index->nTx) {
index->nTx = 1;
}
// Fake nChainTx so that GuessVerificationProgress reports accurately
index->nChainTx = index->pprev->nChainTx + index->nTx;
// Mark unvalidated block index entries beneath the snapshot base block
// as assumed-valid.
if (!index->IsValid(BlockValidity::SCRIPTS)) {
// This flag will be removed once the block is fully validated by a
// background chainstate.
index->nStatus = index->nStatus.withAssumedValid();
}
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(index);
// Changes to the block index will be flushed to disk after this call
// returns in `ActivateSnapshot()`, when `MaybeRebalanceCaches()` is
// called, since we've added a snapshot chainstate and therefore will
// have to downsize the IBD chainstate, which will result in a call to
// `FlushStateToDisk(ALWAYS)`.
}
assert(index);
index->nChainTx = au_data.nChainTx;
snapshot_chainstate.setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(snapshot_start_block);
LogPrintf("[snapshot] validated snapshot (%.2f MB)\n",
coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000));
return true;
}
// Currently, this function holds cs_main for its duration, which could be for
// multiple minutes due to the ComputeUTXOStats call. This hold is necessary
// because we need to avoid advancing the background validation chainstate
// farther than the snapshot base block - and this function is also invoked
// from within ConnectTip, i.e. from within ActivateBestChain, so cs_main is
// held anyway.
//
// Eventually (TODO), we could somehow separate this function's runtime from
// maintenance of the active chain, but that will either require
//
// (i) setting `m_disabled` immediately and ensuring all chainstate accesses go
// through IsUsable() checks, or
//
// (ii) giving each chainstate its own lock instead of using cs_main for
// everything.
SnapshotCompletionResult ChainstateManager::MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation(
std::function<void(bilingual_str)> shutdown_fnc) {
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
if (m_ibd_chainstate.get() == &this->ActiveChainstate() ||
!this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get()) ||
!this->IsUsable(m_ibd_chainstate.get()) ||
!m_ibd_chainstate->m_chain.Tip()) {
// Nothing to do - this function only applies to the background
// validation chainstate.
return SnapshotCompletionResult::SKIPPED;
}
const int snapshot_tip_height = this->ActiveHeight();
const int snapshot_base_height = *Assert(this->GetSnapshotBaseHeight());
const CBlockIndex &index_new = *Assert(m_ibd_chainstate->m_chain.Tip());
if (index_new.nHeight < snapshot_base_height) {
// Background IBD not complete yet.
return SnapshotCompletionResult::SKIPPED;
}
assert(SnapshotBlockhash());
BlockHash snapshot_blockhash = *Assert(SnapshotBlockhash());
auto handle_invalid_snapshot = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
bilingual_str user_error = strprintf(
_("%s failed to validate the -assumeutxo snapshot state. "
"This indicates a hardware problem, or a bug in the software, or "
"a bad software modification that allowed an invalid snapshot to "
"be loaded. As a result of this, the node will shut down and "
"stop using any state that was built on the snapshot, resetting "
"the chain height from %d to %d. On the next restart, the node "
"will resume syncing from %d without using any snapshot data. "
"Please report this incident to %s, including how you obtained "
"the snapshot. The invalid snapshot chainstate will be left on "
"disk in case it is helpful in diagnosing the issue that caused "
"this error."),
PACKAGE_NAME, snapshot_tip_height, snapshot_base_height,
snapshot_base_height, PACKAGE_BUGREPORT);
LogPrintf("[snapshot] !!! %s\n", user_error.original);
LogPrintf("[snapshot] deleting snapshot, reverting to validated chain, "
"and stopping node\n");
m_active_chainstate = m_ibd_chainstate.get();
m_snapshot_chainstate->m_disabled = true;
assert(!this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get()));
assert(this->IsUsable(m_ibd_chainstate.get()));
auto rename_result = m_snapshot_chainstate->InvalidateCoinsDBOnDisk();
if (!rename_result) {
user_error = strprintf(Untranslated("%s\n%s"), user_error,
util::ErrorString(rename_result));
}
shutdown_fnc(user_error);
};
if (index_new.GetBlockHash() != snapshot_blockhash) {
LogPrintf(
"[snapshot] supposed base block %s does not match the "
"snapshot base block %s (height %d). Snapshot is not valid.\n",
index_new.ToString(), snapshot_blockhash.ToString(),
snapshot_base_height);
handle_invalid_snapshot();
return SnapshotCompletionResult::BASE_BLOCKHASH_MISMATCH;
}
assert(index_new.nHeight == snapshot_base_height);
int curr_height = m_ibd_chainstate->m_chain.Height();
assert(snapshot_base_height == curr_height);
assert(snapshot_base_height == index_new.nHeight);
assert(this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get()));
assert(this->GetAll().size() == 2);
CCoinsViewDB &ibd_coins_db = m_ibd_chainstate->CoinsDB();
m_ibd_chainstate->ForceFlushStateToDisk();
auto maybe_au_data = ExpectedAssumeutxo(curr_height, GetParams());
if (!maybe_au_data) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] assumeutxo data not found for height "
"(%d) - refusing to validate snapshot\n",
curr_height);
handle_invalid_snapshot();
return SnapshotCompletionResult::MISSING_CHAINPARAMS;
}
const AssumeutxoData &au_data = *maybe_au_data;
std::optional<CCoinsStats> maybe_ibd_stats;
LogPrintf(
"[snapshot] computing UTXO stats for background chainstate to validate "
"snapshot - this could take a few minutes\n");
try {
maybe_ibd_stats =
ComputeUTXOStats(CoinStatsHashType::HASH_SERIALIZED, &ibd_coins_db,
m_blockman, SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint);
} catch (StopHashingException const &) {
return SnapshotCompletionResult::STATS_FAILED;
}
if (!maybe_ibd_stats) {
LogPrintf(
"[snapshot] failed to generate stats for validation coins db\n");
// While this isn't a problem with the snapshot per se, this condition
// prevents us from validating the snapshot, so we should shut down and
// let the user handle the issue manually.
handle_invalid_snapshot();
return SnapshotCompletionResult::STATS_FAILED;
}
const auto &ibd_stats = *maybe_ibd_stats;
// Compare the background validation chainstate's UTXO set hash against the
// hard-coded assumeutxo hash we expect.
//
// TODO: For belt-and-suspenders, we could cache the UTXO set
// hash for the snapshot when it's loaded in its chainstate's leveldb. We
// could then reference that here for an additional check.
if (AssumeutxoHash{ibd_stats.hashSerialized} != au_data.hash_serialized) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] hash mismatch: actual=%s, expected=%s\n",
ibd_stats.hashSerialized.ToString(),
au_data.hash_serialized.ToString());
handle_invalid_snapshot();
return SnapshotCompletionResult::HASH_MISMATCH;
}
LogPrintf("[snapshot] snapshot beginning at %s has been fully validated\n",
snapshot_blockhash.ToString());
m_ibd_chainstate->m_disabled = true;
this->MaybeRebalanceCaches();
return SnapshotCompletionResult::SUCCESS;
}
Chainstate &ChainstateManager::ActiveChainstate() const {
LOCK(::cs_main);
assert(m_active_chainstate);
return *m_active_chainstate;
}
bool ChainstateManager::IsSnapshotActive() const {
LOCK(::cs_main);
return m_snapshot_chainstate &&
m_active_chainstate == m_snapshot_chainstate.get();
}
void ChainstateManager::MaybeRebalanceCaches() {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
bool ibd_usable = this->IsUsable(m_ibd_chainstate.get());
bool snapshot_usable = this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get());
assert(ibd_usable || snapshot_usable);
if (ibd_usable && !snapshot_usable) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] allocating all cache to the IBD chainstate\n");
// Allocate everything to the IBD chainstate.
m_ibd_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache,
m_total_coinsdb_cache);
} else if (snapshot_usable && !ibd_usable) {
// If background validation has completed and snapshot is our active
// chain...
LogPrintf(
"[snapshot] allocating all cache to the snapshot chainstate\n");
// Allocate everything to the snapshot chainstate.
m_snapshot_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache,
m_total_coinsdb_cache);
} else if (ibd_usable && snapshot_usable) {
// If both chainstates exist, determine who needs more cache based on
// IBD status.
//
// Note: shrink caches first so that we don't inadvertently overwhelm
// available memory.
if (m_snapshot_chainstate->IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
m_ibd_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.05,
m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.05);
m_snapshot_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(
m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.95, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.95);
} else {
m_snapshot_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(
m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.05, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.05);
m_ibd_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.95,
m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.95);
}
}
}
void ChainstateManager::ResetChainstates() {
m_ibd_chainstate.reset();
m_snapshot_chainstate.reset();
m_active_chainstate = nullptr;
}
/**
* Apply default chain params to nullopt members.
* This helps to avoid coding errors around the accidental use of the compare
* operators that accept nullopt, thus ignoring the intended default value.
*/
static ChainstateManager::Options &&Flatten(ChainstateManager::Options &&opts) {
if (!opts.check_block_index.has_value()) {
opts.check_block_index =
opts.config.GetChainParams().DefaultConsistencyChecks();
}
if (!opts.minimum_chain_work.has_value()) {
opts.minimum_chain_work = UintToArith256(
opts.config.GetChainParams().GetConsensus().nMinimumChainWork);
}
if (!opts.assumed_valid_block.has_value()) {
opts.assumed_valid_block =
opts.config.GetChainParams().GetConsensus().defaultAssumeValid;
}
Assert(opts.adjusted_time_callback);
return std::move(opts);
}
ChainstateManager::ChainstateManager(
Options options, node::BlockManager::Options blockman_options)
: m_options{Flatten(std::move(options))}, m_blockman{std::move(
blockman_options)} {}
bool ChainstateManager::DetectSnapshotChainstate(CTxMemPool *mempool) {
assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate);
std::optional<fs::path> path = node::FindSnapshotChainstateDir();
if (!path) {
return false;
}
std::optional<BlockHash> base_blockhash =
node::ReadSnapshotBaseBlockhash(*path);
if (!base_blockhash) {
return false;
}
LogPrintf("[snapshot] detected active snapshot chainstate (%s) - loading\n",
fs::PathToString(*path));
this->ActivateExistingSnapshot(mempool, *base_blockhash);
return true;
}
Chainstate &
ChainstateManager::ActivateExistingSnapshot(CTxMemPool *mempool,
BlockHash base_blockhash) {
assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate);
m_snapshot_chainstate = std::make_unique<Chainstate>(mempool, m_blockman,
*this, base_blockhash);
LogPrintf("[snapshot] switching active chainstate to %s\n",
m_snapshot_chainstate->ToString());
m_active_chainstate = m_snapshot_chainstate.get();
return *m_snapshot_chainstate;
}
util::Result<void> Chainstate::InvalidateCoinsDBOnDisk() {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
// Should never be called on a non-snapshot chainstate.
assert(m_from_snapshot_blockhash);
auto storage_path_maybe = this->CoinsDB().StoragePath();
// Should never be called with a non-existent storage path.
assert(storage_path_maybe);
fs::path snapshot_datadir = *storage_path_maybe;
// Coins views no longer usable.
m_coins_views.reset();
auto invalid_path = snapshot_datadir + "_INVALID";
std::string dbpath = fs::PathToString(snapshot_datadir);
std::string target = fs::PathToString(invalid_path);
LogPrintf("[snapshot] renaming snapshot datadir %s to %s\n", dbpath,
target);
// The invalid snapshot datadir is simply moved and not deleted because we
// may want to do forensics later during issue investigation. The user is
// instructed accordingly in MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation().
try {
fs::rename(snapshot_datadir, invalid_path);
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error &e) {
auto src_str = fs::PathToString(snapshot_datadir);
auto dest_str = fs::PathToString(invalid_path);
LogPrintf("%s: error renaming file '%s' -> '%s': %s\n", __func__,
src_str, dest_str, e.what());
return util::Error{strprintf(_("Rename of '%s' -> '%s' failed. "
"You should resolve this by manually "
"moving or deleting the invalid "
"snapshot directory %s, otherwise you "
"will encounter the same error again "
"on the next startup."),
src_str, dest_str, src_str)};
}
return {};
}
const CBlockIndex *ChainstateManager::GetSnapshotBaseBlock() const {
const auto blockhash_op = this->SnapshotBlockhash();
if (!blockhash_op) {
return nullptr;
}
return Assert(m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(*blockhash_op));
}
std::optional<int> ChainstateManager::GetSnapshotBaseHeight() const {
const CBlockIndex *base = this->GetSnapshotBaseBlock();
return base ? std::make_optional(base->nHeight) : std::nullopt;
}
bool ChainstateManager::ValidatedSnapshotCleanup() {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
auto get_storage_path = [](auto &chainstate) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(
::cs_main) -> std::optional<fs::path> {
if (!(chainstate && chainstate->HasCoinsViews())) {
return {};
}
return chainstate->CoinsDB().StoragePath();
};
std::optional<fs::path> ibd_chainstate_path_maybe =
get_storage_path(m_ibd_chainstate);
std::optional<fs::path> snapshot_chainstate_path_maybe =
get_storage_path(m_snapshot_chainstate);
if (!this->IsSnapshotValidated()) {
// No need to clean up.
return false;
}
// If either path doesn't exist, that means at least one of the chainstates
// is in-memory, in which case we can't do on-disk cleanup. You'd better be
// in a unittest!
if (!ibd_chainstate_path_maybe || !snapshot_chainstate_path_maybe) {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] snapshot chainstate cleanup cannot happen with "
"in-memory chainstates. You are testing, right?\n");
return false;
}
const auto &snapshot_chainstate_path = *snapshot_chainstate_path_maybe;
const auto &ibd_chainstate_path = *ibd_chainstate_path_maybe;
// Since we're going to be moving around the underlying leveldb filesystem
// content for each chainstate, make sure that the chainstates (and their
// constituent CoinsViews members) have been destructed first.
//
// The caller of this method will be responsible for reinitializing
// chainstates if they want to continue operation.
this->ResetChainstates();
// No chainstates should be considered usable.
assert(this->GetAll().size() == 0);
LogPrintf("[snapshot] deleting background chainstate directory (now "
"unnecessary) (%s)\n",
fs::PathToString(ibd_chainstate_path));
fs::path tmp_old{ibd_chainstate_path + "_todelete"};
auto rename_failed_abort = [](fs::path p_old, fs::path p_new,
const fs::filesystem_error &err) {
LogPrintf("Error renaming file (%s): %s\n", fs::PathToString(p_old),
err.what());
AbortNode(strprintf(
"Rename of '%s' -> '%s' failed. "
"Cannot clean up the background chainstate leveldb directory.",
fs::PathToString(p_old), fs::PathToString(p_new)));
};
try {
fs::rename(ibd_chainstate_path, tmp_old);
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error &e) {
rename_failed_abort(ibd_chainstate_path, tmp_old, e);
throw;
}
LogPrintf("[snapshot] moving snapshot chainstate (%s) to "
"default chainstate directory (%s)\n",
fs::PathToString(snapshot_chainstate_path),
fs::PathToString(ibd_chainstate_path));
try {
fs::rename(snapshot_chainstate_path, ibd_chainstate_path);
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error &e) {
rename_failed_abort(snapshot_chainstate_path, ibd_chainstate_path, e);
throw;
}
if (!DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(tmp_old, /*is_snapshot=*/false)) {
// No need to AbortNode because once the unneeded bg chainstate data is
// moved, it will not interfere with subsequent initialization.
LogPrintf("Deletion of %s failed. Please remove it manually, as the "
"directory is now unnecessary.\n",
fs::PathToString(tmp_old));
} else {
LogPrintf("[snapshot] deleted background chainstate directory (%s)\n",
fs::PathToString(ibd_chainstate_path));
}
return true;
}
diff --git a/src/validation.h b/src/validation.h
index 2beefc7e8..2b0c1dd8f 100644
--- a/src/validation.h
+++ b/src/validation.h
@@ -1,1581 +1,1581 @@
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
// Copyright (c) 2009-2019 The Bitcoin Core developers
// Copyright (c) 2017-2020 The Bitcoin developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#ifndef BITCOIN_VALIDATION_H
#define BITCOIN_VALIDATION_H
#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H)
#include <config/bitcoin-config.h>
#endif
#include <arith_uint256.h>
#include <attributes.h>
#include <blockfileinfo.h>
#include <blockindexcomparators.h>
#include <chain.h>
#include <common/bloom.h>
#include <config.h>
#include <consensus/amount.h>
#include <consensus/consensus.h>
#include <deploymentstatus.h>
#include <disconnectresult.h>
#include <flatfile.h>
#include <kernel/chainparams.h>
#include <kernel/chainstatemanager_opts.h>
#include <kernel/cs_main.h>
#include <node/blockstorage.h>
#include <policy/packages.h>
#include <script/script_error.h>
#include <script/script_metrics.h>
#include <shutdown.h>
#include <sync.h>
#include <txdb.h>
#include <txmempool.h> // For CTxMemPool::cs
#include <uint256.h>
#include <util/check.h>
#include <util/fs.h>
#include <util/result.h>
#include <util/translation.h>
#include <atomic>
#include <cstdint>
#include <map>
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <thread>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
class BlockPolicyValidationState;
class CChainParams;
class Chainstate;
class ChainstateManager;
class CScriptCheck;
class CTxMemPool;
class CTxUndo;
class DisconnectedBlockTransactions;
struct ChainTxData;
struct FlatFilePos;
struct PrecomputedTransactionData;
struct LockPoints;
struct AssumeutxoData;
namespace node {
class SnapshotMetadata;
} // namespace node
namespace Consensus {
struct Params;
} // namespace Consensus
namespace avalanche {
class Processor;
} // namespace avalanche
#define MIN_TRANSACTION_SIZE \
(::GetSerializeSize(CTransaction(), PROTOCOL_VERSION))
/** Maximum number of dedicated script-checking threads allowed */
static const int MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS = 15;
/** -par default (number of script-checking threads, 0 = auto) */
static const int DEFAULT_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS = 0;
static const bool DEFAULT_PEERBLOOMFILTERS = true;
/** Default for -stopatheight */
static const int DEFAULT_STOPATHEIGHT = 0;
/**
* Block files containing a block-height within MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP of
* ActiveChain().Tip() will not be pruned.
*/
static const unsigned int MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP = 288;
static const signed int DEFAULT_CHECKBLOCKS = 6;
static constexpr int DEFAULT_CHECKLEVEL{3};
/**
* Require that user allocate at least 550 MiB for block & undo files
* (blk???.dat and rev???.dat)
* At 1MB per block, 288 blocks = 288MB.
* Add 15% for Undo data = 331MB
* Add 20% for Orphan block rate = 397MB
* We want the low water mark after pruning to be at least 397 MB and since we
* prune in full block file chunks, we need the high water mark which triggers
* the prune to be one 128MB block file + added 15% undo data = 147MB greater
* for a total of 545MB
* Setting the target to >= 550 MiB will make it likely we can respect the
* target.
*/
static const uint64_t MIN_DISK_SPACE_FOR_BLOCK_FILES = 550 * 1024 * 1024;
/** Current sync state passed to tip changed callbacks. */
enum class SynchronizationState { INIT_REINDEX, INIT_DOWNLOAD, POST_INIT };
extern GlobalMutex g_best_block_mutex;
extern std::condition_variable g_best_block_cv;
/** Used to notify getblocktemplate RPC of new tips. */
extern const CBlockIndex *g_best_block;
/** Documentation for argument 'checklevel'. */
extern const std::vector<std::string> CHECKLEVEL_DOC;
class BlockValidationOptions {
private:
uint64_t excessiveBlockSize;
bool checkPoW : 1;
bool checkMerkleRoot : 1;
public:
// Do full validation by default
explicit BlockValidationOptions(const Config &config);
explicit BlockValidationOptions(uint64_t _excessiveBlockSize,
bool _checkPow = true,
bool _checkMerkleRoot = true)
: excessiveBlockSize(_excessiveBlockSize), checkPoW(_checkPow),
checkMerkleRoot(_checkMerkleRoot) {}
BlockValidationOptions withCheckPoW(bool _checkPoW = true) const {
BlockValidationOptions ret = *this;
ret.checkPoW = _checkPoW;
return ret;
}
BlockValidationOptions
withCheckMerkleRoot(bool _checkMerkleRoot = true) const {
BlockValidationOptions ret = *this;
ret.checkMerkleRoot = _checkMerkleRoot;
return ret;
}
bool shouldValidatePoW() const { return checkPoW; }
bool shouldValidateMerkleRoot() const { return checkMerkleRoot; }
uint64_t getExcessiveBlockSize() const { return excessiveBlockSize; }
};
/**
* Run instances of script checking worker threads
*/
void StartScriptCheckWorkerThreads(int threads_num);
/**
* Stop all of the script checking worker threads
*/
void StopScriptCheckWorkerThreads();
Amount GetBlockSubsidy(int nHeight, const Consensus::Params &consensusParams);
bool AbortNode(BlockValidationState &state, const std::string &strMessage,
const bilingual_str &userMessage = bilingual_str{});
/**
* Guess verification progress (as a fraction between 0.0=genesis and
* 1.0=current tip).
*/
double GuessVerificationProgress(const ChainTxData &data,
const CBlockIndex *pindex);
/** Prune block files up to a given height */
void PruneBlockFilesManual(Chainstate &active_chainstate,
int nManualPruneHeight);
// clang-format off
/**
* Validation result for a transaction evaluated by MemPoolAccept (single or
* package).
* Here are the expected fields and properties of a result depending on its
* ResultType, applicable to results returned from package evaluation:
*+--------------------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+---------------+
*| Field or property | VALID | INVALID | MEMPOOL_ENTRY |
*| | |-------------------------------------------| |
*| | | TX_PACKAGE_RECONSIDERABLE | Other | |
*+--------------------------+-----------+---------------------------+---------------+---------------+
*| txid in mempool? | yes | no | no* | yes |
*| m_state | IsValid() | IsInvalid() | IsInvalid() | IsValid() |
*| m_replaced_transactions | yes | no | no | no |
*| m_vsize | yes | no | no | yes |
*| m_base_fees | yes | no | no | yes |
*| m_effective_feerate | yes | yes | no | no |
*| m_txids_fee_calculations | yes | yes | no | no |
*+--------------------------+-----------+---------------------------+---------------+---------------+
* (*) Individual transaction acceptance doesn't return MEMPOOL_ENTRY. It
* returns INVALID, with the error txn-already-in-mempool. In this case, the
- * txid may be in the mempool for a TX_CONFLICT.
+ * txid may be in the mempool for a tx conflict (TX_AVALANCHE_RECONSIDERABLE).
*/
// clang-format on
struct MempoolAcceptResult {
/** Used to indicate the results of mempool validation. */
enum class ResultType {
//! Fully validated, valid.
VALID,
//! Invalid.
INVALID,
//! Valid, transaction was already in the mempool.
MEMPOOL_ENTRY,
};
/** Result type. Present in all MempoolAcceptResults. */
const ResultType m_result_type;
/** Contains information about why the transaction failed. */
const TxValidationState m_state;
/**
* Virtual size as used by the mempool, calculated using serialized size
* and sigchecks.
*/
const std::optional<int64_t> m_vsize;
/** Raw base fees in satoshis. */
const std::optional<Amount> m_base_fees;
/**
* The feerate at which this transaction was considered. This includes any
* fee delta added using prioritisetransaction (i.e. modified fees). If this
* transaction was submitted as a package, this is the package feerate,
* which may also include its descendants and/or ancestors
* (see m_txids_fee_calculations below).
*/
const std::optional<CFeeRate> m_effective_feerate;
/**
* Contains the txids of the transactions used for fee-related checks.
* Includes this transaction's txid and may include others if this
* transaction was validated as part of a package. This is not necessarily
* equivalent to the list of transactions passed to ProcessNewPackage().
*/
const std::optional<std::vector<TxId>> m_txids_fee_calculations;
static MempoolAcceptResult Failure(TxValidationState state) {
return MempoolAcceptResult(state);
}
static MempoolAcceptResult
FeeFailure(TxValidationState state, CFeeRate effective_feerate,
const std::vector<TxId> &txids_fee_calculations) {
return MempoolAcceptResult(state, effective_feerate,
txids_fee_calculations);
}
/** Constructor for success case */
static MempoolAcceptResult
Success(int64_t vsize, Amount fees, CFeeRate effective_feerate,
const std::vector<TxId> &txids_fee_calculations) {
return MempoolAcceptResult(ResultType::VALID, vsize, fees,
effective_feerate, txids_fee_calculations);
}
/**
* Constructor for already-in-mempool case. It wouldn't replace any
* transactions.
*/
static MempoolAcceptResult MempoolTx(int64_t vsize, Amount fees) {
return MempoolAcceptResult(vsize, fees);
}
// Private constructors. Use static methods MempoolAcceptResult::Success,
// etc. to construct.
private:
/** Constructor for failure case */
explicit MempoolAcceptResult(TxValidationState state)
: m_result_type(ResultType::INVALID), m_state(state),
m_base_fees(std::nullopt) {
// Can be invalid or error
Assume(!state.IsValid());
}
/** Generic constructor for success cases */
explicit MempoolAcceptResult(
ResultType result_type, int64_t vsize, Amount fees,
CFeeRate effective_feerate,
const std::vector<TxId> &txids_fee_calculations)
: m_result_type(result_type), m_vsize{vsize}, m_base_fees(fees),
m_effective_feerate(effective_feerate),
m_txids_fee_calculations(txids_fee_calculations) {}
/** Constructor for fee-related failure case */
explicit MempoolAcceptResult(
TxValidationState state, CFeeRate effective_feerate,
const std::vector<TxId> &txids_fee_calculations)
: m_result_type(ResultType::INVALID), m_state(state),
m_effective_feerate(effective_feerate),
m_txids_fee_calculations(txids_fee_calculations) {}
/** Constructor for already-in-mempool case. */
explicit MempoolAcceptResult(int64_t vsize, Amount fees)
: m_result_type(ResultType::MEMPOOL_ENTRY), m_vsize{vsize},
m_base_fees(fees) {}
};
/**
* Validation result for package mempool acceptance.
*/
struct PackageMempoolAcceptResult {
PackageValidationState m_state;
/**
* Map from txid to finished MempoolAcceptResults. The client is
* responsible for keeping track of the transaction objects themselves.
* If a result is not present, it means validation was unfinished for that
* transaction. If there was a package-wide error (see result in m_state),
* m_tx_results will be empty.
*/
std::map<TxId, MempoolAcceptResult> m_tx_results;
explicit PackageMempoolAcceptResult(
PackageValidationState state,
std::map<TxId, MempoolAcceptResult> &&results)
: m_state{state}, m_tx_results(std::move(results)) {}
/**
* Constructor to create a PackageMempoolAcceptResult from a
* MempoolAcceptResult
*/
explicit PackageMempoolAcceptResult(const TxId &txid,
const MempoolAcceptResult &result)
: m_tx_results{{txid, result}} {}
};
/**
* Try to add a transaction to the mempool. This is an internal function and is
* exposed only for testing. Client code should use
* ChainstateManager::ProcessTransaction()
*
* @param[in] active_chainstate Reference to the active chainstate.
* @param[in] tx The transaction to submit for mempool
* acceptance.
* @param[in] accept_time The timestamp for adding the transaction to
* the mempool.
* It is also used to determine when the entry
* expires.
* @param[in] bypass_limits When true, don't enforce mempool fee and
* capacity limits.
* @param[in] test_accept When true, run validation checks but don't
* submit to mempool.
* @param[in] heightOverride Override the block height of the transaction.
* Used only upon reorg.
*
* @returns a MempoolAcceptResult indicating whether the transaction was
* accepted/rejected with reason.
*/
MempoolAcceptResult
AcceptToMemoryPool(Chainstate &active_chainstate, const CTransactionRef &tx,
int64_t accept_time, bool bypass_limits,
bool test_accept = false, unsigned int heightOverride = 0)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Validate (and maybe submit) a package to the mempool.
* See doc/policy/packages.md for full detailson package validation rules.
*
* @param[in] test_accept When true, run validation checks but don't
* submit to mempool.
* @returns a PackageMempoolAcceptResult which includes a MempoolAcceptResult
* for each transaction. If a transaction fails, validation will exit early
* and some results may be missing. It is also possible for the package to
* be partially submitted.
*/
PackageMempoolAcceptResult
ProcessNewPackage(Chainstate &active_chainstate, CTxMemPool &pool,
const Package &txns, bool test_accept)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Simple class for regulating resource usage during CheckInputScripts (and
* CScriptCheck), atomic so as to be compatible with parallel validation.
*/
class CheckInputsLimiter {
protected:
std::atomic<int64_t> remaining;
public:
explicit CheckInputsLimiter(int64_t limit) : remaining(limit) {}
bool consume_and_check(int consumed) {
auto newvalue = (remaining -= consumed);
return newvalue >= 0;
}
bool check() { return remaining >= 0; }
};
class TxSigCheckLimiter : public CheckInputsLimiter {
public:
TxSigCheckLimiter() : CheckInputsLimiter(MAX_TX_SIGCHECKS) {}
// Let's make this bad boy copiable.
TxSigCheckLimiter(const TxSigCheckLimiter &rhs)
: CheckInputsLimiter(rhs.remaining.load()) {}
TxSigCheckLimiter &operator=(const TxSigCheckLimiter &rhs) {
remaining = rhs.remaining.load();
return *this;
}
static TxSigCheckLimiter getDisabled() {
TxSigCheckLimiter txLimiter;
// Historically, there has not been a transaction with more than 20k sig
// checks on testnet or mainnet, so this effectively disable sigchecks.
txLimiter.remaining = 20000;
return txLimiter;
}
};
/**
* Check whether all of this transaction's input scripts succeed.
*
* This involves ECDSA signature checks so can be computationally intensive.
* This function should only be called after the cheap sanity checks in
* CheckTxInputs passed.
*
* If pvChecks is not nullptr, script checks are pushed onto it instead of being
* performed inline. Any script checks which are not necessary (eg due to script
* execution cache hits) are, obviously, not pushed onto pvChecks/run.
*
* Upon success nSigChecksOut will be filled in with either:
* - correct total for all inputs, or,
* - 0, in the case when checks were pushed onto pvChecks (i.e., a cache miss
* with pvChecks non-null), in which case the total can be found by executing
* pvChecks and adding the results.
*
* Setting sigCacheStore/scriptCacheStore to false will remove elements from the
* corresponding cache which are matched. This is useful for checking blocks
* where we will likely never need the cache entry again.
*
* pLimitSigChecks can be passed to limit the sigchecks count either in parallel
* or serial validation. With pvChecks null (serial validation), breaking the
* pLimitSigChecks limit will abort evaluation early and return false. With
* pvChecks not-null (parallel validation): the cached nSigChecks may itself
* break the limit in which case false is returned, OR, each entry in the
* returned pvChecks must be executed exactly once in order to probe the limit
* accurately.
*/
bool CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction &tx, TxValidationState &state,
const CCoinsViewCache &view, const uint32_t flags,
bool sigCacheStore, bool scriptCacheStore,
const PrecomputedTransactionData &txdata,
int &nSigChecksOut, TxSigCheckLimiter &txLimitSigChecks,
CheckInputsLimiter *pBlockLimitSigChecks,
std::vector<CScriptCheck> *pvChecks)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Handy shortcut to full fledged CheckInputScripts call.
*/
static inline bool
CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction &tx, TxValidationState &state,
const CCoinsViewCache &view, const uint32_t flags,
bool sigCacheStore, bool scriptCacheStore,
const PrecomputedTransactionData &txdata, int &nSigChecksOut)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) {
TxSigCheckLimiter nSigChecksTxLimiter;
return CheckInputScripts(tx, state, view, flags, sigCacheStore,
scriptCacheStore, txdata, nSigChecksOut,
nSigChecksTxLimiter, nullptr, nullptr);
}
/**
* Mark all the coins corresponding to a given transaction inputs as spent.
*/
void SpendCoins(CCoinsViewCache &view, const CTransaction &tx, CTxUndo &txundo,
int nHeight);
/**
* Apply the effects of this transaction on the UTXO set represented by view.
*/
void UpdateCoins(CCoinsViewCache &view, const CTransaction &tx, CTxUndo &txundo,
int nHeight);
/**
* Calculate LockPoints required to check if transaction will be BIP68 final in
* the next block to be created on top of tip.
*
* @param[in] tip Chain tip for which tx sequence locks are
* calculated. For example, the tip of the current active chain.
* @param[in] coins_view Any CCoinsView that provides access to the
* relevant coins for checking sequence locks. For example, it can be a
* CCoinsViewCache that isn't connected to anything but contains all the
* relevant coins, or a CCoinsViewMemPool that is connected to the mempool
* and chainstate UTXO set. In the latter case, the caller is responsible
* for holding the appropriate locks to ensure that calls to GetCoin()
* return correct coins.
* @param[in] tx The transaction being evaluated.
*
* @returns The resulting height and time calculated and the hash of the block
* needed for calculation, or std::nullopt if there is an error.
*/
std::optional<LockPoints> CalculateLockPointsAtTip(CBlockIndex *tip,
const CCoinsView &coins_view,
const CTransaction &tx);
/**
* Check if transaction will be BIP68 final in the next block to be created on
* top of tip.
* @param[in] tip Chain tip to check tx sequence locks against.
* For example, the tip of the current active chain.
* @param[in] lock_points LockPoints containing the height and time at
* which this transaction is final.
* Simulates calling SequenceLocks() with data from the tip passed in.
*/
bool CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(CBlockIndex *tip, const LockPoints &lock_points);
/**
* Closure representing one script verification.
* Note that this stores references to the spending transaction.
*
* Note that if pLimitSigChecks is passed, then failure does not imply that
* scripts have failed.
*/
class CScriptCheck {
private:
CTxOut m_tx_out;
const CTransaction *ptxTo;
unsigned int nIn;
uint32_t nFlags;
bool cacheStore;
ScriptError error{ScriptError::UNKNOWN};
ScriptExecutionMetrics metrics;
PrecomputedTransactionData txdata;
TxSigCheckLimiter *pTxLimitSigChecks;
CheckInputsLimiter *pBlockLimitSigChecks;
public:
CScriptCheck(const CTxOut &outIn, const CTransaction &txToIn,
unsigned int nInIn, uint32_t nFlagsIn, bool cacheIn,
const PrecomputedTransactionData &txdataIn,
TxSigCheckLimiter *pTxLimitSigChecksIn = nullptr,
CheckInputsLimiter *pBlockLimitSigChecksIn = nullptr)
: m_tx_out(outIn), ptxTo(&txToIn), nIn(nInIn), nFlags(nFlagsIn),
cacheStore(cacheIn), txdata(txdataIn),
pTxLimitSigChecks(pTxLimitSigChecksIn),
pBlockLimitSigChecks(pBlockLimitSigChecksIn) {}
CScriptCheck(const CScriptCheck &) = delete;
CScriptCheck &operator=(const CScriptCheck &) = delete;
CScriptCheck(CScriptCheck &&) = default;
CScriptCheck &operator=(CScriptCheck &&) = default;
bool operator()();
ScriptError GetScriptError() const { return error; }
ScriptExecutionMetrics GetScriptExecutionMetrics() const { return metrics; }
};
/** Functions for validating blocks and updating the block tree */
/**
* Context-independent validity checks.
*
* Returns true if the provided block is valid (has valid header,
* transactions are valid, block is a valid size, etc.)
*/
bool CheckBlock(const CBlock &block, BlockValidationState &state,
const Consensus::Params &params,
BlockValidationOptions validationOptions);
/**
* This is a variant of ContextualCheckTransaction which computes the contextual
* check for a transaction based on the chain tip.
*
* See consensus/consensus.h for flag definitions.
*/
bool ContextualCheckTransactionForCurrentBlock(
const CBlockIndex &active_chain_tip, const Consensus::Params &params,
const CTransaction &tx, TxValidationState &state)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
/**
* Check a block is completely valid from start to finish (only works on top of
* our current best block)
*/
bool TestBlockValidity(
BlockValidationState &state, const CChainParams &params,
Chainstate &chainstate, const CBlock &block, CBlockIndex *pindexPrev,
const std::function<NodeClock::time_point()> &adjusted_time_callback,
BlockValidationOptions validationOptions) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Check with the proof of work on each blockheader matches the value in nBits
*/
bool HasValidProofOfWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers,
const Consensus::Params &consensusParams);
/** Return the sum of the work on a given set of headers */
arith_uint256 CalculateHeadersWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &headers);
enum class VerifyDBResult {
SUCCESS,
CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB,
INTERRUPTED,
SKIPPED_L3_CHECKS,
SKIPPED_MISSING_BLOCKS,
};
/**
* RAII wrapper for VerifyDB: Verify consistency of the block and coin
* databases.
*/
class CVerifyDB {
private:
kernel::Notifications &m_notifications;
public:
CVerifyDB();
public:
explicit CVerifyDB(kernel::Notifications &notifications);
~CVerifyDB();
[[nodiscard]] VerifyDBResult VerifyDB(Chainstate &chainstate,
CCoinsView &coinsview,
int nCheckLevel, int nCheckDepth)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
};
/** @see Chainstate::FlushStateToDisk */
enum class FlushStateMode { NONE, IF_NEEDED, PERIODIC, ALWAYS };
/**
* A convenience class for constructing the CCoinsView* hierarchy used
* to facilitate access to the UTXO set.
*
* This class consists of an arrangement of layered CCoinsView objects,
* preferring to store and retrieve coins in memory via `m_cacheview` but
* ultimately falling back on cache misses to the canonical store of UTXOs on
* disk, `m_dbview`.
*/
class CoinsViews {
public:
//! The lowest level of the CoinsViews cache hierarchy sits in a leveldb
//! database on disk. All unspent coins reside in this store.
CCoinsViewDB m_dbview GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
//! This view wraps access to the leveldb instance and handles read errors
//! gracefully.
CCoinsViewErrorCatcher m_catcherview GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
//! This is the top layer of the cache hierarchy - it keeps as many coins in
//! memory as can fit per the dbcache setting.
std::unique_ptr<CCoinsViewCache> m_cacheview GUARDED_BY(cs_main);
//! This constructor initializes CCoinsViewDB and CCoinsViewErrorCatcher
//! instances, but it *does not* create a CCoinsViewCache instance by
//! default. This is done separately because the presence of the cache has
//! implications on whether or not we're allowed to flush the cache's state
//! to disk, which should not be done until the health of the database is
//! verified.
//!
//! All arguments forwarded onto CCoinsViewDB.
CoinsViews(DBParams db_params, CoinsViewOptions options);
//! Initialize the CCoinsViewCache member.
void InitCache() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
};
enum class CoinsCacheSizeState {
//! The coins cache is in immediate need of a flush.
CRITICAL = 2,
//! The cache is at >= 90% capacity.
LARGE = 1,
OK = 0
};
/**
* Chainstate stores and provides an API to update our local knowledge of the
* current best chain.
*
* Eventually, the API here is targeted at being exposed externally as a
* consumable libconsensus library, so any functions added must only call
* other class member functions, pure functions in other parts of the consensus
* library, callbacks via the validation interface, or read/write-to-disk
* functions (eventually this will also be via callbacks).
*
* Anything that is contingent on the current tip of the chain is stored here,
* whereas block information and metadata independent of the current tip is
* kept in `BlockManager`.
*/
class Chainstate {
protected:
/**
* The ChainState Mutex.
* A lock that must be held when modifying this ChainState.
*/
Mutex m_chainstate_mutex;
/**
* Every received block is assigned a unique and increasing identifier, so
* we know which one to give priority in case of a fork.
* Blocks loaded from disk are assigned id 0, so start the counter at 1.
*/
std::atomic<int32_t> nBlockSequenceId{1};
/** Decreasing counter (used by subsequent preciousblock calls). */
int32_t nBlockReverseSequenceId = -1;
/** chainwork for the last block that preciousblock has been applied to. */
arith_uint256 nLastPreciousChainwork = 0;
/**
* Whether this chainstate is undergoing initial block download.
*
* Mutable because we need to be able to mark IsInitialBlockDownload()
* const, which latches this for caching purposes.
*/
mutable std::atomic<bool> m_cached_finished_ibd{false};
//! Optional mempool that is kept in sync with the chain.
//! Only the active chainstate has a mempool.
CTxMemPool *m_mempool;
//! Manages the UTXO set, which is a reflection of the contents of
//! `m_chain`.
std::unique_ptr<CoinsViews> m_coins_views;
//! This toggle exists for use when doing background validation for UTXO
//! snapshots.
//!
//! In the expected case, it is set once the background validation chain
//! reaches the same height as the base of the snapshot and its UTXO set is
//! found to hash to the expected assumeutxo value. It signals that we
//! should no longer connect blocks to the background chainstate. When set
//! on the background validation chainstate, it signifies that we have fully
//! validated the snapshot chainstate.
//!
//! In the unlikely case that the snapshot chainstate is found to be
//! invalid, this is set to true on the snapshot chainstate.
bool m_disabled GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){false};
mutable Mutex cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex;
/**
* The best block via avalanche voting.
* This block cannot be reorged in any way except by explicit user action.
*/
const CBlockIndex *m_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex
GUARDED_BY(cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex) = nullptr;
/**
* Filter to prevent parking a block due to block policies more than once.
* After first application of block policies, Avalanche voting will
* determine the final acceptance state. Rare false positives will be
* reconciled by the network and should not have any negative impact.
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_filterParkingPoliciesApplied =
CRollingBloomFilter{1000, 0.000001};
CBlockIndex const *m_best_fork_tip = nullptr;
CBlockIndex const *m_best_fork_base = nullptr;
public:
//! Reference to a BlockManager instance which itself is shared across all
//! Chainstate instances.
node::BlockManager &m_blockman;
//! The chainstate manager that owns this chainstate. The reference is
//! necessary so that this instance can check whether it is the active
//! chainstate within deeply nested method calls.
ChainstateManager &m_chainman;
explicit Chainstate(
CTxMemPool *mempool, node::BlockManager &blockman,
ChainstateManager &chainman,
std::optional<BlockHash> from_snapshot_blockhash = std::nullopt);
/**
* Initialize the CoinsViews UTXO set database management data structures.
* The in-memory cache is initialized separately.
*
* All parameters forwarded to CoinsViews.
*/
void InitCoinsDB(size_t cache_size_bytes, bool in_memory, bool should_wipe,
std::string leveldb_name = "chainstate");
//! Initialize the in-memory coins cache (to be done after the health of the
//! on-disk database is verified).
void InitCoinsCache(size_t cache_size_bytes)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! @returns whether or not the CoinsViews object has been fully initialized
//! and we can
//! safely flush this object to disk.
bool CanFlushToDisk() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
return m_coins_views && m_coins_views->m_cacheview;
}
//! The current chain of blockheaders we consult and build on.
//! @see CChain, CBlockIndex.
CChain m_chain;
/**
* The blockhash which is the base of the snapshot this chainstate was
* created from.
*
* std::nullopt if this chainstate was not created from a snapshot.
*/
const std::optional<BlockHash> m_from_snapshot_blockhash{};
//! Return true if this chainstate relies on blocks that are assumed-valid.
//! In practice this means it was created based on a UTXO snapshot.
bool reliesOnAssumedValid() {
return m_from_snapshot_blockhash.has_value();
}
/**
* The set of all CBlockIndex entries with either BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS
* (for itself and all ancestors) *or* BLOCK_ASSUMED_VALID (if using
* background chainstates) and as good as our current tip or better.
* Entries may be failed, though, and pruning nodes may be missing the data
* for the block.
*/
std::set<CBlockIndex *, CBlockIndexWorkComparator> setBlockIndexCandidates;
//! @returns A reference to the in-memory cache of the UTXO set.
CCoinsViewCache &CoinsTip() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
Assert(m_coins_views);
return *Assert(m_coins_views->m_cacheview);
}
//! @returns A reference to the on-disk UTXO set database.
CCoinsViewDB &CoinsDB() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
return Assert(m_coins_views)->m_dbview;
}
//! @returns A pointer to the mempool.
CTxMemPool *GetMempool() { return m_mempool; }
//! @returns A reference to a wrapped view of the in-memory UTXO set that
//! handles disk read errors gracefully.
CCoinsViewErrorCatcher &CoinsErrorCatcher()
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
return Assert(m_coins_views)->m_catcherview;
}
//! Destructs all objects related to accessing the UTXO set.
void ResetCoinsViews() { m_coins_views.reset(); }
//! Does this chainstate have a UTXO set attached?
bool HasCoinsViews() const { return (bool)m_coins_views; }
//! The cache size of the on-disk coins view.
size_t m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes{0};
//! The cache size of the in-memory coins view.
size_t m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes{0};
//! Resize the CoinsViews caches dynamically and flush state to disk.
//! @returns true unless an error occurred during the flush.
bool ResizeCoinsCaches(size_t coinstip_size, size_t coinsdb_size)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
/**
* Import blocks from an external file
*
* During reindexing, this function is called for each block file
* (datadir/blocks/blk?????.dat). It reads all blocks contained in the given
* file and attempts to process them (add them to the block index). The
* blocks may be out of order within each file and across files. Often this
* function reads a block but finds that its parent hasn't been read yet, so
* the block can't be processed yet. The function will add an entry to the
* blocks_with_unknown_parent map (which is passed as an argument), so that
* when the block's parent is later read and processed, this function can
* re-read the child block from disk and process it.
*
* Because a block's parent may be in a later file, not just later in the
* same file, the blocks_with_unknown_parent map must be passed in and out
* with each call. It's a multimap, rather than just a map, because multiple
* blocks may have the same parent (when chain splits or stale blocks
* exist). It maps from parent-hash to child-disk-position.
*
* This function can also be used to read blocks from user-specified block
* files using the -loadblock= option. There's no unknown-parent tracking,
* so the last two arguments are omitted.
*
*
* @param[in] fileIn FILE handle to file containing blocks to read
* @param[in] dbp (optional) Disk block position (only for reindex)
* @param[in,out] blocks_with_unknown_parent
* (optional) Map of disk positions for blocks with
* unknown parent, key is parent block hash
* (only used for reindex)
*/
void LoadExternalBlockFile(FILE *fileIn, FlatFilePos *dbp = nullptr,
std::multimap<BlockHash, FlatFilePos>
*blocks_with_unknown_parent = nullptr,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche = nullptr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_chainstate_mutex,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
/**
* Update the on-disk chain state.
* The caches and indexes are flushed depending on the mode we're called
* with if they're too large, if it's been a while since the last write, or
* always and in all cases if we're in prune mode and are deleting files.
*
* If FlushStateMode::NONE is used, then FlushStateToDisk(...) won't do
* anything besides checking if we need to prune.
*
* @returns true unless a system error occurred
*/
bool FlushStateToDisk(BlockValidationState &state, FlushStateMode mode,
int nManualPruneHeight = 0);
//! Unconditionally flush all changes to disk.
void ForceFlushStateToDisk();
//! Prune blockfiles from the disk if necessary and then flush chainstate
//! changes if we pruned.
void PruneAndFlush();
/**
* Find the best known block, and make it the tip of the block chain. The
* result is either failure or an activated best chain. pblock is either
* nullptr or a pointer to a block that is already loaded (to avoid loading
* it again from disk).
*
* ActivateBestChain is split into steps (see ActivateBestChainStep) so that
* we avoid holding cs_main for an extended period of time; the length of
* this call may be quite long during reindexing or a substantial reorg.
*
* May not be called with cs_main held. May not be called in a
* validationinterface callback.
*
* Note that if this is called while a snapshot chainstate is active, and if
* it is called on a background chainstate whose tip has reached the base
* block of the snapshot, its execution will take *MINUTES* while it hashes
* the background UTXO set to verify the assumeutxo value the snapshot was
* activated with. `cs_main` will be held during this time.
*
* @param[in] skip_checkblockindex (optional)
* If true, skip calling CheckBlockIndex even if -checkblockindex is
* true. If false (default behavior), respect the -checkblockindex arg.
* This is used in tests when we need to skip the checks only
* temporarily, and resume normal behavior later.
* @returns true unless a system error occurred
*/
bool ActivateBestChain(BlockValidationState &state,
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock = nullptr,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche = nullptr,
bool skip_checkblockindex = false)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_chainstate_mutex,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main);
bool AcceptBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock,
BlockValidationState &state, bool fRequested,
const FlatFilePos *dbp, bool *fNewBlock,
bool min_pow_checked) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
// Block (dis)connection on a given view:
DisconnectResult DisconnectBlock(const CBlock &block,
const CBlockIndex *pindex,
CCoinsViewCache &view)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock &block, BlockValidationState &state,
CBlockIndex *pindex, CCoinsViewCache &view,
BlockValidationOptions options,
Amount *blockFees = nullptr, bool fJustCheck = false)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
// Apply the effects of a block disconnection on the UTXO set.
bool DisconnectTip(BlockValidationState &state,
DisconnectedBlockTransactions *disconnectpool)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_mempool->cs);
// Manual block validity manipulation:
/**
* Mark a block as precious and reorganize.
*
* May not be called in a validationinterface callback.
*/
bool PreciousBlock(BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindex,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche = nullptr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_chainstate_mutex,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main);
/** Mark a block as invalid. */
bool InvalidateBlock(BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindex)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_chainstate_mutex,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
/** Park a block. */
bool ParkBlock(BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindex)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_chainstate_mutex,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
/**
* Mark a block as finalized by avalanche.
*/
bool AvalancheFinalizeBlock(CBlockIndex *pindex,
avalanche::Processor &avalanche)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
/**
* Clear avalanche finalization.
*/
void ClearAvalancheFinalizedBlock()
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
/**
* Checks if a block is finalized by avalanche voting.
*/
bool IsBlockAvalancheFinalized(const CBlockIndex *pindex) const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
/** Remove invalidity status from a block and its descendants. */
void ResetBlockFailureFlags(CBlockIndex *pindex)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
template <typename F>
bool UpdateFlagsForBlock(CBlockIndex *pindexBase, CBlockIndex *pindex, F f)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
template <typename F, typename C, typename AC>
void UpdateFlags(CBlockIndex *pindex, CBlockIndex *&pindexReset, F f,
C fChild, AC fAncestorWasChanged)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/** Remove parked status from a block and its descendants. */
void UnparkBlockAndChildren(CBlockIndex *pindex)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/** Remove parked status from a block. */
void UnparkBlock(CBlockIndex *pindex) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/** Replay blocks that aren't fully applied to the database. */
bool ReplayBlocks();
/**
* Ensures we have a genesis block in the block tree, possibly writing one
* to disk.
*/
bool LoadGenesisBlock();
void PruneBlockIndexCandidates();
void UnloadBlockIndex() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Check whether we are doing an initial block download (synchronizing from
* disk or network)
*/
bool IsInitialBlockDownload() const;
/** Find the last common block of this chain and a locator. */
const CBlockIndex *FindForkInGlobalIndex(const CBlockLocator &locator) const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Make various assertions about the state of the block index.
*
* By default this only executes fully when using the Regtest chain; see:
* m_options.check_block_index.
*/
void CheckBlockIndex();
/** Load the persisted mempool from disk */
void
LoadMempool(const fs::path &load_path,
fsbridge::FopenFn mockable_fopen_function = fsbridge::fopen);
/** Update the chain tip based on database information, i.e. CoinsTip()'s
* best block. */
bool LoadChainTip() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
//! Dictates whether we need to flush the cache to disk or not.
//!
//! @return the state of the size of the coins cache.
CoinsCacheSizeState GetCoinsCacheSizeState()
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
CoinsCacheSizeState
GetCoinsCacheSizeState(size_t max_coins_cache_size_bytes,
size_t max_mempool_size_bytes)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
std::string ToString() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! Indirection necessary to make lock annotations work with an optional
//! mempool.
RecursiveMutex *MempoolMutex() const LOCK_RETURNED(m_mempool->cs) {
return m_mempool ? &m_mempool->cs : nullptr;
}
private:
bool ActivateBestChainStep(
BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindexMostWork,
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock, bool &fInvalidFound,
const avalanche::Processor *const avalanche = nullptr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_mempool->cs,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
bool ConnectTip(BlockValidationState &state,
BlockPolicyValidationState &blockPolicyState,
CBlockIndex *pindexNew,
const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &pblock,
DisconnectedBlockTransactions &disconnectpool,
const avalanche::Processor *const avalanche = nullptr)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_mempool->cs,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
void InvalidBlockFound(CBlockIndex *pindex,
const BlockValidationState &state)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, !cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
CBlockIndex *
FindMostWorkChain(std::vector<const CBlockIndex *> &blocksToReconcile,
bool fAutoUnpark)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, !cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
void ReceivedBlockTransactions(const CBlock &block, CBlockIndex *pindexNew,
const FlatFilePos &pos)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
bool RollforwardBlock(const CBlockIndex *pindex, CCoinsViewCache &inputs)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
void UnparkBlockImpl(CBlockIndex *pindex, bool fClearChildren)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
bool UnwindBlock(BlockValidationState &state, CBlockIndex *pindex,
bool invalidate)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(m_chainstate_mutex,
!cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
void CheckForkWarningConditions() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
void CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(CBlockIndex *pindexNewForkTip)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
void InvalidChainFound(CBlockIndex *pindexNew)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, !cs_avalancheFinalizedBlockIndex);
const CBlockIndex *FindBlockToFinalize(CBlockIndex *pindexNew)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
/**
* Check warning conditions and do some notifications on new chain tip set.
*/
void UpdateTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
std::chrono::microseconds m_last_write{0};
std::chrono::microseconds m_last_flush{0};
/**
* In case of an invalid snapshot, rename the coins leveldb directory so
* that it can be examined for issue diagnosis.
*/
[[nodiscard]] util::Result<void> InvalidateCoinsDBOnDisk()
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
friend ChainstateManager;
};
enum class SnapshotCompletionResult {
SUCCESS,
SKIPPED,
// Expected assumeutxo configuration data is not found for the height of the
// base block.
MISSING_CHAINPARAMS,
// Failed to generate UTXO statistics (to check UTXO set hash) for the
// background chainstate.
STATS_FAILED,
// The UTXO set hash of the background validation chainstate does not match
// the one expected by assumeutxo chainparams.
HASH_MISMATCH,
// The blockhash of the current tip of the background validation chainstate
// does not match the one expected by the snapshot chainstate.
BASE_BLOCKHASH_MISMATCH,
};
/**
* Provides an interface for creating and interacting with one or two
* chainstates: an IBD chainstate generated by downloading blocks, and
* an optional snapshot chainstate loaded from a UTXO snapshot. Managed
* chainstates can be maintained at different heights simultaneously.
*
* This class provides abstractions that allow the retrieval of the current
* most-work chainstate ("Active") as well as chainstates which may be in
* background use to validate UTXO snapshots.
*
* Definitions:
*
* *IBD chainstate*: a chainstate whose current state has been "fully"
* validated by the initial block download process.
*
* *Snapshot chainstate*: a chainstate populated by loading in an
* assumeutxo UTXO snapshot.
*
* *Active chainstate*: the chainstate containing the current most-work
* chain. Consulted by most parts of the system (net_processing,
* wallet) as a reflection of the current chain and UTXO set.
* This may either be an IBD chainstate or a snapshot chainstate.
*
* *Background IBD chainstate*: an IBD chainstate for which the
* IBD process is happening in the background while use of the
* active (snapshot) chainstate allows the rest of the system to function.
*/
class ChainstateManager {
private:
//! The chainstate used under normal operation (i.e. "regular" IBD) or, if
//! a snapshot is in use, for background validation.
//!
//! Its contents (including on-disk data) will be deleted *upon shutdown*
//! after background validation of the snapshot has completed. We do not
//! free the chainstate contents immediately after it finishes validation
//! to cautiously avoid a case where some other part of the system is still
//! using this pointer (e.g. net_processing).
//!
//! Once this pointer is set to a corresponding chainstate, it will not
//! be reset until init.cpp:Shutdown().
//!
//! This is especially important when, e.g., calling ActivateBestChain()
//! on all chainstates because we are not able to hold ::cs_main going into
//! that call.
std::unique_ptr<Chainstate> m_ibd_chainstate GUARDED_BY(::cs_main);
//! A chainstate initialized on the basis of a UTXO snapshot. If this is
//! non-null, it is always our active chainstate.
//!
//! Once this pointer is set to a corresponding chainstate, it will not
//! be reset until init.cpp:Shutdown().
//!
//! This is especially important when, e.g., calling ActivateBestChain()
//! on all chainstates because we are not able to hold ::cs_main going into
//! that call.
std::unique_ptr<Chainstate> m_snapshot_chainstate GUARDED_BY(::cs_main);
//! Points to either the ibd or snapshot chainstate; indicates our
//! most-work chain.
//!
//! Once this pointer is set to a corresponding chainstate, it will not
//! be reset until init.cpp:Shutdown().
//!
//! This is especially important when, e.g., calling ActivateBestChain()
//! on all chainstates because we are not able to hold ::cs_main going into
//! that call.
Chainstate *m_active_chainstate GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){nullptr};
CBlockIndex *m_best_invalid GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){nullptr};
CBlockIndex *m_best_parked GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){nullptr};
//! Internal helper for ActivateSnapshot().
[[nodiscard]] bool
PopulateAndValidateSnapshot(Chainstate &snapshot_chainstate,
AutoFile &coins_file,
const node::SnapshotMetadata &metadata);
/**
* If a block header hasn't already been seen, call CheckBlockHeader on it,
* ensure that it doesn't descend from an invalid block, and then add it to
* m_block_index.
* Caller must set min_pow_checked=true in order to add a new header to the
* block index (permanent memory storage), indicating that the header is
* known to be part of a sufficiently high-work chain (anti-dos check).
*/
bool AcceptBlockHeader(
const CBlockHeader &block, BlockValidationState &state,
CBlockIndex **ppindex, bool min_pow_checked,
const std::optional<CCheckpointData> &test_checkpoints = std::nullopt)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
friend Chainstate;
//! Returns nullptr if no snapshot has been loaded.
const CBlockIndex *GetSnapshotBaseBlock() const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! Return the height of the base block of the snapshot in use, if one
//! exists, else nullopt.
std::optional<int> GetSnapshotBaseHeight() const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! Return true if a chainstate is considered usable.
//!
//! This is false when a background validation chainstate has completed its
//! validation of an assumed-valid chainstate, or when a snapshot
//! chainstate has been found to be invalid.
bool IsUsable(const Chainstate *const pchainstate) const
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
return pchainstate && !pchainstate->m_disabled;
}
/** Most recent headers presync progress update, for rate-limiting. */
SteadyMilliseconds m_last_presync_update GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){};
public:
using Options = kernel::ChainstateManagerOpts;
explicit ChainstateManager(Options options,
node::BlockManager::Options blockman_options);
const Config &GetConfig() const { return m_options.config; }
const CChainParams &GetParams() const {
return m_options.config.GetChainParams();
}
const Consensus::Params &GetConsensus() const {
return m_options.config.GetChainParams().GetConsensus();
}
bool ShouldCheckBlockIndex() const {
return *Assert(m_options.check_block_index);
}
const arith_uint256 &MinimumChainWork() const {
return *Assert(m_options.minimum_chain_work);
}
const BlockHash &AssumedValidBlock() const {
return *Assert(m_options.assumed_valid_block);
}
kernel::Notifications &GetNotifications() const {
return m_options.notifications;
};
/**
* Alias for ::cs_main.
* Should be used in new code to make it easier to make ::cs_main a member
* of this class.
* Generally, methods of this class should be annotated to require this
* mutex. This will make calling code more verbose, but also help to:
* - Clarify that the method will acquire a mutex that heavily affects
* overall performance.
* - Force call sites to think how long they need to acquire the mutex to
* get consistent results.
*/
RecursiveMutex &GetMutex() const LOCK_RETURNED(::cs_main) {
return ::cs_main;
}
const Options m_options;
std::thread m_load_block;
//! A single BlockManager instance is shared across each constructed
//! chainstate to avoid duplicating block metadata.
node::BlockManager m_blockman;
/**
* In order to efficiently track invalidity of headers, we keep the set of
* blocks which we tried to connect and found to be invalid here (ie which
* were set to BLOCK_FAILED_VALID since the last restart). We can then
* walk this set and check if a new header is a descendant of something in
* this set, preventing us from having to walk m_block_index when we try
* to connect a bad block and fail.
*
* While this is more complicated than marking everything which descends
* from an invalid block as invalid at the time we discover it to be
* invalid, doing so would require walking all of m_block_index to find all
* descendants. Since this case should be very rare, keeping track of all
* BLOCK_FAILED_VALID blocks in a set should be just fine and work just as
* well.
*
* Because we already walk m_block_index in height-order at startup, we go
* ahead and mark descendants of invalid blocks as FAILED_CHILD at that
* time, instead of putting things in this set.
*/
std::set<CBlockIndex *> m_failed_blocks;
/**
* Best header we've seen so far (used for getheaders queries' starting
* points).
*/
CBlockIndex *m_best_header GUARDED_BY(::cs_main){nullptr};
//! The total number of bytes available for us to use across all in-memory
//! coins caches. This will be split somehow across chainstates.
int64_t m_total_coinstip_cache{0};
//
//! The total number of bytes available for us to use across all leveldb
//! coins databases. This will be split somehow across chainstates.
int64_t m_total_coinsdb_cache{0};
//! Instantiate a new chainstate.
//!
//! @param[in] mempool The mempool to pass to the chainstate
// constructor
Chainstate &InitializeChainstate(CTxMemPool *mempool)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! Get all chainstates currently being used.
std::vector<Chainstate *> GetAll();
//! Construct and activate a Chainstate on the basis of UTXO snapshot data.
//!
//! Steps:
//!
//! - Initialize an unused Chainstate.
//! - Load its `CoinsViews` contents from `coins_file`.
//! - Verify that the hash of the resulting coinsdb matches the expected
//! hash per assumeutxo chain parameters.
//! - Wait for our headers chain to include the base block of the snapshot.
//! - "Fast forward" the tip of the new chainstate to the base of the
//! snapshot, faking nTx* block index data along the way.
//! - Move the new chainstate to `m_snapshot_chainstate` and make it our
//! ActiveChainstate().
[[nodiscard]] bool ActivateSnapshot(AutoFile &coins_file,
const node::SnapshotMetadata &metadata,
bool in_memory);
//! Once the background validation chainstate has reached the height which
//! is the base of the UTXO snapshot in use, compare its coins to ensure
//! they match those expected by the snapshot.
//!
//! If the coins match (expected), then mark the validation chainstate for
//! deletion and continue using the snapshot chainstate as active.
//! Otherwise, revert to using the ibd chainstate and shutdown.
SnapshotCompletionResult MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation(
std::function<void(bilingual_str)> shutdown_fnc =
[](bilingual_str msg) { AbortNode(msg.original, msg); })
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! The most-work chain.
Chainstate &ActiveChainstate() const;
CChain &ActiveChain() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(GetMutex()) {
return ActiveChainstate().m_chain;
}
int ActiveHeight() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(GetMutex()) {
return ActiveChain().Height();
}
CBlockIndex *ActiveTip() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(GetMutex()) {
return ActiveChain().Tip();
}
node::BlockMap &BlockIndex() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
return m_blockman.m_block_index;
}
//! @returns true if a snapshot-based chainstate is in use. Also implies
//! that a background validation chainstate is also in use.
bool IsSnapshotActive() const;
std::optional<BlockHash> SnapshotBlockhash() const;
//! Is there a snapshot in use and has it been fully validated?
bool IsSnapshotValidated() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
return m_snapshot_chainstate && m_ibd_chainstate &&
m_ibd_chainstate->m_disabled;
}
/**
* Process an incoming block. This only returns after the best known valid
* block is made active. Note that it does not, however, guarantee that the
* specific block passed to it has been checked for validity!
*
* If you want to *possibly* get feedback on whether block is valid, you
* must install a CValidationInterface (see validationinterface.h) - this
* will have its BlockChecked method called whenever *any* block completes
* validation.
*
* Note that we guarantee that either the proof-of-work is valid on block,
* or (and possibly also) BlockChecked will have been called.
*
* May not be called in a validationinterface callback.
*
* @param[in] block The block we want to process.
* @param[in] force_processing Process this block even if unrequested;
* used for non-network block sources.
* @param[in] min_pow_checked True if proof-of-work anti-DoS checks have
* been done by caller for headers chain
* (note: only affects headers acceptance; if
* block header is already present in block
* index then this parameter has no effect)
* @param[out] new_block A boolean which is set to indicate if the block
* was first received via this call.
* @returns If the block was processed, independently of block validity
*/
bool ProcessNewBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &block,
bool force_processing, bool min_pow_checked,
bool *new_block,
avalanche::Processor *const avalanche = nullptr)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main);
/**
* Process incoming block headers.
*
* May not be called in a validationinterface callback.
*
* @param[in] block The block headers themselves.
* @param[in] min_pow_checked True if proof-of-work anti-DoS checks have
* been done by caller for headers chain
* @param[out] state This may be set to an Error state if any error
* occurred processing them.
* @param[out] ppindex If set, the pointer will be set to point to the
* last new block index object for the given
* headers.
* @return True if block headers were accepted as valid.
*/
bool ProcessNewBlockHeaders(
const std::vector<CBlockHeader> &block, bool min_pow_checked,
BlockValidationState &state, const CBlockIndex **ppindex = nullptr,
const std::optional<CCheckpointData> &test_checkpoints = std::nullopt)
LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main);
/**
* Try to add a transaction to the memory pool.
*
* @param[in] tx The transaction to submit for mempool
* acceptance.
* @param[in] test_accept When true, run validation checks but don't
* submit to mempool.
*/
[[nodiscard]] MempoolAcceptResult
ProcessTransaction(const CTransactionRef &tx, bool test_accept = false)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
//! Load the block tree and coins database from disk, initializing state if
//! we're running with -reindex
bool LoadBlockIndex() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
//! Check to see if caches are out of balance and if so, call
//! ResizeCoinsCaches() as needed.
void MaybeRebalanceCaches() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
/**
* This is used by net_processing to report pre-synchronization progress of
* headers, as headers are not yet fed to validation during that time, but
* validation is (for now) responsible for logging and signalling through
* NotifyHeaderTip, so it needs this information.
*/
void ReportHeadersPresync(const arith_uint256 &work, int64_t height,
int64_t timestamp);
//! When starting up, search the datadir for a chainstate based on a UTXO
//! snapshot that is in the process of being validated.
bool DetectSnapshotChainstate(CTxMemPool *mempool)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
void ResetChainstates() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! Switch the active chainstate to one based on a UTXO snapshot that was
//! loaded previously.
Chainstate &ActivateExistingSnapshot(CTxMemPool *mempool,
BlockHash base_blockhash)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
//! If we have validated a snapshot chain during this runtime, copy its
//! chainstate directory over to the main `chainstate` location, completing
//! validation of the snapshot.
//!
//! If the cleanup succeeds, the caller will need to ensure chainstates are
//! reinitialized, since ResetChainstates() will be called before leveldb
//! directories are moved or deleted.
//!
//! @sa node/chainstate:LoadChainstate()
bool ValidatedSnapshotCleanup() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main);
};
/** Deployment* info via ChainstateManager */
template <typename DEP>
bool DeploymentActiveAfter(const CBlockIndex *pindexPrev,
const ChainstateManager &chainman, DEP dep) {
return DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman.GetConsensus(), dep);
}
template <typename DEP>
bool DeploymentActiveAt(const CBlockIndex &index,
const ChainstateManager &chainman, DEP dep) {
return DeploymentActiveAt(index, chainman.GetConsensus(), dep);
}
/**
* Return the expected assumeutxo value for a given height, if one exists.
*
* @param[in] height Get the assumeutxo value for this height.
*
* @returns empty if no assumeutxo configuration exists for the given height.
*/
const AssumeutxoData *ExpectedAssumeutxo(const int height,
const CChainParams &params);
#endif // BITCOIN_VALIDATION_H
diff --git a/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_transaction_voting.py b/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_transaction_voting.py
index 4c0cf889d..d03827867 100644
--- a/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_transaction_voting.py
+++ b/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_transaction_voting.py
@@ -1,313 +1,335 @@
# Copyright (c) 2022 The Bitcoin developers
# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
"""Test avalanche transaction voting."""
import random
from test_framework.avatools import can_find_inv_in_poll, get_ava_p2p_interface
from test_framework.blocktools import (
COINBASE_MATURITY,
create_block,
create_coinbase,
make_conform_to_ctor,
)
from test_framework.key import ECPubKey
from test_framework.messages import (
MSG_TX,
AvalancheTxVoteError,
AvalancheVote,
CTransaction,
FromHex,
)
from test_framework.p2p import P2PDataStore
from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework
from test_framework.util import assert_equal, assert_raises_rpc_error, uint256_hex
from test_framework.wallet import MiniWallet
QUORUM_NODE_COUNT = 16
class AvalancheTransactionVotingTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
def set_test_params(self):
self.num_nodes = 1
self.extra_args = [
[
"-avalanchepreconsensus=1",
"-avacooldown=0",
"-avaproofstakeutxoconfirmations=1",
# Low enough for coinbase transactions to be staked in valid proofs
"-avaproofstakeutxodustthreshold=1000000",
"-avaminquorumstake=0",
"-avaminavaproofsnodecount=0",
"-whitelist=noban@127.0.0.1",
]
]
def run_test(self):
node = self.nodes[0]
poll_node = get_ava_p2p_interface(self, node)
peer = node.add_p2p_connection(P2PDataStore())
# Create helper to check expected poll responses
avakey = ECPubKey()
avakey.set(bytes.fromhex(node.getavalanchekey()))
def assert_response(expected):
response = poll_node.wait_for_avaresponse()
r = response.response
# Verify signature.
assert avakey.verify_schnorr(response.sig, r.get_hash())
# Verify correct votes list
votes = r.votes
assert_equal(len(votes), len(expected))
for i in range(0, len(votes)):
assert_equal(repr(votes[i]), repr(expected[i]))
# Make some valid txs
num_txs = 5
wallet = MiniWallet(node)
self.generate(wallet, num_txs, sync_fun=self.no_op)
# Mature the coinbases
self.generate(node, COINBASE_MATURITY, sync_fun=self.no_op)
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()["size"], 0)
tx_ids = [
int(wallet.send_self_transfer(from_node=node)["txid"], 16)
for _ in range(num_txs)
]
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()["size"], num_txs)
self.log.info("Check the votes are unknown while the quorum is not established")
poll_node.send_poll(tx_ids, MSG_TX)
assert_response(
[AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.UNKNOWN, txid) for txid in tx_ids]
)
self.log.info("Check the votes on valid mempool transactions")
def get_quorum():
return [
get_ava_p2p_interface(self, node) for _ in range(0, QUORUM_NODE_COUNT)
]
quorum = get_quorum()
assert node.getavalancheinfo()["ready_to_poll"]
poll_node.send_poll(tx_ids, MSG_TX)
assert_response(
[AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.ACCEPTED, txid) for txid in tx_ids]
)
self.log.info("Check the votes on recently mined transactions")
self.generate(node, 1, sync_fun=self.no_op)
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()["size"], 0)
poll_node.send_poll(tx_ids, MSG_TX)
assert_response(
[AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.ACCEPTED, txid) for txid in tx_ids]
)
for _ in range(10):
self.generate(node, 1, sync_fun=self.no_op)
poll_node.send_poll(tx_ids, MSG_TX)
assert_response(
[AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.ACCEPTED, txid) for txid in tx_ids]
)
self.log.info("Check the votes on unknown transactions")
tx_ids = [random.randint(0, 2**256) for _ in range(10)]
poll_node.send_poll(tx_ids, MSG_TX)
assert_response(
[AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.UNKNOWN, txid) for txid in tx_ids]
)
self.log.info("Check the votes on invalid transactions")
invalid_tx = CTransaction()
invalid_txid = int(invalid_tx.rehash(), 16)
# The node has the NOBAN whitelist flag, so it remains connected
peer.send_txs_and_test(
[invalid_tx], node, success=False, reject_reason="bad-txns-vin-empty"
)
poll_node.send_poll([invalid_txid], MSG_TX)
assert_response([AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.INVALID, invalid_txid)])
self.log.info("Check the votes on orphan transactions")
def from_wallet_tx(tx):
tx_obj = FromHex(CTransaction(), tx["hex"])
tx_obj.rehash()
return tx_obj
orphan_tx = wallet.create_self_transfer_chain(chain_length=2)[-1]
orphan_txid = int(orphan_tx["txid"], 16)
peer.send_txs_and_test(
[from_wallet_tx(orphan_tx)],
node,
success=False,
reject_reason="bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent",
)
poll_node.send_poll([orphan_txid], MSG_TX)
assert_response([AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.ORPHAN, orphan_txid)])
self.log.info("Check the votes on conflicting transactions")
utxo = wallet.get_utxo()
mempool_tx = wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=utxo)
peer.send_txs_and_test([from_wallet_tx(mempool_tx)], node, success=True)
assert mempool_tx["txid"] in node.getrawmempool()
conflicting_tx = wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=utxo)
conflicting_txid = int(conflicting_tx["txid"], 16)
peer.send_txs_and_test(
[from_wallet_tx(conflicting_tx)],
node,
success=False,
reject_reason="txn-mempool-conflict",
)
poll_node.send_poll([conflicting_txid], MSG_TX)
assert_response(
[AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.CONFLICTING, conflicting_txid)]
)
self.log.info("Check the node polls for transactions added to the mempool")
# Let's clean up the non transaction inventories from our avalanche polls
def has_finalized_proof(proofid):
can_find_inv_in_poll(quorum, proofid)
return node.getrawavalancheproof(uint256_hex(proofid))["finalized"]
for q in quorum:
self.wait_until(lambda: has_finalized_proof(q.proof.proofid))
def has_finalized_block(block_hash):
can_find_inv_in_poll(quorum, int(block_hash, 16))
return node.isfinalblock(block_hash)
tip = node.getbestblockhash()
self.wait_until(lambda: has_finalized_block(tip))
# Now we can focus on transactions
def has_finalized_tx(txid):
can_find_inv_in_poll(quorum, int(txid, 16))
return node.isfinaltransaction(txid)
def has_invalidated_tx(txid):
can_find_inv_in_poll(
quorum, int(txid, 16), response=AvalancheTxVoteError.INVALID
)
return txid not in node.getrawmempool()
+ self.wait_until(lambda: has_finalized_tx(mempool_tx["txid"]))
+
+ self.log.info("Check the node rejects txs that conflict with a finalized tx")
+
+ another_conflicting_tx = wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=utxo)
+ another_conflicting_txid = int(another_conflicting_tx["txid"], 16)
+ peer.send_txs_and_test(
+ [from_wallet_tx(another_conflicting_tx)],
+ node,
+ success=False,
+ reject_reason="finalized-tx-conflict",
+ )
+ # This transaction is plain invalid, so it is NOT stored in the
+ # conflicting pool
+ assert_equal(
+ node.gettransactionstatus(another_conflicting_tx["txid"])["pool"], "none"
+ )
+ poll_node.send_poll([another_conflicting_txid], MSG_TX)
+ assert_response(
+ [AvalancheVote(AvalancheTxVoteError.INVALID, another_conflicting_txid)]
+ )
+
self.log.info("Check the node can mine a finalized tx")
txid = wallet.send_self_transfer(from_node=node)["txid"]
assert txid in node.getrawmempool()
assert not node.isfinaltransaction(txid)
self.wait_until(lambda: has_finalized_tx(txid))
assert txid in node.getrawmempool()
tip = self.generate(node, 1)[0]
self.log.info("The transaction remains finalized after it's mined")
assert node.isfinaltransaction(txid, tip)
assert txid not in node.getrawmempool()
self.log.info("The transaction remains finalized even when reorg'ed")
node.parkblock(tip)
assert node.getbestblockhash() != tip
assert node.isfinaltransaction(txid)
assert txid in node.getrawmempool()
node.unparkblock(tip)
assert_equal(node.getbestblockhash(), tip)
assert node.isfinaltransaction(txid, tip)
assert txid not in node.getrawmempool()
self.log.info("The transaction remains finalized after the block is finalized")
self.wait_until(lambda: has_finalized_block(tip))
assert node.isfinaltransaction(txid, tip)
assert txid not in node.getrawmempool()
self.log.info("Check the node drops transactions invalidated by avalanche")
parent_tx = wallet.send_self_transfer(from_node=node)
parent_txid = parent_tx["txid"]
child_tx = wallet.send_self_transfer(
from_node=node, utxo_to_spend=parent_tx["new_utxo"]
)
child_txid = child_tx["txid"]
assert parent_txid in node.getrawmempool()
assert child_txid in node.getrawmempool()
assert not node.isfinaltransaction(parent_txid)
assert not node.isfinaltransaction(child_txid)
self.wait_until(lambda: has_invalidated_tx(parent_txid))
assert parent_txid not in node.getrawmempool()
assert child_txid not in node.getrawmempool()
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-5, "No such transaction", node.isfinaltransaction, parent_txid
)
assert_raises_rpc_error(
-5, "No such transaction", node.isfinaltransaction, child_txid
)
self.log.info(
"The node rejects blocks that contains tx conflicting with a finalized one"
)
utxo = wallet.get_utxo()
txid = wallet.send_self_transfer(from_node=node, utxo_to_spend=utxo)["txid"]
assert txid in node.getrawmempool()
assert not node.isfinaltransaction(txid)
self.wait_until(lambda: has_finalized_tx(txid))
assert txid in node.getrawmempool()
conflicting_block = create_block(
int(node.getbestblockhash(), 16),
create_coinbase(node.getblockcount() - 1),
)
conflicting_tx = wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=utxo)["tx"]
assert conflicting_tx.get_id() != txid
conflicting_block.vtx.append(conflicting_tx)
make_conform_to_ctor(conflicting_block)
conflicting_block.hashMerkleRoot = conflicting_block.calc_merkle_root()
conflicting_block.solve()
peer.send_blocks_and_test(
[conflicting_block],
node,
success=False,
reject_reason="finalized-tx-conflict",
)
# The tx is still finalized as the block is rejected
assert node.isfinaltransaction(txid)
assert txid in node.getrawmempool()
# The block is accepted if we remove the offending transaction
conflicting_block.vtx.remove(conflicting_tx)
conflicting_block.hashMerkleRoot = conflicting_block.calc_merkle_root()
conflicting_block.solve()
peer.send_blocks_and_test(
[conflicting_block],
node,
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
AvalancheTransactionVotingTest().main()

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