diff --git a/src/avalanche/peermanager.cpp b/src/avalanche/peermanager.cpp
index 877986138..75398acb2 100644
--- a/src/avalanche/peermanager.cpp
+++ b/src/avalanche/peermanager.cpp
@@ -1,815 +1,817 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2020 The Bitcoin developers
 // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
 // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
 
 #include <avalanche/peermanager.h>
 
 #include <avalanche/avalanche.h>
 #include <avalanche/delegation.h>
 #include <avalanche/validation.h>
 #include <random.h>
 #include <scheduler.h>
 #include <validation.h> // For ChainstateActive()
 
 #include <algorithm>
 #include <cassert>
 
 namespace avalanche {
 PeerManager::PeerManager(CScheduler &scheduler) {
     scheduler.scheduleEvery(
         [this]() -> bool {
             this->cleanupDanglingProofs();
             return true;
         },
         5min);
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::addNode(NodeId nodeid, const ProofId &proofid) {
     auto &pview = peers.get<by_proofid>();
     auto it = pview.find(proofid);
     if (it == pview.end()) {
         // If the node exists, it is actually updating its proof to an unknown
         // one. In this case we need to remove it so it is not both active and
         // pending at the same time.
         removeNode(nodeid);
         pendingNodes.emplace(proofid, nodeid);
         return false;
     }
 
     return addOrUpdateNode(peers.project<0>(it), nodeid);
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::addOrUpdateNode(const PeerSet::iterator &it, NodeId nodeid) {
     assert(it != peers.end());
 
     const PeerId peerid = it->peerid;
 
     auto nit = nodes.find(nodeid);
     if (nit == nodes.end()) {
         if (!nodes.emplace(nodeid, peerid).second) {
             return false;
         }
     } else {
         const PeerId oldpeerid = nit->peerid;
         if (!nodes.modify(nit, [&](Node &n) { n.peerid = peerid; })) {
             return false;
         }
 
         // We actually have this node already, we need to update it.
         bool success = removeNodeFromPeer(peers.find(oldpeerid));
         assert(success);
     }
 
     bool success = addNodeToPeer(it);
     assert(success);
 
     // If the added node was in the pending set, remove it
     pendingNodes.get<by_nodeid>().erase(nodeid);
 
     return true;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::addNodeToPeer(const PeerSet::iterator &it) {
     assert(it != peers.end());
     return peers.modify(it, [&](Peer &p) {
         if (p.node_count++ > 0) {
             // We are done.
             return;
         }
 
         // We need to allocate this peer.
         p.index = uint32_t(slots.size());
         const uint32_t score = p.getScore();
         const uint64_t start = slotCount;
         slots.emplace_back(start, score, it->peerid);
         slotCount = start + score;
 
         // Add to our allocated score when we allocate a new peer in the slots
         connectedPeersScore += score;
     });
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::removeNode(NodeId nodeid) {
     if (pendingNodes.get<by_nodeid>().erase(nodeid) > 0) {
         // If this was a pending node, there is nothing else to do.
         return true;
     }
 
     auto it = nodes.find(nodeid);
     if (it == nodes.end()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     const PeerId peerid = it->peerid;
     nodes.erase(it);
 
     // Keep the track of the reference count.
     bool success = removeNodeFromPeer(peers.find(peerid));
     assert(success);
 
     return true;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::removeNodeFromPeer(const PeerSet::iterator &it,
                                      uint32_t count) {
     // It is possible for nodes to be dangling. If there was an inflight query
     // when the peer gets removed, the node was not erased. In this case there
     // is nothing to do.
     if (it == peers.end()) {
         return true;
     }
 
     assert(count <= it->node_count);
     if (count == 0) {
         // This is a NOOP.
         return false;
     }
 
     const uint32_t new_count = it->node_count - count;
     if (!peers.modify(it, [&](Peer &p) { p.node_count = new_count; })) {
         return false;
     }
 
     if (new_count > 0) {
         // We are done.
         return true;
     }
 
     // There are no more nodes left, we need to clean up. Subtract allocated
     // score and remove from slots.
     const size_t i = it->index;
     assert(i < slots.size());
     assert(connectedPeersScore >= slots[i].getScore());
     connectedPeersScore -= slots[i].getScore();
 
     if (i + 1 == slots.size()) {
         slots.pop_back();
         slotCount = slots.empty() ? 0 : slots.back().getStop();
     } else {
         fragmentation += slots[i].getScore();
         slots[i] = slots[i].withPeerId(NO_PEER);
     }
 
     return true;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::updateNextRequestTime(NodeId nodeid, TimePoint timeout) {
     auto it = nodes.find(nodeid);
     if (it == nodes.end()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     return nodes.modify(it, [&](Node &n) { n.nextRequestTime = timeout; });
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::latchAvaproofsSent(NodeId nodeid) {
     auto it = nodes.find(nodeid);
     if (it == nodes.end()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     return !it->avaproofsSent &&
            nodes.modify(it, [&](Node &n) { n.avaproofsSent = true; });
 }
 
 static bool isOrphanState(const ProofValidationState &state) {
     return state.GetResult() == ProofValidationResult::MISSING_UTXO ||
            state.GetResult() == ProofValidationResult::HEIGHT_MISMATCH ||
            state.GetResult() == ProofValidationResult::IMMATURE_UTXO;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::updateNextPossibleConflictTime(
     PeerId peerid, const std::chrono::seconds &nextTime) {
     auto it = peers.find(peerid);
     if (it == peers.end()) {
         // No such peer
         return false;
     }
 
     // Make sure we don't move the time in the past.
     peers.modify(it, [&](Peer &p) {
         p.nextPossibleConflictTime =
             std::max(p.nextPossibleConflictTime, nextTime);
     });
 
     return it->nextPossibleConflictTime == nextTime;
 }
 
 template <typename ProofContainer>
 void PeerManager::moveToConflictingPool(const ProofContainer &proofs) {
     auto &peersView = peers.get<by_proofid>();
     for (const ProofRef &proof : proofs) {
         auto it = peersView.find(proof->getId());
         if (it != peersView.end()) {
             removePeer(it->peerid);
         }
 
         conflictingProofPool.addProofIfPreferred(proof);
     }
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::registerProof(const ProofRef &proof,
                                 ProofRegistrationState &registrationState,
                                 RegistrationMode mode) {
     assert(proof);
 
     const ProofId &proofid = proof->getId();
 
     auto invalidate = [&](ProofRegistrationResult result,
                           const std::string &message) {
         return registrationState.Invalid(
             result, message, strprintf("proofid: %s", proofid.ToString()));
     };
 
     if ((mode != RegistrationMode::FORCE_ACCEPT ||
          !isInConflictingPool(proofid)) &&
         exists(proofid)) {
         // In default mode, we expect the proof to be unknown, i.e. in none of
         // the pools.
         // In forced accept mode, the proof can be in the conflicting pool.
         return invalidate(ProofRegistrationResult::ALREADY_REGISTERED,
                           "proof-already-registered");
     }
 
     // Check the proof's validity.
     ProofValidationState validationState;
     if (!WITH_LOCK(cs_main,
                    return proof->verify(validationState,
                                         ::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip()))) {
         if (isOrphanState(validationState)) {
             // Only accept orphan proofs if there's room in the orphan pool.
             auto status = orphanProofPool.addProofIfNoConflict(proof);
             if (status != ProofPool::AddProofStatus::SUCCEED) {
                 // Attempt proof replacement
                 orphanProofPool.addProofIfPreferred(proof);
             } else if (orphanProofPool.countProofs() >
                        AVALANCHE_MAX_ORPHAN_PROOFS) {
                 // Adding this proof exceeds the orphan pool limit, so remove
                 // it.
                 orphanProofPool.removeProof(proof->getId());
             }
 
             return invalidate(ProofRegistrationResult::ORPHAN, "orphan-proof");
         }
 
         // Reject invalid proof.
         return invalidate(ProofRegistrationResult::INVALID, "invalid-proof");
     }
 
     auto now = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
     auto nextCooldownTimePoint =
         now + std::chrono::seconds(
                   gArgs.GetArg("-avalancheconflictingproofcooldown",
                                AVALANCHE_DEFAULT_CONFLICTING_PROOF_COOLDOWN));
 
     ProofPool::ConflictingProofSet conflictingProofs;
     switch (validProofPool.addProofIfNoConflict(proof, conflictingProofs)) {
         case ProofPool::AddProofStatus::REJECTED: {
             if (mode != RegistrationMode::FORCE_ACCEPT) {
                 auto bestPossibleConflictTime = std::chrono::seconds();
                 auto &pview = peers.get<by_proofid>();
                 for (auto &conflictingProof : conflictingProofs) {
                     auto it = pview.find(conflictingProof->getId());
                     assert(it != pview.end());
 
                     // Search the most recent time over the peers
                     bestPossibleConflictTime = std::max(
                         bestPossibleConflictTime, it->nextPossibleConflictTime);
 
                     updateNextPossibleConflictTime(it->peerid,
                                                    nextCooldownTimePoint);
                 }
 
                 if (bestPossibleConflictTime > now) {
                     // Cooldown not elapsed, reject the proof.
                     return invalidate(
                         ProofRegistrationResult::COOLDOWN_NOT_ELAPSED,
                         "cooldown-not-elapsed");
                 }
 
                 // If proof replacement is enabled, give the proof a chance to
                 // replace the conflicting ones.
                 if (gArgs.GetBoolArg(
                         "-enableavalancheproofreplacement",
                         AVALANCHE_DEFAULT_PROOF_REPLACEMENT_ENABLED)) {
                     if (validProofPool.addProofIfPreferred(proof)) {
                         // If we have overridden other proofs due to conflict,
                         // remove the peers and attempt to move them to the
                         // conflicting pool.
                         moveToConflictingPool(conflictingProofs);
 
                         // Replacement is successful, continue to peer creation
                         break;
                     }
                 }
 
                 // Not the preferred proof, or replacement is not enabled
                 return conflictingProofPool.addProofIfPreferred(proof) ==
                                ProofPool::AddProofStatus::REJECTED
                            ? invalidate(ProofRegistrationResult::REJECTED,
                                         "rejected-proof")
                            : invalidate(ProofRegistrationResult::CONFLICTING,
                                         "conflicting-utxos");
             }
 
             conflictingProofPool.removeProof(proofid);
 
             // Move the conflicting proofs from the valid pool to the
             // conflicting pool
             moveToConflictingPool(conflictingProofs);
 
             auto status = validProofPool.addProofIfNoConflict(proof);
             assert(status == ProofPool::AddProofStatus::SUCCEED);
 
             break;
         }
         case ProofPool::AddProofStatus::DUPLICATED:
             // If the proof was already in the pool, don't duplicate the peer.
             return invalidate(ProofRegistrationResult::ALREADY_REGISTERED,
                               "proof-already-registered");
         case ProofPool::AddProofStatus::SUCCEED:
             break;
 
             // No default case, so the compiler can warn about missing cases
     }
 
     // At this stage we are going to create a peer so the proof should never
     // exist in the conflicting pool, but use belt and suspenders.
     conflictingProofPool.removeProof(proofid);
 
     // New peer means new peerid!
     const PeerId peerid = nextPeerId++;
 
     // We have no peer for this proof, time to create it.
     auto inserted = peers.emplace(peerid, proof, nextCooldownTimePoint);
     assert(inserted.second);
 
     auto insertedRadixTree = shareableProofs.insert(proof);
     assert(insertedRadixTree);
 
     // Add to our registered score when adding to the peer list
     totalPeersScore += proof->getScore();
 
     // If there are nodes waiting for this proof, add them
     auto &pendingNodesView = pendingNodes.get<by_proofid>();
     auto range = pendingNodesView.equal_range(proofid);
 
     // We want to update the nodes then remove them from the pending set. That
     // will invalidate the range iterators, so we need to save the node ids
     // first before we can loop over them.
     std::vector<NodeId> nodeids;
     nodeids.reserve(std::distance(range.first, range.second));
     std::transform(range.first, range.second, std::back_inserter(nodeids),
                    [](const PendingNode &n) { return n.nodeid; });
 
     for (const NodeId &nodeid : nodeids) {
         addOrUpdateNode(inserted.first, nodeid);
     }
 
     return true;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::rejectProof(const ProofId &proofid, RejectionMode mode) {
     if (!exists(proofid)) {
         return false;
     }
 
     if (orphanProofPool.removeProof(proofid)) {
         return true;
     }
 
     if (mode == RejectionMode::DEFAULT &&
         conflictingProofPool.getProof(proofid)) {
         // In default mode we keep the proof in the conflicting pool
         return true;
     }
 
     if (mode == RejectionMode::INVALIDATE &&
         conflictingProofPool.removeProof(proofid)) {
         // In invalidate mode we remove the proof completely
         return true;
     }
 
     auto &pview = peers.get<by_proofid>();
     auto it = pview.find(proofid);
     assert(it != pview.end());
 
     const ProofRef proof = it->proof;
 
     if (!removePeer(it->peerid)) {
         return false;
     }
 
     // If there was conflicting proofs, attempt to pull them back
     for (const SignedStake &ss : proof->getStakes()) {
         const ProofRef conflictingProof =
             conflictingProofPool.getProof(ss.getStake().getUTXO());
         if (!conflictingProof) {
             continue;
         }
 
         conflictingProofPool.removeProof(conflictingProof->getId());
         registerProof(conflictingProof);
     }
 
     if (mode == RejectionMode::DEFAULT) {
         conflictingProofPool.addProofIfPreferred(proof);
     }
 
     return true;
 }
 
 NodeId PeerManager::selectNode() {
     for (int retry = 0; retry < SELECT_NODE_MAX_RETRY; retry++) {
         const PeerId p = selectPeer();
 
         // If we cannot find a peer, it may be due to the fact that it is
         // unlikely due to high fragmentation, so compact and retry.
         if (p == NO_PEER) {
             compact();
             continue;
         }
 
         // See if that peer has an available node.
         auto &nview = nodes.get<next_request_time>();
         auto it = nview.lower_bound(boost::make_tuple(p, TimePoint()));
         if (it != nview.end() && it->peerid == p &&
             it->nextRequestTime <= std::chrono::steady_clock::now()) {
             return it->nodeid;
         }
     }
 
     // We failed to find a node to query, flag this so we can request more
     needMoreNodes = true;
 
     return NO_NODE;
 }
 
-void PeerManager::updatedBlockTip() {
+std::unordered_set<ProofRef, SaltedProofHasher> PeerManager::updatedBlockTip() {
     std::vector<ProofId> invalidProofIds;
     std::vector<ProofRef> newOrphans;
 
     {
         LOCK(cs_main);
 
         const CCoinsViewCache &coins = ::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip();
         for (const auto &p : peers) {
             ProofValidationState state;
             if (!p.proof->verify(state, coins)) {
                 if (isOrphanState(state)) {
                     newOrphans.push_back(p.proof);
                 }
                 invalidProofIds.push_back(p.getProofId());
             }
         }
     }
 
     // Remove the invalid proofs before the orphans rescan. This makes it
     // possible to pull back proofs with utxos that conflicted with these
     // invalid proofs.
     for (const ProofId &invalidProofId : invalidProofIds) {
         rejectProof(invalidProofId, RejectionMode::INVALIDATE);
     }
 
-    orphanProofPool.rescan(*this);
+    auto registeredProofs = orphanProofPool.rescan(*this);
 
     for (auto &p : newOrphans) {
         orphanProofPool.addProofIfPreferred(p);
     }
+
+    return registeredProofs;
 }
 
 ProofRef PeerManager::getProof(const ProofId &proofid) const {
     ProofRef proof;
 
     forPeer(proofid, [&](const Peer &p) {
         proof = p.proof;
         return true;
     });
 
     if (!proof) {
         proof = conflictingProofPool.getProof(proofid);
     }
 
     if (!proof) {
         proof = orphanProofPool.getProof(proofid);
     }
 
     return proof;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::isBoundToPeer(const ProofId &proofid) const {
     auto &pview = peers.get<by_proofid>();
     return pview.find(proofid) != pview.end();
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::isOrphan(const ProofId &proofid) const {
     return orphanProofPool.getProof(proofid) != nullptr;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::isInConflictingPool(const ProofId &proofid) const {
     return conflictingProofPool.getProof(proofid) != nullptr;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::removePeer(const PeerId peerid) {
     auto it = peers.find(peerid);
     if (it == peers.end()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     // Remove all nodes from this peer.
     removeNodeFromPeer(it, it->node_count);
 
     auto &nview = nodes.get<next_request_time>();
 
     // Add the nodes to the pending set
     auto range = nview.equal_range(peerid);
     for (auto &nit = range.first; nit != range.second; ++nit) {
         pendingNodes.emplace(it->getProofId(), nit->nodeid);
     };
 
     // Remove nodes associated with this peer, unless their timeout is still
     // active. This ensure that we don't overquery them in case they are
     // subsequently added to another peer.
     nview.erase(nview.lower_bound(boost::make_tuple(peerid, TimePoint())),
                 nview.upper_bound(boost::make_tuple(
                     peerid, std::chrono::steady_clock::now())));
 
     // Release UTXOs attached to this proof.
     validProofPool.removeProof(it->getProofId());
 
     auto removed = shareableProofs.remove(Uint256RadixKey(it->getProofId()));
     assert(removed != nullptr);
 
     m_unbroadcast_proofids.erase(it->getProofId());
 
     // Remove the peer from the PeerSet and remove its score from the registered
     // score total.
     assert(totalPeersScore >= it->getScore());
     totalPeersScore -= it->getScore();
     peers.erase(it);
     return true;
 }
 
 PeerId PeerManager::selectPeer() const {
     if (slots.empty() || slotCount == 0) {
         return NO_PEER;
     }
 
     const uint64_t max = slotCount;
     for (int retry = 0; retry < SELECT_PEER_MAX_RETRY; retry++) {
         size_t i = selectPeerImpl(slots, GetRand(max), max);
         if (i != NO_PEER) {
             return i;
         }
     }
 
     return NO_PEER;
 }
 
 uint64_t PeerManager::compact() {
     // There is nothing to compact.
     if (fragmentation == 0) {
         return 0;
     }
 
     std::vector<Slot> newslots;
     newslots.reserve(peers.size());
 
     uint64_t prevStop = 0;
     uint32_t i = 0;
     for (auto it = peers.begin(); it != peers.end(); it++) {
         if (it->node_count == 0) {
             continue;
         }
 
         newslots.emplace_back(prevStop, it->getScore(), it->peerid);
         prevStop = slots[i].getStop();
         if (!peers.modify(it, [&](Peer &p) { p.index = i++; })) {
             return 0;
         }
     }
 
     slots = std::move(newslots);
 
     const uint64_t saved = slotCount - prevStop;
     slotCount = prevStop;
     fragmentation = 0;
 
     return saved;
 }
 
 bool PeerManager::verify() const {
     uint64_t prevStop = 0;
     uint32_t scoreFromSlots = 0;
     for (size_t i = 0; i < slots.size(); i++) {
         const Slot &s = slots[i];
 
         // Slots must be in correct order.
         if (s.getStart() < prevStop) {
             return false;
         }
 
         prevStop = s.getStop();
 
         // If this is a dead slot, then nothing more needs to be checked.
         if (s.getPeerId() == NO_PEER) {
             continue;
         }
 
         // We have a live slot, verify index.
         auto it = peers.find(s.getPeerId());
         if (it == peers.end() || it->index != i) {
             return false;
         }
 
         // Accumulate score across slots
         scoreFromSlots += slots[i].getScore();
     }
 
     // Score across slots must be the same as our allocated score
     if (scoreFromSlots != connectedPeersScore) {
         return false;
     }
 
     uint32_t scoreFromAllPeers = 0;
     uint32_t scoreFromPeersWithNodes = 0;
 
     std::unordered_set<COutPoint, SaltedOutpointHasher> peersUtxos;
     for (const auto &p : peers) {
         // Accumulate the score across peers to compare with total known score
         scoreFromAllPeers += p.getScore();
 
         // A peer should have a proof attached
         if (!p.proof) {
             return false;
         }
 
         // Check proof pool consistency
         for (const auto &ss : p.proof->getStakes()) {
             const COutPoint &outpoint = ss.getStake().getUTXO();
             auto proof = validProofPool.getProof(outpoint);
 
             if (!proof) {
                 // Missing utxo
                 return false;
             }
             if (proof != p.proof) {
                 // Wrong proof
                 return false;
             }
 
             if (!peersUtxos.emplace(outpoint).second) {
                 // Duplicated utxo
                 return false;
             }
         }
 
         // Count node attached to this peer.
         const auto count_nodes = [&]() {
             size_t count = 0;
             auto &nview = nodes.get<next_request_time>();
             auto begin =
                 nview.lower_bound(boost::make_tuple(p.peerid, TimePoint()));
             auto end =
                 nview.upper_bound(boost::make_tuple(p.peerid + 1, TimePoint()));
 
             for (auto it = begin; it != end; ++it) {
                 count++;
             }
 
             return count;
         };
 
         if (p.node_count != count_nodes()) {
             return false;
         }
 
         // If there are no nodes attached to this peer, then we are done.
         if (p.node_count == 0) {
             continue;
         }
 
         scoreFromPeersWithNodes += p.getScore();
         // The index must point to a slot refering to this peer.
         if (p.index >= slots.size() || slots[p.index].getPeerId() != p.peerid) {
             return false;
         }
 
         // If the score do not match, same thing.
         if (slots[p.index].getScore() != p.getScore()) {
             return false;
         }
 
         // Check the proof is in the radix tree
         if (shareableProofs.get(p.getProofId()) == nullptr) {
             return false;
         }
     }
 
     // Check our accumulated scores against our registred and allocated scores
     if (scoreFromAllPeers != totalPeersScore) {
         return false;
     }
     if (scoreFromPeersWithNodes != connectedPeersScore) {
         return false;
     }
 
     // We checked the utxo consistency for all our peers utxos already, so if
     // the pool size differs from the expected one there are dangling utxos.
     if (validProofPool.size() != peersUtxos.size()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     // Check there is no dangling proof in the radix tree
     return shareableProofs.forEachLeaf([&](RCUPtr<const Proof> pLeaf) {
         return isBoundToPeer(pLeaf->getId());
     });
 }
 
 PeerId selectPeerImpl(const std::vector<Slot> &slots, const uint64_t slot,
                       const uint64_t max) {
     assert(slot <= max);
 
     size_t begin = 0, end = slots.size();
     uint64_t bottom = 0, top = max;
 
     // Try to find the slot using dichotomic search.
     while ((end - begin) > 8) {
         // The slot we picked in not allocated.
         if (slot < bottom || slot >= top) {
             return NO_PEER;
         }
 
         // Guesstimate the position of the slot.
         size_t i = begin + ((slot - bottom) * (end - begin) / (top - bottom));
         assert(begin <= i && i < end);
 
         // We have a match.
         if (slots[i].contains(slot)) {
             return slots[i].getPeerId();
         }
 
         // We undershooted.
         if (slots[i].precedes(slot)) {
             begin = i + 1;
             if (begin >= end) {
                 return NO_PEER;
             }
 
             bottom = slots[begin].getStart();
             continue;
         }
 
         // We overshooted.
         if (slots[i].follows(slot)) {
             end = i;
             top = slots[end].getStart();
             continue;
         }
 
         // We have an unalocated slot.
         return NO_PEER;
     }
 
     // Enough of that nonsense, let fallback to linear search.
     for (size_t i = begin; i < end; i++) {
         // We have a match.
         if (slots[i].contains(slot)) {
             return slots[i].getPeerId();
         }
     }
 
     // We failed to find a slot, retry.
     return NO_PEER;
 }
 
 void PeerManager::addUnbroadcastProof(const ProofId &proofid) {
     // The proof should be bound to a peer
     if (isBoundToPeer(proofid)) {
         m_unbroadcast_proofids.insert(proofid);
     }
 }
 
 void PeerManager::removeUnbroadcastProof(const ProofId &proofid) {
     m_unbroadcast_proofids.erase(proofid);
 }
 
 void PeerManager::cleanupDanglingProofs() {
     const auto now = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>();
 
     std::vector<ProofId> danglingProofIds;
     for (const Peer &peer : peers) {
         // If the peer has been registered for some time and has no node
         // attached, discard it.
         if (peer.node_count == 0 &&
             (peer.registration_time + Peer::DANGLING_TIMEOUT) <= now) {
             danglingProofIds.push_back(peer.getProofId());
         }
     }
 
     for (const ProofId &proofid : danglingProofIds) {
         rejectProof(proofid, RejectionMode::INVALIDATE);
     }
 }
 
 } // namespace avalanche
diff --git a/src/avalanche/peermanager.h b/src/avalanche/peermanager.h
index a42a6e936..08c6e31f2 100644
--- a/src/avalanche/peermanager.h
+++ b/src/avalanche/peermanager.h
@@ -1,414 +1,414 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2020 The Bitcoin developers
 // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
 // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
 
 #ifndef BITCOIN_AVALANCHE_PEERMANAGER_H
 #define BITCOIN_AVALANCHE_PEERMANAGER_H
 
 #include <avalanche/node.h>
 #include <avalanche/proof.h>
 #include <avalanche/proofpool.h>
 #include <avalanche/proofradixtreeadapter.h>
 #include <coins.h>
 #include <consensus/validation.h>
 #include <pubkey.h>
 #include <radix.h>
 #include <salteduint256hasher.h>
 #include <util/time.h>
 
 #include <boost/multi_index/composite_key.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index/hashed_index.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index/mem_fun.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index/member.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index/ordered_index.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index_container.hpp>
 
 #include <atomic>
 #include <chrono>
 #include <cstdint>
 #include <memory>
 #include <unordered_set>
 #include <vector>
 
 class CScheduler;
 
 namespace avalanche {
 
 /**
  * Maximum number of orphan proofs the peer manager will accept from the
  * network. Under good conditions, this allows the node to collect relevant
  * proofs during IBD. Note that reorgs can cause the orphan pool to
  * temporarily exceed this limit. But a change in chaintip cause previously
  * reorged proofs to be trimmed.
  */
 static constexpr uint32_t AVALANCHE_MAX_ORPHAN_PROOFS = 4000;
 
 class Delegation;
 
 namespace {
     struct TestPeerManager;
 }
 
 struct Slot {
 private:
     uint64_t start;
     uint32_t score;
     PeerId peerid;
 
 public:
     Slot(uint64_t startIn, uint32_t scoreIn, PeerId peeridIn)
         : start(startIn), score(scoreIn), peerid(peeridIn) {}
 
     Slot withStart(uint64_t startIn) const {
         return Slot(startIn, score, peerid);
     }
     Slot withScore(uint64_t scoreIn) const {
         return Slot(start, scoreIn, peerid);
     }
     Slot withPeerId(PeerId peeridIn) const {
         return Slot(start, score, peeridIn);
     }
 
     uint64_t getStart() const { return start; }
     uint64_t getStop() const { return start + score; }
     uint32_t getScore() const { return score; }
     PeerId getPeerId() const { return peerid; }
 
     bool contains(uint64_t slot) const {
         return getStart() <= slot && slot < getStop();
     }
     bool precedes(uint64_t slot) const { return slot >= getStop(); }
     bool follows(uint64_t slot) const { return getStart() > slot; }
 };
 
 struct Peer {
     PeerId peerid;
     uint32_t index = -1;
     uint32_t node_count = 0;
 
     ProofRef proof;
 
     // The network stack uses timestamp in seconds, so we oblige.
     std::chrono::seconds registration_time;
     std::chrono::seconds nextPossibleConflictTime;
 
     /**
      * Consider dropping the peer if no node is attached after this timeout
      * expired.
      */
     static constexpr auto DANGLING_TIMEOUT = 15min;
 
     Peer(PeerId peerid_, ProofRef proof_,
          std::chrono::seconds nextPossibleConflictTime_)
         : peerid(peerid_), proof(std::move(proof_)),
           registration_time(GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>()),
           nextPossibleConflictTime(std::move(nextPossibleConflictTime_)) {}
 
     const ProofId &getProofId() const { return proof->getId(); }
     uint32_t getScore() const { return proof->getScore(); }
 };
 
 struct proof_index {
     using result_type = ProofId;
     result_type operator()(const Peer &p) const { return p.proof->getId(); }
 };
 
 struct score_index {
     using result_type = uint32_t;
     result_type operator()(const Peer &p) const { return p.getScore(); }
 };
 
 struct next_request_time {};
 
 struct PendingNode {
     ProofId proofid;
     NodeId nodeid;
 
     PendingNode(ProofId proofid_, NodeId nodeid_)
         : proofid(proofid_), nodeid(nodeid_){};
 };
 
 struct by_proofid;
 struct by_nodeid;
 struct by_score;
 
 enum class ProofRegistrationResult {
     NONE = 0,
     ALREADY_REGISTERED,
     ORPHAN,
     INVALID,
     CONFLICTING,
     REJECTED,
     COOLDOWN_NOT_ELAPSED,
 };
 
 class ProofRegistrationState : public ValidationState<ProofRegistrationResult> {
 };
 
 namespace bmi = boost::multi_index;
 
 class PeerManager {
     std::vector<Slot> slots;
     uint64_t slotCount = 0;
     uint64_t fragmentation = 0;
 
     /**
      * Several nodes can make an avalanche peer. In this case, all nodes are
      * considered interchangeable parts of the same peer.
      */
     using PeerSet = boost::multi_index_container<
         Peer, bmi::indexed_by<
                   // index by peerid
                   bmi::hashed_unique<bmi::member<Peer, PeerId, &Peer::peerid>>,
                   // index by proof
                   bmi::hashed_unique<bmi::tag<by_proofid>, proof_index,
                                      SaltedProofIdHasher>,
                   // ordered by score, decreasing order
                   bmi::ordered_non_unique<bmi::tag<by_score>, score_index,
                                           std::greater<uint32_t>>>>;
 
     PeerId nextPeerId = 0;
     PeerSet peers;
 
     ProofPool validProofPool;
     ProofPool conflictingProofPool;
     ProofPool orphanProofPool;
 
     using ProofRadixTree = RadixTree<const Proof, ProofRadixTreeAdapter>;
     ProofRadixTree shareableProofs;
 
     using NodeSet = boost::multi_index_container<
         Node,
         bmi::indexed_by<
             // index by nodeid
             bmi::hashed_unique<bmi::member<Node, NodeId, &Node::nodeid>>,
             // sorted by peerid/nextRequestTime
             bmi::ordered_non_unique<
                 bmi::tag<next_request_time>,
                 bmi::composite_key<
                     Node, bmi::member<Node, PeerId, &Node::peerid>,
                     bmi::member<Node, TimePoint, &Node::nextRequestTime>>>>>;
 
     NodeSet nodes;
 
     /**
      * Flag indicating that we failed to select a node and need to expand our
      * node set.
      */
     std::atomic<bool> needMoreNodes{false};
 
     using PendingNodeSet = boost::multi_index_container<
         PendingNode,
         bmi::indexed_by<
             // index by proofid
             bmi::hashed_non_unique<
                 bmi::tag<by_proofid>,
                 bmi::member<PendingNode, ProofId, &PendingNode::proofid>,
                 SaltedProofIdHasher>,
             // index by nodeid
             bmi::hashed_unique<
                 bmi::tag<by_nodeid>,
                 bmi::member<PendingNode, NodeId, &PendingNode::nodeid>>>>;
     PendingNodeSet pendingNodes;
 
     static constexpr int SELECT_PEER_MAX_RETRY = 3;
     static constexpr int SELECT_NODE_MAX_RETRY = 3;
 
     /**
      * Track proof ids to broadcast
      */
     std::unordered_set<ProofId, SaltedProofIdHasher> m_unbroadcast_proofids;
 
     /**
      * Quorum management.
      */
     uint32_t totalPeersScore = 0;
     uint32_t connectedPeersScore = 0;
 
 public:
     PeerManager(CScheduler &scheduler);
 
     /**
      * Node API.
      */
     bool addNode(NodeId nodeid, const ProofId &proofid);
     bool removeNode(NodeId nodeid);
     size_t getNodeCount() const { return nodes.size(); }
     size_t getPendingNodeCount() const { return pendingNodes.size(); }
 
     // Update when a node is to be polled next.
     bool updateNextRequestTime(NodeId nodeid, TimePoint timeout);
     /**
      * Flag that a node did send its compact proofs.
      * @return True if the flag changed state, i;e. if this is the first time
      * the message is accounted for this node.
      */
     bool latchAvaproofsSent(NodeId nodeid);
 
     // Randomly select a node to poll.
     NodeId selectNode();
 
     /**
      * Returns true if we encountered a lack of node since the last call.
      */
     bool shouldRequestMoreNodes() { return needMoreNodes.exchange(false); }
 
     template <typename Callable>
     bool forNode(NodeId nodeid, Callable &&func) const {
         auto it = nodes.find(nodeid);
         return it != nodes.end() && func(*it);
     }
 
     template <typename Callable>
     void forEachNode(const Peer &peer, Callable &&func) const {
         auto &nview = nodes.get<next_request_time>();
         auto range = nview.equal_range(peer.peerid);
         for (auto it = range.first; it != range.second; ++it) {
             func(*it);
         }
     }
 
     /**
      * Proof and Peer related API.
      */
 
     /**
      * Update the time before which a proof is not allowed to have conflicting
      * UTXO with this peer's proof.
      */
     bool updateNextPossibleConflictTime(PeerId peerid,
                                         const std::chrono::seconds &nextTime);
 
     /**
      * Registration mode
      *  - DEFAULT: Default policy, register only if the proof is unknown and has
      *    no conflict.
      *  - FORCE_ACCEPT: Turn a valid proof into a peer even if it has conflicts
      *    and is not the best candidate.
      */
     enum class RegistrationMode {
         DEFAULT,
         FORCE_ACCEPT,
     };
 
     bool registerProof(const ProofRef &proof,
                        ProofRegistrationState &registrationState,
                        RegistrationMode mode = RegistrationMode::DEFAULT);
     bool registerProof(const ProofRef &proof,
                        RegistrationMode mode = RegistrationMode::DEFAULT) {
         ProofRegistrationState dummy;
         return registerProof(proof, dummy, mode);
     }
 
     /**
      * Rejection mode
      *  - DEFAULT: Default policy, reject a proof and attempt to keep it in the
      *    conflicting pool if possible.
      *  - INVALIDATE: Reject a proof by removing it from any of the pool.
      *
      * In any case if a peer is rejected, it attempts to pull the conflicting
      * proofs back.
      */
     enum class RejectionMode {
         DEFAULT,
         INVALIDATE,
     };
 
     bool rejectProof(const ProofId &proofid,
                      RejectionMode mode = RejectionMode::DEFAULT);
 
     bool exists(const ProofId &proofid) const {
         return getProof(proofid) != nullptr;
     }
 
     template <typename Callable>
     bool forPeer(const ProofId &proofid, Callable &&func) const {
         auto &pview = peers.get<by_proofid>();
         auto it = pview.find(proofid);
         return it != pview.end() && func(*it);
     }
 
     template <typename Callable> void forEachPeer(Callable &&func) const {
         for (const auto &p : peers) {
             func(p);
         }
     }
 
     /**
      * Update the peer set when a new block is connected.
      */
-    void updatedBlockTip();
+    std::unordered_set<ProofRef, SaltedProofHasher> updatedBlockTip();
 
     /**
      * Proof broadcast API.
      */
     void addUnbroadcastProof(const ProofId &proofid);
     void removeUnbroadcastProof(const ProofId &proofid);
     auto getUnbroadcastProofs() const { return m_unbroadcast_proofids; }
 
     /*
      * Quorum management
      */
     uint32_t getTotalPeersScore() const { return totalPeersScore; }
     uint32_t getConnectedPeersScore() const { return connectedPeersScore; }
 
     /****************************************************
      * Functions which are public for testing purposes. *
      ****************************************************/
 
     /**
      * Remove an existing peer.
      */
     bool removePeer(const PeerId peerid);
 
     /**
      * Randomly select a peer to poll.
      */
     PeerId selectPeer() const;
 
     /**
      * Trigger maintenance of internal data structures.
      * Returns how much slot space was saved after compaction.
      */
     uint64_t compact();
 
     /**
      * Perform consistency check on internal data structures.
      */
     bool verify() const;
 
     // Accessors.
     uint64_t getSlotCount() const { return slotCount; }
     uint64_t getFragmentation() const { return fragmentation; }
 
     ProofRef getProof(const ProofId &proofid) const;
     bool isBoundToPeer(const ProofId &proofid) const;
     bool isOrphan(const ProofId &proofid) const;
     bool isInConflictingPool(const ProofId &proofid) const;
 
     const ProofRadixTree &getShareableProofsSnapshot() const {
         return shareableProofs;
     }
 
 private:
     template <typename ProofContainer>
     void moveToConflictingPool(const ProofContainer &proofs);
 
     bool addOrUpdateNode(const PeerSet::iterator &it, NodeId nodeid);
     bool addNodeToPeer(const PeerSet::iterator &it);
     bool removeNodeFromPeer(const PeerSet::iterator &it, uint32_t count = 1);
 
     void cleanupDanglingProofs();
 
     friend struct ::avalanche::TestPeerManager;
 };
 
 /**
  * Internal methods that are exposed for testing purposes.
  */
 PeerId selectPeerImpl(const std::vector<Slot> &slots, const uint64_t slot,
                       const uint64_t max);
 
 } // namespace avalanche
 
 #endif // BITCOIN_AVALANCHE_PEERMANAGER_H
diff --git a/src/avalanche/processor.cpp b/src/avalanche/processor.cpp
index 7bf3d4685..25f75374a 100644
--- a/src/avalanche/processor.cpp
+++ b/src/avalanche/processor.cpp
@@ -1,953 +1,960 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2018-2019 The Bitcoin developers
 // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
 // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
 
 #include <avalanche/processor.h>
 
 #include <avalanche/avalanche.h>
 #include <avalanche/delegationbuilder.h>
 #include <avalanche/peermanager.h>
 #include <avalanche/proofcomparator.h>
 #include <avalanche/validation.h>
 #include <avalanche/voterecord.h>
 #include <chain.h>
 #include <key_io.h> // For DecodeSecret
 #include <net.h>
 #include <netmessagemaker.h>
 #include <reverse_iterator.h>
 #include <scheduler.h>
 #include <util/bitmanip.h>
 #include <util/moneystr.h>
 #include <util/translation.h>
 #include <validation.h>
 
 #include <chrono>
 #include <limits>
 #include <tuple>
 
 /**
  * Run the avalanche event loop every 10ms.
  */
 static constexpr std::chrono::milliseconds AVALANCHE_TIME_STEP{10};
 
 // Unfortunately, the bitcoind codebase is full of global and we are kinda
 // forced into it here.
 std::unique_ptr<avalanche::Processor> g_avalanche;
 
 namespace avalanche {
 static bool VerifyProof(const Proof &proof, bilingual_str &error) {
     ProofValidationState proof_state;
 
     if (!proof.verify(proof_state)) {
         switch (proof_state.GetResult()) {
             case ProofValidationResult::NO_STAKE:
                 error = _("The avalanche proof has no stake.");
                 return false;
             case ProofValidationResult::DUST_THRESOLD:
                 error = _("The avalanche proof stake is too low.");
                 return false;
             case ProofValidationResult::DUPLICATE_STAKE:
                 error = _("The avalanche proof has duplicated stake.");
                 return false;
             case ProofValidationResult::INVALID_STAKE_SIGNATURE:
                 error = _("The avalanche proof has invalid stake signatures.");
                 return false;
             case ProofValidationResult::TOO_MANY_UTXOS:
                 error = strprintf(
                     _("The avalanche proof has too many utxos (max: %u)."),
                     AVALANCHE_MAX_PROOF_STAKES);
                 return false;
             default:
                 error = _("The avalanche proof is invalid.");
                 return false;
         }
     }
 
     return true;
 }
 
 static bool VerifyDelegation(const Delegation &dg,
                              const CPubKey &expectedPubKey,
                              bilingual_str &error) {
     DelegationState dg_state;
 
     CPubKey auth;
     if (!dg.verify(dg_state, auth)) {
         switch (dg_state.GetResult()) {
             case avalanche::DelegationResult::INVALID_SIGNATURE:
                 error = _("The avalanche delegation has invalid signatures.");
                 return false;
             case avalanche::DelegationResult::TOO_MANY_LEVELS:
                 error = _(
                     "The avalanche delegation has too many delegation levels.");
                 return false;
             default:
                 error = _("The avalanche delegation is invalid.");
                 return false;
         }
     }
 
     if (auth != expectedPubKey) {
         error = _(
             "The avalanche delegation does not match the expected public key.");
         return false;
     }
 
     return true;
 }
 
 struct Processor::PeerData {
     ProofRef proof;
     Delegation delegation;
 };
 
 class Processor::NotificationsHandler
     : public interfaces::Chain::Notifications {
     Processor *m_processor;
 
 public:
     NotificationsHandler(Processor *p) : m_processor(p) {}
 
     void updatedBlockTip() override {
-        LOCK(m_processor->cs_peerManager);
+        auto registerProofs = [&]() {
+            LOCK(m_processor->cs_peerManager);
 
-        if (m_processor->peerData && m_processor->peerData->proof) {
-            m_processor->peerManager->registerProof(
-                m_processor->peerData->proof);
-        }
+            if (m_processor->peerData && m_processor->peerData->proof) {
+                m_processor->peerManager->registerProof(
+                    m_processor->peerData->proof);
+            }
 
-        m_processor->peerManager->updatedBlockTip();
+            return m_processor->peerManager->updatedBlockTip();
+        };
+
+        auto registeredProofs = registerProofs();
+        for (const auto &proof : registeredProofs) {
+            m_processor->addProofToReconcile(proof);
+        }
     }
 };
 
 Processor::Processor(const ArgsManager &argsman, interfaces::Chain &chain,
                      CConnman *connmanIn, CScheduler &scheduler,
                      std::unique_ptr<PeerData> peerDataIn, CKey sessionKeyIn,
                      uint32_t minQuorumTotalScoreIn,
                      double minQuorumConnectedScoreRatioIn,
                      int64_t minAvaproofsNodeCountIn,
                      uint32_t staleVoteThresholdIn, uint32_t staleVoteFactorIn)
     : connman(connmanIn),
       queryTimeoutDuration(argsman.GetArg(
           "-avatimeout", AVALANCHE_DEFAULT_QUERY_TIMEOUT.count())),
       round(0), peerManager(std::make_unique<PeerManager>(scheduler)),
       peerData(std::move(peerDataIn)), sessionKey(std::move(sessionKeyIn)),
       minQuorumScore(minQuorumTotalScoreIn),
       minQuorumConnectedScoreRatio(minQuorumConnectedScoreRatioIn),
       minAvaproofsNodeCount(minAvaproofsNodeCountIn),
       staleVoteThreshold(staleVoteThresholdIn),
       staleVoteFactor(staleVoteFactorIn) {
     // Make sure we get notified of chain state changes.
     chainNotificationsHandler =
         chain.handleNotifications(std::make_shared<NotificationsHandler>(this));
 }
 
 Processor::~Processor() {
     chainNotificationsHandler.reset();
     stopEventLoop();
 }
 
 std::unique_ptr<Processor> Processor::MakeProcessor(const ArgsManager &argsman,
                                                     interfaces::Chain &chain,
                                                     CConnman *connman,
                                                     CScheduler &scheduler,
                                                     bilingual_str &error) {
     std::unique_ptr<PeerData> peerData;
     CKey masterKey;
     CKey sessionKey;
 
     if (argsman.IsArgSet("-avasessionkey")) {
         sessionKey = DecodeSecret(argsman.GetArg("-avasessionkey", ""));
         if (!sessionKey.IsValid()) {
             error = _("The avalanche session key is invalid.");
             return nullptr;
         }
     } else {
         // Pick a random key for the session.
         sessionKey.MakeNewKey(true);
     }
 
     if (argsman.IsArgSet("-avaproof")) {
         if (!argsman.IsArgSet("-avamasterkey")) {
             error = _(
                 "The avalanche master key is missing for the avalanche proof.");
             return nullptr;
         }
 
         masterKey = DecodeSecret(argsman.GetArg("-avamasterkey", ""));
         if (!masterKey.IsValid()) {
             error = _("The avalanche master key is invalid.");
             return nullptr;
         }
 
         auto proof = RCUPtr<Proof>::make();
         if (!Proof::FromHex(*proof, argsman.GetArg("-avaproof", ""), error)) {
             // error is set by FromHex
             return nullptr;
         }
 
         peerData = std::make_unique<PeerData>();
         peerData->proof = std::move(proof);
         if (!VerifyProof(*peerData->proof, error)) {
             // error is set by VerifyProof
             return nullptr;
         }
 
         std::unique_ptr<DelegationBuilder> dgb;
         const CPubKey &masterPubKey = masterKey.GetPubKey();
 
         if (argsman.IsArgSet("-avadelegation")) {
             Delegation dg;
             if (!Delegation::FromHex(dg, argsman.GetArg("-avadelegation", ""),
                                      error)) {
                 // error is set by FromHex()
                 return nullptr;
             }
 
             if (dg.getProofId() != peerData->proof->getId()) {
                 error = _("The delegation does not match the proof.");
                 return nullptr;
             }
 
             if (masterPubKey != dg.getDelegatedPubkey()) {
                 error = _(
                     "The master key does not match the delegation public key.");
                 return nullptr;
             }
 
             dgb = std::make_unique<DelegationBuilder>(dg);
         } else {
             if (masterPubKey != peerData->proof->getMaster()) {
                 error =
                     _("The master key does not match the proof public key.");
                 return nullptr;
             }
 
             dgb = std::make_unique<DelegationBuilder>(*peerData->proof);
         }
 
         // Generate the delegation to the session key.
         const CPubKey sessionPubKey = sessionKey.GetPubKey();
         if (sessionPubKey != masterPubKey) {
             if (!dgb->addLevel(masterKey, sessionPubKey)) {
                 error = _("Failed to generate a delegation for this session.");
                 return nullptr;
             }
         }
         peerData->delegation = dgb->build();
 
         if (!VerifyDelegation(peerData->delegation, sessionPubKey, error)) {
             // error is set by VerifyDelegation
             return nullptr;
         }
     }
 
     // Determine quorum parameters
     Amount minQuorumStake = AVALANCHE_DEFAULT_MIN_QUORUM_STAKE;
     if (argsman.IsArgSet("-avaminquorumstake") &&
         !ParseMoney(argsman.GetArg("-avaminquorumstake", ""), minQuorumStake)) {
         error = _("The avalanche min quorum stake amount is invalid.");
         return nullptr;
     }
 
     if (!MoneyRange(minQuorumStake)) {
         error = _("The avalanche min quorum stake amount is out of range.");
         return nullptr;
     }
 
     double minQuorumConnectedStakeRatio =
         AVALANCHE_DEFAULT_MIN_QUORUM_CONNECTED_STAKE_RATIO;
     if (argsman.IsArgSet("-avaminquorumconnectedstakeratio") &&
         !ParseDouble(argsman.GetArg("-avaminquorumconnectedstakeratio", ""),
                      &minQuorumConnectedStakeRatio)) {
         error = _("The avalanche min quorum connected stake ratio is invalid.");
         return nullptr;
     }
 
     if (minQuorumConnectedStakeRatio < 0 || minQuorumConnectedStakeRatio > 1) {
         error = _(
             "The avalanche min quorum connected stake ratio is out of range.");
         return nullptr;
     }
 
     int64_t minAvaproofsNodeCount =
         argsman.GetArg("-avaminavaproofsnodecount",
                        AVALANCHE_DEFAULT_MIN_AVAPROOFS_NODE_COUNT);
     if (minAvaproofsNodeCount < 0) {
         error = _("The minimum number of node that sent avaproofs message "
                   "should be non-negative");
         return nullptr;
     }
 
     // Determine voting parameters
     int64_t staleVoteThreshold = argsman.GetArg("-avastalevotethreshold",
                                                 AVALANCHE_VOTE_STALE_THRESHOLD);
     if (staleVoteThreshold < AVALANCHE_VOTE_STALE_MIN_THRESHOLD) {
         error = strprintf(_("The avalanche stale vote threshold must be "
                             "greater than or equal to %d"),
                           AVALANCHE_VOTE_STALE_MIN_THRESHOLD);
         return nullptr;
     }
     if (staleVoteThreshold > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) {
         error = strprintf(_("The avalanche stale vote threshold must be less "
                             "than or equal to %d"),
                           std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max());
         return nullptr;
     }
 
     int64_t staleVoteFactor =
         argsman.GetArg("-avastalevotefactor", AVALANCHE_VOTE_STALE_FACTOR);
     if (staleVoteFactor <= 0) {
         error = _("The avalanche stale vote factor must be greater than 0");
         return nullptr;
     }
     if (staleVoteFactor > std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()) {
         error = strprintf(_("The avalanche stale vote factor must be less than "
                             "or equal to %d"),
                           std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max());
         return nullptr;
     }
 
     // We can't use std::make_unique with a private constructor
     return std::unique_ptr<Processor>(new Processor(
         argsman, chain, connman, scheduler, std::move(peerData),
         std::move(sessionKey), Proof::amountToScore(minQuorumStake),
         minQuorumConnectedStakeRatio, minAvaproofsNodeCount, staleVoteThreshold,
         staleVoteFactor));
 }
 
 bool Processor::addBlockToReconcile(const CBlockIndex *pindex) {
     if (!pindex) {
         // isWorthPolling expects this to be non-null, so bail early.
         return false;
     }
 
     bool isAccepted;
     {
         LOCK(cs_main);
         if (!isWorthPolling(pindex)) {
             // There is no point polling this block.
             return false;
         }
 
         isAccepted = ::ChainActive().Contains(pindex);
     }
 
     return blockVoteRecords.getWriteView()
         ->insert(std::make_pair(pindex, VoteRecord(isAccepted)))
         .second;
 }
 
 bool Processor::addProofToReconcile(const ProofRef &proof) {
     if (!proof) {
         // isWorthPolling expects this to be non-null, so bail early.
         return false;
     }
 
     bool isAccepted;
     {
         LOCK(cs_peerManager);
         if (!isWorthPolling(proof)) {
             return false;
         }
 
         isAccepted = peerManager->isBoundToPeer(proof->getId());
     }
 
     return proofVoteRecords.getWriteView()
         ->insert(std::make_pair(proof, VoteRecord(isAccepted)))
         .second;
 }
 
 bool Processor::isAccepted(const CBlockIndex *pindex) const {
     if (!pindex) {
         // CBlockIndexWorkComparator expects this to be non-null, so bail early.
         return false;
     }
 
     auto r = blockVoteRecords.getReadView();
     auto it = r->find(pindex);
     if (it == r.end()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     return it->second.isAccepted();
 }
 
 bool Processor::isAccepted(const ProofRef &proof) const {
     auto r = proofVoteRecords.getReadView();
     auto it = r->find(proof);
     if (it == r.end()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     return it->second.isAccepted();
 }
 
 int Processor::getConfidence(const CBlockIndex *pindex) const {
     if (!pindex) {
         // CBlockIndexWorkComparator expects this to be non-null, so bail early.
         return -1;
     }
 
     auto r = blockVoteRecords.getReadView();
     auto it = r->find(pindex);
     if (it == r.end()) {
         return -1;
     }
 
     return it->second.getConfidence();
 }
 
 int Processor::getConfidence(const ProofRef &proof) const {
     auto r = proofVoteRecords.getReadView();
     auto it = r->find(proof);
     if (it == r.end()) {
         return -1;
     }
 
     return it->second.getConfidence();
 }
 
 namespace {
     /**
      * When using TCP, we need to sign all messages as the transport layer is
      * not secure.
      */
     class TCPResponse {
         Response response;
         SchnorrSig sig;
 
     public:
         TCPResponse(Response responseIn, const CKey &key)
             : response(std::move(responseIn)) {
             CHashWriter hasher(SER_GETHASH, 0);
             hasher << response;
             const uint256 hash = hasher.GetHash();
 
             // Now let's sign!
             if (!key.SignSchnorr(hash, sig)) {
                 sig.fill(0);
             }
         }
 
         // serialization support
         SERIALIZE_METHODS(TCPResponse, obj) {
             READWRITE(obj.response, obj.sig);
         }
     };
 } // namespace
 
 void Processor::sendResponse(CNode *pfrom, Response response) const {
     connman->PushMessage(
         pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(pfrom->GetCommonVersion())
                    .Make(NetMsgType::AVARESPONSE,
                          TCPResponse(std::move(response), sessionKey)));
 }
 
 bool Processor::registerVotes(NodeId nodeid, const Response &response,
                               std::vector<BlockUpdate> &blockUpdates,
                               std::vector<ProofUpdate> &proofUpdates,
                               int &banscore, std::string &error) {
     {
         // Save the time at which we can query again.
         LOCK(cs_peerManager);
 
         // FIXME: This will override the time even when we received an old stale
         // message. This should check that the message is indeed the most up to
         // date one before updating the time.
         peerManager->updateNextRequestTime(
             nodeid, std::chrono::steady_clock::now() +
                         std::chrono::milliseconds(response.getCooldown()));
     }
 
     std::vector<CInv> invs;
 
     {
         // Check that the query exists.
         auto w = queries.getWriteView();
         auto it = w->find(std::make_tuple(nodeid, response.getRound()));
         if (it == w.end()) {
             banscore = 2;
             error = "unexpected-ava-response";
             return false;
         }
 
         invs = std::move(it->invs);
         w->erase(it);
     }
 
     // Verify that the request and the vote are consistent.
     const std::vector<Vote> &votes = response.GetVotes();
     size_t size = invs.size();
     if (votes.size() != size) {
         banscore = 100;
         error = "invalid-ava-response-size";
         return false;
     }
 
     for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
         if (invs[i].hash != votes[i].GetHash()) {
             banscore = 100;
             error = "invalid-ava-response-content";
             return false;
         }
     }
 
     std::map<CBlockIndex *, Vote> responseIndex;
     std::map<ProofRef, Vote, ProofRefComparatorByAddress> responseProof;
 
     // At this stage we are certain that invs[i] matches votes[i], so we can use
     // the inv type to retrieve what is being voted on.
     for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
         if (invs[i].IsMsgBlk()) {
             CBlockIndex *pindex;
             {
                 LOCK(cs_main);
                 pindex = g_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(
                     BlockHash(votes[i].GetHash()));
                 if (!pindex) {
                     // This should not happen, but just in case...
                     continue;
                 }
 
                 if (!isWorthPolling(pindex)) {
                     // There is no point polling this block.
                     continue;
                 }
             }
 
             responseIndex.insert(std::make_pair(pindex, votes[i]));
         }
 
         if (invs[i].IsMsgProof()) {
             const ProofId proofid(votes[i].GetHash());
 
             ProofRef proof;
             {
                 LOCK(cs_peerManager);
                 proof = peerManager->getProof(proofid);
                 if (!proof) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
                 if (!isWorthPolling(proof)) {
                     continue;
                 }
             }
 
             responseProof.insert(std::make_pair(proof, votes[i]));
         }
     }
 
     // Thanks to C++14 generic lambdas, we can apply the same logic to various
     // parameter types sharing the same interface.
     auto registerVoteItems = [&](auto voteRecordsWriteView, auto &updates,
                                  auto responseItems) {
         // Register votes.
         for (const auto &p : responseItems) {
             auto item = p.first;
             const Vote &v = p.second;
 
             auto it = voteRecordsWriteView->find(item);
             if (it == voteRecordsWriteView.end()) {
                 // We are not voting on that item anymore.
                 continue;
             }
 
             auto &vr = it->second;
             if (!vr.registerVote(nodeid, v.GetError())) {
                 if (vr.isStale(staleVoteThreshold, staleVoteFactor)) {
                     updates.emplace_back(item, VoteStatus::Stale);
 
                     // Just drop stale votes. If we see this item again, we'll
                     // do a new vote.
                     voteRecordsWriteView->erase(it);
                 }
                 // This vote did not provide any extra information, move on.
                 continue;
             }
 
             if (!vr.hasFinalized()) {
                 // This item has note been finalized, so we have nothing more to
                 // do.
                 updates.emplace_back(item, vr.isAccepted()
                                                ? VoteStatus::Accepted
                                                : VoteStatus::Rejected);
                 continue;
             }
 
             // We just finalized a vote. If it is valid, then let the caller
             // know. Either way, remove the item from the map.
             updates.emplace_back(item, vr.isAccepted() ? VoteStatus::Finalized
                                                        : VoteStatus::Invalid);
             voteRecordsWriteView->erase(it);
         }
     };
 
     registerVoteItems(blockVoteRecords.getWriteView(), blockUpdates,
                       responseIndex);
     registerVoteItems(proofVoteRecords.getWriteView(), proofUpdates,
                       responseProof);
 
     return true;
 }
 
 CPubKey Processor::getSessionPubKey() const {
     return sessionKey.GetPubKey();
 }
 
 bool Processor::sendHello(CNode *pfrom) const {
     if (!peerData) {
         // We do not have a delegation to advertise.
         return false;
     }
 
     // Now let's sign!
     SchnorrSig sig;
 
     {
         const uint256 hash = buildLocalSighash(pfrom);
 
         if (!sessionKey.SignSchnorr(hash, sig)) {
             return false;
         }
     }
 
     connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(pfrom->GetCommonVersion())
                                     .Make(NetMsgType::AVAHELLO,
                                           Hello(peerData->delegation, sig)));
 
     pfrom->AddKnownProof(peerData->delegation.getProofId());
 
     return true;
 }
 
 ProofRef Processor::getLocalProof() const {
     return peerData ? peerData->proof : ProofRef();
 }
 
 bool Processor::startEventLoop(CScheduler &scheduler) {
     return eventLoop.startEventLoop(
         scheduler, [this]() { this->runEventLoop(); }, AVALANCHE_TIME_STEP);
 }
 
 bool Processor::stopEventLoop() {
     return eventLoop.stopEventLoop();
 }
 
 void Processor::avaproofsSent(NodeId nodeid) {
     if (::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
         // Before IBD is complete there is no way to make sure a proof is valid
         // or not, e.g. it can be spent in a block we don't know yet. In order
         // to increase confidence that our proof set is similar to other nodes
         // on the network, the messages received during IBD are not accounted.
         return;
     }
 
     LOCK(cs_peerManager);
     if (peerManager->latchAvaproofsSent(nodeid)) {
         avaproofsNodeCounter++;
     }
 }
 
 /*
  * Returns a bool indicating whether we have a usable Avalanche quorum enabling
  * us to take decisions based on polls.
  */
 bool Processor::isQuorumEstablished() {
     if (quorumIsEstablished) {
         return true;
     }
 
     // Don't do Avalanche while node is IBD'ing
     if (::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
         return false;
     }
 
     if (avaproofsNodeCounter < minAvaproofsNodeCount) {
         return false;
     }
 
     auto localProof = getLocalProof();
 
     // Get the registered proof score and registered score we have nodes for
     uint32_t totalPeersScore;
     uint32_t connectedPeersScore;
     {
         LOCK(cs_peerManager);
         totalPeersScore = peerManager->getTotalPeersScore();
         connectedPeersScore = peerManager->getConnectedPeersScore();
 
         // Consider that we are always connected to our proof, even if we are
         // the single node using that proof.
         if (localProof &&
             peerManager->forPeer(localProof->getId(), [](const Peer &peer) {
                 return peer.node_count == 0;
             })) {
             connectedPeersScore += localProof->getScore();
         }
     }
 
     // Ensure enough is being staked overall
     if (totalPeersScore < minQuorumScore) {
         return false;
     }
 
     // Ensure we have connected score for enough of the overall score
     uint32_t minConnectedScore =
         std::round(double(totalPeersScore) * minQuorumConnectedScoreRatio);
     if (connectedPeersScore < minConnectedScore) {
         return false;
     }
 
     quorumIsEstablished = true;
     return true;
 }
 
 void Processor::FinalizeNode(const Config &config, const CNode &node,
                              bool &update_connection_time) {
     WITH_LOCK(cs_peerManager, peerManager->removeNode(node.GetId()));
 }
 
 void Processor::runEventLoop() {
     // Don't poll if quorum hasn't been established yet
     if (!isQuorumEstablished()) {
         return;
     }
 
     // First things first, check if we have requests that timed out and clear
     // them.
     clearTimedoutRequests();
 
     // Make sure there is at least one suitable node to query before gathering
     // invs.
     NodeId nodeid = getSuitableNodeToQuery();
     if (nodeid == NO_NODE) {
         return;
     }
     std::vector<CInv> invs = getInvsForNextPoll();
     if (invs.empty()) {
         return;
     }
 
     do {
         /**
          * If we lost contact to that node, then we remove it from nodeids, but
          * never add the request to queries, which ensures bad nodes get cleaned
          * up over time.
          */
         bool hasSent = connman->ForNode(nodeid, [this, &invs](CNode *pnode) {
             uint64_t current_round = round++;
 
             {
                 // Compute the time at which this requests times out.
                 auto timeout =
                     std::chrono::steady_clock::now() + queryTimeoutDuration;
                 // Register the query.
                 queries.getWriteView()->insert(
                     {pnode->GetId(), current_round, timeout, invs});
                 // Set the timeout.
                 LOCK(cs_peerManager);
                 peerManager->updateNextRequestTime(pnode->GetId(), timeout);
             }
 
             pnode->m_avalanche_state->invsPolled(invs.size());
 
             // Send the query to the node.
             connman->PushMessage(
                 pnode, CNetMsgMaker(pnode->GetCommonVersion())
                            .Make(NetMsgType::AVAPOLL,
                                  Poll(current_round, std::move(invs))));
             return true;
         });
 
         // Success!
         if (hasSent) {
             return;
         }
 
         {
             // This node is obsolete, delete it.
             LOCK(cs_peerManager);
             peerManager->removeNode(nodeid);
         }
 
         // Get next suitable node to try again
         nodeid = getSuitableNodeToQuery();
     } while (nodeid != NO_NODE);
 }
 
 void Processor::clearTimedoutRequests() {
     auto now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
     std::map<CInv, uint8_t> timedout_items{};
 
     {
         // Clear expired requests.
         auto w = queries.getWriteView();
         auto it = w->get<query_timeout>().begin();
         while (it != w->get<query_timeout>().end() && it->timeout < now) {
             for (const auto &i : it->invs) {
                 timedout_items[i]++;
             }
 
             w->get<query_timeout>().erase(it++);
         }
     }
 
     if (timedout_items.empty()) {
         return;
     }
 
     auto clearInflightRequest = [&](auto &voteRecords, const auto &voteItem,
                                     uint8_t count) {
         if (!voteItem) {
             return false;
         }
 
         auto voteRecordsWriteView = voteRecords.getWriteView();
         auto it = voteRecordsWriteView->find(voteItem);
         if (it == voteRecordsWriteView.end()) {
             return false;
         }
 
         it->second.clearInflightRequest(count);
 
         return true;
     };
 
     // In flight request accounting.
     for (const auto &p : timedout_items) {
         const CInv &inv = p.first;
         if (inv.IsMsgBlk()) {
             const CBlockIndex *pindex = WITH_LOCK(
                 cs_main, return g_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(
                              BlockHash(inv.hash)));
 
             if (!clearInflightRequest(blockVoteRecords, pindex, p.second)) {
                 continue;
             }
         }
 
         if (inv.IsMsgProof()) {
             const ProofRef proof =
                 WITH_LOCK(cs_peerManager,
                           return peerManager->getProof(ProofId(inv.hash)));
 
             if (!clearInflightRequest(proofVoteRecords, proof, p.second)) {
                 continue;
             }
         }
     }
 }
 
 std::vector<CInv> Processor::getInvsForNextPoll(bool forPoll) {
     std::vector<CInv> invs;
 
     // Use NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS to avoid false positive due to
     // isWorthPolling requiring a different lock depending of the prototype.
     auto removeItemsNotWorthPolling =
         [&](auto &itemVoteRecords) NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS {
             auto w = itemVoteRecords.getWriteView();
             for (auto it = w->begin(); it != w->end();) {
                 if (!isWorthPolling(it->first)) {
                     it = w->erase(it);
                 } else {
                     ++it;
                 }
             }
         };
 
     auto extractVoteRecordsToInvs = [&](const auto &itemVoteRecordRange,
                                         auto buildInvFromVoteItem) {
         for (const auto &[item, voteRecord] : itemVoteRecordRange) {
             if (invs.size() >= AVALANCHE_MAX_ELEMENT_POLL) {
                 // Make sure we do not produce more invs than specified by the
                 // protocol.
                 return true;
             }
 
             const bool shouldPoll =
                 forPoll ? voteRecord.registerPoll() : voteRecord.shouldPoll();
 
             if (!shouldPoll) {
                 continue;
             }
 
             invs.emplace_back(buildInvFromVoteItem(item));
         }
 
         return invs.size() >= AVALANCHE_MAX_ELEMENT_POLL;
     };
 
     // First remove all proofs that are not worth polling.
     WITH_LOCK(cs_peerManager, removeItemsNotWorthPolling(proofVoteRecords));
 
     if (extractVoteRecordsToInvs(proofVoteRecords.getReadView(),
                                  [](const ProofRef &proof) {
                                      return CInv(MSG_AVA_PROOF, proof->getId());
                                  })) {
         // The inventory vector is full, we're done
         return invs;
     }
 
     // First remove all blocks that are not worth polling.
     WITH_LOCK(cs_main, removeItemsNotWorthPolling(blockVoteRecords));
 
     auto r = blockVoteRecords.getReadView();
     extractVoteRecordsToInvs(reverse_iterate(r), [](const CBlockIndex *pindex) {
         return CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash());
     });
 
     return invs;
 }
 
 NodeId Processor::getSuitableNodeToQuery() {
     LOCK(cs_peerManager);
     return peerManager->selectNode();
 }
 
 uint256 Processor::buildLocalSighash(CNode *pfrom) const {
     CHashWriter hasher(SER_GETHASH, 0);
     hasher << peerData->delegation.getId();
     hasher << pfrom->GetLocalNonce();
     hasher << pfrom->nRemoteHostNonce;
     hasher << pfrom->GetLocalExtraEntropy();
     hasher << pfrom->nRemoteExtraEntropy;
     return hasher.GetHash();
 }
 
 bool Processor::isWorthPolling(const CBlockIndex *pindex) const {
     AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
 
     if (pindex->nStatus.isInvalid()) {
         // No point polling invalid blocks.
         return false;
     }
 
     if (::ChainstateActive().IsBlockFinalized(pindex)) {
         // There is no point polling finalized block.
         return false;
     }
 
     return true;
 }
 
 bool Processor::isWorthPolling(const ProofRef &proof) const {
     AssertLockHeld(cs_peerManager);
 
     if (!gArgs.GetBoolArg("-enableavalancheproofreplacement",
                           AVALANCHE_DEFAULT_PROOF_REPLACEMENT_ENABLED)) {
         // If proof replacement is not enabled there is no point dealing
         // with proof polling, so we're done.
         return false;
     }
 
     const ProofId &proofid = proof->getId();
 
     // No point polling orphans or discarded proofs
     return peerManager->isBoundToPeer(proofid) ||
            peerManager->isInConflictingPool(proofid);
 }
 
 } // namespace avalanche
diff --git a/src/avalanche/proofpool.cpp b/src/avalanche/proofpool.cpp
index 81ad06bef..0379e2f9b 100644
--- a/src/avalanche/proofpool.cpp
+++ b/src/avalanche/proofpool.cpp
@@ -1,138 +1,141 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2021 The Bitcoin developers
 // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
 // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
 
 #include <avalanche/proofpool.h>
 
 #include <avalanche/peermanager.h>
 #include <avalanche/proofcomparator.h>
 
 #include <unordered_set>
 
 namespace avalanche {
 
 ProofPool::AddProofStatus
 ProofPool::addProofIfNoConflict(const ProofRef &proof,
                                 ConflictingProofSet &conflictingProofs) {
     const ProofId &proofid = proof->getId();
 
     // Make sure the set is empty before we add items
     conflictingProofs.clear();
 
     auto &poolView = pool.get<by_proofid>();
     if (poolView.find(proofid) != poolView.end()) {
         return AddProofStatus::DUPLICATED;
     }
 
     // Attach UTXOs to this proof.
     for (size_t i = 0; i < proof->getStakes().size(); i++) {
         auto p = pool.emplace(i, proof);
         if (!p.second) {
             // We have a collision with an existing proof.
             conflictingProofs.insert(p.first->proof);
         }
     }
 
     // If there is a conflict, just cleanup the mess.
     if (conflictingProofs.size() > 0) {
         for (const auto &s : proof->getStakes()) {
             auto it = pool.find(s.getStake().getUTXO());
             assert(it != pool.end());
 
             // We need to delete that one.
             if (it->proof->getId() == proofid) {
                 pool.erase(it);
             }
         }
 
         return AddProofStatus::REJECTED;
     }
 
     cacheClean = false;
     return AddProofStatus::SUCCEED;
 }
 
 ProofPool::AddProofStatus
 ProofPool::addProofIfPreferred(const ProofRef &proof,
                                ConflictingProofSet &conflictingProofs) {
     auto status = addProofIfNoConflict(proof, conflictingProofs);
 
     // In case the proof was rejected due to conflict and it is the best
     // candidate, override the conflicting ones and add it again
     if (status != AddProofStatus::REJECTED ||
         ConflictingProofComparator()(*conflictingProofs.begin(), proof)) {
         return status;
     }
 
     for (auto &conflictingProof : conflictingProofs) {
         removeProof(conflictingProof->getId());
     }
 
     status = addProofIfNoConflict(proof);
     assert(status == AddProofStatus::SUCCEED);
 
     cacheClean = false;
     return AddProofStatus::SUCCEED;
 }
 
 // Having the ProofId passed by reference is risky because it is usually a
 // reference to a proof member. This proof will be deleted during the erasure
 // loop so we pass it by value.
 bool ProofPool::removeProof(ProofId proofid) {
     cacheClean = false;
     auto &poolView = pool.get<by_proofid>();
     return poolView.erase(proofid);
 }
 
-void ProofPool::rescan(PeerManager &peerManager) {
+std::unordered_set<ProofRef, SaltedProofHasher>
+ProofPool::rescan(PeerManager &peerManager) {
     auto previousPool = std::move(pool);
     pool.clear();
     cacheClean = false;
 
     std::unordered_set<ProofRef, SaltedProofHasher> registeredProofs;
     for (auto &entry : previousPool) {
         if (registeredProofs.insert(entry.proof).second) {
             peerManager.registerProof(entry.proof);
         }
     }
+
+    return registeredProofs;
 }
 
 ProofRef ProofPool::getProof(const ProofId &proofid) const {
     auto &poolView = pool.get<by_proofid>();
     auto it = poolView.find(proofid);
     return it == poolView.end() ? ProofRef() : it->proof;
 }
 
 ProofRef ProofPool::getProof(const COutPoint &outpoint) const {
     auto it = pool.find(outpoint);
     return it == pool.end() ? ProofRef() : it->proof;
 }
 
 ProofRef ProofPool::getLowestScoreProof() const {
     auto &poolView = pool.get<by_proof_score>();
     return poolView.rbegin() == poolView.rend() ? ProofRef()
                                                 : poolView.rbegin()->proof;
 }
 
 size_t ProofPool::countProofs() {
     if (cacheClean) {
         return cacheProofCount;
     }
 
     size_t count = 0;
     ProofId lastProofId;
     auto &poolView = pool.get<by_proofid>();
     for (auto it = poolView.begin(); it != poolView.end(); it++) {
         const ProofId &proofId = it->proof->getId();
         if (lastProofId != proofId) {
             lastProofId = proofId;
             count++;
         }
     }
 
     cacheProofCount = count;
     cacheClean = true;
     return cacheProofCount;
 }
 
 } // namespace avalanche
diff --git a/src/avalanche/proofpool.h b/src/avalanche/proofpool.h
index ba027141b..5ddf7bf55 100644
--- a/src/avalanche/proofpool.h
+++ b/src/avalanche/proofpool.h
@@ -1,124 +1,125 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2021 The Bitcoin developers
 // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
 // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
 
 #ifndef BITCOIN_AVALANCHE_PROOFPOOL_H
 #define BITCOIN_AVALANCHE_PROOFPOOL_H
 
 #include <avalanche/proof.h>
 #include <avalanche/proofcomparator.h>
 #include <avalanche/proofid.h>
 #include <coins.h>
 #include <primitives/transaction.h>
 
 #include <boost/multi_index/hashed_index.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index/mem_fun.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index/member.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index/ordered_index.hpp>
 #include <boost/multi_index_container.hpp>
 
 #include <cstdint>
 
 namespace avalanche {
 
 class PeerManager;
 
 struct ProofPoolEntry {
     size_t utxoIndex;
     ProofRef proof;
 
     const COutPoint &getUTXO() const {
         return proof->getStakes().at(utxoIndex).getStake().getUTXO();
     }
 
     ProofPoolEntry(size_t _utxoIndex, ProofRef _proof)
         : utxoIndex(_utxoIndex), proof(std::move(_proof)) {}
 };
 
 struct by_utxo;
 struct by_proofid;
 struct by_proof_score;
 
 struct ProofPoolEntryProofIdKeyExtractor {
     using result_type = ProofId;
     result_type operator()(const ProofPoolEntry &entry) const {
         return entry.proof->getId();
     }
 };
 
 namespace bmi = boost::multi_index;
 
 /**
  * Map a proof to each utxo. A proof can be mapped with several utxos.
  */
 class ProofPool {
     boost::multi_index_container<
         ProofPoolEntry,
         bmi::indexed_by<
             // index by utxo
             bmi::hashed_unique<
                 bmi::tag<by_utxo>,
                 bmi::const_mem_fun<ProofPoolEntry, const COutPoint &,
                                    &ProofPoolEntry::getUTXO>,
                 SaltedOutpointHasher>,
             // index by proofid
             bmi::hashed_non_unique<bmi::tag<by_proofid>,
                                    ProofPoolEntryProofIdKeyExtractor,
                                    SaltedProofIdHasher>,
             // index by proof score
             bmi::ordered_non_unique<
                 bmi::tag<by_proof_score>,
                 bmi::member<ProofPoolEntry, ProofRef, &ProofPoolEntry::proof>,
                 ProofComparatorByScore>>>
         pool;
 
     bool cacheClean = true;
     size_t cacheProofCount = 0;
 
 public:
     enum AddProofStatus {
         REJECTED = 0,   //!< Rejected due to conflicts
         SUCCEED = 1,    //!< Added successfully
         DUPLICATED = 2, //!< Already in pool
     };
 
     using ConflictingProofSet = std::set<ProofRef, ConflictingProofComparator>;
 
     /**
      * Attempt to add a proof to the pool, and fail if there is a conflict on
      * any UTXO.
      */
     AddProofStatus addProofIfNoConflict(const ProofRef &proof,
                                         ConflictingProofSet &conflictingProofs);
     AddProofStatus addProofIfNoConflict(const ProofRef &proof) {
         ConflictingProofSet dummy;
         return addProofIfNoConflict(proof, dummy);
     }
 
     /**
      * Attempt to add a proof to the pool. In case there is a conflict with one
      * or more UTXO, the proof is only added if it is the best candidate over
      * all the conflicting proofs according to ConflictingProofComparator.
      */
     AddProofStatus addProofIfPreferred(const ProofRef &proof,
                                        ConflictingProofSet &conflictingProofs);
     AddProofStatus addProofIfPreferred(const ProofRef &proof) {
         ConflictingProofSet dummy;
         return addProofIfPreferred(proof, dummy);
     }
 
     bool removeProof(ProofId proofid);
 
-    void rescan(PeerManager &peerManager);
+    std::unordered_set<ProofRef, SaltedProofHasher>
+    rescan(PeerManager &peerManager);
 
     ProofRef getProof(const ProofId &proofid) const;
     ProofRef getProof(const COutPoint &outpoint) const;
     ProofRef getLowestScoreProof() const;
 
     size_t size() const { return pool.size(); }
     size_t countProofs();
 };
 
 } // namespace avalanche
 
 #endif // BITCOIN_AVALANCHE_PROOFPOOL_H
diff --git a/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_proof_voting.py b/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_proof_voting.py
index edd6a3b70..d7b027fd8 100755
--- a/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_proof_voting.py
+++ b/test/functional/abc_p2p_avalanche_proof_voting.py
@@ -1,483 +1,509 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 # Copyright (c) 2021 The Bitcoin developers
 # Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
 # file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
 """Test the resolution of conflicting proofs via avalanche."""
 import time
 
 from test_framework.avatools import (
     avalanche_proof_from_hex,
     create_coinbase_stakes,
     gen_proof,
     get_ava_p2p_interface,
     get_proof_ids,
 )
 from test_framework.key import ECPubKey
 from test_framework.messages import (
     MSG_AVA_PROOF,
     AvalancheProofVoteResponse,
     AvalancheVote,
 )
 from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework
 from test_framework.util import (
     assert_equal,
     assert_greater_than,
     assert_raises_rpc_error,
     try_rpc,
 )
 from test_framework.wallet_util import bytes_to_wif
 
 QUORUM_NODE_COUNT = 16
 
 
 class AvalancheProofVotingTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
     def set_test_params(self):
         self.setup_clean_chain = True
         self.num_nodes = 1
         self.conflicting_proof_cooldown = 100
         self.peer_replacement_cooldown = 2000
         self.extra_args = [
             ['-enableavalanche=1',
              '-enableavalancheproofreplacement=1',
              '-avaproofstakeutxoconfirmations=1',
                 f'-avalancheconflictingproofcooldown={self.conflicting_proof_cooldown}', f'-avalanchepeerreplacementcooldown={self.peer_replacement_cooldown}', '-avacooldown=0', '-avastalevotethreshold=140', '-avastalevotefactor=1'],
         ]
         self.supports_cli = False
 
     # Build a fake quorum of nodes.
     def get_quorum(self, node):
         quorum = [get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
                   for _ in range(0, QUORUM_NODE_COUNT)]
 
         for n in quorum:
             success = node.addavalanchenode(
                 n.nodeid,
                 self.privkey.get_pubkey().get_bytes().hex(),
                 self.quorum_proof.serialize().hex(),
             )
             assert success is True
 
         return quorum
 
     def can_find_proof_in_poll(self, hash, response):
         found_hash = False
         for n in self.quorum:
             poll = n.get_avapoll_if_available()
 
             # That node has not received a poll
             if poll is None:
                 continue
 
             # We got a poll, check for the hash and repond
             votes = []
             for inv in poll.invs:
                 # Vote yes to everything
                 r = AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE
 
                 # Look for what we expect
                 if inv.hash == hash:
                     r = response
                     found_hash = True
 
                 votes.append(AvalancheVote(r, inv.hash))
 
             n.send_avaresponse(poll.round, votes, self.privkey)
 
         return found_hash
 
     @staticmethod
     def send_proof(from_peer, proof_hex):
         proof = avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_hex)
         from_peer.send_avaproof(proof)
         return proof.proofid
 
     def send_and_check_for_polling(self, peer,
                                    proof_hex, response=AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE):
         proofid = self.send_proof(peer, proof_hex)
         self.wait_until(lambda: self.can_find_proof_in_poll(proofid, response))
 
     def build_conflicting_proof(self, node, sequence):
         return node.buildavalancheproof(
             sequence, 0, self.privkey_wif, self.conflicting_stakes)
 
     def run_test(self):
         node = self.nodes[0]
 
         self.privkey, self.quorum_proof = gen_proof(node)
         self.privkey_wif = bytes_to_wif(self.privkey.get_bytes())
 
         self.quorum = self.get_quorum(node)
 
         addrkey0 = node.get_deterministic_priv_key()
         blockhash = node.generatetoaddress(10, addrkey0.address)
         self.conflicting_stakes = create_coinbase_stakes(
             node, blockhash[5:], addrkey0.key)
 
         self.poll_tests(node)
         self.update_tests(node)
         self.vote_tests(node)
         self.stale_proof_tests(node)
+        self.unorphan_poll_tests(node)
 
     def poll_tests(self, node):
         proof_seq10 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 10)
         proof_seq20 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 20)
         proof_seq30 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 30)
         proof_seq40 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 40)
 
         orphan = node.buildavalancheproof(
             100, 2000000000, self.privkey_wif, [{
                 'txid': '0' * 64,
                 'vout': 0,
                 'amount': 10e6,
                 'height': 42,
                 'iscoinbase': False,
                 'privatekey': self.privkey_wif,
             }]
         )
 
         no_stake = node.buildavalancheproof(
             200, 2000000000, self.privkey_wif, []
         )
 
         # Get the key so we can verify signatures.
         avakey = ECPubKey()
         avakey.set(bytes.fromhex(node.getavalanchekey()))
 
         self.log.info("Trigger polling from the node...")
 
         peer = get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
 
         mock_time = int(time.time())
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         self.log.info("Check we poll for valid proof")
         self.send_and_check_for_polling(peer, proof_seq30)
 
         self.log.info(
             "Check we don't poll for subsequent proofs if the cooldown is not elapsed, proof not the favorite")
         with node.assert_debug_log(["Not polling the avalanche proof (cooldown-not-elapsed)"]):
             peer.send_avaproof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq20))
 
         self.log.info(
             "Check we don't poll for subsequent proofs if the cooldown is not elapsed, proof is the favorite")
         with node.assert_debug_log(["Not polling the avalanche proof (cooldown-not-elapsed)"]):
             peer.send_avaproof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq40))
 
         self.log.info(
             "Check we poll for conflicting proof if the proof is not the favorite")
         mock_time += self.conflicting_proof_cooldown
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
         self.send_and_check_for_polling(
             peer, proof_seq20, response=AvalancheProofVoteResponse.REJECTED)
 
         self.log.info(
             "Check we poll for conflicting proof if the proof is the favorite")
         mock_time += self.conflicting_proof_cooldown
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
         self.send_and_check_for_polling(peer, proof_seq40)
 
         mock_time += self.conflicting_proof_cooldown
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         self.log.info("Check we don't poll for orphans")
         with node.assert_debug_log(["Not polling the avalanche proof (orphan-proof)"]):
             peer.send_avaproof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(orphan))
 
         self.log.info("Check we don't poll for proofs that get rejected")
         with node.assert_debug_log(["Not polling the avalanche proof (rejected-proof)"]):
             peer.send_avaproof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq10))
 
         self.log.info("Check we don't poll for invalid proofs and get banned")
         with node.assert_debug_log(["Misbehaving", "invalid-proof"]):
             peer.send_avaproof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(no_stake))
         peer.wait_for_disconnect()
 
         self.log.info("We don't poll for proofs if replacement is disabled")
 
         self.restart_node(
             0,
             extra_args=self.extra_args[0] +
             ['-enableavalancheproofreplacement=0'])
         peer = get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
         with node.assert_debug_log(["Not polling the avalanche proof (not-worth-polling)"]):
             peer.send_avaproof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq10))
 
     def update_tests(self, node):
         # Restart the node to get rid of in-flight requests
         self.restart_node(0)
 
         mock_time = int(time.time())
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         self.quorum = self.get_quorum(node)
         peer = get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
 
         proof_seq30 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 30)
         proof_seq40 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 40)
         proof_seq50 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 50)
         proofid_seq30 = avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq30).proofid
         proofid_seq40 = avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq40).proofid
         proofid_seq50 = avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq50).proofid
 
         node.sendavalancheproof(proof_seq40)
         self.wait_until(lambda: proofid_seq40 in get_proof_ids(node))
 
         assert proofid_seq40 in get_proof_ids(node)
         assert proofid_seq30 not in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         self.log.info("Test proof acceptance")
 
         def accept_proof(proofid):
             self.wait_until(lambda: self.can_find_proof_in_poll(
                 proofid, response=AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE), timeout=5)
             return proofid in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         mock_time += self.conflicting_proof_cooldown
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         self.send_and_check_for_polling(peer, proof_seq30)
 
         # Let the quorum vote for it
         self.wait_until(lambda: accept_proof(proofid_seq30))
         assert proofid_seq40 not in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         self.log.info("Test the peer replacement rate limit")
 
         # Wait until proof_seq30 is finalized
         retry = 5
         while retry > 0:
             try:
                 with node.assert_debug_log([f"Avalanche finalized proof {proofid_seq30:0{64}x}"]):
                     self.wait_until(lambda: not self.can_find_proof_in_poll(
                         proofid_seq30, response=AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE))
                 break
             except AssertionError:
                 retry -= 1
 
         assert_greater_than(retry, 0)
 
         # Not enough
         assert self.conflicting_proof_cooldown < self.peer_replacement_cooldown
         mock_time += self.conflicting_proof_cooldown
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         peer = get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
 
         with node.assert_debug_log(["Not polling the avalanche proof (cooldown-not-elapsed)"]):
             self.send_proof(peer, proof_seq50)
 
         mock_time += self.peer_replacement_cooldown
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         self.log.info("Test proof rejection")
 
         self.send_proof(peer, proof_seq50)
         self.wait_until(lambda: proofid_seq50 in get_proof_ids(node))
         assert proofid_seq40 not in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         def reject_proof(proofid):
             self.wait_until(
                 lambda: self.can_find_proof_in_poll(
                     proofid, response=AvalancheProofVoteResponse.REJECTED))
             return proofid not in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         self.wait_until(lambda: reject_proof(proofid_seq50))
 
         assert proofid_seq50 not in get_proof_ids(node)
         assert proofid_seq40 in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         self.log.info("Test proof invalidation")
 
         def invalidate_proof(proofid):
             self.wait_until(
                 lambda: self.can_find_proof_in_poll(
                     proofid, response=AvalancheProofVoteResponse.REJECTED))
             return try_rpc(-8, "Proof not found",
                            node.getrawavalancheproof, f"{proofid:0{64}x}")
 
         self.wait_until(lambda: invalidate_proof(proofid_seq50))
 
         self.log.info("The node will now ignore the invalid proof")
 
         for i in range(5):
             with node.assert_debug_log(["received: avaproof"]):
                 self.send_proof(peer, proof_seq50)
             assert_raises_rpc_error(-8,
                                     "Proof not found",
                                     node.getrawavalancheproof,
                                     f"{proofid_seq50:0{64}x}")
 
     def vote_tests(self, node):
         self.restart_node(0, extra_args=['-enableavalanche=1',
                                          '-avaproofstakeutxoconfirmations=1',
                                          '-avacooldown=0',
                                          '-avalancheconflictingproofcooldown=0',
                                          '-whitelist=noban@127.0.0.1', ])
 
         ava_node = get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
 
         # Generate coinbases to use for stakes
         stakes_key = node.get_deterministic_priv_key()
         blocks = node.generatetoaddress(4, stakes_key.address)
 
         # Get the ava key so we can verify signatures.
         ava_key = ECPubKey()
         ava_key.set(bytes.fromhex(node.getavalanchekey()))
 
         def create_proof(stakes):
             proof = node.buildavalancheproof(11, 12, self.privkey_wif, stakes)
             proof_id = avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof).proofid
             return proof, proof_id
 
         # proof_0 is valid right now
         stakes_0 = create_coinbase_stakes(node, [blocks[0]], stakes_key.key)
         proof_0, proof_0_id = create_proof(stakes_0)
 
         # proof_1 is valid right now, and from different stakes
         stakes_1 = create_coinbase_stakes(node, [blocks[1]], stakes_key.key)
         proof_1, proof_1_id = create_proof(stakes_1)
 
         # proof_2 is an orphan because the stake UTXO is unknown
         stakes_2 = create_coinbase_stakes(node, [blocks[2]], stakes_key.key)
         stakes_2[0]['height'] = 5
         proof_2, proof_2_id = create_proof(stakes_2)
 
         # proof_3 conflicts with proof_0 and proof_1
         stakes_3 = create_coinbase_stakes(
             node, [blocks[0], blocks[1]], stakes_key.key)
         proof_3, proof_3_id = create_proof(stakes_3)
 
         # proof_4 is invalid and should be rejected
         stakes_4 = create_coinbase_stakes(node, [blocks[3]], stakes_key.key)
         stakes_4[0]['amount'] -= 100000
         proof_4, proof_4_id = create_proof(stakes_4)
 
         # Create a helper to issue a poll and validate the responses
         def poll_assert_response(expected):
             # Issue a poll for each proof
             self.log.info("Trigger polling from the node...")
             ava_node.send_poll(
                 [proof_0_id, proof_1_id, proof_2_id, proof_3_id, proof_4_id],
                 MSG_AVA_PROOF)
             response = ava_node.wait_for_avaresponse()
             r = response.response
 
             # Verify signature
             assert ava_key.verify_schnorr(response.sig, r.get_hash())
 
             # Verify votes
             votes = r.votes
             assert_equal(len(votes), len(expected))
             for i in range(0, len(votes)):
                 assert_equal(repr(votes[i]), repr(expected[i]))
 
         # Check that all proofs start unknown
         poll_assert_response([
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_0_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_1_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_2_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_3_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_4_id)])
 
         # Send the first proof. Nodes should now respond that it's accepted
         node.sendavalancheproof(proof_0)
         poll_assert_response([
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_0_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_1_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_2_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_3_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_4_id)])
 
         # Send and check the 2nd proof. Nodes should now respond that it's
         # accepted
         node.sendavalancheproof(proof_1)
         poll_assert_response([
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_0_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_1_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_2_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_3_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_4_id)])
 
         # The next proof should be rejected/put in the orphan pool
         ava_node.send_proof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_2))
         poll_assert_response([
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_0_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_1_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ORPHAN, proof_2_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_3_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_4_id)])
 
         # The next proof should be rejected and marked as a conflicting proof
         assert_raises_rpc_error(-8,
                                 "The proof has conflicting utxo with an existing proof",
                                 node.sendavalancheproof, proof_3)
         poll_assert_response([
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_0_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_1_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ORPHAN, proof_2_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.CONFLICT, proof_3_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proof_4_id)])
 
         # The final proof should be permanently rejected for being completely
         # invalid
         ava_node.send_proof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_4))
         poll_assert_response([
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_0_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proof_1_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ORPHAN, proof_2_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.CONFLICT, proof_3_id),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.REJECTED, proof_4_id)])
 
     def stale_proof_tests(self, node):
         # Restart the node to get rid of in-flight requests
         self.restart_node(0)
 
         mock_time = int(time.time())
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         self.quorum = self.get_quorum(node)
         peer = get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
 
         proof_seq1 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 1)
         proof_seq2 = self.build_conflicting_proof(node, 2)
         proofid_seq1 = avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq1).proofid
         proofid_seq2 = avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq2).proofid
 
         node.sendavalancheproof(proof_seq2)
         self.wait_until(lambda: proofid_seq2 in get_proof_ids(node))
 
         assert proofid_seq2 in get_proof_ids(node)
         assert proofid_seq1 not in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         mock_time += self.conflicting_proof_cooldown
         node.setmocktime(mock_time)
 
         peer.send_avaproof(avalanche_proof_from_hex(proof_seq1))
 
         # Wait until proof_seq1 voting goes stale
         retry = 5
         while retry > 0:
             try:
                 with node.assert_debug_log([f"Avalanche stalled proof {proofid_seq1:0{64}x}"]):
                     self.wait_until(lambda: not self.can_find_proof_in_poll(
                         proofid_seq1, response=AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN), timeout=10)
                 break
             except AssertionError:
                 retry -= 1
 
         assert_greater_than(retry, 0)
 
         # Verify that proof_seq2 was not replaced
         assert proofid_seq2 in get_proof_ids(node)
         assert proofid_seq1 not in get_proof_ids(node)
 
         # When polled, peer responds with expected votes for both proofs
         peer.send_poll([proofid_seq1, proofid_seq2], MSG_AVA_PROOF)
         response = peer.wait_for_avaresponse()
         assert repr(response.response.votes) == repr([
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.UNKNOWN, proofid_seq1),
             AvalancheVote(AvalancheProofVoteResponse.ACTIVE, proofid_seq2)])
 
+    def unorphan_poll_tests(self, node):
+        # Restart the node with appropriate flags for this test
+        self.restart_node(0, extra_args=[
+            '-enableavalanche=1',
+            '-enableavalancheproofreplacement=1',
+            '-avaproofstakeutxoconfirmations=2',
+            '-avalancheconflictingproofcooldown=0',
+            '-avacooldown=0',
+        ])
+
+        self.quorum = self.get_quorum(node)
+        peer = get_ava_p2p_interface(node)
+
+        _, immature_proof = gen_proof(node)
+
+        self.log.info("Orphan proofs are not polled")
+
+        with node.assert_debug_log(["Not polling the avalanche proof (orphan-proof)"]):
+            peer.send_avaproof(immature_proof)
+
+        self.log.info("Unorphaned proofs are polled")
+
+        node.generate(1)
+        self.send_and_check_for_polling(peer, immature_proof.serialize().hex())
+
 
 if __name__ == '__main__':
     AvalancheProofVotingTest().main()